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Energy Market on the Brink: Russia, CNY, and the Fed’s Dilemma

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In the latest episode of The Week Ahead, Tony Nash is joined by Michael Nicoletos, Tracy Shuchart, and Albert Marko. The panel first explores Russia’s recent announcement that it would use CNY for trade settlement outside of the US and Europe. Michael Nicoletos explains that this move could be viable, but it would depend on whether all countries would accept the terms of trade.

Albert Marko believes that the recent rate hike was the right thing to do and predicted that the Fed would raise rates twice more. He also criticizes the lack of depth in the economics department of some central banks, citing examples from the RBNZ and the ECB.

The panel also analyzes the energy market and predicted when we might see an uptrend. Tracy Shuchart updates the chart and pointed out that crude seemed to break the down cycle a bit, leading to a good week for the commodity. The team answers a viewer’s question about the possibility of energy prices remaining low for a long time and offered their perspectives on the matter.

Finally, the panel discusses what they expected for the Week Ahead. Michael Nicoletos predicts that the energy market would remain volatile, and Tracy Shuchart believes that the focus would be on the stock market, particularly the Nasdaq. Albert Marko highlights the importance of watching the inflation data and suggests that investors should keep an eye on the bond market.

Key themes:
1. Russia ❤️ $CNY. Why?
2. Where does the Fed (and other central banks) go from here?
3. When will we see an uptrend in energy?

This is the 58th episode of The Week Ahead, where experts talk about the week that just happened and what will most likely happen in the coming week.

Follow The Week Ahead panel on Twitter:
Tony: https://twitter.com/TonyNashNerd
Michael: https://twitter.com/mnicoletos
Albert: https://twitter.com/amlivemon
Tracy: https://twitter.com/chigrl

Transcript:

Tony

Hi, and welcome to The Week Ahead. I’m Tony Nash and today we’re joined by Michael Nicoletos. Michael is the founder and CEO of DeFi Advisors based in Athens. We’re also joined by Tracy Shuchart of Hilltower Resource Advisors and Albert Marko. Guys, thanks so much for joining us. We have a couple of key themes and I was really in questioning mood when I put these together. The first one is around Russia and the CNY. There was an announcement this week. My question really is why? What’s the point of that? Next is where does the Fed go from here? And really where do all central banks go from here, but mainly the Fed, ECB. Albert is going to lead on that and I know Michael has some views on that as well. That’ll be really exciting to talk through. And then we’ll talk to Tracy about energy. For the first part of this week, we saw energy on an uptrend and we’ve seen a little bit of turbulence on Friday. So when do we expect to see an uptrend in energy? So again, guys, thanks for joining us. Michael, I really appreciate you taking the time from Athens to get involved with us today. Thanks so much.

Michael

Thank you. Happy to be here. Great, love to talk to you guys.

Tony

Great. So first, Michael, I know that you know a lot about China and you follow a lot of their economic activity. And I saw you commenting on this Russia announcement about CNY. Of course, they announced that they’ll use CNY for trade settlement outside of the US and Europe, which is Latin America, Africa and Asia is what they said in their announcement. So that’s about 37% of Russia’s exports. So I put a little chart together. I used UN ComTrade data.

This is 2021 data, which is the latest data that UN ComTrade has. So if they’re really doing that, Latin America is 2% of Russia’s trade, Africa is 3% of Russia’s trade. China is 14%. Okay? And so I guess is all of their trade with China settled in CNY? I seriously doubt it. And then Asia is rest of Asia is 18%. And of that about 1%, just under 1% is Taiwan. So I seriously doubt Taiwan would settle in CNY. But what’s obvious from looking at this chart is Europe is more than half of Russia’s trade. So it’s not as if this is necessarily a massive bold announcement that everything is going to be in CNY from here on out.

Tony

It really is just kind of putting a stake in the ground saying I think it’s almost a best efforts thing. So I guess is this viable? That’s really the question. And Michael, you put out this thought-provoking tweet.

You said if that were the case, China would have no issues running out of USDs. Let’s take that on and help me understand why is China trying to do this and what is the US dollar question that you have around this arrangement?

Michael

Well, first of all, again, thank you for having me. It’s great to be here. Now we need to segregate two things: wanting to do something and being able to do something. It’s clear that a lot of countries which are highly dependent on the US dollar for trading would rather be on something else and not be dependent on the dollar. We saw what happened with Russian FX Reserve when the war started. So clearly this was a warning shot or a lot of countries said we could be next if we go into a fight with the US. So clearly there is a tendency and China wants this to happen as soon as possible. Now, for this to happen, there are a lot of things that need to happen first. I’ll give just an anecdotal example because we get all this news flow and all these headlines where one signs an agreement with another and then two people or two prime ministers come up and say we’re going to do it, and everyone takes it for granted, especially on Twitter. It’s either a fanatic from one side or a fanatic from the other side. So again, I agree with everyone who is afraid of this happening in the sense that a lot of people are saying that the end of the dollar is close and that everyone’s going to go to something different.

Michael

I agree there is the willingness. I’m not sure this can happen soon, and I don’t think it can happen without some conflict occurring somewhere. So an example is that in 2018, Iran signed an agreement with China to sell oil in Yuan. Still, after four or five years, the volumes are ridiculously low. So again, there are agreements, but in order to enforce them and in order for them to happen, they take a lot more time than one would want. So Russia had no option. So because of the sanctions, they still sell to Europe, a few things, but they’re trying to outweigh it by selling more to China. And China and Russia are trying to make these agreements where they will be settling in Rubles or in Yuan. And they try to make these agreements. They want to expand them to other countries as well. However, you see, for example, India. India doesn’t want to settle in Yuan or doesn’t want to settle in ruble. They want to settle in Dirhams, which is back to the dollar. So you get all this information and the data, at least until now, does not support that there is a threat to the dollar.

Michael

There is a threat to the dollar in terms of willingness. There is no threat to the dollar in terms of data which says that this is going to happen tomorrow. So I think that this will eventually happen, but I don’t think it will happen soon. I think until it happens, we’re going to see a few episodes. And these episodes are not straightforward, how they will evolve.

Michael

Now, regarding China and its macro, the reason I’m saying what I’m saying and I’m saying that China needs dollars. China has been dependent, first of all, on its real estate, which was like 30% of its GDP. We saw what happened to the real estate. The second leg was it was highly dependent on exports. There’s a global slowdown. So these exports will have some issues. And now, how has China managed to keep this economy running? I’ll give you a few metrics to understand. The US is an economy which is like 26, I think 26 trillion of GDP. And if I’m not mistaken, its M2 is around 21 trillion. In China, the GDP is around 17 trillion, all in dollars. Okay? And M2 is $40 trillion. 40. Four, zero. So what does that mean?

Michael

The China government prints money. Prints money. Prints money. Because there are capital controls, the balloon gets bigger and bigger and bigger, but the money can’t leave, or it can leave for selected few, and I’ll explain how it leaves. And for the rest, because our capital control, the money can’t leave. So it stays in. But this is in one. Some try to buy gold, some try to invoice over invoice to Hong Kong and take it out of Hong Kong. But when the disparity is so big, clearly there is a problem. There’s an NPL problem. Chinese banks are like four times China’s GDP.

Tony

Sorry, NPL is non performing loans.

Michael

Non performing loans. Sorry. Sometimes they’re non performing. You cannot have an M2 of 40 trillion and a GDP of 17 trillion and not have non performing loans. Chinese banking system.

Tony

Sorry, I just want to go back and I don’t mean to interrupt you, but I just want to make sure that people understand. China has currency in circulation of $40 trillion, and they have a GDP of $17 trillion. Whereas the US has a GDP of what you say 24 trillion. I don’t remember what number you’re… 26 trillion. And they have 21 trillion in circulation. Right. So for all of these people who talk about China being this economic model for other people, why does it matter that their M2 is more than double the size of their economy?

Michael

Let me say something. First of all, let’s put something that the US. Is also the global reserve currency. So everyone in the world wants dollars. It’s not like only the US wants dollars. At this stage, less than 10% of the world wants Yuan. So it’s not like everyone wants to get.

Tony

I think it’s 2.1% of transactions or something like that.

Tracy

2.8%?

Tony

2.8, yeah, transactions.

Michael

Okay. I saw a number which was around 6%. Maybe I’m wrong. Okay. But again, it’s a number which is very small. 

Michael

All this money that is in the economy, if Chinese people were given the choice, they would be able to take it out. The economy is growing at a faster pace than its potential. I’ll give you a number. Right now, Chinese banks are more than 50% of global GDP in terms of size. The US, I think its peak was 32% in 1985 and Japan’s 27% in 1994. So we’ve passed all metrics in terms of the world dominant power or the dominant economy, if you want to put it this way, being a percentage of GDP in terms of banking assets. So the banking assets clearly have a lot of bad debts in there, which we cannot know what they are because the Chinese economy wants the Chinese government wants to control that. Now, there was a special committee put in place this month, I think, in order to oversee the financial situation in China. So I’m pretty sure they’re a bit worried about it. They want to switch from an export oriented economy to a consumption driven economy. But this is still less than 40% of GDP and this takes a lot of time to go like the US is around 70%, but it takes a lot of time to go for 40%, 70%.

Michael

Now, all this money stays in China. They have no option, they can’t do anything. So it’s an issue. And I’ll give you a ratio. If you take their FX reserve, it’s around 3 point something trillion. If you divide FX to M2, it’s around 7%. So if that money were to want if that money wanted to leave, in theory, only 7% can be covered by FX reserves, the fixed reserves of the government. Just to clarify, the Asian tiger crisis in 97, the tigers collapsed when the ratio went below 25%. So they didn’t have that support to keep it up.

Tony

And just be clear for the US that’s 100%, right?

Michael

The US doesn’t have any problems. So this is something that needs to be addressed and I don’t know how they will address it. They try to make all these agreements so that the one becomes a tradable currency and they can invoicing one. So if the Yuan, in theory was to become the global reserve currency tomorrow morning, their debt would become the world’s problem. Now, they haven’t managed to export that, so they need these dollars to keep that balloon, let’s say, from all the area in the balloon to be taken up. They need these FX reserves to keep the money in and they need to build confidence, and they try to build confidence with narratives and not with data. But again, they don’t have a choice right now, in my opinion.

Tony

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https://youtu.be/yYom7Zqezio

Tony

The difference between, say, the onshore and offshore CNY or CNH or whatever, there is a huge difference in perceived value. I would think you can’t change the perceived value of CNY onshore, but offshore, if people are nominating contracts in, say, I’ll say “CNY” in quotes, there is an exchange right there. But again, this M2 issue, which I can’t stress how important that is, I haven’t heard anybody else talking about this. And it’s so critical to understand the fiat value of CNY itself, right, because it’s not limited, and the government because they’re effectively fun tickets with Mao’s face on it.

Tony

Right. And that’s how the PBOC was treating it. And again, when people talk about CNY as a global reserve currency, nobody is looking at the integrity of the PBOC and nobody is looking at how the PBOC manages monetary policy in China.

Michael

I’ll give you anecdotal information. I haven’t checked the number for a few years, but the last time I checked, if you look at the import-export numbers from Hong Kong to China, and you look at the PBOC, and then you go and see the same numbers in the HKMA, you would assume that these four numbers should be the same, not the same. Import should be export and export should be imports. The numbers should be very close. The discrepancy is huge. These numbers do not reconciliate, which means that in some form there is some over invoicing to Hong Kong.

Tony

And you’re not talking about 30%, you’re talking about multiples.

Michael

You’re talking about a lot. It’s ridiculous. So I think if you see the Hong Kong peg has been stable to the upper bound lately because I guess because of the interest rate differential, a lot of money is leaving. So it’s putting pressure on Hong Kong as well. So it remains to be seen what happens there.

Tony

So let me go to Tracy. Tracy, in terms of Russia using CNY, okay? And I know you look at a lot of their energy exports, and of course there’s all this official dumb around sanctions and stuff, but what’s your kind of guess on Russia using either USD or proxy USD, Dirhams or something else as currencies for collecting on energy exports or commodity exports more broadly?

Tracy

Well, first, I think that they prefer dollars no matter what this kind of China saying we want to trade a Yuan. And Russia said, okay, but that was a suggestion. That does not mean that it’s necessarily happening. But what is really interesting is earlier this week, on Monday, Russia laid out conditions for extending the grain, the black seed grain deal, right? Because it was supposed to be for 90 days, but they cut it to 60 days because they’re trying to use that as leverage. And one of the things that they are trying to use as a leverage is they will extend the deal or they’ll give or the other part is they’ll give African countries just free grain instead of selling it. But one of the big conditions for that was for the removal of some Western sanction, specifically to get them back on Swift. And so if that happens, forget it. Everything’s going to be all the trade will be all euros and dollars.

Tony

I thought Swift was terrible and everybody wanted on Swift.

Tracy

I just thought it was important to point out because if they get back on Swift, obviously that’s going to make trading in dollars easy for everything, all commodities across the board.

Tony

Right. And so that goes back to what Michael said initially about kind of these guys really want dollars and all this other stuff. There’s the official dumb of the prime ministers meeting each other, right. And then there’s the factual activities they undertake based on the reality of their position in the world economy. Right. What are your thoughts here?

Albert

I agree with Michael and Tracy to talk about the reserve currency. Switching from the dollar to the Yuan is a joke, to be honest with you. You do have some people in other countries in the Middle East and China and whatnot talking about the death of the dollar and actual serious tone. But anyone with even like a shred of financial backing and insight knows that it’s just an impossible thing. From what it sounds like, it’s more of like a barter system. But that introduces even bigger problems. I mean, you can’t scale it up. There’s no standardization. How do you value things to begin with?

Tony

That’s it.

Albert

Valuing goods and services without using the dollar right now is just an impossibility. And on top of that, you have the political problems that come along with it. I mean, like the Saudis, they want dollars for their oil. They need defense assistance. The Greeks needed US defense assistance. The Turks, as much as they want to make noise again, they’re reliant on the US and NATO for defense and whatnot. These components not just financially, what Michael talked about and decided much more eloquently than I would ever would, but there’s also political components that you just can’t get around in the near term.

Tony

But even if they had a barter system, they would reference the price in dollars, right?

Albert

Well, yeah.

Tony

10 billion.

Tracy

Your chocolate is back to iran did that when they were first sanctioned over a decade ago. They were trading oil for gold, but it was still referencing dollars.

Albert

On top of that, you run the risk of hyperinflation eliminating dollars from your FX reserves and starting to trade away from the dollar. You’re going to end up in a hyperinflation event.

Tony

Right.

Michael

Can I say something? Can I say something? About all these points? I agree with all these points. There’s one more thing. Let’s say you trade in rubles and you trade in Yuan, okay? It means that you’re going to keep FX reserves in rubles or in Yuan. So you feel more comfortable keeping a currency from an authoritarian regime than holding the US. Dollar, which is fully liquid, fully tradable, and anyone in the street will take it at a split of a second. You need many years of track record to build that trust. There are a lot of bad things about the dollar. We agree that I don’t think anyone will say that it’s a perfect mechanism, but right now, it’s very functional, it’s very liquid. And if you want to keep your reserves in US Treasuries, you can sell them at the split of a second. You don’t have any issues with that. If you have Yuan, you’re going to do what? You’re going to buy Chinese government bonds? And how will you sell them if the PBOC calls you and says, it’s not a good idea to sell your Chinese bonds this week? We would prefer you didn’t.

Tony

Bet on the central bank, right? If you’re holding rubles, you’re betting that the Russian central bank is trustworthy. If you’re holding CNY, you’re betting that the Chinese center. So what central banks are out there that you could potentially trust? You have the Fed, you have the ECB, you have BOJ, right? Those are really the only three that are visible enough that have the scale and transparency to manage a currency. And look what the BOJ has done since Abenomics. And on and on and on. Do you trust the ECB? I don’t know. And it becomes, do you trust the ECB or the Fed more? I mean, sorry, but I just don’t trust the ECB.

Michael

I don’t trust ECB. But it’s relative. I mean, you don’t have a problem keeping Euros. Maybe it’s not your preferred choice, but you don’t lose your sleep on holding Euros. Let me put it at this stage.

Tony

That’s exactly right. That’s exactly right. Okay, guys, this is great. Let’s move on to the next thing, because I think we all agreed violently here, but I think we’re going to not agree on the next one, which I’m really excited about. So let’s talk about central banks. And where does the Fed and where do other central banks go from here? So, of course, we saw the Fed raise this week. I think it was the right thing to do. Albert, I know you think it’s the right thing to do. Markets have been up and down since then. And Albert, you’ve said that you expect the Fed to raise two more times, and I want to talk about kind of what’s behind that assertion. And then we get silly statements like this one from the RBNZ in New Zealand, where the chief economist basically says, if inflation expectations don’t fall, we’ll be forced to do more regarding interest rates.

Well, of course. Why wouldn’t you do that. So can you walk us through a little bit, kind of just very quick, because there have been thousands of hours of Fed analysis this week. But why do you think the Fed is going to raise two more times?

Albert

Supercore is trending up and it continues to trend up. Services are on fire. Real estate numbers have been on fire. There’s no slowdown in reality. I mean, even the layoffs have been slow. They’ve come from the tech sector. They haven’t come from construction or any other blue collar jobs at the moment. So until we see that, the economy is going to be red hot and it’s a problem for the Fed, inflation overall.

Tony

Okay, so play devil’s advocate here. Banking crisis, Fed had to bail out banks, all this other stuff. So why isn’t the Fed saying, let’s pause on the banking crisis worries?

Albert

Because banks are fully liquid. The big banks have no problem whatsoever. Some of these smaller banks that have no risk protocols are getting exposed. The tech heavy investments are getting exposed. Everyone knows that higher rates hurts the tech sector the most. And those banks were at fault. They didn’t hedge properly.

Tony

Now you have duration risk. I just want to be clear. I just want to make sure that people understand. You’re not saying that they failed necessarily because they’re tech, but they failed because of duration risk and then their tech depositors took their money out. Right?

Albert

Absolutely. But the banking system overall is not really at risk. They’re just shaking out some of the weaker players. But that was inevitable as interest rates have risen. A lot of the problems stem from the Fed and them guaranteeing four, five, 6% deposits, while the banks only do 1%. They can’t compete with that.

Tony

Right. Michael, I know that you think this wasn’t the right action. So what’s your perspective?

Michael

Well, let me say something first. I believe that it was a mistake, and I’ll say why it was a mistake. I think it’s a mistake when you raise interest rates as a central bank and the banks follow by raising rates on the loan side and on the deposit side, what do you do? You make debt more expensive and then you make people because you have, let’s say, a 5% interest rate on your bank, you create an opportunity cost so people want to save. So you reduce liquidity from the deposit side, and also you reduce loan demand because it’s more expensive, and that creates a slowdown. What happened now, because we had ten years of QE, everyone forgot that there was an interest rate on the deposit side. So the Fed, MDCB and all the central banks raised the interest rate. So the loan side adjusted. That became more expensive, but the deposit side stayed zero at 1%. I don’t know where this is in the US. But it’s really low. At some point, people started waking up when it arrived at 4% and they suddenly started saying, okay, I don’t have any interest on my deposit.

Michael

Let me put my money in the money market fund. How much does it give? Three, four, 5%? I don’t know. It’s a much higher rate. So I think I saw somewhere today that around 5 trillion have gone into money market funds. The numbers close to that. So when you take your money out of the deposit and you take it to a money market fund, this is the equivalent of a bank run for the bank that you’re taking the money, it’s a deposit living. It might not feel like a bank run, but on the balance sheet of a bank, it’s a bank run. So this started happening, and again, because of what you mentioned, they had invested in Treasuries and the duration risk was a mismatch. They didn’t do some of them at least hadn’t done appropriate hedging. They started losing money and they started selling this bond at a loss, although they had them at the Healthy Maturity portfolio where you don’t need to take a mark to market loss. And suddenly both sides of the balance sheet were screwed. Let me put it this way. So a few banks started going under. Now, I know that the central bank has come up and I know a lot of people come up.

Michael

And I do agree that there’s no systemic risk. And I mean that I don’t see a cascade of people losing their deposits. But nevertheless, people feel uncomfortable and try to do something about it. Either take them more money market funds or take their money from a regional bank, if they can. To JP morgan or one of the big guys. This creates a big problem for the economy. Yes, there are some signs which show that the economy is still robust. But I think a lot of leading indicators suggest that the economy is slowing down and most of the metrics coming from the inflation side have collapsed. Yes, core CPI is still high and it’s a lagging indicator, so it will take time for it to come down. But I think that given the stress we saw this week and why do I say that? Because we look at the US as a closed system. It’s not. When you raise interest rates as the Fed and you are the global reserve currency, you create a global credit crunch. You saw that last week. The Fed had come out with swap lines for everyone. You saw today that foreign banks borrowed 60 billion in liquidity, the ones that didn’t have a swap line.

Michael

And we see today Deutsche Bank being in the headlines and Commerce Bank being in the gate. So you might think that the US system is okay, but it creates a domino effect, which we’re starting to see. We saw Credit Suisse going under in a deal, which was not, I’d say, what we would think of. I believe that that deal in combination with the high rates is probably the root of the problem in the sense that they destroyed the capital structure, they wiped out all the 80 ones without wiping out the equity holders. Which means now that in Europe everyone’s wondering if my 81 is of any value. And that creates another uncertainty in combination with the higher interest rates and the stress that has started to build up. I think we’ve passed the moment where, okay, it could be debatable if they did right or if they did wrong. The US bond market is saying that it was wrong. It was a mistake. The two years at 370. And so the bond market went from the one side and the Fed went on the other side.

Tony

Why? The two year at 270 is important.

Michael

373, 70. Sorry, yeah. Three seven. Because if in two years you’re getting 3.7% and the Fed fund rate is five someone, it means that someone is buying a two year bond getting much less. Which means what? It means that the market is saying rate cuts are coming soon. So the market is saying there’s no way we can keep it this way. And the Fed is saying the opposite. Historically speaking, the bond market has been right. If you take it into context, it could be this time that they are wrong. It feels to me, at least from the stress I look in global markets and not in US. Only, that things are getting a bit out of hand. And having a bank like Credit Suisse go under, which is a big bank, and having all the central banks come in together on a Sunday night to give up swap lines, it means that the stress in the system, it’s much bigger than with yeah, but Sunday night.

Tony

Is the best time to get swap lines. Okay, so you talk about European banks, but we had Mueller from the ECB out this week saying, I wouldn’t worry about a financial crisis in Europe.

So we have ECB guys out there going, yeah, Credit Suisse happened and we know Deutsche is an issue, but I wouldn’t worry about that in Europe. So I think we’re seeing statements from Yellen, the Fed, the ECB, other guys who are saying, no, there’s nothing to see here, but then we see things kind of blowing up all over the place. Right, and then we have a question especially specifically for you, Michael, from a viewer who said, I’d like Michael’s thoughts on the EU, particularly banks, pensions and future growth prospects. So can you talk us through? How do these banking issues in Europe flow through to European pensions?

Michael

First of all, let’s say something. We’re talking about the US and.

Albert

Duration.

Michael

Risk on the bond losses. Let’s remind everyone that at the peak of QE 18 1818 trillion worth of bonds had negative yield, and these were mostly Europe and Asia. So pension funds and banks in Europe which are forced to buy these bonds were buying bonds. With a negative yield. So they were losing on day one these bonds from -50 basis bonds have gone to two and 3%, the losses on these are much greater and pension funds will have much bigger issues than the ones that have in the US we were talking about a pension crisis in the US. But the European one is pretty bad too. Just look at in France, they raised this week the year that you take your pension from 62 years old to 64 and the country is burning to the ground. Now, you understand that it’s 62 to 64. It’s not like they made 62 to 70 years old. So it’s very delicate. And the situation in Europe, given the negative bonds, given the interest rate hikes and given one more thing in Europe, given that Europe doesn’t have the dollar and it has the Euro was mostly a supply driven issue.

Michael

It means that we were importing oil and energy from Russia and from everywhere and all these commodities were priced in dollars. So as a Europe tell, the price of these commodities were more expensive. So inflation was a supply driven problem. I think there’s a report, I think from the San Francisco Fed two thirds of the inflation was supply driven in Europe. So when inflation is supply driven and you raise rates to stop it, you’re using the wrong medicine to stop the problem. You need to crash the economy in order for this to stop. This is not really efficient. Now, in the meantime, you have yields going higher and now the yields that we see on our screen on Bloomberg or anywhere are not the yield real yields because the ECB is in and tries to contain the spreads. If you left the market low, I’m pretty sure the spreads would be much, much wider. And you have the new thing which came up this week when the Swiss National Bank decided that tier one, additional tier ones would be written off and equity holder, an equity holder would be saved. Now, imagine what happened. You probably saw what happened this week, all the 80 ones in Europe got smashed because everyone says I don’t trust this instrument.

Michael

I don’t know. Yes, central bankers will come out.

Tony

These are the cocoa bonds that came out in I think, 2013, right?

Michael

Yeah, there are a few of them, yeah, but it’s a cocoa, it’s contingent convertible. It means that they’re convertible be converted to equity if something happens. Let me put it as simple as it is, but these are supposed to be wiped out before the equity. So the question is what prevents for something else similar to happen again, the ECB came out, BoE came out, they said this is not accepted. But the fear and the is now everywhere. So you have a combination of factors. You have a factor that this ECB has been raising rates when I don’t think it’s a proper mechanism to address inflation in europe, they’ve created a slowdown. If you see Germany’s numbers and everywhere’s numbers in Europe, the economy is slowing down fast. You have a discussion on the capital structure of lending, which is very critical in the way companies and banks go and borrow themselves and all this at the same time and when the US. Is draining liquidity from the global system. I think the situation in Europe is very tough. Again, after 2008, I don’t think we have a systemic risk on our hands and the risks never materialize in the same place.

Michael

But I think things are about to get tough and it’s going to be much worse before it gets any better.

Tony

So what I would offer back, and I think everything you’re saying is valid and Albert Tracy, let me know if you want to think about this, but in the US. We have a presidential election next year. There is almost no way that we will see the US economy crash in the next 24 months because Janet Yellen won’t let that happen. And so we may see issues in Europe and we may see Europe and the rest of the world suffer based on US interest rate and monetary policy. But the US. Will do everything, the current administration will do everything they can to keep the US. From crashing in that time. And I’m not just saying this because they’re Democrats, Republicans would do the same thing to keep the economy afloat in the year before an election.

Albert

Albert, what do you think about that? It depends on what is happening specifically with debt ceiling, right? I mean, Janet Yellen and the Biden administration would gladly let the economy sink, the market sink anyways if they could blame it on escape both the GOP on the debt ceiling not getting hyped. So that’s definitely something you need to watch over the next six months because it is campaign fundraising season and they can’t really agitate their voters all that much, to be honest with you. Certainly the political component is going to be high over the next twelve months.

Tony

Okay, great. Let’s move on. Thank you for that, guys. Let’s move on to energy.

Michael

Can I say something?

Tony

Absolutely. Yes, please.

Michael

What appears to be happening right now, at least in my eyes, is that the Fed is using interest rates to attack inflation and it’s using the balance sheet to give liquidity. So these two do not go in the same direction at this point. The question is if they can do this for a long time. It doesn’t feel to me that they can. But at least right now they’re giving liquidity on the one side and they’re raising rates on the other side. I’m not sure they can do this for us.

Albert

We’ve actually talked about that at length here. But it’s not the Fed. It’s really the treasury. Sterilizing QT They’re coordinating.

Michael

They’re coordinating.

Albert

Of course they coordinate for the most part, but sometimes in the last six months or the last twelve months. Powell and Yellen have been at odds with each other in policy. So this is a lot of the reasons why the markets has just been topsy turbine. Don’t understand which way it’s going because you have conflicting policy and agendas from the treasury and the Fed.

Michael

So you feel it’s conflicting or do you think it’s coordinating? They’re doing it on purpose. That’s what I haven’t figured out yet.

Albert

I think the want to eliminate excess cash in the system is coordinated but I think the policy of how they’re doing that is conflicting and that’s going to be a bigger problem, say second half of this year.

Michael

Okay, sounds logical, but it’s one of these things that pass on me. I don’t know if they’re doing it on purpose or if they do any as you say, because they’re using other tools and they step on each other doing so.

Albert

My rule of thumb is to side with incompetence rather than conspiracy.

Tony

Okay.

Michael

It’s not conspiracy when the Fed chairman talks with the treasury guy?

Albert

No, I am absolutely in your corner on this one. I absolutely believe that they talk and coordinate things for sure. I just think that their agenda at the moment doesn’t line up 100% of the time.

Michael

Okay.

Tony

Very good. Okay, thanks for that guys. Tracy, let’s talk about energy for a while. Up until Friday we had a pretty good week for crude. I thought we were breaking that down cycle a bit, but we’re seeing some chop in energy markets. And so we had a question for you from a viewer saying when do you see oil and natty in a sustainable uptrend?

Tracy

Yeah, nat gas is a whole other issue. I think it’s going to be very difficult really. We’re trading in the range that we’ve been trading in most of the time for the last 20 years or so. That $2, $3 range has been very comfortable for nat gas. We produce a lot of nat gas. Yes, we are building out LNG facilities and yes, we have had problems with freeport and such. I just think that we probably won’t really see a big spike in prices unless we see another energy crisis in Europe, do you know what I’m saying? And then we’re going to have to force to sell even more. So for right now I would kind of get comfortable with nat gas about that range. But if it starts breaking above like 375 or so I would start getting bullish. But for right now, just kind of in that area where it’s been comfortable most of the time. Right. So I think it’s going to be a while for that. So we got to kind of assess the situation in Europe as we get to summer air conditioning use and to next winter if they have a bad winter, I think it’s going to be a few more months at least down the line for natural gas as far as oil is concerned.

Tracy

Brent said about $75 right now, saudi Arabia would like it around 80, 90 range is where they’re really comfortable. I think right now what we’re going to have to get through is we’re going to have to really assess we need more time to assess Russia’s situation. They just extended that 500,000 barrel a day cut out until June. The latest records do show that they actually have cut that much so far in March. So the cut is happening, which also means that they’re experiencing kind of a pullback in demand, even though they have really it’s more on the product end rather than, I should say, rather than the crude oil end, because they have floating storage, they have ships piling up everywhere with product. And so I think that will help clear their excess product a little more. So it’s really on the product end and that we also have to see everybody’s freaking if the Fed again decides to stop raising rates or pause. I think commodities really like that situation just because of the cost of carry and transportation and storage for all these commodities is very expensive. Right.

Tony

Because.

Tracy

You get bank credit lines for that. Right. And so I think that’s putting downward pressure on markets right now. And then obviously fear of recession is kind of kicking in again after the recent bank crisis in the US. And in Europe. And so I really don’t think that we’ll see higher prices. I mean, typically this is the time of year we do start seeing higher prices heading into high summer demand season. But we’ve also been seeing, I think everybody expected China. China demanded to shoot up right away. That’s taking longer than anticipated, which I kind of have been saying that on this show for quite a few months.

Tony

Long time. Exactly.

Tracy

So I think that there’s a lot of factors involved right now. I do think, again, it’s higher for longer. Historically still, prices at $70 is high for oil. The market is crashing by any means, just coming down from geopolitically induced spike last year. I think it’s higher for longer. And definitely I could see prices go into that $110 range, but likely into 2024. Not really this year, obviously, unless something happens. Okay.

Michael

Do you think if the Fed poses or whatever reason, or if they do a rate cut, do you think that commodities will explode or do you think.

Tracy

I think if they cut, commodities would get really excited. I think if they pause, they would get excited. Right. I think we would see a rebound in a lot of these commodities, grains, things of that base metals and industrial metals and oil. But if they start cutting, then I think that they’ll really like that because then they don’t have to throw product at the market because they can’t afford to store it.

Michael

Thank you.

Albert

I’m actually quite bullish for oil in the near term. One of the reasons is I’ve heard through the grapevine that the Chicanery and the futures market and I’m reading that hedge funds and other money managers sold the equivalent of 139,000,000 barrels of oil in futures over seven days a week and a half ago. So, I mean, to me, it’s like they’re almost out of ammo when it comes to suppressing oil at the moment. And any little flare up or anything is probably going to be bullish for oil and probably shoot right back up to 80.

Tony

So what could that be, Albert?

Albert

It could be a natural event. It could be weather, I mean, some kind of economic policy stimulus from Europe coming out there, or even the United States going into, like Tracy was saying, the travel season and whatnot. It could be anything, really. I mean, I think the market is just begging for some kind of bullish signal for them to run it up.

Tony

Okay. And Tracy, if you’re sitting in Europe because energy prices were such a factor in 2022, what are the main things that you’re worried about? Their nat gas storage. Has that been depleted much over the winter?

Tracy

No, it wasn’t depleted. They just had to start injections again because what we are seeing is that this really started in fall of 2021. Everybody kind of forgets that the crisis started before the Ukraine invasion, but what we saw is industry start to shut down, especially industry like smelting and glass blowing and things of that nature that require a lot of energy. Right when nat gas prices started spiking, and that was well before that summer of 2022 spike, they didn’t need to spike much where we saw a lot of those industries shut down. So what we’re seeing now is that since prices have been muted for long enough now, now we are seeing manufacturing and whatnot pick up with the numbers came in overnight for Europe. We’re seeing manufacturing pick up again. We’re starting to see some drawdowns finally in storage. Spain in particular has really ramped up a lot of their industry that had shut down prior. I have to say, natural gas prices are still more expensive than they typically are in Europe. Even at this price, right, they’re still higher than normal. So this is also why we’re not seeing a flurry of activity.

Tracy

As soon as prices came down, you have to realize that relative to where they were, they’re still generally high. But we are seeing, I think people are getting used to kind of this price range for Ttf, which is Dutchnet gas. And so we are seeing in manufacturing and industry pick up again in some of these traditional industries that require a lot of energy. So we’ll have to see, and if that really picks up, companies are going back to where they went to fuel instead of gas. We’re seeing them go back to gas now. And so that’s really what I’m watching on the energy end. Is this just one off, kind of, or does this continue throughout the summer?

Michael

Okay.

Tracy

Sorry.

Tony

And then everybody’s favorite energy secretary, Jennifer Grandholm, had some comments about refilling the Spr this week. Can you fill us in on that? And what does that mean for markets?

Tracy

Basically, she said we’re not filling in the Spr, refilling the Spr anytime soon.

Michael

Sorry.

Tracy

She said a few years, which means a lot more years unless there’s a change of administration and a policy change. But I would say from until the election not going to see an Sbr, which makes sense because they know that if they fill the Spr, what’s going to happen? Oil prices are likely going to go higher, and they can’t afford that going heading into an election year. And so I think that’s really why they kind of pushed that off. That’s kind of what’s going on with that.

Michael

Can they be saying something and doing something else?

Tracy

Yeah, but we would know if they’re actually filling the Spr or not because it’s a public auction.

Tony

Okay, why don’t we just stop calling it the Strategic Petroleum Reserve and just call it the Petroleum Reserve? Nothing strategic about the way they’re using the Tactical Petroleum Reserve.

Tracy

They’re using it as a piggy bank. Right.

Albert

Instead of strategic, you use slush fund, petroleum reserve.

Tony

Right, exactly. Okay, guys, one last question, I guess. What are you looking for in the week ahead? We’ve had a lot of volatility over the past couple of weeks. Michael, what are you looking for in the week ahead?

Michael

I’m focusing on central banks and interest rates. I think the issue will be banks. Again, I think the big stress in the economy is private markets and not public markets. BCS, private equity, all these investments need to do write downs. It will take a bit more time for them to do that. It doesn’t happen that fast. They don’t adjust as fast as public market. I believe that bank we will see that stress mostly on banking stocks. A because the cost of funding goes up, b because the capital structure is put into a discussion. C because they continue to raise interest rates. And there is a stress within, I think, focusing on what happens to the banks and to the two central banks. Again, we’re looking at the same thing, unfortunately, but the problem is not in the same place. But these are the indicators you need to look. I believe that you’re going to see inflation coming down fast. That’s my expectation. Maybe I’m wrong, but if you see inflation coming down, it’ll make the life much easier for central bank. Yeah.

Tony

And for all of us. Do you expect to see, like VCs, for example, some VCs close up because of the cost of funds and a lot of these banking issues, or do you think it really doesn’t impact them much?

Michael

I don’t know if they’re going to close down because it’s a 510 year investment. It depends if they can reinvest or if they have to liquidate. But I think funds that are coming up to their maturity, they need to liquidate or they need to roll over. It’s going to happen at a much lower price than they thought, or they’ll have to wait one or two years more. So I think that stress is going to show up somewhere.

Tony

Tracy, what do you see over the next week?

Tracy

I think it’s type based markets. There’s not really a lot coming up as far as oil is concerned. OPEC meeting is the following week, which we already know they’re going to do nothing. So really, next week, end of month stuff, there’s not a whole lot going on in the commodities world, really newswise next week. So I think probably see the same sideways action.

Tony

Okay, great. Robert, what are you looking for? Let me ask a little bit of a kind of loaded question with that. As springtime is coming in in Ukraine, do we expect that to heat up at all as things warm a bit there?

Albert

Well, yeah, I would say yes. Geopolitically? I think it would be advantageous for Russia to do something to stay face. Absolutely. But for the week ahead, I think the narrative shift I’m watching for the narrative shift of interest rates to banking, like Michael was talking about, I think Yellen is most likely going to come out and try to guarantee 500,000 in deposits and even talk about 750 and get it up there and just get the crisis over and done with. So that’s what I’m looking for.

Michael

Okay.

Tony

Wow. Would that require congressional no, they can use emergency powers. Everything’s. Emergency power is great. Perfect. Okay, thanks, guys. Thank you very much. Really appreciate your time and all your insight, and have a great week ahead.

Albert

Thanks.

Michael

Thank you very much. Have a great weekend, too.

Tony

Thank you.

Categories
Podcasts

BBC: How are sanctions affecting Russia?

This podcast is owned and originally published by BBC here: https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/play/w172ydqbbld0z8y

The BBC’s Business Matters podcast covers a range of topics, including the positive economic signs in the US, the Russian tech brain drain, and the potential for a new plug to be the secret to a green transition.

Guests Emily Eng, NPR’s Beijing correspondent, and Tony Nash, founder and CEO of the financial forecasting platform Complete Intelligence in Houston, provide their insights on these topics.

They discuss the impact of economic sanctions on Russia and how the country is responding to them, including increasing exports to China and reducing its crude oil supplies by 500,000 barrels per day to push up prices.

The conversation also touches on a controversial proposal by the European Commission to seize Russian assets to help rebuild Ukraine.

Additionally, the podcast covers the announcement by the US federal government that all new garages and four courts built in the country will have to include charging points for electric vehicles and its potential impact on accelerating EV adoption.

Transcript

BBC

Hi there. Welcome to Business Matters. My name is Ed Butler, and today, despite all the political rows we’ve been hearing about a potential debt default, there are more positive economic signs from the United States. This week, we read the tea leaves with a former presidential economic adviser and hear about the new incumbent in that job. Also, we consider the Russian tech brain drain, and why a new plug could be the secret to a green transition.

Emily

This will definitely help accelerate EV adoption. Charging is one of the things that really does stand in the way of someone’s decision about going electric.

BBC

All the latest on electric vehicles in the States coming up in the show, and I’m going to be joined throughout the program by two guests on opposite sides of the world. Emily eng is NPR’s Beijing correspondent, although she is based in Taiwan at the moment. Hi, Emily, can you hear us?

Emily

Yes, I can. Good morning.

BBC

Great to have you on the show. Tony Nash. He’s the founder and CEO of the financial forecasting platform Complete Intelligence in Houston, Texas. Hi, Tony.

Tony

Hi, Ed. Thank you.

BBC

Great to have you both with us. Tony Nash this is obviously a function of, to some extent of the economic sanctions that we’ve been talking about, those applied against Russia. I mean, the funny thing about this is to some extent Russia hasn’t done that badly in the last twelve months, at least initially. I mean, that’s what the headline data is telling us. You look further into the future, I mean, are you seeing a kind of more serious decline potentially with Russia now because of what’s been applied against it?

Tony

Sure, there are a couple of things to look at. First, in the four weeks in January, Russia exported more crude oil than during any four-week period in 2021. So they are recovering their export capacity to places like India, China, parts of Africa, and other places. So, you know, it really hasn’t necessarily hurt their crude exports. When you look at imports, they’ve really substituted, say, the west for China. Their imports from China have grown by, I think, $8 billion a month. It’s got to be more than that, but I saw some numbers recently, but they’ve substituted imports from China. So in terms of trade, they’ve really turned eastward and southward instead of westward, which is just a natural response to sanctions. So where they’ve hurt is domestically in terms of things like industrial production of, say, machinery and domestic goods outside of, say, coal and oil and gas.

BBC

What the west, of course, has tried to do most recently is apply these caps on Russian crude exports. Now you’re saying that they’re getting around those or are they simply selling a larger amount of crude but at a lower price?

Tony

They’re getting around them. They haven’t hit the price cap yet. The crude is trading, or what has been trading at, I think, a $20 discount to the price cap. So they’re not even hitting the price cap. There’s a $20 discount to Euros crude. What Russia on its own, announced last week is that they’ll reduce their supplies by 500,000 barrels per day. So Russia is, on its own, taking barrels off the market as a way to push up crude prices. So the volume and the price caps really aren’t having an impact necessarily on crude itself. Of course, the Russian economy is being hit. Of course the isolation, of course other things are impacting Russia. I’m not trying to say that there are no impacts at all, but in terms of that natural resources, trade, and some of the import substitution, they’re actually doing okay.

BBC

Yeah, import substitution. This is the thing, and it’s a fascinating subject, actually. I was suddenly trying to dig into this, and it’s really complicated. But Tony, one last tantalizing thought on this. An element we understand, what Bloomberg is reporting that may be part of these new sanctions from the EU is to force banks to report more information on what Russian central bank assets they are actually holding. Because of course, the EU and other countries want to know how much has been frozen in Western bank accounts that used to belong to the Russian state budget. Now, this is seen possibly as a first step towards a controversial move touted by the European Commission, not just to freeze Russian assets, but to actually seize them, to use them to start rebuilding Ukraine or to at least pay Ukraine back for the damage that’s been caused. I mean, gosh. Do you think that that could be something we’ll be looking at in the next few weeks?

Tony

I think as a threat, I guess useful as a threat, but as an actual policy, I think it would be very difficult to execute and justify. Usually, these things are seized for years or decades. Sorry, frozen for years or decades, not necessarily seized. So I think that could be a very problematic policy to carry out.

BBC

Because it would set precedents.

Tony

Yes, that’s right.

BBC

For western countries, I suppose. Okay.

Tony

And the banking system that supports Russian assets or sovereign assets, would be dangerous for people like Russia going forward.

BBC

Tony Nash, thank you for now but stay tuned to this because this is big news. If you’re a car owner who wants to buy an electric vehicle, maybe you’ve got an electric vehicle already, especially if you’re in the US. The Us federal government has said that from now on, all charges that are used in the garages and the four courts around the states must be American made and have to be usable for all-electric vehicles. That means that Tesla, which has had most of the existing charging points, they have to carry, adapters, allowing other cars to use them. I spoke earlier about this with Alexis and John of Business Insider in Detroit. Well, Tony Nash, there you are in the big oil state, famously, there Texas. How is EV adoption going in the States?

Tony

It’s great. I’m sorry. It’s great. A lot of my neighbors have EVs, and I think it’s probably not as dense as, say, San Francisco or something. But we do have a lot of EVs here in Texas.

BBC

You’ve got a lot of territories to cover, though, don’t you? I mean, if you’re a driver. We do, and I have an electric vehicle. Every time I’ve gone 100 miles down the road, of course, I’m starting to sweat at the thought that, you know, at some point I’m going to have to refuel, otherwise I’m going to stop on the highway. Tony Nash are you confident that the move to electric vehicles is going to move as fast as some politicians, I suppose particularly politicians in Europe, are saying that we can sort of phase out the internal combustion engine in the next few years and rely entirely on electric vehicles? It’s going to require an awful lot of infrastructure. An awful lot of rare earth. Exactly, that’s right.

Tony

A lot of infrastructure. I mean, I understand the aggressive plans, but I just don’t think it can happen on that time scale. So it seems to me that maybe add ten years to it and sure, that makes sense. And to be honest, ten years in terms of adoption, in terms of building this stuff is really just the blink of an eye. So sure, I think it’ll happen, but I think it’s going to take a bit longer than people right now believe.

BBC

Right, it’s going to take longer, but that’s going to leave, I guess, a lot of politicians with egg on their faces, isn’t it?

Tony

That won’t be the first time. Quite true. Especially American politicians. Won’t be the first time.

BBC

Quite true. evelyn professor Jason Furman. Tony Nash, obviously he’s speaking in an upbeat way. He’s a supporter of the Democratic cause. Are you sensing a slightly kind of warmer, more positive mood in the US right now over its economic performance?

Tony

I think the mood is tentative because inflation is affecting everything. So if we look at that retail sales number, if you look at it in inflation-adjusted terms, we actually saw a decline of retail sales by 2.3%, and it was the fifth consecutive year-on-year decline. So five months in a row we’ve seen negative retail sales if we adjust for inflation. So I think inflation really covers everything. One of the things that the professor said that I’m not really sure is right is he says the White House can’t do anything about inflation. So we have Janet Yellen, who is a Treasury Secretary reporting to the White House, who is spending $140,000,000,000 a month from the treasury general account, and it’s offsetting all of the work that the Fed is doing. So the treasury is actually putting $140,000,000,000 into markets every month to keep markets booming. When the Fed is raising interest rates and selling off its balance sheet. So the US Treasury is actually and literally offsetting all of the good that the Fed is trying to do.

BBC

It’s interesting because we got Lyle Brainer coming from the Fed right this week to the White House as an economic advisor. You’re seeing that the political executive and the Fed are basically in conflict.

Tony

Absolutely. And Lail Brainerd is very smart. She’s fantastic. But she is very much a dove. She’s very much a loose monetary policy believer. And so what Janet Yellen is doing at the Fed in terms of pumping money in through the treasury general account, Lail Brainerd would be an absolute supporter of. And so we have to be very, very careful of inflation. All of these stimulatory activities really hurt your average worker. So there’s a concept called core inflation which really takes out everything energy, food, and so on and so forth. And really all it’s reflective of is service industry wages. Okay? So what we like to see is a headline number which will say 6% or something and what we’ll talk about is a core number which may be 1.2%. All that really means is that your hourly workers are being squeezed by inflation. So when the headline exceeds the super core inflation rate it just means that your hourly workers are being squeezed. And so it’s a really tough environment for wage workers.

BBC

Okay? It’s a tough environment. The bigger issue perhaps. Meanwhile, Tony, we still have this debt default issue, don’t we? We’ve been hearing about it in the headlines. Yet another cliff edge approaching in the United States. The wearyingly inevitable to some people kind of confrontation between Republicans and Democrats in Congress.

Tony

Yeah, I think what’s happened is the US has not actually had a budget for years and my understanding is what is trying to be negotiated is for the US to actually start doing an annual budget again that gets approved by Congress which is their constitutional role. One of the other items that I know are under discussion is this Treasury general account issue. Kind of profligate spending from the treasury to support markets. So there are some issues. It’s not just about the full faith and credit of the US. Of course, nobody wants the US to default but we’ve had some pretty ugly spending patterns for the past well as far as I can remember and I think some of that is just being discussed to come under control. So the US won’t default but it’s going to take some time to come to an agreement.

BBC

Yeah, indeed it will. We’re probably just going to be talking about it for weeks and weeks and weeks.

Tony

Well, I don’t think people realize there are thousands of protests in China every year. It’s not rare to have protests in China. Some of them are local workplace protests. Some of them are bigger. There was a protest east of Wuhan a few years ago about the location of I think a plastics factory or something like that. And there was one in Guangdong about, I think, an incineration plant or something, probably four or five years ago. But there are thousands of protests in China. It’s good that this is happening, and it’s a good discussion to have, and it’s good that Western media are able to view it. So every society has protested and every society has disagreements, and China is no different. Yeah, but there are older people, and even during the COVID lockdowns, the aunties in the buildings were yelling at the people, bringing food to them, and yelling at the police. So there is a difference in the age population in China. So I just don’t find any of this surprising, whether it’s a protest or a deference to old people.

BBC

What are they yelling down at the government? I mean, is this an escalation in the sense of the language, perhaps the boldness of some of the protesting and the way it’s being put?

Tony

They’re not saying, down with the CCP. Right? So if Beijing will let local governments take the flak for local issues, that’s not all that abnormal. It’s not a daily occurrence, but it’s not all that abnormal. If they were shouting down at the CCP, of course, that protest would have been squashed, but local governments and local government officials always take the hit for these types of issues. That’s normal in China.

BBC

Okay, Tony and Emily and Tony Nash, I suppose workers, you know, if they did kick up a fuss, for example, at a handful of Starbucks stores, they are still, particularly they’re still potentially vulnerable to just being fired, aren’t they? I mean, how protected are they from that kind of retaliatory action if they were to try and organize just on a shop-by-shop basis?

Tony

Yeah, I honestly don’t know. I think that would have to do with the contracts they negotiate. As your guest said, unionizing is one thing, but getting a contract is a whole different level. So I think her interview is very interesting. And what’s really interesting to me is what is leading to this desire to unionize. People obviously don’t feel like they’re getting fair pay and fair benefits, and that’s something that really needs to be looked at across companies.

BBC

Yes. And that is what seems to be a legacy of the pandemic, partly, wasn’t it? People went home, they were kind of laid off or furloughed for often long periods, they reflected, and there is a kind of militancy that seems to have left as a legacy.

Tony

What’s interesting to me is Starbucks is supportive of this, but they’re also the company that people want to unionize under. Right? And so they have the orientation toward doing that, but they’re not providing on their own the benefits and the pay that would keep people from unionizing. So I just think it’s an interesting circular discussion. Tesla is a different story. They’re an auto company in different parts of the country, automakers are highly unionized. So I don’t think it should be any surprise to Musk that that’s happening in Taiwan.

BBC

Thank you so much for all your thoughts, your words, and your wisdom. And to Tony nash there at Complete Intelligence in Houston, Texas. My name is Ed Butler.

Categories
Week Ahead

Unveiling Shocking Risks: Markets, Cracks, Freeport, and Ukraine’s Hardware

Learn more: http://completeintel.com/futures 👈


In this video, our first-time guest Jim Iuorio leads the discussion on the topic of whether markets are too good for the Fed. With speculation around CPI, layoffs, and interest rates, the question of the Fed’s direction and potential pivots later in the year is raised.

Jim also delves into the recent success of the metals market and offers insight into where the market may go in the future. He also offers his thoughts on the potential impact on equities if the S&P hits his target of 4060.

Next, Tracy takes the lead in discussing cracks and Freeport. She explains the significance of rising crack spreads and its impact on the market. She also shares her insights on the recent opening of the Freeport facility and its effect on US natural gas prices.

Albert then discusses the risks associated with Ukraine’s new hardware. He addresses the classification of “direct involvement” and its potential impact on European countries. He also offers insight into what actions Russia may take to further complicate the situation and the potential impact on markets such as wheat.

Finally, the team gives their expectations for the upcoming Fed meeting and what to look for in the week ahead.

This is the 51st episode of The Week Ahead, where experts talk about the week that just happened and what will most likely happen in the coming week.

Follow The Week Ahead panel on Twitter:
Tony: https://twitter.com/TonyNashNerd
Jim: https://twitter.com/jimiuorio
Albert: https://twitter.com/amlivemon
Tracy: https://twitter.com/chigrl

Listen on Spotify here:

Listen on Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/complete-intelligence/id1651532699?i=1000597046195

Transcript

Tony

Hi, and welcome to the Week Ahead. I’m Tony Nash and today we’re joined by Jim Urio. Jim is at TJM Institutional and he’s with the Futuresedge podcast. Or is it on the Futuresddge podcast, right? Yes. Also with Albert Marko and Tracy Shuchart with Hightower Resources Advisors.

We’ve got a couple of key themes. Obviously, it’s the week before the Fed and we’ve had a really good week in markets. So one of our key themes is our market is too good for the Fed. Second I think Tracy is going to talk about crack spreads and Freeport and what’s happening there. And then we’re going to look at the risk with Ukraine’s new hardware. There’s been a lot of talk about tanks going to Ukraine this week, so we’re going to talk about some geopolitical risks with Albert.

Learn more about CI Futures tiered pricing here.

So Jim, first, thanks again for joining us and watching some of your comments through the week with markets breaking through some of the key levels that you were looking at, the Fed’s direction is obviously a big factor in markets and there’s a lot of conjecture around CPI, layoffs, rates going lower or pause or pivot or whatever you want to call it, and people saying the Fed may do 25 and then pause.

What’s your view on that? You’ve been obviously speaking about this several times this week. So I’m curious, what’s your view after seeing a whole week, where do you think we go from here?

Jim

Well, I’ve been somewhat more of a bull, I think, than most over the last few months. And I’m not trying to take a victory lap or anything, it’s just a fact. And my reasoning was that every one of us knows that these Fed rate hikes have a huge lag period before we feel the efficacy. Fed knows that too. As stupid as the Fed is, this is something that’s so fundamental, but I think they genuinely do know that. So now we’re starting to see things happen. We saw a pretty good PCE report today. CPI has been trending lower too. The only things in CPI that are stubbornly high, consistently, are food and energy, which are the two things that are least rate sensitive. The yield curve is still wildly inverted, signaling to them that they still are in a financially tight market. I believe that the Fed is getting close to having some sort of gentler language. Now, whether they go 25 basis points this time and then 25 basis points again, that’s fine to me. Now, the one thing I do have a problem with is that the Fed Funds futures curve says 50 basis points over the next two meetings.

And then toward the end of ’23, there’s going to be an ease. But they say it’s only going to be a quarter, two and a half point ease. And that I say “no way.” If they’re ever going to actually pivot and start easing, it’s only going to be as if something is burning and something is falling down and then it’s not going to be a quarter point ease. That being said, I still like risk assets. And I have because I think we are nearing the end of the Fed tightening cycle. I believed, I’ve been doing my podcast for the last hour. I wanted the market to settle above 4070. It certainly did, right? We went into the closed pretty strong, I thought. And I think that that green lights the next move higher. I particularly like the metals market, and I’ll shut up in 1 second, I swear to God. I particularly like the metals market because I think that… I don’t mean to talk for so long. I thought copper was being held down by China news, by the Fed, by the strength of the dollar, and all those things have seemed disappeared. And I’ve made good money on that so far, and I plan on keeping those lumps.

Tony

So it’s a good question about metals. What are you looking at? You said China and you said China reopening other things. What are you looking at in metals? Are you looking at industrial metals, copper and so on? Are you looking at precious metals or kind of all of the above?

Jim

Copper is number one and that’s my biggest position. Silver and then go down from base industrial all the way to just gold being pressured. And the gold thesis for me is different than the copper one in that I believed at the time when I started buying more gold, that Bitcoin and Etherium in the crypto market and all that dollar safety hedge or whatever the hell it is, if that was disappearing, then money would go back into gold. Well, that didn’t disappear. Bitcoin is butting up against new cycle highs now, but gold is still doing well. So in that I was kind of wrong on the thesis. The thesis was also the dollar weakening, which happened as well. Once the Pound of the Euro started really bouncing off those October lows, I thought, okay, the green light is on for all these metals. So I’ve done okay in gold, even though my thesis about crypto was wrong.

Tony

Okay, but was your thesis wrong? Do you see crypto and gold as substitutional somewhat at the margin still?

Jim

I don’t know. I was going to ask you that same question. I always did. And I thought that the $3 trillion crypto market was sucking away some of the gold. And I thought that that was a big deal. But then it doesn’t seem to be now, so I guess I can’t answer that. I’m confused, I guess.

Tony

Yeah. I’m curious. What do you think about that, Tracy, in terms of crypto and gold? Do you think there’s a trade off there?

Tracy

This is not really my… Crypto market, is not really my market.

Tony

Internet, say whatever you want.

Tracy

Albert knows way more about this than I do, to be honest, because I’ve never traded crypto, and he’s traded a lot in the past. So I’m going to defer this to Albert.

Albert

Before I do think that there was a correlation between how much money was flying into crypto versus taken away from gold, I think there is no doubt that gold suffered because of that. I don’t think that as the case right now, simply because there’s been too many blow ups in the crypto world at the moment. I don’t really know how liquid it really is. There’s certainly no retail left in the crypto market, so it looks like it’s all institutional. So I don’t know. You can’t really make a fundamental call on crypto at the moment.

Tony

Could you ever make a fundamental call on crypto?

Albert

You could at some point, because institutional money was flying in there because their clients were forcing them to get into the space. So you could make a little bit of a fundamental case for crypto, but as all these ponzi schemes blew up, like FTX and everything, that’s just gone completely out the window at the moment.

Jim

Sure, Tony, I can make a slight fundamental argument of it. When they were adding an additional $7 trillion, throwing it into the money supply, and really being poor stewards of the dollar, that was somewhat of a fundamental argument for crypto, I guess, right?

Tony

Yeah. Okay. Are markets too good for the Fed. As we’re going into next week, are these levels too good for the fed? Is Powell going to come out and really, you know, say, look, this is irrational or whatever, and it’s too much, and is he going to pour out, say, 50 basis points and disappoint a lot of people?

Jim

Just to punish me a rug pull? I mean, I think he’s capable of that. He certainly did at the Jackson Hole meeting a while back. So you have identified, I think, the major risk, and it’ll probably go into that somewhat hedged. And again, hedging is probably going to be expensive going into it because people realize that that’s where the risk is. So on balance, I will say, no, I don’t believe he is. I think he believes that going too far this way. And again, I think he thinks going not far enough in this direction is the worst possible thing. But I also think he’s starting to realize going too far and what that looks like. He sits around and talks about creating slack in the job market, and to him, it’s just an equation on a whiteboard where the reality is talking about people losing their jobs. I think he balances a lot of realities. I think he’s incompetent. His entire tenure has been mostly incompetent, but I think he’s done a pretty good job trying to clean up the mess that he made over the last year and a half, and I don’t think he’s going to do something stupid like that. But, yes, to your point, it is a risk.

Albert

I actually disagree with Jim on this.

I think it’s going to really matter about what the market does. If we start flying into the 4200 before Tuesday on the SPX and whatnot. I think that Powell will come out. I don’t know if he’ll do 50. I don’t think he’ll do 50, but he might come out with a 25 basis point rate hike and then start talking extremely hawkish and dismiss all the rate cuts that everybody’s been talking about, which would be essentially the same thing as doing 50 to the market. If the market says that. If the market here is that we’re not getting rate cuts till 2024, I don’t see that as positive whatsoever.

Jim

I certainly hope you’re right in the near term, too, because I’m short some of those 4200 calls, like, too many. That’s the position I keep checking in my bold position was like, oh, sh*t, they’re getting too expensive. So I actually like what you’re saying a little bit in the short term.

Albert

Yeah, I have a problem because of this is falling liquidity right now and tightness at the same time. I look at the market and I’m like, well, money is starting to fly out into Asia, which we talked about Tony, repetitively for months now. Where are we going to get that $5 trillion incremental money coming into the market to keep this thing afloat? For me, it’s like I don’t see the math adding up to 4300 on the S&P and anytime soon. And on top of that, if you calculate rate hikes and everything you’re looking at the market, 4150 or 4200 is more expensive than 4800 was. It’s technically even higher valuation. So for these things, I’m just like I think we’re probably going to retrace the 3850 on some kind of ridiculous Powell talk. And on top of that, Brainard is talking about leaving. She’s not leaving if Powell is talking about being dovish. She wouldn’t be doing that, in my opinion.

Tracy

I asked a question. I was just saying and that’s for both of you. I mean, considering that the Fed has hiked so quickly, do we even think, and the data has remained pretty good, considering right, so do we think that the rate hikes have actually even been able to filter down into the economy at?

Jim

I don’t, Tracy. I think that that’s the point. I think when you look, just take the real estate market. How in the world is it not going to be a major hurdle for the real estate market to take mortgage rates from 2.8% to 7%? I think that it’s silly to think that if they just left things the way it is, I believe that we would certainly go in recession at some point in time with money being restrictive as it is compared to… I’ve argued for 30 years that rates had to be inorganically low to make up for the fact that we have all these crappy regulations and punitive taxes on companies. They need low rates to function. I think rates are to point now where eventually they would drag on us too much. Albert, do you agree with that?

Albert

I do. But the flip side of that is, like, if Powell doesn’t stay the course, Yellen is using the TGA, in my opinion, from what I heard, to offset quantitative tightening. This could set off another round of inflation if China comes on too fast, or even Europe starts to gear up a little bit and reset their manufacturing sectors with stimulus. The fear I have is a second half inflationary run again, and then we’re going to be talking no more pauses, but another round of 50-75 basis point rate hikes.

Tony

Second half of Q2. I don’t think it’s a second half inflation run. I think it’s Q2. I think it happens a little bit sooner than that.

Albert

Yeah, it could. I mean, you could have any kind of geopolitical event like Russia re-invading Ukraine with some gusto this time.

Tony

Okay, guys, here’s my question, though. We’re talking all this potential dovishness, but all we’ve seen is the rate of inflation slow. We haven’t seen prices come down. Okay, so why would he go to zero? Or why would he just do 25? I’m not seeing it. When you look at the job market, sure, you’ve lost 70,000 tech jobs, but they hired 2 million since 2020 or something like that, right? So it’s nothing. It’s dropping the bucket.

Tracy

Chipotle hiring 15,000 so those people can get a job.

Tony

Exactly. What is it that would tell us that he’s going to go 25 or pivot or whatever? I’m just not seeing that thing because the job market is still really strong.

Jim

So here’s what I would say to that, is that the job market is going to be strong and tighten. It’s a weird kind of anomaly that happened with 3 million boomers leaving the job market prematurely over the last three years. To your point about why would he not stay the course if prices aren’t coming down? Because, remember, ultimately, the end of the day, the inflation was intentional and it was done because of this wild indebtedness all over the board. But I always focus on the five states that could not possibly have paid their bills under any possible scenario. And that’s why for ten years, they kept telling us that they needed inflation. So I think in Powell’s mind, he tells us 2%. I think he’d be perfectly happy with three and a half.

Albert

And they’ll get three and a half because they’re starting to change the way CPI has waited starting 2023.

Jim

Just like when Nixon changed the definition of unemployment back in the 70s.

Albert

The BLS have done that in the past. They changed the way unemployment is calculated. Now they changed the way the CPI is calculated.

Tracy

They changed the way inflation is calculated.

Albert

Perception is reality in the market. We can sit there and b*tch about fake data from China and fake data from the Europe and the US. But perception is reality in the markets.

Tony

Yes. So we’re going to change the rules to win.

Albert

Well, yeah, of course.

Tony

And the CPAC calculation changes this month, right?

Albert

Yeah, January 2023.

Tony

Fantastic. Okay, so you guys are in the 25 basis point camp for next week, right? 25 and very hawkish. 25 and very hawkish.

Jim

Okay, I don’t I like what Albert saying. I say 25 and mildly hawkish.

Tony

All right, we’ll see. I think it might be a little harder than that. So we’ll see. That’s good, though. I appreciate that.

Tony

Okay, Tracy, I want to talk a little bit about refineries and crack spread. You sent out a tweet on Monday about diesel prices.

Can you help us, help us understand what’s happening at refineries and what’s happening with diesel and gasoline and other refined products prices?

Tracy

Well, this is actually the perfect segue because I tweeted out a chart of ULSD, which is diesel, basically. And so we’re seeing those refinery margins explode again. And most people say, well, that’s anticipation of the diesel embargo in Russia and refineries across the world that are not part of Russia are seeing these increases. But that’s not just happening in the diesel market, that’s also happening in gasoline cracks. And so higher refining, basically the long and short, higher refining margins mean higher prices for consumers. Right. So Tuesday we just hit a three month high of $42. And when oil was at its highest price, those crack spreads were at $60. So this should start ringing alarm bells a little bit about inflation. This is why it kind of correlates to what we were just talking about. And so CBs, even though they don’t count energy in the CPI as part of inflation, they should be keeping an eye on these indicators because it kind of indicates that we’re going to see higher gasoline, diesel costs, jet fuel, et cetera. And that could add to inflationary pressures across the board, not only for just the consumer, you and I, but for companies that are heavily dependent on these products.

Tony

And when there’s inflation in energy, there’s inflation in everything.

Tracy

Right, right.

Tony

Second or two tier impacts.

Tracy

Exactly, yeah.

Albert

One of my oil friends was telling me that normally January, February, they’re running at minimum rates, trying not to lose money. But this has been like absolutely insane, where they’re just making money hand over fist right now because the demand is so high.

Jim

Tracy, I have a quick question for tracy, by the way. Is that okay?

Tony

Yes.

Jim

So, Tracy, just last week, I don’t know if it was Chevron or Conical Phillips, where they announced raising the dividend or whatever, paying bonuses and not investing in it. Was that an indication that they still feel that the government is not smiling upon fossil fuel companies expanding their operation?

Tracy

Oh, 100%. Right. For over a year now, we’ve seen elevated energy prices in that seventy dollars to eighty dollars range. Negating, the spikes that we saw from the Ukraine invasion. But so after a year of pretty much stable higher energy prices, we are still not seeing anybody want to invest in this sector. Right. They still want to cater to the investor. They still want to pay down debts. They still want to do higher dividends. They still want to engage in stock buybacks. All to placate the investor. And so that is very telling that after a year, they’re still not willing to reinvest into capex, particularly in shale.

Tony

It’s nothing but downside to invest, right?

Jim

No doubt.

Tracy

Yeah, absolutely.

Jim

It’s maddening when you think about it. Everything seems like it’s such a self inflicted wound. And this is the kind of thing that keeps me up at night. It seems like a government that’s working against us. And I’m not trying to be that guy. I’m not political. I just see policies and they’re asinine.

Tracy

Who wants to invest when they say, we want to phase you out, we want to kill you?

Jim

Right? Yeah.

Albert

Well, this is the problem when politics gets mixed up in economic policy, it starts muddying things up and mistakes become exponential at this point.

Tony

But politics is always mixed up in economic policy everywhere. You know that. I’m not telling you you don’t know, but it’s always there. When I hear you talk about refineries, and it’s been how many decades since we built refineries in the US, Tracy? The 70s was the last time we built refinery?

Tracy

70s was the last major. We’ve had a lot of brown projects, which means we’ve added refinery capacity to already existing refineries, but we haven’t had any new green projects, which means building new refineries. And we were talking about, I think, last week or the week before the expansion that we’re having in Texas. But the problem is that the amount of refining that is coming offline is more than the refining capacity that is coming online.

Tony

Right. So what’s our capacity utilization right now in refineries?

Tracy

Well, we’re down right now because we’re in the middle of maintenance. And we also had Elliot storm, which some refineries, for instance, Baytown, is just coming back up this week from the storm in December. So utilization rates right now at about 89.5%. But, you know, you have to realize that, you know, we’ve been over, well over 90%.

Tony

Yeah, 94 or something like that. Right?

Tracy

Yeah. And we have aging refineries. And so what does that mean? Those refineries are more prone to breakdown because we’re running them at, like, ridiculous max capacity. Right, exactly.

Tony

Okay, so since you mentioned Texas, let’s look at this tweet that you put out a couple of days ago saying that Freeport gets approval.

So USLNG, the Freeport terminal has been approved and reopened. So can you talk us through what that means for European nat gas and what that means for US nat gas prices?

Tracy

Well, for US natural prices, that is positive. And I know that all nat gas prices have tumbled 35% to 45%. Regardless, we’re back into that two area that is pretty much where we’ve been for several years. But it is a good thing. I think the market, I think, spiked 15% or 15% $0.15 sorry, on that move. And they kind of retraced it. I think the market is a very Freeport is an export place. So what that means is that if Freeport being closed basically landlocks US nat gas, which is obviously a negative because we have a lot of it. But I think that the market in general is a little bit skeptical. But as soon as we actually start seeing export capacity increase from that facility, then I think that the markets will be more enthusiastic about the success of that because it’s really been since August since that facility is shut down.

Tony

So you’re saying we should see US nat gas prices rise as we have more export volumes from Freeport?

Tracy

Absolutely. And even this week, Semper Energy announced that their new Port Arthur facility has already been booked. And that facility isn’t even all the way built yet. And that’s another export facility. So there’s a lot coming online and a lot being built out that we will be able to see. I think that just market participants have become a little bit placated because they look at European stocks and European stocks, of course they’re still full. They’ve had a mild winter, but everybody kind of forgets that last year 50% of their storage capacity came from cheap Russian pipeline. And that’s not going to happen this year.

Tony

Yeah. So all of those new roads that are being built in Texas, it may have been started with other money, but it’s going to be finished with European money. Right. So I just want to take this moment to thank our European friends for finishing our transportation.

Albert

About time they give back.

Tony

That’s right.

Jim

Finally, their currency has come back a little bit, so now they can actually buy stuff here.

Tony

Perfect. Okay, very good, Tracy. Anything else on nat gas? Are you still keeping eye on fertilizer for kind of late spring time period?

Tracy

Yes, absolutely. I think that’ll still come into play. I mean, nat gas prices are extremely low right now, which is great news for fertilizer prices. That will give farmers a break. This is all good news in that respect, but I still think we need to keep an eye on this going forward and keep an eye on that gas prices because obviously that’s going to affect fertilizer prices and farming in general.

Tony

Jim?

Jim

Tracy, you talked about diesel before, and I don’t trade diesel. Is the spread between diesel and regular WTI still blown out? And what could possibly get diesel back in line?

Tracy

Well, I think that there’s been a shortage for a very long time. That spreads come in a lot, comparatively speaking. But now it’s starting to blow out again because again, you have the EU embargo of diesel, and they got literally like 95% of their diesel came from Russia. Another dependent project. And I’m sure Russian diesel will go somewhere else. It’s not more about that, but it’s more about really boils down to refining capacity as well. Because even in the United States, we can’t refine. If Europe wants to buy from us, we can’t even refine enough. We’re sending what we have over there as well as our domestic needs. So really, diesel to me comes down to refining capacity altogether.

Jim

That’s an unfixable problem, right?

Tony

Until Russia’s solved, right?

Albert

What about the Jones Act waivers for sending diesel up to these coast cheaper?

Tracy

Yes, they could do that, but they haven’t done that. They’ve done that in the past for Puerto Rico after the hurricane and all of that, but they still haven’t given waivers. Even when prices were extremely high in the United States, when we were at the height back in June, July, when prices, gas prices were highest, diesel prices were highest, they still wouldn’t give Jones Act waivers. You have to understand that the Jones Act came into play into 1920 when we had a fleet of over 1000 vessels, and we now have under 100 vessels that can transport that. So, you know, it’s the government could do it. They’ve chosen not to. Why? I’m not sure, but…

Jim

We can come up with some guesses. They’re either stupid or they’re nefarious. I believe at some point in time you’re going to have to say some of it’s nefarious, where they keep making the wrong decision at every turn. And I apologize for that.

Tony

No, don’t apologize. Look, it’s making it more expensive for people on the East Coast to get diesel. It’s not good.

Tony

Okay, great. Speaking of Russia, Albert, we saw a lot of news over last week about tanks going to Ukraine. And there’s a tweet from Max Abrams, who’s a great geopolitical professor talking about  Russia, says that tanks from the west count as, quote, “direct involvement in the war”.

So I wanted to get your… Jim said what would solve the diesel problem. Obviously, Russia coming back into the market would solve the diesel problem. Now with a lot of Western countries sending tanks to Ukraine, that doesn’t sound like we’re coming closer to a solution on that. So first of all, why are they sending them if they don’t have the people to operate them? Second, tanks are to take land. Right? So what do you think is being planned? And third, how risky is it? Do you think it really implicates these kind of donor countries as direct participants in the war?

Albert

I don’t really buy into the whole direct participants of the war. The rhetoric coming out of Russia is a little bit bombastic in that respect. Referring to those tanks, there’s only going to be about 100 of them, right? They’re not going to be able to push out the Russians with those tanks. On top of that, they’re going to be about six months out until they’re actually even deliver, and then you still have to train these guys and they need supplies, and the Ukrainians don’t really have all that. So the best guess that I have is that they’re forcing Russia to come into a ceasefire in about six to eight months time, which gives them a window now to try to take Dambus and have some kind of wind before these tanks get delivered. Listen, they’re no joke. The Leopard tanks and the Abrams are better than what the Russians have. But in terms of the Ukrainians using them to push Russians out of all Ukrainian territories, that’s just not happening.

Tony

Right. So are these just old tanks or is it a quality kit that they’re getting?

Albert

Well, I think they’re getting like the second tier tanks of what the west has, but that’s still better than what the Russians have or even willing to use for Ukraine. So, like I said, this is more of a measure to force the ceasefire later on in the year.

Tony

Okay. Yeah, Jim?

Jim

Albert, a couple of days ago, when this escalation started in Germany, we announced I immediately put on my screens, looked at oil, wheat, even the defense sector ETF, and nothing really budged. Do you think the market was looking at it like it wasn’t a big deal? Or do you think the market was looking at it as somewhat balanced, perhaps a quicker end of the war and not an escalation, or perhaps an escalation, the two things come around?

Albert

Oh, man, that’s a good one, Jim. I honestly think that the market’s probably in a wait and see position at the moment.

Jim

Numb to the shit kind of. Right?

Albert

Yeah. You got to wait and see what Moscow is going to do. I certainly think they’re going to use wheat and grains and other grains asymmetrical responses to the west to push inflation out over there, make it hurt. That’s the only thing they have. They don’t really have anything else to go after. I mean, the oil that they’re selling to India and China is enough to sustain their pocketbooks for a little while until this gets sorted out. But until there’s some sort of major upheaval in Ukraine, I don’t think the defense stocks will take off or wheat yet. But they will. I think they will. They haven’t moved.

Tony

The defense stocks haven’t moved for a while. If it is we and other AG stuff that is going to be their lever, that probably means the Turks will get more involved in the discussion because they’re the ones who arbitrated the discussion earlier. Is that right?

Albert

Well, they’re trying to get into the discussion. I actually have really good connections with the Turks and their main thing is to distract the West and the Russians into Ukraine while they push their trade deals out into Africa at the moment. You know, the Turks have a great drone, the TB Two, which they sell to pretty much everybody. So that’s as far as they’ll actually get into the war besides making media comments.

Tony

Right, okay. And so what risk do you think there is on wheat? Do you think we see more wheat risks, say, in Q2 – Q3 this year?

Albert

I absolutely do. The Ukrainians, they’re planting a lot less. I think 40% less is what they’re reporting, is probably even more than that.

Tony

Right.

Albert

And on top of that, if the Russians decide to blow up a port or blow up a few ships that are trying to get out with wheat, and all of a sudden, wheat, you know, takes off back to the 900 or $1,000 mark again. So I definitely see that happening in Q2 Q3.

Tony

Okay. That could be exciting. All right, guys, let’s close it up. We’re in that quiet period for the Fed. We have that Fed discussion next week. So what are you keeping an eye on next week aside from the Fed, of course, but what are you keeping an eye on in markets? Tracy, why don’t you get us started.

Tracy

Well, I know that most people are looking forward to OPEC is next week at the beginning of February. My personal stance on that is that I think they will keep everything as is. Right. They made that 2 million cut, even though it’s technically not 2 million, because they were under quota anyway. They said they were going to carry that through 2023 unless something came up that they really needed to address. And I just don’t see anything coming. I don’t see any reason they would need to change this policy stance right now. We have Russian barrels still on the market. We have China is still kind of an unknown because they haven’t really opened up yet. So that’s what I’m looking forward to, or at least that’s what my feeling is about the data.

Tony

Great. Okay. Albert, what are you looking at next week?

Albert

Well, obviously the Fed. I think, is in order with a hawkish tone, but honestly, I want to see how the dollar reacts to all this. And the VIX. The VIX at 17, start looking at some good old put options and call options with the 17 VIX is fantastic. But, yeah, basically what the dollar is going to do. I really want to see if the dollar breaks into the 90s with some kind of bull market talk.

Tony

Excellent. Okay. And Jim. Wrap us up. What are you looking at?

Jim

The unemployment numbers on Friday. Big deal. The last shooter drop is going to be the slack in the labor market that they want. Albert mentioned that level on the dollar. I call it like 101 to 100. As soon as it goes below that, as soon as we get a nine handle on the dollar, I think it greenlights a lot of risk assets. But the thing I’m mostly focused on is unemployment and then the week after that my trip to South Florida. Because every time I leave these damn markets, something crazy happened. So you guys can count on that. I’ll tell you when I’m on my flight. Something weird is going to happen.

Tony

When is that?

Jim

I don’t know. My wife makes the arrangements. I think it’s the next, like a week from next Thursday. I think we’re going on vacation.

Tony

Keep an eye on. Jim, thanks so much for joining us, Jim. Guys, this has been great. Thanks very much everyone have a great weekend. Thanks Jim.

Jim

Thank you guys. Yeah, let’s see you guys.

Categories
Week Ahead

2023 Supply Chain: How China’s Future & Germany’s Dependence on Russian Gas Will Impact Global Trade

Learn more: http://completeintel.com/futures 👈

In this episode, Ross Kennedy of Fortis Analysis, Ralph Schoellhammer of Webster Vienna Private University and Albert Marko joined Tony to discuss three main themes: supply chains in 2023, the existence of China in 10 years and Germany’s dependence on Russian gas.

Ross Kennedy led the discussion on supply chains in 2023, and he explained that although supply chain issues have appeared to normalize over the last 4 months, with trans-Pacific shipping rates falling to levels at the start of the Covid pandemic, there are still things to watch out for in the upcoming year.

Albert Marko led the discussion on the prediction that China will not exist in 10 years. This claim was made by Peter Zeihan, a geopolitical analyst, during his appearance on Joe Rogan’s podcast. He went on to say that some of Zeihan’s predictions sound impressive, but he and Ross Kennedy both have doubts about the validity of this claim.

Tony pointed out that similar predictions were made by George Friedman in his book “The Next 100 Years” (2009), where he said that China would split into 5 countries. However, both Albert and Ross argue that China’s economy, military, and political power are too strong for this to happen in the near future. They also highlighted the fact that China’s growth and development have been hindered by the pandemic, but the country has managed to recover quickly and is still a major player in the global economy.

Ralph Schoellhammer led the discussion on Germany’s ongoing dependence on Russian gas. He wrote about how the green push in Germany has led to a decrease in the country’s dependence on Russian gas, but there are other considerations. He explained that the Russia-Ukraine War had a major impact on Germany’s dependence on Russian gas and that when the war stops, it is likely that Germany will welcome Russian gas again. He also highlighted the fact that Germany’s dependence on Russian gas is not just a matter of energy security, but also a matter of economic and political considerations.

Key themes:
1. Supply Chains in 2023
2. Will China exist in 10 years?
3. Germany can’t quit Russian gas

This is the 49th episode of The Week Ahead, where experts talk about the week that just happened and what will most likely happen in the coming week.

Follow The Week Ahead panel on Twitter:

Tony: https://twitter.com/TonyNashNerd
Ross: https://twitter.com/maphumanintent
Albert: https://twitter.com/amlivemon
Ralph: https://twitter.com/Raphfel

You can also listen on Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/complete-intelligence/id1651532699?i=1000594418263

Transcript

Tony

Hi, everyone, and welcome to the Week Ahead. I’m Tony Nash. Today we’re joined by two new guests. We’ve got Ross Kennedy. You may know Ross as Huntsman on Twitter. He’s with Fortis Analysis. And we’ve got Ralph Schoellhammer. Ralph is at Webster Vienna Private University. And we have the honor of having Albert Marko with us again today. So there’s a lot that’s happened really over the past couple of years around supply chains. And we’re going to kick off talking about supply chains in 2023, and Ross is going to lead us on that. But next we’re going to look at China. There have been some claims made about kind of existential claims made about China over the past couple of weeks, and Albert is going to walk us through those. And then finally, Ralph is going to help us talk about Russian or sorry, German energy and German dependence on Russian gas. So let’s get into it, guys. Thanks for joining us. Ross, you know, I’ve seen a lot on Twitter. You’re you’re talking quite a lot about supply chains. And in 20 and 21, you really opened a lot of our eyes to some of those issues.

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Tony

So I’ve wanted to have you on the show for a long time. On the screen right now, I’ve got a chart of shipping rates, Asia to us, west coast seafood rates, and those obviously ballooned up in 21, came back down in 22. And we’re kind of now down to about where we were in Q, one of 20. So the last four months, things have really started to calm down in terms of the costs.

But I guess really what I want to get into with you is, are supply chain risks a thing of the past? You know, what should be we be looking for in 2023? I guess that’s let’s just start with that. Are they a thing of the past? And what should we be looking for in supply chains in 23?

Ross

Yeah, I think supply chains have changed in terms of the scope of risk. Certainly it shifted from one to the other. We had a short term risk that was very systemic as far as manufacturing in China being completely disrupted, the ability to ship out. And then we had the entire issue of people changing their buying habits basically by force as far as lockdowns from a lot of events, a lot of entertainment, a lot of things where their dollars are being spent on, not physical things that actually have to be chipped. And all of a sudden, everybody took that spending, they took the stimulus money, and they just began buying things that were feathering their nest or occupying their attention. And so you had the disruption not only of lockdowns, not only of that, but you had this very enormous shift in purchasing from experiences or non tangible things to physical things that have to be shipped. That’s why you saw the run up in stock for Amazon and numerous others, it was because people were doing that right. So we had this enormous crunch that was driven by that fundamentally. And now we’ve seen we have the bullet effect.

Ross

Inventories were dramatically over ordered and now we’ve got inflation happening. So inventories are full and demand is down, particularly on the transpacific trade to the West Coast, the US. China. What we have seen, though, is that there has been container volume shifted to the Gulf. It’s also shifted to the East Coast because we’ve had the risk really since July of last year of longshoreman strikes. And then you have the concurrent risk of rail strikes coming off the West Coast. So we have seen some volume that’s still in place shift. But depending on who you are as a company, we’ll determine if that has actually your supply chain problems have begin to unwind a little bit or if they have really only begun or if they’ve just changed as far as what they are. If you’re a retailer in the US, you really just started shipping over the East Coast if you’re concerned about West Coast risk and you still have to move inventory. But that’s assuming that now the lockdown, lockdown, lockdown, no lockdown, back to lockdown and now no lockdown again with people out sick right in front of the Chinese New Year, if that hasn’t dramatically impacted your business.

Ross

There are some sectors that have been heavily hit by that hard. The impact is less to China in some ways because they’re heavily subsidized in a lot of their industries. The impact is more so, I think, felt by the US. And I know Albert will talk about the China side of that factor. But what we’ve seen now is a dramatic disruption, really, to the way things are. Not in a foreseeable way, not in a way that a lot of people know how to forecast. In a very I would say very unexpected way where you’ve got this sort of well, not unexpected to this group, but unexpected through a lot of supply chain and planners and executives of. They went from huge amounts of demand to very little demand due to inflation here in the US. And then you also have the supply side disruption in Asia. So that’s sort of the twin monsters that a lot of North American companies and European companies are dealing with related to planning this.

Tony

It sounds to me like we have a couple of things in general that are helping to alleviate this. First is price, right? Things are more expensive and so that’s pushing down demand on a volume basis. But we also have China opening up and so that is alleviating supply chains on the supply side. So those two dynamics seem to be really helping us into 23. Have we also seen I know there’s been a lot of talk about this, but to what extent are we seeing rotation of manufacturing locations? Is that a major effect or are we in the early stages of that?

Ross

I think we’re in the very early stages of it. It takes multiple years if you’re going to uproot a semiconductor foundry, for example, which everybody’s made a big deal about, the chips act and all that. And I think Nancy Pelosi had a great run financially because of that for a while. But it takes three to four years, even five years, from soup to nuts, be able to get the process of moving something halfway around the world from one location to another. You have to make a lot of things before you install them and then begin making chips. Other things that are able to transition very quickly are doing so. Things that are fungible, where you’re essentially reprogramming a machine to print a T shirt in China versus Vietnam, that stuff is already shifting. You’re already seeing demand pick up for things like garments and textiles in Southeast Asia and India and Bangladesh. Pakistan also has gained a little bit on the textile side, but things that are energy intensive to manufacture, things that require critical raw materials or certain types of inputs that China does very well. We’ll probably talk a little bit about Zahance hypothesis with regards to China, but China is very dominant in a lot of raw material sectors, and assuming they continue to have the energy and labor available, it’s going to be a lot slower to ship that type of stuff away from China.

Ross

But things that can shift. Are you’re seeing more tires produced outside of China again, for example? So, again, it’s very sector dependent, and a lot of people want to make projections or economic plans or suggestions about the way things are on a macro scale without really understanding that in certain ways, china still very much holds the whip hand. And you won’t see manufacturing shift in other ways. You’re seeing it shift very rapidly away from China and that’ll have an impact on them as well.

Tony

Okay, so let’s take a step back to, say, 2019. Okay? We had Trump, who was trying to get different things out of China and bring things to the US. And reduce China’s centrality or centricity to supply chains. And then we have COVID come in, and that really disrupts supply chains. And then there’s this wake up call for people to kind of regionalize manufacturing, right? So this reminds me a lot of, say, 2007 eight, when it started with Japanese companies doing a China plus one, china plus two, China plus three strategy, right? That’s happening again. But after we got through the financial crisis, everyone just was like, China is easy. Let’s just go back and do that. Are we going to see that again? Are people just going to kind of shrug shoulders at the end of the day and go, people are inherently lazy. I don’t want to have to do the work to have three different sites to manufacture this stuff. So let’s just put it back in China. Is that likely to happen? Or was this wake up call the one that really pushes people to have resiliency in their supply chain?

Ross

I think, again, from a sector dependent standpoint, it’s yes and no. To the extent that if the stakeholder, if the primary stakeholder of a company is the US. Let’s say a Honeywell, for example, they will have to pull out US policies. We have reached a point that even if the US has a company is US based and they’re like, we’re going to still try to manufacture there for whatever reason, it is too much of a lift to pull out of there. In a lot of respects, xi Jinping has a vote on that too. If he wants a company out, or if he wants to just see that company’s manufacturing capacity or whatever, he’ll do it. Right. So the bad guy always has a vote on how the fight goes too. So that is one group of companies that very much can be expected to either leave on their own or be forced out in other sectors where a company can be co opted or the US. Isn’t really paying attention. Yeah, I think you’ll see the impetus to just kind of try to hunker down and ride out this ten year sort of economic cold war, if you will.

Ross

In their mind, they’ll do that as well. But again, so many of the unknowns that are driven here are the fact that China has a vast ability, if it chooses to, to leverage its own strategic advantages to push us around the anchor companies there if they want to, to kick them out if they choose to. And for whatever reason, really, outside of a relatively small group of Natsych types and people that do analysis really well, they’re not discussing what the calculus is on the other side. They’re just discussing what the US. May or may not be able to do through our own policy. At the end of the day, particularly when it comes to energy, anything that’s super energy intensive to manufacture, it’s not attractive to restore to the US right now because the Biden Administration, the Department of Energy, particularly FERC, they’re not going to get out of the way, and they have not proven to do that. So we’re not going to be able to make the fertilizers and fuels that we need to if we are continuing to drive them away with terrible energy policy and drive the price of energy sky high.

Tony

And as a Texan, I will tell you, we have all the raw materials here, right? There’s no reason for us not to do that. A lot of Americans may not like Texans, but generating wealth here really does help all of America, right?

Ross

So in my view, particularly when you talk about the Gulf, the raw capacity is there from a transportation side, from a labor side, from a raw material side, particularly energy, to to turn the south MidSouth all the way down to the Gulf into a manufacturing mega region. That that would be one of the great economic success stories of all time anywhere in the world. And that’s a policy issue. It’s certainly not a capability or capacity issue.

Albert

Yeah, the problem with that is the EPA makes a lot of manufacturing in the United States inefficient and uneconomical, just something yeah, we can’t get around it. It’s the problem.

Tony

Okay.

Ross

And Europe has done very well with a lot of that stuff as well, too. But again, it’s subsidized in Europe, some of those offsets, if you will, they’re heavily subsidized. And so the companies don’t bear that burden to the extent that they would in the US. Where that type of thing is just as heavily regulated and penalized with zero subsidy.

Tony

Right. So since we’re talking about supply chains mostly into the US. Since we’re often here, let’s talk a little bit about Germany. We’ve seen German politicians go to China over the past couple of months, and German heads of industry go to China and kind of almost double down on their commitment to China and double down on their dependency. And it almost feels like Germany is having the opposite conversation from a policy perspective that the US. Is in terms of the US. Is trying to reduce its dependence on China. It seems like Germany is just going all in. Is that a misread, what’s going on there?

Ralph

Well, yes and no. There have been voices in Germany getting louder, particularly when it came, for example, to the Chinese buying parts of the harbor in Hamburg or a German Chip producer. So there are some voices that are getting more critical, but overall, the Chinese market is still crucial for German exports. So kind of when the German Foreign Minister, Angelina Bieberk was in Asia a couple of months ago and she said, we will stand side by side with Taiwan in the case of a conflict. That kind of was immediately backpedaled by other German parliamentarians who said, well, the Taiwanese didn’t ask moral support, so we have no intention to give tomorrow support. So I guess it would be very similar to the Russia Ukraine thing. I mean, in a sense, I think what’s always very important when we look at particular German foreign policy, they are not really for or against someone. They primarily want to maintain the status quo. So they want to maintain as much as they can the 1990s early 2000s status quo. That is true in the Asian case. It’s also true in the case with Russia and Ukraine. Right. Because some people say, why are the Germans not more supportive of Ukraine?

Ralph

Or are they all in the pockets of the Russians? I don’t think that’s the case. I think German policy is to maintain a status quo when it comes to exports in China, when it comes to energy with Russia and everything that quote unquote disturbs the peace is seen as a nuisance, and they usually kind of bet on the party that they hope can end that nuisance as quick as possible. And then I think was a little bit the miscalculation in the Russia case that they originally believed that this is going to be a war like Georgia, like other earlier conflicts, that this is going to end very quickly.

Tony

And we can all pretend it didn’t happen, right? If it ends quick, it didn’t happen.

Ralph

Precisely.

Ross

And that didn’t happen too, that are like leading indicators of German behavior with regards to China. BASF is one of them. Not only is BASF not recognizing its potential position of dominance on the vitamin and specialty chemical side, it’s actually doubling down on China and expanding its manufacturing operations there, not retracing from it. And if you look at Mercedes, for example, I love Mercedes Benz as a company, and I think they make some of the most amazing machines in the world. But you’re not going to tell Mercedes, get the hell out of China. They’ll do, and they can.

Tony

But they have got Volkswagen cans. Mercedes can.

Ross

Volkswagen can.

Ralph

And as a quick second point of this, the German energy planet, we’re going to talk about this a little later in more detail, but they still want to double down, particularly on solar and wind. And they need China as a partner to have good relations with China because they control most of the supply chains in these areas. So as long as Germany doesn’t really have this often announced but never actually materialized u turn in their foreign and domestic policy, this is not going to change. So I think, as you guys correctly point out, whatever the headlines say, whatever the Sunday speeches by politicians are, I think the underlying indicators still strongly point towards not just Germany, I would say all of Europe kind of being at least economically very benevolent towards China. And I think sooner or later, with the exception of some Eastern and Central European countries, I think many Europeans would be more than happy to renormalize relations with Russia as much as possible.

Tony

Let’s get on that later.

Ralph

Okay.

Tony

Before we move on, what do you see in supply chains that people aren’t talking about, that we need to know about? What is a thing where you’re just like, gosh, why don’t people see this? What is that? What’s supply chains?

Ross

It’s food. Probably the biggest and most obvious one that comes to mind. Everyone’s talking about semiconductors. That’s an obvious one too. But that gets beat to death. And frankly, the US. Really holds some major strategic advantages with that as well that don’t get discussed enough when we talk about that issue. On the food side, though, particularly with regards to China and Russia, russia is an enormous manufacturer of certain fertilizers. That’s very true. Now. The US. Has tremendous optionality with Canada next door. We make a tremendous amount of nitrogen. We have the ability to make more. We do find for ourselves on phosphates. We have significant phosphate reserves on the potash side. Canada has the far and away the most reserves in the world and an untapped capacity to move more to the US. So I don’t subscribe at least as far as like Europe and the US are concerned to the macro nutrient issue of NP and K that you’ve heard recently and for a long term elsewhere, that Russia and China control the world on it. They don’t. We do find out fertilizers amino acids are an enormous issue. Vitamins and micronutrients. And those are the ones where, when you’re talking about there’s roughly ten major vitamins that go into animal and human nutrition, but particularly into animal feed to keep them alive, to help them grow faster, to help them produce higher quality meat and eggs and milk.

Ross

Almost all of those vitamins are 90% or more manufactured in China, most of them at 100%. When you talk about key minerals that needs to go into their diets, whether it’s a zinc, calcium, or you see sometimes manganese and magnesium added in as well. Other than Turkey, India and Brazil, most of that stuff comes from China, too. And then you talk about the big amino acids. The US. Is far and away the largest meat producer in the world per capita, even more so than China. But we make about 40% of the amino acids needed in the diet. So we make far and away adequate supplies of DDGs or soybean meal that we use as the crude protein and the crude fiber. But the other 20% of that is completely, almost completely controlled by China. And then BASF and one other company based in Switzerland. And so if they turned off the tap on that, I hope you got it, that she’s not watching this, they turn off the tap on that, it would be crushing for our food sector.

Tony

So is there anybody who’s talking about rotating that production elsewhere? Any company is making that?

Ross

Adm and Cargill talk about it because they’re the only ones that actually make the stuff in the US. In ADM’s case, they manufacture in house. In Cargill’s case, they’re actually the glucose or dextro stream that gets fed into that fermentation cycle to make aminos. You have Ivana and Blair, Nebraska. You’ve got two companies in Iowa, korean and Japanese. And that’s CJ and International and Naji Namoto. They are also an over the fence agreement with an extra cargo, corn mills. That’s it, really, as far as that type of product in the US. We could expand that capacity relatively rapidly. But we have seen amino acids in particular go through so many expansion contraction, volatility cycles that to an American company, particularly one that’s publicly owned, one like Adm, the juice isn’t there for them. They’re not going to take a 20 year investment risk on something that on a year to year basis could lose a lot of money.

Tony

Okay, but if they had to, how long would it take to get that up and running?

Ross

It takes less than two years to build a wet corn mill. But if you were to expand fermentation capacity at any of the already existing wet corn mills in the US that are making, let’s say, high fructose corn syrup, I think of Golden Growers, which is a 50% joint venture with Cargill up in the southeastern corner of North Dakota. All they’re making up there is high fructose corn syrup for food. They can easily convert that stream into fermentation inside twelve months or less. So we do have a dormant quick to market capacity, relatively speaking, the faster we could get that type of thing online, you could do it with subsidies, you could do it with some market protections, you can do it in the food bill and just add certain things in there that favor that type of production. So these are not unsolvable problems. Vitamins. We are, pardon the language, if China really does decide to cut us off on that, that becomes very problematic in a hurry because it’s three to five years to get vitamin production online. If you’re talking synthetic vitamin production, all of that is adjacent and utilizes coproduct from the petrochemical industry.

Tony

Okay. So when I hear this stuff, it makes me wonder, with all of the money that the federal government puked out in 20 and 21 and early 22, this seems like a relatively small investment.

Ross

And it’s very small. A couple years to build a massive vitamin plant? Yeah, you could co locate a vitamin plant right next to Port Arthur, any of the places that are along the Gulf that are very dense and natural gas, and within 24 to 36 months, depending on permitting, if you put a fast lane in place, you could do it in 24 months. And the expertise exists in the US. To build that.

Tony

Okay, thanks for that frustrating example, but it’s something we need to talk about, right? And people need to know about it.

Ross

Albert will tell you this. It’s not talked about much in DC. I’ve briefed numerous Senate committees over the last year on this. A couple of House committees, a whole lot of staff members and Congressmen to their faces. And I show them the charts, I show them the numbers. And it’s really outside of anybody who’s part of the Midwestern congressional delegations. They have no idea. It’s completely foreign to them, and it’s really one of our pacing. Strategic risk.

Albert

Yeah, there’s like deer in headlights when you start bringing up these complex issues, supply chains and asymmetrical responses that the Chinese hold against us, it’s just nothing. It just doesn’t register.

Tony

Yeah, it’s terrible. Okay. Thank you, Ross. Sober, let’s move over to you. And I want to since we are talking about China, let’s talk about, I guess, a Twitter discussion that you and Ross had last week where you invited him on the podcast to talk about some of Peter Zaan’s comments about China.

So, just so everyone knows, I tried to connect with Peter Zion on Twitter and invite him to come on, but he’s very popular and we’re really small time for him, so I don’t blame him for not coming on.

Ross

But anyway, he just doesn’t want to be challenged, maybe.

Tony

Well, possibly. Look, the guy is a great speaker. When I watch him speak, I wish I could speak that well. Right. He’s obviously very smart and he says some stuff that sounds really impressive. Big old predictions, all that stuff. So, having said all of that, he was on Joe Rogan last week and talked about China and basically said that China won’t exist in ten years. Right. Now, this, to be honest, is a derivative of George Friedman’s hypothesis in a book called The Next Hundred Years that was published in 2009, where Friedman said that China would split into, I think, five countries. You know, part of it owned by Japan, part of it, you know, whatever. It’s it’s a really interesting book where he talks about a research in Turkey, a stronger Mexico, all that stuff. I definitely recommend that to people. Some of the stuff doesn’t sound real, but directionally it’s interesting. But Albert, both you and Ross have opinions on this, and you can talk about any of the stuff that Peter Town said. But I guess, broadly, do you see China as a nation state by 2033?

Ross

Of course I do.

Albert

It’s an absurd comment to say that it’s going to break apart within ten years. I mean, you’d have to have something cataclysmic to break up some major industrial nation into ceasing to exist. I don’t understand how that could possibly even come to come to fruition. I mean, China has a strong economic growth. They’ve brought up a middle class, they have a CCP that’s a centralized government that can initiate policies and stimulate the economy at will. They have a grasp on the country, they have a good grasp on the population. Everything that you see that comes out of these protests or whatnot, that’s something that the politicians in China allow you to see. And it’s a messaging thing. I was on here what is it, like, a month ago with Atlantic Council guys, and they’re about the COVID lockdowns and whatnot, and I said, this is your signal that China is opening. And literally, I think it was like a week later, they opened. The thing is, people look at China and they take things at face value with politicians and with data that comes out of China at face value, and you simply cannot do that.

Albert

As much as we blast the Chinese for their belt and road initiative, the key component of that is they have food security coming through that. They have farmlands in Africa, they have meat coming through the South American border. And even if we were to cut off their meat supply, by some measure or another, they still can fish the Sea of Japan, that has 5% of the world’s fish. So they have options for feeding their population in a pinch, and they have the stability and the military and the police force to keep people aligned. So I don’t see how, barring a meteor hitting the place or barring some kind of like, supercharged COVID starting to kill millions and millions of Chinese people, I don’t see how it’s even possible, even logical, to say that it can end up ceasing to exist in ten years. Just the asymmetrical challenges that the world would have to bring China down if they tried to would be devastating for the global economy.

Tony

Yeah. Ross, what do you think there?

Ross

Yeah, I think almost every discussion about the demise of China ignores one simple thing, and that’s not unique to Communists. Will to power is certainly very baked into the cake when you’re talking about communism. But in terms of strategic optionality, china has done a better job than any communist country ever at reinforcing their flanks strategically in a lot of different ways. And so you have to account for that. You have to account for the agency, again, of the adversary, which I think a lot of the discussions about the decline of China do not account for. It at least makes it incredibly complex and certainly is by no means is anything certain one way or the other. On the demographic time bomb issue. I have a very cold hearted way to say this. I don’t think they care. I don’t think they care. When you look at an enormous number of people that are, on the one hand, potentially would die off in some sort of food shortage, certainly with the reopening the percentage of people that at least from the people I talk to and deal with in China on a daily basis. It’s not a lot of young people, it’s not a lot of the productive workforce.

Ross

Again, just like in the US. It’s a lot of people that are unhealthy or older or both. And so you’re talking about people that already have significant respiratory issues in the cities, then getting hit with any sort of cold that’s beyond a basic cold, it’s going to be a problem for them. Right. So even if they survive, you’re still talking about a percentage of the population that in the communist mentality are viewed as less productive or drains on the state’s resources. They don’t really care if a lot of these people die. They truly don’t. And some level of very minor famine where they have the ability to begin to marshal resources and shepherd them a certain way where they can even target who wins and who dies, that type of thing, we will see in that sort of scenario. And they will be able to almost indefinitely put on not indefinitely, but for a much longer. Period of time be able to put off the more severe impacts of a demographic time bomb. And the other issue is, of course, too, they’re atheistic, right? They don’t recognize Christianity or a Jewish god or an Islamic god or whatever.

Ross

So they’re really unbound by any sort of traditional moral or ethical constraints that we have in the west. And so who knows what sorts of technology, what sorts of medical procedures and things they’re pursuing that will in addition to things like automation, they’re now one of the top 15 most automated manufacturing economies. A lot of the robots in the world have shifted production to China from Europe. So they’re dealing with things in a way that all these other models talk about the demographic time bomb don’t account for. They’re going to be a smaller population, but I think long term that also may be baked into their calculus or even serve the interests of what they’re looking towards. Absolutely.

Albert

Yeah, I could have said it better myself for us, I mean, the Chinese are pragmatic. They don’t make foolish mistakes when it comes to their existence. They went out and bought grains for a year and a half. They went out and secured meat for a year and a half. They took advantage of the Ukraine war and secured energy supplies for a year and a half. I mean, they’re not some kind of blind entity that’s going to be taken by surprise. They know their challenges. They understand these problems. There’s something that it’s not as simple. The population goes down, they’re in trouble, they cease to exist. Those dots I just can’t connect.

Tony

Sorry, Ralph, you had some comments.

Ralph

Yeah, just that I fully agree with Albert and Ross said, and I think the demographic part what is often overlooked. I mean, imagine you as a dictator, right? What kind of population would you like to have? One that is on average in the early 20s, or one that’s, on average in the late 30s or early forty s? I think an older population is easier to control because we see this in the Middle East and in Palestine. In these areas, it’s young men who are the biggest problem for social stability. If you can find this golden middle ground of late 30s, early forty s, I think that actually could be to the advantage of the stability of the political system. The only thing because Ross, you mentioned the religion part. I mean, I don’t know if this is still true. It was definitely true a couple of years ago, right, that China had the fastest growing Christian minority in the world. So that doesn’t matter if it doesn’t penetrate the political system or the political leadership. I’d be curious. That’s kind of the only scenario where I would see major changes if all of a sudden kind of these ideas, for whatever reason, start to penetrate the inner circle of Chinese leadership in a kind of ancient Roman scenario.

Ralph

Where all of a sudden the Roman Empire became Christian in an exaggerated fashion. But otherwise, I think you guys are completely right. The I think the the rumors of China’s immediate demise are strongly, strongly exaggerated.

Tony

Yeah. Let me let me add a couple things here. I think when when people make comments about the demise of China, I don’t think they understand modern Chinese history. If you look from, say, the mid 50s until today, certainly well, I guess the 19 teens until today, right. The the volatility that you’ve seen in China’s social structures, the conflict you’ve seen, the famines you’ve seen, the deaths you’ve seen. And certainly in the CCP area, the tolerance that the population has had for leadership, whether that’s coercive tolerance or whether that’s genuine tolerance, they have tolerated a lot. Okay? Now, when we look at, I think, part of the pressure on the CCP, maybe not China as a nation state, but the CCP as a ruling party is through much of the CCP’s existence. The population was very poor and not very educated. And this was Deng Xiaoping was really the one to say, hey, we need an educated leadership. Because until then, most of the people kind of dumb and not really well educated. And a lot of the universities were closed down in the 60s. Right. And so they really started having this educated leadership in the an educated business class starting in the 90s.

Tony

Right. And so you now have a very widespread level of education, and you have a pretty widespread communications platform where people can understand what life is like in other parts of the world. And so I do think that there will be more pressure put onto the CCP to open up and to do things like respect individual rights, whether that’s Christian or not. It’s something that with wealth comes an expectation that individual rights are respected. Right? And so if somehow there was some sort of economic regression where people were poor again, fine, but that would make people really angry. But as people get more wealthy and as they get more educated, I think that does put more pressure on the CCP to be more responsive to the population. Because in the past, people would go into their government guy or woman and they didn’t really have any ability to push back, say, intellectually necessarily. Right now they can go into their government representative and go, oh, that person’s stupid. They don’t know what they’re talking about. And we do that in the US. And we do that in Europe, and we go, our politicians are stupid.

Tony

Right. And so that’s happening more and more in China. And so I don’t think that it leads to the demise of China as a nation state. I think it leads to heavy pressure to the CCP to evolve into something different. And I’m not sure what that is, but I think the pressure on the CCP to evolve will become immense over the next five to six years. And maybe that’s what Dion meant and he just kind of simplified language.

Albert

I don’t know. The CCP morphing into something slightly more liberal is obviously going to happen. I mean, they’ve used actually done quite a good job of promoting national unity. If you want to give them any sort of praise, you know, national unity within China has risen over the past five to ten years. The CCP, like I said, they’ve been around for 70 years. Tony, you said that they’ve got a grip on the country, and I just don’t see it releasing anytime soon under any circumstances.

Tony

Let me just go back and say one thing. We’re all disagree with you. It’s a rare moment of disagreement, Albert, but I actually think the CCP are terrible planners. They’re terrible, yes, they bought things for a year and a half at a time, but they’re just terrible planners. And because they have such a heavy current account surplus, they have the money to make up for their mistakes. And that’s been their situation for the past 30 years. But I think in general, central planning is horrific, and I think Chinese central planners are incredibly awful. So the belief and I’m not accusing you of having this belief, but I think there is among kind of Western intellectuals, there is a belief that Chinese are amazing planners. And central planners, they’re really thoughtful, and I think that’s garbage because it’s just not true. They make a lot of mistakes.

Albert

Oh, no question about that. When you start talking about, like, central piloting and strategic moves, the Chinese have not been historically not been good. You’re right. But those are like 2030 years out, right? I’m talking about four or five years out. They usually don’t make mistakes when it comes to their own domestic politics within the country itself. I mean, they’re they’re still around 70 years. Nothing’s, you know, nothing’s changed, really, in 70 years. So in that respect, I would give them credit to, hey, for national unity’s sake, if they keep themselves in power, they’re done a good job for everything else.

Tony

They do a terrible job. Yeah.

Ross

Again, the dog not barking so much for China when they talk about this stuff. This is the first time we’ve ever seen any sort of synergy between the PLA and the CPC leadership. There has historically been a significant externally, people don’t realize it, but if you’re in the game, you give it. There has always been a historical significant antagonism in a lot of ways between PLA senior leadership and the CPC, the civilian Mandarins, if you will. And this is the first time that we’ve ever seen. And going all the way back to Mao and before him, any sort of cohesion, whether it’s enforced at the barrel of a gun or not, but cohesion because of all these corruption purges that she’s been on since he took power in 2012, going all the way now to today. We’re seeing for the first time, really, the output of a unified PLA CPC kind of mega deep state, if you will. And that gives for the first time, the civilian side a lot more control over what has historically been a multi trillion dollar dark economy and revenue engine of China. And that’s that massive network of shell companies and enterprises that the PLA owns through everything that they’ve got.

Ross

And I’m not saying necessarily we can predict yet what this means, but if that cohesion, if that’s some sort of maybe for the first time unity, if you will, from a political side and from a commercial side, the more that’s.

Tony

Going to look like, the more that happens, the more fragile that whole infrastructure becomes. It becomes so inflexible. And I think for the adversaries of China, that’s a great thing. So go down that path as fast as they can because it creates a very fragile infrastructure within the Chinese government.

Albert

I’m glad that Ross brought that up because I actually had a Tweet thread today about something similar where Xi has been messing with the CMC, which is the PLA Navy’s group that kind of operated away from the CCP and was instrumental in dialogue with the US navy. He’s like, pretty much eliminated those leadership and starting to put his own people in there. So there’s room for error. When you put civilians inside of a military complex.

Ross

That’s a path that I would say if we see a decline of China as an actual aspiring global head of mine, if you will, I think it’s more likely to come from that vector than it would be any sort of demographic time bomb considerations.

Tony

Yeah, I don’t disagree with you. Okay, guys, let’s move on to Germany. Ralph, you had sent a Tweet earlier, I think you sent it a couple of days ago talking about the German energy mix and the push for clean energy in Germany and how ultimately that will lead to more demand for Russian gas.

Can you talk us through that hypothesis? I know you wrote a detailed thought piece about it. Can you talk us through that and then help us understand when the Russia Ukraine war stops, how long before Germany goes kind of rushing into Russian gas again?

Ralph

Yeah, I think the first and most important takeaway is that the underlying German energy strategy has not changed despite the war in Ukraine. And maybe just to sum it up a little bit, in 2021, where we have the most recent numbers, right, about 40% of German electricity production came from coal and nuclear, all kinds of coal. So lignite and black coal. And they want to phase that out in the next ten years. Actually coal, they want to phase out now faster than originally planned. So that means they have to replace 40% of their electricity production. But at the same time, until 2030, the expectation is by German industry that they will have an increase in 20% of demand. And what is the German plan to kind of meet replacing the lost coal and nuclear and meeting this new demand of 20%? The plan was always gas fired power plants and that plan is still in place. So they still want to double their gas fired power plants. And of course the question is where’s the gas going to come from? Now, the quick answer is always it’s going to be US LNG, but I think this is just going to be an affordability problem at some point.

Ralph

The Germans spent $440,000,000,000 only for energy related matters this year, just to give you a comparison, the entire EU spent $700 billion as the so called relief package for COVID. So just to give you a dimension, we are just talking about Germany here, so this is not sustainable. That’s 12% of their domestic industrial output, so they cannot do this forever. And secondly, kind of the more geopolitical thing, I think they prefer close cooperation with Russia than being dependent either on the US or being dependent on Italy or Spain and these areas where LNG would also come through. So I think that on the medium to long run, if there isn’t a window of opportunity to reopen the gas flow from Russia, which is of course still going on, to other pipelines, I think they will jump on it. And the last point, which I find quite intriguing, because everybody says Nordstream Two, Nordstream One, that was sabotaged by the Americans, but apparently, if you look at it, one pipeline of the Nord Stream Two net is still operational. So to me this looks more if I would speculate, but of course I’m speculating here is that the Russians say, no, we cannot destroy Nordstream One.

Ralph

We leave a bit of Nordstream Two in place because then we have to start at some point Nordstream Two and then kind of when this is already happening, we just also start Nordstream One again once it’s repetitive because that was always in place. So I think the underlying energy outlook is still the same and I think as soon as there is a ceasefire or something, this is going to happen. At the very last point, we talk a lot about gas, but of course there’s still the unanswered diesel question when it comes to energy between Russia and Europe. So, as I said, I think if there is a chance to re engage in the energy market with the Russians, I think Germany primarily, but I think other Europeans as well would be very happy if they could re engage in this area with Russia.

Tony

Perfect. I’m going to stop you real quick and I know Ross has to jump in a couple of minutes. Ross, what thoughts do you have on that, on Germany’s dependence on Russian gas?

Ross

I think it’s obvious if you work in the commercial world, if you deal with German companies, whether it’s a buyer or a seller or supplier, whatever it may be. I do think you’re seeing a play out the clock scenario here. There is obviously positive alignment at a global scale between Russia and China. And there’s disagreements or things where maybe one surprises the other with some of their behaviors, but in general they’re positively aligned. Major German manufacturers doubling down in China is actually an adjacent indicator. Russia is still the cheapest source of natural gas that Germany itself can get its hands on. And it’s not I say this somewhat facetiously, but also sincerely, it’s not like the Germans and the Russians don’t have a history of secret relationships or conflict benefit maybe them or conflict. So I do think that as long as there is a strategic alignment on a long term basis of Germany and through infrastructure and through relationships that have really been built deeply since the end of the cold war connection to Russia, I think it would take a lot to really completely sever that completely. Because on a long term basis, if they don’t have replacement energy capacity, which they don’t not at this point, germany would stand to be tremendously disrupted by that.

Ross

I don’t think they’re going to let it happen, not for NATO, not for the EU.

Ralph

And maybe to add something, since Ross is still here as a supply guy, the other thing is even the idea they would have to double their renewables, including wind and solar. And the problem is, wherever they can build those wind turbines, they cannot get those transmission lines built basically from the north to the industrial heart or in Bavaria, for example. On one hand is because the lines are too expensive and too long at the moment. And the other thing is nobody wants them in their neighborhood, right? Nobody talks about this. So on paper it’s easy to build them, but every little municipality, every local politician says, sure, you can make those transition lines, but not here. And then this has basically been on ice for a long time now. So as Ross also says, I think at some point it’s either continue spending oodles of money, which at some point I think will just get too expensive, or find ways either openly or secretly, to increase imports in the energy sector from Russia.

Tony

Ross, I know you have to jump. I just want to thank you for your time. We’re going to continue the conversation, but I look forward to having you on again. Thank you so much. Thank you very much.

Ross

Thanks gentlemen.

Ralph

Thanks Ross.

Tony

Ross, one of the things you said was that Germany would rather source gas from Russia than from southern Europe. Can you help us understand why that’s the case?

Ralph

Yeah, because I think this is one thing that has been overlooked in the entire debate when it comes to the Russian position. Let’s also Twitter a little bit for the French position that a shift towards the east in focus both economically and politically is not in Germany’s interest. So as many I say now fantasizing. But I don’t mean it in a disrespectful way of a new kind of Baltic Polish Ukrainian alliance under the military protection, let’s say your military cooperation with the UK and the US. That is not something that Germany is particularly interested in because they want to remain the major power in Central and Eastern Europe and a new formed bloc with 44 million Ukrainians is not something that they are particularly interested in. And the same is true with kind of shifting the energy focus, let’s say towards Italy or towards southern Europe. It’s the same thing. I think this is not the kind of power shift that they want to see. And just as a quick add on to this is often forgotten, germany together with the Czech Republic as a smaller player, particularly France, they have been the major electricity exporter in Europe.

Ralph

They in some cases quite literally had the hand on the light switch and I think this is also something that Germany doesn’t want to lose. Now, I don’t know to what extent they are aware of this themselves, but I think if you look at German behavior towards Ukraine, towards Russia in this entire conflict, even now, at the moment, right, where they say, yeah. We might deliver Main Battle tanks if the US delivers them first. And if the Polish deliver them first, then maybe we’ll do it as well. I think this hesitancy is not just facetiousness on part of the Germans. I think it is kind of being concerned that the power could shift further towards the east into this kind of Polish Baltic Ukrainian new power center and it would be economically weaker but it’s already militarily potentially significantly stronger. So I think Germany is playing a kind of geopolitical game here that is not we can have a moral debate whether we agree or disagree but I think from what they are trying to accomplish it’s at least partially understandable and it’s a truly last point. There was a moment if they would have really kind of switched entirely their energy policy in February continuing the nuclear power plants and shifting other areas, I think then it would have been credible that they say they want to kind of emancipate from Russian energy, from Russian gas but they didn’t do anything of that kind.

Ralph

So this is why I think that on the long run, on the medium to long run relations between Russia and Germany will improve, whatever that means for other players.

Tony

I think it’s so interesting that the Polish Baltic Ukrainian that is such an ancient political entity from centuries ago, right? And so it’s just interesting that these things are coming back. But I want to push a little bit harder on that. As much as you say they would rather source from Russia than from southern Europe, why are they so hesitant to source gas from southern Europe? Because it’s a part of the EU, it wouldn’t be a political kind of lever that the south would pull.

Albert

It would be Tony. It would be because the Germans have Spain, and Italy is indebted to Germany a significant amount of money. Right. So that upsets the political dynamic from the Germans being able to counter the French and what are they doing within the EU? So you have a political economic dynamic here where Germany just does not want to give money back to the Italians in the space.

Tony

Okay, so what you’re saying is Germany would rather empower a hostile Russia. I would rather enrich a hostile Russia than give up the political power that they have over the south by giving them money. They would rather have the thumb on southern Europe and control them politically than actually help enrich their fellow Europeans. I wasn’t aware of this.

Ralph

I used to do this 20 years ago.

Tony

I don’t as much anymore.

Albert

I would do the same thing because Russia is not in my political sphere, and there is little to zero chance that the Russians are going to attack NATO lands. So from the German perspective, I get cheap power from Party A, and I still control Party B and C over here under my thumb. Why would I change that dynamic? I would never do that.

Ralph

The German area or the German sphere of interest that they are interested in is central. It’s Europe. Whether it’s the European Union, they don’t really care what’s going on in further to the east or, for example, between Russia and Ukraine, which they have shown quite openly up until February. I think Albert is precisely on the money here. So this was a very good deal for Germany.

Tony

Wow. Just another reason for me to think that the EU, as I’ve thought for the last 30 years, is just a cynical political grouping rather than a functional union.

Albert

It’s very nation states have their own interests at heart. Always first and foremost, before you want to talk about globalist or community.

Tony

Sure, yeah, absolutely. Okay, guys, this has been great. Can you just before we kind of end this, can you guys help us think? What are you looking at, let’s say for the rest of January, kind of the week ahead, the next couple of weeks ahead? What are you guys looking at with, say, ECB or Fed or markets? What are the things that are on your mind right now that you’re looking at for the next week?

Albert

I don’t know about the next week. I think Opex is next week, so it’ll probably be pretty muted before the Fed in February. But honestly, I’m looking at Russia whether or not they desire to have a new surge into Ukraine, albeit a smaller one, more tactical. But they need a win for the PR before they actually try to come into actual peace negotiations, because it’s just not sustainable, what they’re doing right there right now.

Tony

So do you think there will be peace negotiations, say, in March, April, something.

Albert

Like that, as plausible at least June, July, maybe?

Ralph

June, July.

Tony

Okay, ross?

Ralph

I’m kind of looking at the German economic numbers at the moment because they have all been very celebratory, because in the fourth quarter, apparently it grew by 1.9%. My suspicion is that these numbers were particularly pushed because Germany was simply pumping so much money into the economy. This is something oliver, you mentioned this a couple of times on your Twitter feed as well. This is something I don’t think enough people talk about that whatever the ECB does, a lot of this is going to be offset by European programs of pumping money into the system via alternative means. So kind of the celebratory mood that now it’s, I think, just 7.7% inflation and not 10% inflation, I think that’s just going to be temporary. And the same is about economic growth. So this idea that there will not be, as I think Goldman Sachs said, and a couple of other economists as well, that there will not be a recession in Europe next year, I’ll be very surprised. I prefer not to be that one, but at some point I know Albert has said something similar ones, but I’m growing increasingly suspicious of these numbers because they don’t add up with anything.

Ralph

When you talk to people in the industry, when you talk to the banking sector, they tell you it’s not all doom and gloom, but it’s definitely not. That all. Next year we’re going to grow beyond our expectations.

Albert

The celebratory chance for the Europeans right now completely missed the fact that they are dormant. They’re in a zombie state. There’s nothing going on in Europe at the moment. So once they start kicking things back up and manufacturing and demand inflation is going to go right back up to where it was a year ago.

Tony

I never trust a preliminary economic data release. Never. Always wait for the second or third revision. So when markets move on a preliminary release, it’s moving on the belief that other people have expectations around it. Right? And so it’s just this reflective, expectations based move rather than based on the numbers themselves. And I always will often say this on my Twitter feed wait for the revision. Don’t trust the initial preliminary data release because it is PR. It’s nothing more than PR. Maybe it’s directionally correct, maybe, but those preliminary releases are PR. So on that optimistic note, guys, I want to thank you for your time. This has been fantastic. We’ve had such a great, deep discussion. So thanks very much. Have a great weekend and have a great week ahead. Thank you.

Albert

Thank you, Tony. Thanks, Tony.

Ross

Thank you.

Categories
Week Ahead

European Natgas: The Week Ahead – 5 Sep 2022

Learn more about CI Futures here: http://completeintel.com/2022Promo

This week we’ve seen a lot around dollar hitting almost 110. We’ve seen a lot in the US market downturn. There’s a lot of speculation around the Fed. But we’re really focusing on Europe this week.

Key themes:

1. European Natgas Stock vs Flow

2. Russian Oil Price Cap Fallout

3. Europe’s Food and Fertilizer Fallout

4. What’s ahead for next week?

This is the 32nd episode of The Week Ahead, where experts talk about the week that just happened and what will most likely happen in the coming week.

Follow The Week Ahead panel on Twitter:

Tony: https://twitter.com/TonyNashNerd

Albert: https://twitter.com/amlivemon/

Sam: https://twitter.com/samuelrines

Tracy: https://twitter.com/chigrl

Listen on Spotify

Time Stamps

0:00 Start

1:51 European natgas: stocks VS flows

8:26 What to expect in manufacturing in Europe

9:26 Difficult environment for the German Finance Ministry?

10:27 Fertilizer fallout and impacts on Europe’s food supply

14:19 Is Europe getting relief soon, or will this crisis continue to 2024?

15:33 Russian oil price cap: is it going to come about?

19:12 What’s to stop countries from indirectly buying Russian crude?

22:00 What’s for the week ahead?

Transcript

Tony Nash: Hi, and welcome to The Week Ahead. I’m Tony Nash. Today we’re joined by Sam Rines, Tracy Shuchart and Albert Marko. We’re going through the events this week and looking toward next week.

Before we get started, I’d like to ask you to like and subscribe. Please add your comments. We’re on top of the comments. We come back pretty quickly. We really want your engagement, so add those comments in.

Also we have a promo right now on our subscription product, CI Futures. That promo ends in two weeks. So you get forecast for about 3000 items. About 900 of those are renewed every week. We show you the forecast, the error rates, all sorts of stuff about all of these different assets, global assets. So please check it out. That runs out in mid September.

So this week we’ve seen a lot around dollar hitting almost 110. We’ve seen a lot in US market downturn. There’s, a lot of speculation around the Fed. But we’re really focusing on Europe this week.

The key themes this week are really around European natgas stock versus flows. Russian oil price caps and the fallout that has come with that. Food and fertilizer in Europe. And then we’ll look to the week ahead. So I think we’ll look at some non Europe activities for the week ahead.

First for European natgas, Sam Rines in his newsletter came out with some really interesting points around natural gas stocks and flows. You can see the chart on the screen. Sam, can you talk us through kind of what’s happening in storage for natural in Europe and what we should be looking for as winter approaches?

Sam Rines: Yeah, sure. So you get this really interesting dynamic where everybody talks about the stock but very few people talk about the flow. So talking about the stocks of that gas in Europe is a really interesting one. Yeah, you’ve got stocks building up pretty quickly, particularly in Germany, sitting north of 82% overall for European stocks in general, north of 80%.

So it’s good, right? Stocks seem to be well ahead of where you would anticipate. Germany has a 95 target for November. They might actually reach it even with the shutdown of Ms one, Nordstream One. It’s actually not that big of a deal incrementally to Germany in particular. You go from about call it a 3.2 kilowatt hour type pump into Germany to about a three.

You didn’t really lose that much. I mean, it was pretty much anticipated anyway. So if they keep it off

for longer, whatever. You don’t have significant usage coming through at the moment for natural gas.

It’s a time where you can actually afford to not have those significant closing. They’ll probably still have some stock bill that will just be slower.

So overall, I think it’s a lot of headlines that a lot of it’s already priced in. If you were looking at the expectations of complete and utter frozen winter, you’re pretty much not looking at that assuming that Norway and Belgium continue to put their flows through to Germany at the current rate.

So overall, you’re actually sitting on a decent call it stock level. Right? That’s fine. And as long as you continue to have the flows from call it Northern Europe, you should be okay for the winter. You’re not going to be great. It’s going to be expensive, and it’s going to suck. But relative to the expectation of Europe’s going to freeze this winter,

I think that might actually be a little bit of an overblown one, and you might begin to have a significant blowback on that. And you’ve seen significant declines in things like electricity pricing ahead, which is a ridiculous contract anyway. And Dutch TTF, the net gas contract you’ve seen collapse this week, even with the shutdown of Nordstream.

So I think a little bit of the froth, a little bit of that angst is beginning to come out of the market, and you might actually have a positive surprise relative to expectations in Europe.

TN: So Dutch TTF peaked on Tuesday or something, right? It was early in the week, right?

SR: Correct.

TN: And Tracy, what are you seeing with that? Do you expect us to hit back up to those peaks, and do you think that was kind of a one time hit? And what Sam saying about storage is really kind of starting to take hold.

Tracy Shuchart: I think it really depends over the long run and how slow go. I totally agree with Sam here. Right now, for winter, Europe is pretty much okay, not great, as he said, but I think given if we don’t see increased flows, that storage would drain significantly by February. So we really have to keep an eye on flows from other countries, particularly in the United States, in the Middle East, and to see how those flows go. So I think it’s too early to be completely doom and gloom, but that is something we need to be cognizant of, because that storage can only last until February.

TN: Right. And for those people who aren’t in Northern Europe, northern European winter really stays cold, really until like, April, right. It’s not something that February comes and goes and it’s spring and everything’s great. You still have cold temperatures in Northern Europe until probably April or so. Is that about right?

TS: Yeah, absolutely. Anecdotally, if you’re been on Twitter, you see a lot of people starting to buy wood. The big thing on the European sites is to post how much wood you collected before this winter. So people are sourcing. People are expecting energy prices to be high and doing whatever they can personally, to kind of lower the prices. Because you have to understand, when you’re talking about European power prices, it’s not just your solid power price. They have that almost all of their taxes on top is on top of what they actually would be paying, which is outrageous carbon, et cetera.

TN: And so I just want to go back to one point in Sam’s chart as well. I think sam, you said the storage is about 82% full or something and they’re targeting 95%, but we’re ahead in 2022 from where we were in 2021, is that right?

SR: Yeah, that is correct.

TN: Okay, so the doom and gloom that we’re hearing again, we have inflation, we definitely have shortages, but in terms of storage, we’re ahead of where we were. And we don’t expect like a mass extinction event in northern Europe because of heating or whatever, right?

SR: Correct. I think that is a good base case. That’s good for everything. No mass extinction is low bar, but yes, that’s right. 

TN: Exactly. Okay, very good. Do you have anything to add on this?

Albert Marko: I’m on middle of the road here. I do agree with Sam that they’ll be okay so long as they’re okay with no manufacturing, no growth in their economy, and so on and so forth. I mean, if they tried to kick things up and the demand starts to rise, I don’t think it will be okay. I don’t think that the Russians are going to play ball, especially when they start talking about these price caps on Russian oil and gas. It’s one of those things where economically, I can understand where Sam is coming from.

Politically, I’m inclined to say that Europeans are going to screw up and just agitate the Russians. And then you start getting into this back and forth. That economic trade and price.

TN: Let’s set the price cap aside for a minute. But when you say no manufacturing, so we’ve seen some manufacturing dial back and some facilities slow down and shutter. Is that expected to continue or do we expect that to ramp back up?

AM: I expect it to completely be just stalled for the entire winter. I just think the energy prices are so astronomically high that it’s just not economical for companies to manufacture anything.

TN: Okay, so if you’re sourcing things in Germany, then you should expect supply chain issues for the next five or so months. Is that fair to say?

AM: At least six months. And this is why I keep saying that this inflation doom loop keeps recurring because as the demand rises, there’s not enough supply and then you get back into an inflationary event. What’s the inflation rate in the UK right now? Like 20% reported. 20%? And in Germany, I think it’s like 19% and rising. It doesn’t stop.

TN: And PPI is in the 30s or something. Just to play this out, I wouldn’t have a whole lot of time to cover this, but if private sector is shutting down, even parts of it, then government spending has to kick up. And if government spending is kicking up and we have an ECB that’s tightening, that’s a difficult environment for the German Finance Ministry, right? Or is it no big deal then?

SR: No, I would completely disagree. I mean, Germany is one of the few countries in the world that has they could basically print their GDP and they’d still be perfectly fine on an ability to pay basis. They spent, like, three years getting paid to have debt.

TN: So very good, because, look, nobody wants Germany to suffer, right? And if government spending

has to kick up, then great. If they’re not going to suffer as a government to be able to do that, then that’s even more fantastic, because with ECB tightening, it could create some difficult trade offs for some countries in the region, of course.

So let’s take this and park it and let’s move on to fertilizer, because, of course, that’s related to natural gas.

And we have some there’s a recent Bloomberg story about Europe’s deepening fertilizer crunch. 70% of fertilizer production is halted. And then we have a chart showing the price of nitrogen fertilizer in Germany. Obviously, it looks pretty extreme. Can we cover that, Albert, and look at the impacts of fertilizer and how that’s going to hit food going into spring or summer of next year?

AM: Oh, yeah, the fertilizer, specifically what you’re talking about, nitrogen based ones, are relying on natural gas. Natural gas prices just keep on spiking over there. And again, we can continue this whole discussion about inflationary, commodity prices, but food is a big problem. They shut down their potash.

On top of that, the farmers, they’re notorious penny pinchers, whether it’s the United States, whether it’s Europe, so on and so forth. But they’re going to have to make up the nutrients for the soil in the spring of 2023 and most likely into 2024, they can’t deprive the land of nutrients.

So, of course, they’re going to have to have another round of demand for fertilizer. I don’t know about the night gas based ones, but potash certainly will have a surge.

That’s why I’ve always on Twitter have been big on Mosaic being the 800 pound gorilla outside of Morocco’s. OCP, but OPC, I think it is. But that’s not a tradable stock mosaic fertilizer. I’m very bullish on that. That’s going to relate to bigger increases in food prices, specifically in the UK.

TN: What crops in Europe would be most impacted by this?

AM: Wheat. Most likely wheat.

TN: Yeah. Okay. And where does Germany traditionally, where does it source most of its fertilizer? Is it from Russia?

AM: I believe they get most of their stuff from Belarus originally. And I know that they have potash fertilizer plants inside of Germany itself, but I’m not sure how. I don’t know the exact numbers on the importance of what they do for a fertilizer, but it’s certainly a problem specifically for Germany. Of course it’s a problem for France. It’s even bigger problem because they’re a big food producer.

TN: Okay, Tracy, you’ve said a lot about fertilizer in the past. What are your thoughts on this? Does it just get even more intense or do we see some relief on the horizon?

TS: Well, I think it does get a little bit more intensive when we just saw And, Norway’s largest fertilizer company, all kind of curve back production in various countries wherever their plants are concerned. So it’s definitely a concern. 100% agree with Albert. Going into next year is going to be a very big problem. I mean, everybody’s harvesting right now. Everything’s fine. We’ve seen big pullback in those prices. But going forward, in particular next year, we’re going to have a problem.

AM: And a lot of that, Tracy, has to do with the national governments are going to look out for their national interests, their own farmers, so that although the imports will drop, so the exports will drop and they’ll just keep it closed within their own nation, so they can feed their own people.

TN: Fertilizer nationalism.

AM: Well, it’s just the same thing with oil. I mean, the countries are not export more than they can handle.

Yeah.

TN: Okay, so sounds pretty dire, but do we see any relief next year? Or, like you said, is it going to go into 24, or does it all depend on Russia?

AM: I think it depends on Russia whether the Europeans and the United States come to their senses and stop trying to put their foot on the throat of the Russians. You’re hampering your own economic growth, and they’re sitting there talking about, oh, we’re going to get away from fossil fuels and do this whole new climate thing. That’s just not realistic. And I don’t think they just haven’t come to grips with that yet.

TN: I think it’s a time frame thing. Right? I mean, it’s going to take some time, and I think there’s a hybrid mix in the interim that I think we’re trying to rush.

AM: Well, that’s the point. They’re trying to rush things. When you rush things, your own people are going to suffer economically and so on and so forth. It’s just not politically. They just can’t swallow it. Some of the voters don’t swallow that. Sort of stuff. 

TN: And things break. Like Californians can’t charge their electric cars. Right. These are weird times.

Okay, great. Thanks, guys.

And then on the oil price cap, we had about this week, former Russian President Good about this week, saying that Russia just won’t deal with people who subscribe to the price cap.

And then we had Xavier Blossom, Bloomberg tweet about it, saying that he and his friends are going to agree to a price cap on beer at their local pub and that the guys at the pub don’t agree with it, which is a nice analogy, I guess.

Tracy, what are you seeing on the price cap? Is it actually going to come about?

TS: First, they just announced that they’ve been talking about this for months. Let me give a little bit of background. And they just now say there’s going to be three different kind of price caps, one for crude and two for refined products.

However, if you look at the actual G7 statement that was out today, they were pretty vague on it. Basically, they said, we invite all countries to provide input on the price cap design and to implement this important measure. So in other words, they’ve decided they’re going to do this, but not exactly holiday.

TN: It’s going to be 2030 before they come to an agreement on.

TS: it’s because. They’Re asking all their stakeholders to join in this. And so what I see as the problems with this right now is that there are four specific problems. One, it’s not really enforceable outside of G Seven countries if people don’t sign up for this. Two, Russia already said, again repeating you, that they won’t sell to countries that enact price caps. Three, part of this is the maritime insurance on vessels carrying Russian oil India is already providing safety and notification through IRGC class.

So by Dubai, subsidiary of the Russian shipping group. So I hope I pronounced that right. But anyway, they’ve already kind of gotten their way around this. And four, they’re also thinking about creating their own benchmark.

So right now, Russian crude oil is expressed as a discount to Brent because rent is the benchmark price. They already have an oil trading platform in place via RTS and MYsix. So they could build out this platform, which they’ve been talking about, and go through near Mir, which is basically their version of Swift, and completely by past that and just let market forces work.

I think this price cap is still way off from seeing the light of day. But this actually could turn out much more bullish because this price cap overlooks how Russia could influence global markets.

If they wanted to, they could opt to cut off the EU and NATO, not just G7. G Seven members shut production and raise global crude oil prices through the roof because they would take barrels off the market there by hurting the G7 nation.

I’m not saying that would happen. I’m just saying that’s within the realm of two box. And it’s not surprising after we just saw today, as soon as an oil price cap was announced as a plan, suddenly we just saw gas problem with Nordstream one, therefore I’m off of national gas.

TN: So what’s to stop, let’s say, a European country that signs onto a price cap from buying, let’s say, Russian crude that is sent to Chinese, say ownership and then resold to say, I don’t know, Germany. I mean, that type of circumvention is already happening, right?

TS: No, you can definitely do that. What we’re really seeing now is that kind of circumvention is happening in the product market. So it’s very easy for, say, India to buy Russian crude oil, refine it until it’s anywhere else because it’s very hard to track where those barrels really came from. It’s easier to track a resale. Right, if that makes sense.

TN: Sure it does. But they put in a barrel of, say, Emirati crude with a million barrels of Russian crude and then they label it Emirati crude. Right? Something like that.

TS: Yeah. If they both have the same API level, depends. You could mix them. If they both were the same exact API level, then you could mix them. It’s kind of different than, say, the natural gas market. Yeah.

AM: The Iranians do this with the Iraqi oil and bozzar. Often they mix it and label it As Iraqi 

TS: because they share oil fields. I mean, Albert and I have been talking about this for years now.

AM: Years.

TN: Let’s be honest, the rules apply to the people who abide by the rules. Right. And so even if these price caps are put in place, there will be circumvention in a big way, of course, at least a refined product, if not crude product. And so a lot of it’s for sure. Is that fair to say?

AM: Of course, yeah. A lot of it is for show. This is a political thing right now for scapegoating Russia

for inflation problems. Now they’re just snowballing things and saying Russia’s gas is the problem

 for inflation, Russia’s oil is the inflation problem, and other caps. But like I said earlier, and even just Tracy reaffirmed it’s like the moment you mentioned price caps against Russia, Moscow finds an issue, whether it’s gas, prom leak or Belarus problems, or Algeria has problems with Wagner. They create these issues all the time.

TN: Of course, anytime there are sanctions on a country, right. These things happen. Okay, very good. Thank you, guys. We spent a lot of time talking about Europe. So let’s move on to the week ahead and

what we expect to happen the week ahead.

We saw some really interesting action in markets, and last week we talked about how Palo speech, we really should have been a surprise to no one, but markets seem to kind of take it on the chin this week, acting shocked that he repeated himself again. So what do we expect going into next week? Do we expect things to kind of moderate a little bit or do we at least in equity markets, do we still expect some downward movement and also, say energy markets? We saw crude down, I think at 86 or something.

Tracy, do you expect, say, energy markets to continue to fall next week?

TS: What I would really look at, and what I’m looking at more, instead of looking at just reprice, which seems highly manipulated right now, especially going into midterms, not suggesting anything, but I think what I would start looking at is in like second and third month spreads or fourth month spreads. Right. So you really want to be looking, I think, just a couple of months down that curve a little bit. And if you start seeing because those curves are still kind of telling us that the market is very tight and curves, you can’t really manipulate as much as you can somewhat of the front line. So I think that’s where you should be looking at.  I think we’ll really get a better grasp on these markets and to see what front market is next week is OPEC meeting, right. So they were talking about cuts, right, over the last couple of weeks. That’s right. That’s all. I will be on that. That’s on the fifth.

TN: And SPR keeps going until October. So we’re only looking at November,December before we’ll see some upward pressure on prices. At least a stand up pressure.

TS: Yeah, exactly. And depending on what OPEC says, we could see an initial pull back. The general consensus is they’re not going to do anything in September. However, OPEC has been known

to give us some surprises. So just keep that in mind.

TN: That’s good all right. Very good. Sam, what are you looking for for next week?

SR: Next week I’m looking at the ECB. I want to hear how hawkish they are and how quick they’re going to go and what type of language they’re using. They’re still in the QE boat, right? They’re still buying Italy, they’re still buying Spain, they’re still buying a bunch of the southern debt periphery type debt.

So I want to hear what they’re saying, how they’re saying it, and just how call it, quote, unquote, inflation-oriented. They are. They probably should be particularly versus the bank of England, who is very hawkish and likely to continue to, one, explore actually outright sales from their asset purchases to shrink their balance sheet and how quickly the relative moves are there.

I think that can create some fireworks, particularly called the Euro pound type crossed I think that could be really interesting and cross asset class could be.

TN: Do you think you should be able to surprise hawkish?

SR: Yes.

TN: You do? Okay, interesting. That would be very interesting to see. Wow. Okay. And so you think the Euro recovers a little bit on that?

SR: I think it knee jerks, yes. But the question is how long does that last? Right. That, I think, is a much more important question than the initial knee jerk. And I think over time, it would be a fade the news move.

TN: Okay, very interesting. Okay, very good. Thanks for that, Albert, close this out. What do you see for next week?

AM: The big boys come back to play from vacation. That’s right, they do. I think they’re going to start holding the market a little bit more accountable for all this bad data. And I think earnings were just atrocious when you look at what inflation was. I’m actually going to be watching though

China as we get closer to the CCP, the Party meeting, I think it’s October 16, I think XI might start announcing many stimulus packages in certain sectors. So I want to see if those materialize and what that does with commodities that are attached to them.

TN: Okay. I just want to say, with regard to the Party meeting in November, if anybody talks about reading tea leaves or any of that garbage, you’re banned immediately. Okay.

So we’re not going to imply, like, cultural mysteriousness on Chinese political processes. It’s just they’re a bureaucracy like everyone else. They make decisions like everyone else. They’re no more or less mysterious than anyone else. So I would say that for the people watching, because the people watching are going to see a lot of kind of China experts or whatever China watchers talked about how mysterious the CCP is and a lot of question marks. A lot of them are Fed talking points from the CCP spin machine. So they’re not mysterious, they’re a bureaucracy. They’re boring, just like every other country.

AM: Yeah. And the Party is I believe that Congress is October 16, not November. Yeah. So it’s closer than people realize. It’s only 30 days away, but China is going to have to probably stimulate some sectors associated with whoever is in line with the party leadership to keep them happy. So that’s what I’ll be watching next week.

TN: Yes. Very good, guys. Thank you so much. Looking forward to have a great holiday weekend, and I look forward to seeing you next week. Thank you very much.

Categories
Week Ahead

The Week Ahead – 18 Jul 2022: Biden’s Saudi Arabia trip 🛢️

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HpcWVeE8mPY

Biden’s Saudi trip ended up being a disappointment and there really is no immediate spare capacity, which is a surprise to no one.

What does the appreciated USD mean? We’ve already seen a fall in Sri Lanka and other places which we’ve talked about for weeks, but where is that going and when will that end?

We also talked about the FOMC expectations. What will the Fed do, especially given CPI PPI data? We have to also keep in mind that we have an election coming up in November, so it’s really hard for the Fed to keep the heat on.

Key themes:

  1. Biden’s Saudi Arabia trip 🛢️
  2. USD🚀 rocket ship and fallout
  3. FOMC expectations (CPI/PPI)
  4. What’s ahead for next week?

This is the 26th episode of The Week Ahead, where experts talk about the week that just happened and what will most likely happen in the coming week.

Follow The Week Ahead experts on Twitter:

Tony: https://twitter.com/TonyNashNerd
Sam: https://twitter.com/samuelrines
Albert: https://twitter.com/amlivemon/

Time Stamps

0:00 Start
0:49 Key themes for the episode
1:55 Biden’s trip to Saudi Arabia
3:23 PR game and disastrous foreign policies
5:00 The US President looks like he has no power?
6:17 US can be a marginal price setter for oil, but…
7:34 what happens to crude prices?
10:08 Why is USD pushing higher?
11:22 What’s happening in the Euro Dollar and why?
13:51 FOMC
19:00 What happened to the gasoline prices?
20:07 When will Yellen give up on the 2% inflation?
23:45 What’s for the week ahead?

Listen to the podcast version on Spotify here:

https://open.spotify.com/episode/4cvisj39soBnXdia0S9bXv?si=4c2c9ffb0f6f4717

Transcript

TN: Hi, everybody, and welcome to The Week Ahead. I’m Tony Nash. I want to thank Albert and Sam for joining us to take a look at The Week Ahead. Before we get started, please, please like and subscribe on this channel and please comment, ask us questions, let us know additional information you think we should have. We get back to every single one of those and we want to make sure that you guys are happy with what we’re talking about today.

So today there’s a lot that’s happened over the past week and even over the weekend that we want to get into. We’ve got three topics here, but there’s going to be a lot of overlap in these. So I’m just going to introduce these and then we’re going to have a pretty open discussion.

The first is Biden’s Saudi trip, ended up being kind of a disappointment and there really is no immediate spare capacity, which is kind of a surprise to no one, but it happened and we’ll cover it. Next is the US dollar, and what does the appreciated US dollar mean? We’ve already seen a fall in Sri Lanka and other places which we’ve talked about for weeks, but where is that going and when will that end? Next is FOMC expectations. What will the Fed do? Especially given CPI PPI data? And we have to also keep in mind that we have an election coming up in November, so it’s really hard for the Fed to keep the heat on when we have an election coming in November or that would be a normal election year.

So Albert and Sam, thank you so much for taking your Sunday afternoon to talk through to us. Let’s first get into Biden’s trip. Albert, can you give us a little bit of a kind of geopolitical backdrop for us? Help us understand what were the expectations and what actually happened?

AM: Well, I mean, the expectations were that Biden goes into the Saudi Arabians in the Middle East and cuts a deal for them to increase production and capacity and name your whatever little policy that they’re talking about. The reality was Biden wanted to get away from the PPI number and the CPI. They’re just atrocious. So he decided it’s a normal thing that politicians leave and go overseas so they don’t have to deal with it.

So he went over to Saudi Arabia meets MBS, which was already a problem considering the comments that he had for the election. But his goal for upping production by the Middle East and OPEC, it was a fantasy. It was nothing more than a PR gimmick in my opinion, that the Fed has been playing in futures and crushing the price of oil. So it was one of these, look here, this is what I’m doing on the grand stage and oil prices are falling, but in reality they weren’t really connected.

TN: So were there really expectations in the administration that there would be additional immediate capacity? Do they really think that that would be on the table?

AM: I don’t think so to be honest with you, Tony. Like I said, this is a PR game that they’re playing now specifically because, like you mentioned, elections are coming up and their intent is to save the Democratic majority in the Senate. The House is lost, but the Senate is what they’re eyeing up. So in my opinion, this is all PR games.

TN: Okay. But the PR game that is really hard for me to understand is the President, regardless of who it is, okay. The President going to a place that is an ally. Saudi Arabia is pretty much an ally to the US. And coming away with nothing. One would think that the Secretary of State and the Nat Sec guys, other guys would have gone in first to make sure that we could announce something positive and nothing happened.

So it seems to me that there is foreign policy disaster after foreign policy disaster with this administration. I don’t want to be putting my own view on it, but is it that, too?

AM: Of course, we’ve had just multiple disasters and foreign policy. But even from the Saudi Arabian perspective, who’s their biggest client? At the moment, it’s China. Why do they have to listen to Biden, who’s made the Biden administration has made unbelievable mistakes in foreign policy and actually risk their security more than anything else. He’s taking the foot off of the Iranians. The Saudis have to deal with that. The Russians are in their own little world of adventures, but there’s no real stability in the Middle East, and the United States under Biden doesn’t really show that there is anyone stepping up to the plate.

TN: Right. And that’s kind of a leadership issue. Whether or not the US is their main customer, the US has been their main advocate in the Middle East and around the world. Or one of their main advocates. Right.

AM: Yeah.

TN: So that’s the big loss that I see is you have a president going in, not getting an agreement with a huge entourage for agreements that should have been done before they arrived, and it just makes them look like they have no power. Sam, is that how you read it?

SR: Yeah. There’s two things that I think the US. Generally gave to Saudi Arabia, and that was global clout and weapons, right? Yes. And the second part is probably very important to the Saudis going forward because there’s only so many places that manufacture weapons that are decent, and that’s the US, to a certain degree, Russia, China and basically Turkey. So you can kind of buy weapons from those places. Guess what? That was a tool that really wasn’t flexed at all.

And if you’re going to flex policy power, that probably should have been flexed a little bit. And honestly, it doesn’t appear to have been at all. So I would say to Albert’s point exactly, we’re not the largest customer when it comes to oil by a mile. Right, that’s just true. But we are the largest supplier for their national defense.

TN: Here’s the thing that I don’t understand is, with US production, we can be the marginal price setter for global oil prices, but we pull that card off of the table by disabling our domestic manufacturers. Is that a fair thing to say?

SR: Well, I would say that that’s the muscle that we’re kind of flexing right now, right? To a certain extent

TN: Okay, tell me more about that. How are we flexing that?

SR: Well, we’re flexing it. I’m not saying it’s good flex. Right. We’re flexing it by not doing anything. So we are basically the ones holding up global price of oil. OPEC honestly has pumped exactly what they said they would pump with a little variability, and they don’t have much marginal capacity.

The marginal capacity was passed to fracking a long time ago. This is not a shocking revelation. So when you’re the global incremental supply that can flip on in a relatively fast manner and you say, we are not going to do that, period, and we’re not going to in any way supplement the regulatory overhangs and the capital overhangs, and guess what? You’re going to end up with a global shortage of oil and distillates, etc.

TN: Right. So what happens to crude prices with the Saudis saying, okay, maybe capacity in 2027? What do we see in the short term with crude prices? I mean, with a recession looming, supposedly, whether that’s real or not remains to be seen. Right. And we had a good retail sales figure on Friday, pretty strong.

So what do we see happen with crude prices in the short term? Is there upward pressure on crude prices or are we kind of in this range?

AM: I think we’re in this range of 90 to 115. Just simply because of the reality. I want to differentiate pre election versus post election. Right. Pre election, we’re definitely in a range of 90 to 115. The Feds not going to let the price of oil gets to the point where people are paying six, $7 a gallon to the tank. So that’s first and foremost.

After that, hands up. Who knows what’s going to happen then? Because Europe’s going through an energy crisis with gas. The price of oil is probably going to go up just because the green deals that the Biden administration are intent on passing are going to ramp up right at the election and just afterwards. So after the election, I could see 130, 140.

TN: Okay. Sam, any near term change in crude prices because of this? No?

SR: Well, near term, Albert’s point, $90 a barrel seems to be kind of the low here. I don’t think we’re going to go much lower. And that’s a combination of DXY at 108, which DXY at 108 is atypical to oil remaining elevated.

So if you begin to have a dollar breaking into the back half the year, that’s kind of the post election story. I think Albert would back me up on that part. You begin to see that breaking. Guess what? The scaling, that makes 130, 140 is relatively reasonable. But you call it 90 to 115. Absolutely not a problem here. And you probably creep back towards the upper end of that 150 because you’ve seen two things.

You’ve seen gasoline prices come down, which means demand is going to remain resilient, if not pick up on the margins. And guess what? That flows downhill. So I would say oil prices, gasoline prices, they look good right now. I saw a free handle on gasoline close to my house. That’s not going to last. That’s not going to beat the system.

TN: Right. Okay. So, Sam, you mentioned the dollar at 108. We hit 109 last week. Why is the dollar pushing higher, guys?

AM: I can tell you why. I’ve been adamant about this. Yellen tell the European counterparts that she was going to drive the dollar up to 110 and above. She’s done this in 2013 before. There’s nothing new under the sun. It’s part of her playbook. She knows what she’s doing. She can even go up another 10%. Now, what that does to emerging markets? Oh, God help them at the moment. But still, the dollar is the most effective tool in their eyes for inflation busting, at least short term.

TN: So how far are we going?

AM: I think we go up to 112 to 115.

TN: Okay, over what time horizon? The next month? The next three months?

AM: Yeah, I think it’s in the next month. I think they want to get this over and done with so they can pivot starting September. Stop the rate hikes. And on top of that, this is something for Sam that could talk about the Fed is I think that Powell probably loses the majority of votes in the Fed for Fed members come October.

TN: Okay, hold on, hold on, hold on. I want to talk about that. But let’s finish up with the dollar first. Okay? This is good. Okay, so with the dollar, help me understand what’s happening in the Euro dollar markets right now. Okay. We’ve seen the Euro dollar fall as the dollar rises. What’s actually happening there, and why.

SR: Not me?

AM: Okay.

TN: Yes.

AM: I’ve been adamant about this. Also, as global trade slows down, the need and use of Euro dollars becomes less so. And a lot of people sit there mistake that as the dollar is dying and gold is coming back and whatever name your crypto, that’s supposed to be the next reserve currency. But that’s just the reality of the moment, is they are purposely trying to kill demand. When you kill demand, the Euro dollar starts to fall because there’s less need of it. That’s just the most simple basic explanation that I can give you at the moment.

TN: Okay, so, Sam, that is non US demand in US dollars, right?

SR: Yeah. Dollar denominated non US debt.

TN: Okay. And so the largest portion of the euro dollar market. Is that still in Europe?

SR: No, it still flows through Europe. Right, okay. But it’s a much larger market than simply Europe.

TN: Okay. It tells me outside of the US, there’s a slow down generally. Is that fair to say?

SR: Yeah.

TN: And we’ve talked about this before. Europe has big problems. We saw China’s numbers last week, which are obviously overreported anyway, so Japan is having problems. So all the major markets are having issues. So the Euro dollar is just a proxy for what’s actually happening, those markets through trade and through the demand for actually US dollar currency spent outside of the US.

SR: Correct.

AM: Yes. Very simplistic terms, yes, that’s exactly right.

TN: Good. Anything else for the viewers here? Like, anything else that you guys want to add on Euro dollars just so they can pay attention to things?

AM: Not really. It’s a very good just simplistic, basic understanding of Euro dollars. I mean, we can get into the whole mechanics of your dollars, but it’s so big it’ll take up an entire episode.

TN: Okay, good. Very good.

SR: Very into the weeds very quickly.

TN: Good.

AM: Yeah.

TN: So if anybody’s watching has questions about Euro dollars, let us know. We’ll get Sam and Albert in on this and help them answer the questions. All right?

Okay. Finally, FOMC, okay. We saw CPI hit to the high side. We saw PPI hit to the high side last week. A lot of talk about 100 basis point hike. Sam had a newsletter out that said could be 100, could be 75. And Albert obviously thinks that there’s going to be a pivot in September. So Sam, do you want to kick this one off?

SR: Yeah, sure. I do want to point out that I said there’s a difference between should and will in the newspaper, and the notion was, should the Fed go 100 now? Will they? Probably, unless the University of Michigan survey comes in light. And it came in light. So you’re 75 basis points now. It’s that simple.

TN: Okay.

SR: Very straightforward. The Fed probably wanted to have flexibility for 100, but when they tied themselves to something so stupid as the University of Michigan survey and it falls I mean…

AM: You know what, Sam, the funny thing is that you say that is, that is exactly what they look at, for making their policy decisions. The only thing they look at.

TN: University Of Michigan.

SR: I know they look at it. The problem was they said it out loud. Like, you don’t say that out loud. That’s the mysterious parts of it. It’s a survey of a very small subsection that is basically never been tied to reality at all across any time frame whatsoever. And like yeah..

TN: It’s like making policy based on Atlanta GDP now. Right. It’s like a lot of these things are proxies of small survey sizes of whatever.

SR: Error terms that interact with each other, yes.

TN: Right. I think a lot of people who watch markets see these indexes, like the University of Michigan index come out and they think that it means something, but it kind of does, but it kind of doesn’t. And so I always recommend people, you have to understand these indexes. You have to understand what these releases mean. You have to understand the methodology. If you’re going to make investment decisions based upon these things, you have to understand what they are.

And as you dig down beneath these things like University of Michigan was put out what 30 years ago initially. The methodology hasn’t changed much since then. So if you imagine the technology and the capabilities 30 years ago and they carried that forward, it’s pretty light. It’s pretty light. A lot of these things are pretty light.

AM: Yeah, but they want it like that though Tony. They don’t want to update their stuff because they don’t want transparency. Seriously.

TN: It’s true.

AM: If you want to massage the numbers, you go with what you know, what you know is flawed and that’s what you go with.

TN: Right.

AM: I had a quick question for Sam. Like I said, I think that they’re going to pivot in September after 75 basis point rate hike now and whatever CPI coming in in August. But I don’t think this is the right decision for them to pivot this early because they’re expecting demand to come down and I see no demand coming down anywhere at the moment. So what happens if they sit there and try to pivot for September, October, November, election time and then January, December comes along and demand is sky high again? What does that do to inflation for 2023?

SR: I think it’s complicated, right? Because it’s kind of the goods versus services problem going into the back of the year. Right. We’ll have plenty of goods, print, crap on store shelves and Target for toys and whatnot because that part of the supply chain is solved.

What’s going to be persistent on the CPI price is going to be shelter, which we all know is six months lagged and is going to be a problem for the rest of the year. And there’s nothing they can do about that because their methodology is, again, stupid. So there’s nothing they can do on the prints from here out.

They’re going to have prints that are sitting at 30 basis points plus just because of shelter and it’s weight in core, that’s going to be a big problem for them on the CPI front. So if they pivot, they’re basically going to have to say that, you know, look at headline, it absolutely plummeted. Gasoline.

TN: Will we get a core rating, x Energy, Food and shelter? Will we start quoting that?

SR: Yeah. That’s what I started looking at for the exact reason of trying to find a pivot. Because eventually that will be the metric that they are forced to go to if they want to pivot. It’ll be SuperCore and guess what you call it supercore.

SuperCore doesn’t look that great right now, but it could look pretty interesting if you begin to have gasoline coming down 40% month over month with what the next one is going to say or 25% month over month. So you’re going to continue to have some volatility on the headline CPI front, which is basically what the Fed is going to have to look at in order to pivot.

TN: Okay, so can I ask what happened with gasoline prices? We still have 94% or whatever utilization. Crude prices haven’t come down that much. So why have we seen a 30% fall in gasoline prices over the past three to four weeks?

SR: Recession fears?

AM: Yeah.

TN: That’s it. Okay.

AM: Yeah, pretty much exactly. It’s just the narrative of recessions coming and trying to kill demand based on that. It’s just like I said, PR games, nothing more.

SR: The one thing that I want to point out that I think is really important to kind of consider for Albert’s point of a pivot is equities tend to move in a six month precursor. And what you’ve seen since July 1 is an absolute rip in home builders and a relative squashing of utilities.

And if people were betting on a longer recession in a longer Fed cycle, XLU would be the buy and homebuilders would be the short. And that has simply not been the case so far.

TN: Very interesting, Sam Rines.

AM: When do you think that Yellen this is for both of you, when do you think that Yellen gives up on the 2% inflation number and says 4% is the goldilocks level?

TN: Sam Rines you first. It’s a great question.

SR: I don’t think they go 4%, but I think they say, and they’ve begun to do this, if you go back over the last six months of speeches that 2 to 2.5 is fine.

AM: Still it’s going to be higher.

SR: They’re creeping it up. Right. I don’t think it’ll be 4%. I think between two and 3% is a reasonable target, blah, blah, blah, given and they’ll go into things like because of the way that we measure CPI, 2 to 3%, blah, blah, blah. There’ll be some.

AM: Fun times.

TN: I think if they did that, Albert, I think it would be after the election.

AM: Oh, of course. They’re not doing anything that’s going to trip up Operation Save the Democratic Senate, you know what I mean? They’re just not going to do that. Right?

TN: Yeah. I think people are already really upset about inflation. Companies are starting to report or expected report numbers down, their earnings down, and so it’s hurting everybody.

AM: Yeah, but everything they’re doing is just going to make inflation worse in 2023. But it’s going to come back with a vengeance because unemployment is still unemployment is going to start ticking up, because…

TN: It’s not an election year. Nobody cares because it’s not an election year.

AM: Stimulus checks will flow again. It’ll be fun.

SR: The one thing, again this goes to Albert’s point on, will a potential September pivot be a mistake? Pepsi’s report this week showed a 1% organic volume growth and 12% pricing. They put 12% pricing and consumers and had volumes creep up 1%. Guess what? If companies can get away with that, they are going to all day long, and they will in fact, make a fortune on the back side of this.

AM: Of course.

SR: Paying attention to that demand destruction has not crept through yet. If you can push that kind of price and not have volumes fall, guess what?

TN: Well, the biggest thing, of course, and this is a no brainer, but prices are not going back to where they were. They are not going back to where they were. This is not a temporary inflation thing. And it may have started that way, but the way we responded to it was completely wrong. And it just baked in these supply side things that flowed all the way through to the retail side.

AM: Wage inflation alone. Wage inflation alone.

TN: Yeah. But I think we’re going to see more on the, say, low, medium side of wages. I think in order to keep up with a 12% price hike in Pepsi, you’re going to have to see more action on the wage side.

SR: Granted, that was mostly free online. That was mostly salty snacks. And it might have had something to do honestly, it might have had something to do with more frequent gasoline stops. You buy more chips. But I wouldn’t read too much into that. Right. I do think that their ability to push price is pretty good.

TN: Great.

SR: Yes. To your point, it’s a step function in pricing and therefore it’s a step function in inflation. Great. Okay, guys, 60 seconds. What do you see for the week ahead? Albert, go.

AM: Commodities. Rebounding commodities. I’m long wheat. I think there’s problematic globally for wheat. I want to see wheat prices start to track back up, to be honest with you. Same thing with oil.

TN: So soft and energy.

AM: Yeah.

TN: Okay. Sam?

SR: Yeah. Watching the inflation trade, honestly, and I think it’s very similar to Albert’s point on oil. And wheat, I’ll be watching the relative sector distribution pretty closely here, looking for those like XLU versus the housing guys versus some of the other trades to see what people actually putting money to work are really thinking, not just by them.

TN: Very good, guys, thank you so much. Thank you so much for taking your Monday afternoon. Thanks, everybody, for watching our late week ahead. And guys, thanks. Have a great week ahead.

AM: Thanks, guys.

Categories
Week Ahead

The Week Ahead – 11 Jul 2022: Energy Backwardation

We had a pretty volatile week last week, with crude selling off pretty sharply early in the week. In this episode, we looked at energy backwardation, and Tracy educated us on what’s happening in those markets.

We also had some comments from Putin about a multipolar world. Albert talked through that.

And then on Friday, unfortunately, we saw the assassination of Japan’s former Prime Minister Abe. We talked about the Japan post-Abe and what that means for the region.

Key themes:

  1. Energy backwardation
  2. Putin’s Multi-Polar world
  3. Japan post-Abe
  4. What’s ahead for next week?

This is the 25th episode of The Week Ahead, where experts talk about the week that just happened and what will most likely happen in the coming week.

Follow The Week Ahead experts on Twitter:

Tony: https://twitter.com/TonyNashNerd
Tracy: https://twitter.com/chigrl
Albert: https://twitter.com/amlivemon/

Time Stamps

0:00 Start
0:54 Key Themes for the week
1:28 Catalyst of the energy sell-off on Tuesday
5:44 Will we see more action in energy prices?
6:57 Is it cost-ineffective to make hydrogen with natgas prices?
8:11 Diesel
9:20 Vladimir Putin’s multipolar world.
13:44 Japan post-Abe
20:29 What’s for the week ahead?

Listen to the podcast version on Spotify here:

Transcript

TN: Hi. Welcome to the Week Ahead. I’m Tony Nash. Thanks for joining us. I’m with Tracy and Albert today. Sam is away, but we are talking about a pretty volatile week this week. Before we get started, actually, please like and subscribe. Please ask any questions below, make any comments. We want to make sure this is interesting for you, so just let us know any additional info you want or comments. We’re happy to address those.

We had a pretty volatile week this week with crude selling off pretty sharply early in the week. So we’re going to look at energy backwardation, and Tracy is going to educate us all on what’s happening in those markets. We also had some comments out of Putin about a multipolar world. We’re going to have Albert talk through that. And then on Friday, unfortunately, we saw the assassination of Japan’s former Prime Minister Abe. So we’re going to talk about the Japan post Abe and what that means for Japan and the region.

So first let’s get into energy. Tracy, obviously, we had a big sell off in energy early in the week, and then we saw it come back later. What was really the catalyst for that energy sell off on Tuesday?

TS: What happened is that we started on July 5, right? We opened with low liquidity in the market in general. Then we saw a sell off in the general markets and commodities and risky assets that kind of exacerbated that trade. And then on the 6th, we saw a liquidation of a couple of very large positions in that market. And so fundamentally, basically, there is no reason for this sell off other than technicalities.

In fact, if we’re looking at this market, this spreads, the calendar spreads, which means month to month, were exploding higher during this entire move. That implies that the physical market at least, is very tight right now because you’re seeing backwardation increase significantly when we’re seeing a $10 move in ZZ, which is crazy.

TN: Can you tell us what that means? A $10 move in ZZ. What does that mean for the rest of us?

TS: If you’re talking about calendar schedule, we’re talking about monthly. So we can talk about the current front month is August. So we look at August, September, September to October, October to November, et cetera, et cetera. And once these spreads start exploding higher, that means that we’re seeing people want to dump oil in the front month market because that’s more lucrative than keeping it in storage.

So if I’m an investor and I’m looking and I want to invest in a backwardated market, I’m looking at a convex market that goes from right to left, and I’m going to invest in, say, a back month, and I want my investment to move higher…

TN: I’m investing further in the future.

TS: Right. That’s what it backwards. If you’re in a contangable market, we’re looking at the opposite situation, where you’re looking at a convex structure going from right to left, whereas if I invest in December, by the time my investment reaches Frontline X free, I’m losing money. I’m losing value in my investment.

TN: Right.

TS: And so that’s how we kind of have to look at that situation.

TN: Yes. You had a great tweet this week explaining that with visuals.

TS: I did. It’s on Twitter, if anyone wants to see it.

TN: Exactly. We saw this in crude. We also saw it in a natural gas. Right?

TS: Yes. We’re kind of seeing a major pullback in many of the commodities markets. Right. We’re seeing a little bit of a bounce this week because we’re looking at China. China has recently announced we have one last announcement with $200 billion bond sale rate. So we’re looking at a lot of stimulus out of China that’s giving commodities the boost. Right now, we have to see I think the markets are still going to wait on, particularly the industrial and base medical markets are going to wait until we actually see some action in China to really see investment back into these markets after this huge goal.

TN: So nobody believes the China stimulus story right now. It’s kind of a show me the money period. Right. But once they do start to show the money, do you think we’ll see much more action in energy prices?

TS: I think you’ll see more action in metal prices than you will equity prices.

TN: Copper’s way off compared to, say, the last 18 months. But it’s not way off, given historical copper prices. If we go back before, say, Q1 of 2020, it’s kind of where it had been previously in the ballpark, at least. Right. So we haven’t necessarily reverted back to pre-COVID, necessarily. We’re just in the start-stop manufacturing world, and that’s what’s affecting base metals like copper. Is that fair to say?

TS: Oh, absolutely. If you look at, like, a monthly chart rather than looking at a five-minute chart, and the market has kind of just been consolidating, really, for the last two years, until we see a really big break above, say, $5, a really big break below $3, we’re still kind of in that consolidation zone.

TN: 3.50 to 4.50 kind of range. Interesting. Okay. Sorry, Albert.

AM: Yeah. I got a question for Tracy. Nat gas, as we’re talking, since we discussed it a little bit, that’s used to make hydrogen, if I’m not mistaken, and since the nat gas price seems to be elevated, isn’t that going to be a little bit too cost-ineffective to make hydrogen, which causes a diesel problem, if I’m not mistaken? I’m not sure about that. That’s what I’m asking.

TS: No, absolutely. I think that would be a problem. Looking forward. I think there’s a lot of problems if we’re looking at the hydrogen market. There’s still a lot of problems when we’re talking about taking this idea to actual fruition. Right. Because if you look at the hydrogen market, there’s like a rainbow of green hydrogen, blue hydrogen, this hydrogen, this hydrogen. But we really haven’t gotten to the point that can overtake, not gas the allure of the situation is that you can take hydrogen, mix it with nat gas, you can send it down the same pipeline, and that saves a lot of money.

AM: Yeah.

TS: The situation is this is not a great idea in theory, but we’re just not there yet.

TN: Okay, got you. Albert’s, question about diesel. Diesel is not any less tight than it was a week or two ago. Right? In fact, that’s just as tight or tighter than it was, say, a couple of weeks ago or a month ago.

TS: Yeah, I think the diesel market is still very tight.

TN: Right.

AM: Maintenance season starts, isn’t it? From September to November?

TS: Yes, we will start maintenance seasons.

TN: Okay.

TS: I would actually look for some of these refineries to maybe put off maintenance season. So that’s what I would watch to the maintenance season happen. And it’s happened before. If we have it such a tight market, we could see them putting off maintenance seasons. It’s not unheard of.

TN: Okay, so hurricane season and maintenance season are upon us, but we may see at least maintenance season for all of us.

TS: Oh, not I just moved to Florida.

TN: Good luck with that. I’m in Texas. We don’t get as many of you, but it’ll be a fun season for you.

Okay, let’s move on, guys, to some comments out of Putin this week. Vladimir Putin had some comments about us, the multipolar world becoming more and more of reality. We heard this ten years ago. We heard this 20 years ago, and it came up again this week. So, Albert, can you kind of let us know what’s going on there?

AM: Tony, I’ve used this multipolar example for the US. Dollar dominance I got for years now. And the fact of the matter is, we are not in a multipolar world. We are not even going into multipolar world.

People are confusing a little bit of weakness in the US. Leadership and errors and decision making, foreign policy for multipolars, it’s just a multipolarity, and it’s just not the case for the world to be in a multipolar scenario, you would need multiple countries with equal militaries and economies. We are nowhere near that.

The Russian economy is 2.5 trillion. The American economy is pushing 30 trillion. This is just a joke by Vladimir Putin. Simply undermine the US dominance both in the world stage and the dollar.

TN: Aside from some dumpster pundits who write for The Atlantic or whatever, who believes that nonsense?

AM: A lot of Europhiles that want to see the United States take a step down, they can do it. A lot of crypto guys, a lot of gold guys. These guys have to make that argument, because without multipolarity, you cannot have a neutral reserve asset to settle trade. And that’s just the fact of the matter.

The problem becomes, if you have a multipolar world, you’re on the verge of another world war, because there always has to be one alpha that takes hold of the system. You just can’t have equal people.

TN: And the cost of the transaction? Cost? The cost of trade, everything goes up. If you have multiple rights go up, everything goes up.

AM: It’s completely unstable.

TS: Inflation from other countries to other countries.

AM: Yeah.

TN: The world is built on China exporting deflation. Has been for 15, 20 years. And it will continue. If they could just keep their ports open, it will continue. And it makes people happy. Right.

AM: No, you’re right. That’s just the way our system works right now, with the dollar underpinning all of it. It’s the lifeblood that makes trade work. And people are not going to like it. But I promise you, no one alive today is going to see anything other.

TN: So let me just take a step back. Who does he think the polls are? Russia, China and the US? Or Germany or something?

AM: He’s trying to make an assumption to say that Russia and China are the new contenders to the United States. The problem with that is they don’t have military power projection globally like the United States does. They can’t even invade Ukraine. China can’t even invade Taiwan. Otherwise they would have taken it if they’ve it could have. This is the world we live.

TN: Yeah. Russia can stir up problems in Libya or the Middle East or whatever.

AM: There’s no question that they can stir up problems and they can fill in gap vacuums that we leave right, unintentionally, unintentionally. But they cannot hold that territory. They cannot force changes in governments like the United States did.

TN: And every time I hear somebody talk about the Belt and Road as a sign of China’s dominance, it reminds me of Napoleon’s march to Russia. Right? I mean, they’re spreading themselves so thin. They can’t keep that up.

AM: They can’t. That’s perfect example to do that, to make that thing actually successful, you need to back that up to secure your trade line, trade with the military. Right. China has like, what, two military bases outside of China? Like one in Djibouti and something else. I mean, they can’t send ships over to their armor.

TN: Myanmar.

AM: Yeah. This is beyond a joke to me. I don’t take anybody seriously that even brings this part up, right. Vladimir Putin included.

TN: That’s good. So anybody watching this, if you have an alternative view, let us know in the comments. Honestly, we’d love to hear it. We just want to hear some credible.

TS: Put your notes in the comments.

TN: Yes, absolutely. Okay. Now, finally today I woke up in the US to the really tragic news of Japan’s foreign Prime Minister Abe, being assassinated.

I saw Abe in his first stint as PM in the mid 2000s. And then when he came back in, in 2013, and with the Abenomics plan, which was really difficult to pull off, ultimately successfully. The guy was smart. He was all about Japan. He’s all about Japan recovering, all about Japan being competitive. I put a picture up of Abe shaking hands with Prime Minister Modi of India. Japan and India were very tight. A lot of Japanese investment going to India, a lot of partnership across those two countries and in Africa, both to defend against China in Asia and other parts of the world. So Prime Minister Abe will be missed.

I think what Abe did partly was bring back Japan’s ability to defend itself by passing a constitutional change that allowed the Japanese military to defend itself where previously it wasn’t even allowed to do that. So there’s a lot of dignity that Japan kind of got back, and we can rub Japan’s nose in World War II for eternity, but it’s not going to be constructive. What happened, happened. They’ve paid their dues, and that’s kind of what Abe said, look, we paid our dues, we’re going to move on now and join the 21st century. And that’s what Japan did.

So I’m just curious to get your thoughts, guys, on Japan post Abe. What do you see as of course they moved on to another prime minister. Japan has already moved on from the Abe government. He wasn’t a sitting prime minister. But what do you see kind of the challenges of Japan’s role in Asia particularly, but also in the world post Abe?

AM: I think the most pressing issue for Japan would be contending with China, both militarily and economically. Abe was, like you said, brilliant statesman and patriot for the Japanese people. So he’s going to be sorely missed. And it’s not just he’s going to be missed, but his cabinet and the people that his network is going to be missed because they’re losing a big part of what he brought to the table in terms of strategy and ideology. It was a big shift.

I think that the Japanese are probably going to struggle for strategy in the next five to ten years. And it’s a sad thing, but I’m sure the Japanese, they’re resilient people and they’ll move on and they’ll recover.

TN: Tracy?

TS: No, I absolutely agree with what Albert said. I think the thing is that people are painting him, the media right now, in particular the Western media, painting them with some villain, which is very interesting to me. And I think that people should really just look at his legacy and respect what he’s done instead of jumping on the bandwagon.

TN: So they’re portraying him as some ultra nationalist, but he’s as ultra nationalist as Modi as in India, or Jokowi is in Indonesia, or Lee is in Singapore, you name it. Tsai Ing-wen in Taiwan. It’s an Asian direction now. Right. And has been for the last ten to 15 years.

AM: Yeah. The media also, Tony, is desperate to not allow any center right or even right nationalist figures be murderers or looked up upon. They just can’t stomach it. They just can’t help themselves to demonize a person that is absolutely unjustifiably demonized by being called an ultra-nationalist and even worse, by the NPR.

NPR had two other headlines that they had to delete because it was just so atrocious. This is a.. And Modi, Abe, I don’t want to put Victor Orban into that, but all these right leaning leaders just get attacked and the media can’t help it.

TN: Right, yeah. I think from an economic plan, if we look at what Abe did with Abenomics, of course, the Japanese Central Bank is kind of “independent,” right. But they really took the JPY from kind of 76 to the dollar to, say, 120 to the dollar, and it really allowed Japanese manufacturing to be competitive again. Right.

And it took somebody with that clarity of economic vision, as well as the clarity of, say, the military vision and political vision, to be able to pull off what they did. And in terms of, say, energy sustainability under Abe, they also created much deeper relationships in the Middle East with places like Qatar, UAE.

TS: And they also looked forward to nuclear, where you looked at the west was looking to shut things down, Abe was looking to invest in nuclear projects. You’re looking for energy security, energy going forward. There are a lot of things that he did to advance that sector in Japan, which is admirable.

TN: Right. Albert if we take a US perspective on this? The US has worked hard to kind of hold a line against China. Do you think with the mediocre leadership we have in the US right now, do you think it’s possible that some of that US say coalition falls apart a little bit? Or do you think we just kind of take a breather and then it resumes based on the institutional stamina of parts of the Japanese government?

AM: That’s a great question, Tony. That’s actually a really good question. And I think where we have to look for we have to separate the Biden foreign policy cabinet with the Pentagon. Because the Pentagon is actually leading this charge for the Pacific with Japan and Australia in charge. I really don’t think that the Japanese are going to take a step back or the US is going to take a step back. I think the system is pretty much, the train has already left the station and it’s rolling.

There might be an argument from the opposition in Japan, but I don’t think. That it’s going to take hold to derail this new initiative by the US and the Pacific.

TN: Great, that’s good to hear. Okay, guys. Hey, on that somber note, we’ll end it, but let’s look at the week ahead. Guys, what are you looking for in the week ahead? We’ve had this real turnaround this week. What do you see going into next week? Do you see things calming a bit?

We saw it coming into Friday. Things really turn up in US markets and in commodity markets. Do we see things stabilizing a bit going into the Fed meeting after we’ve had some Fed comments late this week?

AM: I want to see the comments of where they might signal a 50 basis point rate hike versus a 75. I absolutely believe 75 points is coming just from the jobs data that they posted. It was obviously massaged a little bit.

TN: Just a little bit.

AM: Of course it is. Yeah, but this was a good one. And then the revision too, and it just seems to me that they want another 75 basis point rate hike.

TN: To really kill it?

AM: They got to tackle inflation. I mean, they’re looking at 8.8 on the next CPI, which is just.. And you’re staring on the barrel at 9% and 9.2 and 9.3 in the coming months, which is absolutely a political nuclear bomb that goes off.

TN: Okay, Tracy, what are you looking for in the next week especially in commodities?

TS: Yeah, I mean, I agree we probably will see 75 after non farm payroll this week, which I was looking for a clue kind of are we going to get 50, are we going to get 75? It looks like 75 for sure.

So looking in the coming weeks, I’m really looking to China right now and to see what comes to fruition with these sort of stimulus plans. What does that do to the base in industrial medals markets? And I think those are the two things that you should be focusing on right now, particularly if you’re invested in commodities markets.

TN: Very good. Okay. Yeah. I’m kind of hoping they give in to 50, but I’m not hopeful. I do think they’ll on the kind of conservative hawkish side and go 75. But if they can pick up the bat phone and talk to China, and the China guys will unload a dump truck of cash over the next week or so, then I think they’ll be a little bit lighter and do 50 basis points. But I think a lot of it depends on China ECB. They can’t get their act together, so there’s nothing ECB can do to really help.

And Europe is in so much trouble that it doesn’t really matter what they do. They have huge problems anyway. So. I think you’re right. And tell me what you think about this. But I don’t necessarily think we see massive chop. I think we see just a lot of fairly sideways moved for the next week or so.

AM: I would be wary if we jumped up to 4000 or even, like, 3970. I think a rug pull would be in an order right after that. That’s what they do. They bowl everybody up and then pull the rug out.

TN: Tracy?

TS: Yeah. After this big move down in the oil market, in particular, because we did have sort of a flow event coupled with a couple of large funds kind of workforce to liquidate. So I could see that we still could go a little bit higher next week. Sideways to higher next week.

TN: Very good. Okay, guys, be interesting to see. Thanks for joining us. Thanks very much. Have a great weekend. And have a great week ahead.

TN: Very good. Thank you, guys.

AM: I struggle with the headache through that whole thing.

Categories
Week Ahead

The Week Ahead – 27 Jun 2022: The “R” Word

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Powell was out saying “I don’t think a recession is inevitable” but also admitted that rate hikes may be one of many factors that push the economy into recession. All of this while bank credit continues to grow, which we saw flatten in 2020 and decline in 2008. What’s happening? Is a recession inevitable at this point?

We talked about the dollar two weeks ago and the strength is still there. Are we pushing higher so commodities feel a bit cheaper to Americans? Is this temporary – mainly so Americans talk about cheaper gasoline over the July 4th holiday weekend? How far and how long do you expect the dollar to go? Why?

Can crude continue to rally into a recession?

Key themes:

  1. The “R” Word
  2. Geopolitical fallout
  3. Crude 💪 or 👎/ Dollar 🚀
  4. What’s ahead for next week?

This is the 23rd episode of The Week Ahead, where experts talk about the week that just happened and what will most likely happen in the coming week.

Follow The Week Ahead experts on Twitter:

Tony: https://twitter.com/TonyNashNerd
Sam: https://twitter.com/SamuelRines
Tracy: https://twitter.com/chigrl
Albert: https://twitter.com/amlivemon/

Time Stamps

0:00 Start
1:03 Key themes for the week
1:48 Powell’s recession call
3:48 The catalysts that could whip growth
6:58 Geopolitics in EMs and related to the US
8:35 Is the ECB a risk as well?
11:00 Crude and the Dollar
16:00 Where do you expect the dollar to go?
19:00 The week ahead

Listen on Spotify:

Transcript

TN: Hi, everybody, and welcome to The Week Ahead. I’m Tony Nash. We’re joined as always, by Tracy, Sam, and Albert. Thanks, guys, for joining us. Before we get started, please, like, please subscribe, please comment. We read all of them and try to respond to all of them. So please go ahead and do that while you’re here. Also, we are running a summer promo for CI Futures. This is our market forecast subscription product. You get three free months, so please go to completeintel.com/2022Promo and learn all about it.

So this week there’s a lot going on, a lot politically in markets, other stuff. We’re talking about three main themes this week. First is the R word. Second is geopolitical fallout of the R word. And third is crude and dollar activity. So I ran a poll earlier this week asking what is the most widely held consensus view that people are seeing right now? And that’s on screen, of course. So first is recession. People are seeing recession as a consensus view all over the place. Next is equities lower, followed by crude higher, followed by a stronger dollar. So we’re going to talk about all these things today.

Sam, let’s talk about that recession call. That recession consensus call. Powell is out this week saying, I don’t think a recession is inevitable after being really hawkish last week and driving people kind of to the edge of this. So what’s actually happening right now? We’re seeing credit continue to grow. And I know I showed you earlier this week. Bank credit continues to grow. Is that meaningful? And what are you looking at to know if we’re going into recession or not?

SR: Yeah, I mean, bank credit, is meh. But at the same time, are we going into a recession? Meh. I don’t really think so. It’s a booming summer. You have hotels full, you have bars and restaurants full. You have airlines unable to keep up with demand. I mean, that sounds like a small subset of the economy, but at the same time, that is a massive portion of the summer economy. It’s massive. So do I think we’re imminently in a recession? No. I actually think that’s one of the big narratives that kind of misses the bigger point, right? Do we make goods? No, we don’t make anything. What we do is we have services. That’s it. So we’re a service based economy. If services are booming, you’re not going into a recession. You’re unlikely to see some sort of huge move in unemployment because a recession technically is down on growth, down on employment.

If you don’t have the down on employment, you don’t have a recession. So maybe you have a slowing of growth. That’s somewhat probable. But a recession, no, not in the cards, at least until the back half this year. In the back half of this year, you have a number of catalysts which could really whip things the other way in terms of both growth.

TN: Okay, so what are some of those catalysts. And when you say back, you’re talking about October? November?

SR: Yes, October. November.

TN: My thinking is if we’re going to see it, we’re going to start seeing it maybe late September, October or something like that. But what are some of those catalysts you’re talking about? A couple of them?

SR: The catalysts then are actually to the gross side, which I think is where I’ll take the opposite side of a lot of people. Those catalysts are called a devolving of the Ukraine conflict. Number one, while that doesn’t take off sanctions in the near term, it does take off the incremental oops.

Then you have the beginning of the reopening of China, which is a big boost to growth in Europe, and secondarily, LatAm and the United States. So you put those pieces together and all of a sudden you’re looking at a back half of the year that has more upside catalysts, potentially. And it’s not like you can reset down China and it’s going to be a negative callus. It’s already in the numbers. It’s not like you can have another war in Ukraine that’s already in the numbers. If you begin to have those two come together, guess what? That’s positive. So I would say the rest of this year is shaping up to be oddly positive.

TN: Yes, but no, I’m kidding. Everyone’s so negative right now. Everyone wants to just find the downside. Russia is going to invade finland or something like that, right?

SR: Yeah. Here’s the play. I would say 3600 is a lot less likely than 43.

TN: I like that.

SR: On the S&P.

TS: I think what we’re going to see is kind of like a balance, right? Where we see services really big this summer, especially in the travel industry, hospitality industry, which we will see taper off this fall, which is not unusual. That always tapers off this fall. But we also see airline prices increasing, so people have booked their summer vacations in Q1. Those people are going to fall off. So I think we’ll see a push. We’ll see a pullback in that industry, but we could see growth in industries that Sam is mentioning.

TN: Great.

SR: Just to throw in there, we have to remember that at some point we have to refill supply chains on the drivable stuff, and those supply chains are at bone zero right now. It will require a whole bunch of employment, a whole bunch of production, and will actually have a fairly significant thrust to GDP. Our production has been zero.

TN: That’s great. My poll is wrong, which is awesome. I love that.

SR: I would bet against every single thing that your poll said.

TN: Perfect. I love that. Okay, so if you’re in the US, that holds. But let’s switch, Albert, to kind of say geopolitical risk and some other things. Obviously, Sri Lanka two months ago started falling apart and not started, but really fell apart. We’ve seen Ecuador and other places really start falling apart.

Albert, what are you seeing, geopolitically, and what are you seeing in EMs related to what’s happening in the US?

AM: I don’t really like focusing on EMs at this moment just because they’re not big enough to really cause a problem in the markets. In my opinion. I’m looking squarely at the European Union right now.

It’s suspicious that we come out with US bank tests and then we come out with EU bank tests and then literally a day later, the Germans come out and say, we could have a Lehman moment across the economy just because of these gas shortages that are happening.

TN: By the way, your tweet about the German Lehman moment up.

AM: Yeah. And this goes back to just the topic we were just talking about, recession. You really need some kind of catalyst or something to break. And the only thing that I could even contemplate of breaking and causing a “recession” would be the European Union going through another financial crisis. You have a contagion that probably leaks over to the United States financial markets and the Putin price hikes become a thing again, justifies any kind of QE that the Federal want to do, probably in Q four this year. Geopolitically, the EU is my target right now to look at.

TN: Okay. It’s energy supply chains. Is the ECB a risk as well? Is there a risk that they tighten too fast or too much or anything?

AM: How are they going to have to I mean, the inflation over there is climbing just as fast as the United States and it’s causing problems across the board.

SR: I would double down on that and say that Qatar, right after we had the train go down in Corpus Christi, came out and said, yeah, we’ll send gas to the European Union. Just sign a 20 year deal.

TN: Right. And they did. Right?

SR: European Union is not going to do that. I mean, nobody in Europe is going to do that. It was kind of like, we got your back, but give us a long term agreement and we’ll do it.

The irony of it is that you have a crisis going on in Europe. There was a dragon moment of do whatever right, anything.

TN: Sorry, Tracy. What’s that?

TS: Self imposed crisis? Their energy crisis is literally self imposed.

TN: Yeah. Okay.

AM: There’s no question that is self imposed. The European Union’s leadership has been atrocious. I mean, they’ve had the worst energy policy you could possibly think of that hampers their economic engine for the last two, three decades. I mean, you can just throw a dart at the board and pick whatever policy they’ve come up with. It has been an absolute disaster.

TN: Why is that? Why are they making such stupid well.

AM: They’ve made such a big swing to the left, the leftist voters, and they’re just climate Nazis. They won’t even discuss nuclear.

SR: We’re literally talking.

AM: They won’t even discuss nuclear power, which is absurd. They’re like, what if something goes bad like Fukushima? Oh, yeah. What if a dam breaks? Or what if a coal plant blows up? Or, God forbid, what if 10,000 Germans freeze to death because you don’t have gas stored because you didn’t have any proper management? I mean, they’re really bad at managing what’s going on without the United States holding their hand and directing what to do.

TN: Well said. Fantastic. Okay, so since we focus a little bit on energy there, Tracy, let’s swing to talk about crude and the dollar. So, our friend Josh Young posted something about kind of energy could potentially outperform this sort of stuff and really kind of looking back to the 1970s.

So it really looked like we were heading there until this week, and then we saw things really come down this week, in terms of, say, WTI, natural gas, other things. What’s going on there?

TS: I think it depends on what you’re looking at. If you were looking at frontline crude oil price, that’s one thing where a lot of speculators are involved in. If you’re looking at the spreads, it’s you’re looking at the crack spreads that are still exploding. If you’re looking at calendar spreads that are up again this week, that pretty much tells you that we put a floor under front month crude price, regardless of who is involved in what specs are involved in the industry right now. Because the spreads are really what I consider will tell you really where things are going. Right.

So we kind of have a floor night. Yes, oil had a bad week. We saw a lot of selling on downtime in markets and things of that nature. I don’t think that doesn’t change the overall fundamentals of the market. Right? I mean, we’re still fundamentally structurally undersupplied.

TN: So I’m going to ask a really dumb question here. I’m sorry if I may hear it.

SR: But we know.

TN: So are we seeing a short term sell off? Is it politically driven so that when Americans get together on July 4, they can say, gosh, gas is really down this week, and then you have a three day weekend where people are talking about that and then it rocket ships up after the fourth?

TS: Well, I think it’s a combination of most things. I think this week recession scares, we’re really the big driver for that market because everybody’s thinking we’re going to have a recession.

SR: That and the potential of having an export ban.

TS: Right.

TN: Recession, export ban, and July 4th.

TS: An export ban. That said, and I kind of tweeted this out, having an export ban, especially a fuel export ban, would make things obviously worse.

First of all, it’ll raise prices for the EU prices abroad, which after all of this with Ukraine, do we really want to hurt the EU that much? Because we supply them with one to 1.3, 1.5 million barrels per day of diesel, which they are having a huge problem. So really, are we going to abandon the you at this point? Also…

TN: My Texas friends would love to have more diesel to power their ram trucks.

TS: But the thing is that what happens is the fuel flows get so disrupted is that we’re going to have to see refineries cut run significantly in the US. Which is going to ultimately raise prices. We may see deepen prices initially, but you’re going to see higher prices ultimately.

SR: I’ll push back on that because you have a lot of storage, but you didn’t have a lot of storage before. So you don’t have to cut back on runs. You can put into storage at a pretty profitable rate because of forward selling basically all of your inventory right now. I would push back on you have to cut runs at this point.

TS: And I’m going to push back on that. We have to look at the east coast. Right. And so that’s looking at gasoline runs to make a barrel. Diesel requires a lot more oil than it does say to make gasoline. And so if we see a diesel problem, we’re going to have to cut back on this runs. I think it depends on what coast you’re looking at and what area you’re looking at.

TN: All we care about is Texas and Florida. Right.

SR: You have a lot of places to store gasoline. I mean, it’s not like we have an oversupply gasoline at the moment.

TN: It’s true. Our bob’s down this week too, right. So it’s tight.

AM: It’s interesting, Tony, it’s funny. One thing that you said July 4 and one thing that Tracy said, thinly traded is that hilariously every time we need a rally in the market during the thinly traded holiday hours, crude goes down, dollar goes down and the market goes up almost by magic on the thinly traded holiday hours. Something you should watch.

SR: University of Michigan. Come on.

TN: It’s a big driver. University of Michigan. Okay, so let’s move on. You mentioned the dollar, Albert, and so if we look at the dollar, obviously it’s near highs for the decade and that’s great if you’re in the US buying dollar denominated commodities. But elsewhere in the world it’s really hard. Right. So where do you expect the dollar to go? I can’t remember what you’ve said your expected target is. Possibly? 110. Possibly 120. So if it hits 120, Japanese Yen is at what, like 160? 170? something like that?

AM: 163,164? My calculation… This is something Yellen has done in 2012. It’s nothing new. She’s driven the dollar up. She’s out into Europe talking that she’s going to take the dollar up to 110. So this is nothing new. Everyone knows what’s going to happen. Everyone’s watching it. So we’re at 104 something today, just sitting there and hasn’t really done anything. Last day or so. Another 5% up is not a big deal for the dollar.

TN: So you see Yellen driving a stronger dollar. Sam, what do you see?

SR: I would say that I hate taking the other side. I’m going to take the other side.

TN: Great.

SR: I’m going to say that Yellen’s ability to control the dollar is de minimis at this point, mostly because the Fed is tapped out. But you already had a 4% terminal rate for Fed funds priced in two weeks ago. Today you’re sitting at basically 3.65%. So you’ve got the peak, in my opinion, priced in for the FOMC hiking cycle and now you’re on the other side of that. So I would say JPY, you’re probably looking at above 10.

TN: Oh, wow, okay, great.

SR: And you’re probably looking at a Euro at 108. 109. And it doesn’t really matter if they go into a recession because they’re… Right. The US is going to back off in incremental steps the long end of the hiking cycle and…

TN: Perfect.

SR: The dollar prices is long end of the hiking cycle and Yellen can do a lot of things. What she can’t do is increase the internal rate.

TN: That’s great.

AM: The thing is, the treasury sets USD policy, so she can certainly drive it up. I don’t know how much ammo she has left because it’s gone up. But we’ll see.

TN: Okay, perfect. That’s great. So we’ve covered almost everything in that survey and almost everything was wrong.

SR: I told you everything was I would take the other side of every single one of those.

TN: Perfect. Okay, let’s talk about the week ahead. We have month end and quarter end coming next week, right? So what does that mean for the week ahead? Everyone else.

TS: Can I go?

TN: Yes, you go Tracy.

TS: I don’t know. What I’m looking at for the week ahead is the last week of the month. Of the month and the quarter. Right. So we have roughly about $100 billion of US equities that need to be purchased over the next five trading sessions. We have a rebalance in the RTY. So we should see a lot of inflows, roughly 5.98 point billion of inflows into the US equity markets just because of the rebalance factor.

We should probably see outflows in the bond market and then that’s walking into a backdrop of negative dealer gamma. So we have the potential of a shot higher in the market.

TN: Sam? Sam?

SR: Yeah. I would say everything Tracy said in terms of the risk seems to be to the upside. I would also say it looks pretty scary when you walk into the end of the month in terms of the way the dollar chart looks right now.

You walk into the end of the month with a dollar chart looking like it’s ready, looking ready to gap down, and you have oil where it’s at. You could have a very interesting quarter end in terms of risk assets. You have a weaker dollar. You have a big buy on SPY, RTX, et cetera, or SPX, not SPY. You begin to put those pieces together and you begin to have a pretty risk on into the quarter that could be very interesting very quickly.

You get any positive headlines out of China in terms of lockdowns, you get any positive headlines out of Ukraine in terms of ceasefires, whatever BS they want to leak. Then all of a sudden you’re more upside. So I would say skewed to the upside through the beginning of July.

TN: Sam, you’re optimistic today. That’s amazing.

SR: I know. And contrarian.

TN: Optimistic and contrarian. I love it. Okay.

AM: Yeah, I mean, I agree mostly with Sam. I think just because the market is so thinly traded, the dollar should be chopping around probably on the downside a little bit, just for the week up until July 4 weekend, so long as the Europeans don’t come out and start saying any more Lehman things, Lehman crash things and all of a sudden dollar shoots up just because of fear factor out of the European side. But I don’t think that’s going to materialize over the next week, probably next couple of weeks.

After that, I think 30 days, we’re starting to look at possibly something that happened in the European Union. But for the week ahead.

TN: Fantastic. So the past three days carries into the next week. Fantastic.

AM: Yeah.

TN: Okay, guys, thank you very much. Thanks for your time. Thanks for all the stuff you passed along, and have a great week ahead. Thank you.

AM: All right, thanks.

TS, SR: Thank you.

Categories
Podcasts

The Unbeatable Artificial Stock Market

Show Notes

MG: The Lead Lag Report joining us for the hour here is Tony Nash of Complete Intelligence has found a lot of people that I respect following. Tony, I saw a few people saying they were excited to hear what Tony has to say. So hopefully we’ll have a good conversation here.

Tony for those who aren’t familiar with your background talk about who you are how’d you get involved in the data side of markets and forecasting in general. And what you’re doing with Complete Intelligence.

TN: Sure, Michael. First of all, thanks for having me. I have followed you for probably 10 or 15 years.

MG: I am very sorry for that I am very very sorry for that.

TN: But yeah so, I got involved in data way back in the late 90s when I was in Silicon Valley and I built a couple of research firms focused on technology businesses. I then took about probably eight years to become an operator. I did a turnaround in Asia of a telecom firm. I built a firm in Sri Lanka during the Civil War and then I started down the research front again. I was the Global Head of Research for the Economist and I was the Asia Head of Consulting for a company called IHS Markit which is now owned by S&P and then after that I started Complete Intelligence.

So, you know my background is really all about data but it’s also all about understanding the operational context of that data. And I think it’s very hard for people to really understand what data means without understanding how people use it.

MG: Okay. So that’s maybe a good direction to start with that point about context with data because I think part of that context is understanding what domains data is more appropriate for forecasting and others. Right? So, I always made this argument that there are certain domains in particular when it comes to, I would argue investing that have sort of a chaotic system element to them. Right? Where small changes can have ripple effects. So, it’s hard to necessarily to sort of make a direct link between a strong set of variables and the actual outcome because there’s always a degree of randomness. Whereas, something that’s more scientific right that doesn’t have that kind of chaos theory element is it’s clearer.

So, talk about that point about context when it comes to looking at data. And again, the kind of domains where data is more appropriate to really have more conviction in than others.

TN: Yeah. Okay. So, that’s a great place to start. So, the first thing I would say is take every macro variable that you know of and throw it out the window. It’s all garbage data 100 of it. Okay? I would never trade based on macro data.

We’ve tested macro data over the years and it’s just garbage. It doesn’t matter the country. You know we hear people saying that China makes up their data. Well, that may be true you can kind of fill in the blank on almost any country because I don’t know how much you guys understand about macro data. But it is not market clearing data. Okay? Like an equity price or a commodity price.

Macroeconomic data is purely academic made-up data that is a proxy for activity. It’s a second or third derivative of actual activity by the time you see, say, a CPI print which is coming out tomorrow. Right? And it’s late and it’s really all not all that meaningful. So, I wouldn’t really make a trade or put a strategy together based on macro data even historical macro data. Every OECD country revises their data by what four times or something.

So, you see, a print for CPI data tomorrow that’s a preliminary print and that’s revised several times before it’s put on quote-unquote actual. And so, you know, you really can’t make decisions using macroeconomic data beyond a directional decision. Okay? So, if you follow me on Twitter, you see I’m very critical macro data all the time. I’m very sarcastic about it.

I think the more specific you can get… You know if you have to look at say national data or macroeconomic data, I would look at very low-level data the more specific you can get the better. Things like household surveys or you know communist and socialist countries. Chinese data at the very specific level can be very interesting. Okay? Government data the high-level data in every country I consider it garbage data in every country. So, you’re looking at very low-level very specific government or multilateral data, that’s interesting.

The closer you get to market clearing data the better because that’s a real price. Right? A real price history on stuff is better and company data is the best. And of course, company data is revised at times but that really helps you understand what’s happening at the kind of firm level. And what’s happening at the transaction level. So, you know, those are the kind of hierarchies of data that I would look at.

MG: So, okay this is a great. That’s a great point you mentioned that it’s you said very these variables is macro variables they’re proxies for activity. Right? They’re really more proxies for narratives. Right? Because and that’s where I think… You mentioned sarcasm almost 99 of my tweets at this point are sarcasm because when Rome is burning, what else I’m not going to do except joke about it. Right? Because I can’t change anything. Right?

So, and to that point I share a lot of that cynicism around data that people will often reference in the financial media that sounds really interesting, sounds like it’s predictive but when you actually test it to your point, you throw it out because it doesn’t work. Right? There’s no real predictive element to it.

So, we’ll get into some of the predictive stuff that you talk about but I want to hit a little bit on this market clearing phrase you kept on using. Explain what you mean by market clearing.

TN: Data is where there is a buyer and a seller.

MG: To actual prices of some asset class or something like that.

TN: Yep. That’s right.

MG: Okay. So, that makes sense. Okay. Now again I go back to the certain domains that data is more clear in terms of cause and effect and getting a sense of probabilities the challenge with markets. As we know is that the probabilities change second by second because not only does that mean meaningless data change second by second but the market clearing data changes second by second. Right? Going back to that point.

So, with what you do with Complete Intelligence, talk us through a little bit. What are some of the variables that you tend to find have some predictive power? And how do you think about confidence when it comes to any kind of decision made based on those variables?

TN: Sure. Okay. So, before I do that let me get into why I started Complete Intelligence because if none of you have started a firm before don’t do it. It’s really really hard so…

MG: From the people in the back because I got to tell you I’m an entrepreneur, I’m going through. And all you got is people on Twitter kicking you when you’re down when it’s the small sample anyway.

TN: Absolutely. So, I was where I had worked for two very large research firms The Economist and IHS Markit. And I saw that both of them claimed to have very detailed and intricate models. Okay? Of the global economy industries, whatever. Okay? For all of the interior models. And I have never spoken with a global research firm a data firm that is different from this. And if I’m wrong then somebody please correct me. But at the end of that whole model pipeline is somebody who says “no that’s a little bit too high” or “a little bit too low” and they change the number. Okay? To whatever they wanted it to be in the first place. So, and I tell you 100% of research firms out there with forecasts today have a manual process at the end of their quote-unquote model. A 100% of them. Again, if there’s somebody else that doesn’t do that, I am happy to be corrected. Okay? But I had done that for a decade and I felt like a hypocrite when I would talk to clients.

So, I started Complete Intelligence because I wanted to build a 100% machine driven forecasts across economics, across market, across equities, across commodities, across currencies. Okay? And we’ve done that. So, we have a multi-phase, multi-layer machine learning process that takes in billions of data items. We’re running trillions of calculations every week when we reforecast our data. Right? Now the interval of our forecast is monthly interval forecast. So, if people looking at daily prices that’s not what we’re doing now. Okay? We will be launching daily interval forecasts. I would say probably before the end of the year to be conservative but we’re doing monthly interval forecasts now.

Why is everything I’ve said is meaningless unless we measure our error. Okay? So, for every forecast that we do. And if you log into our website, you can see whether it’s the gold price, the S&P 500, USD, JPY, molybdenum or whatever. We track our error for every month, for everything that we do. Okay? So, if you want to understand your risk associated with using our data it’s there right in front of you with the error calculations. Okay? It’s only fair, If I’m gonna say sell you a forecast, you should be able to understand how wrong we’ve been in the past, before you use that as a decision-making input.

MG: Well, maybe just add some framework on that because I think that’s interesting. So, what you call error I call luck. Right? Because luck is both good or bad. I always make that point that with any equation any set of variables you’re going to have that error is the luck component that you can’t control. And that doesn’t necessarily mean that the equation is wrong. Right? It’s just means that for whatever reason that error in that moment in time was higher or lower than you might otherwise want. Okay?

TN: There is no such thing as zero error. And anybody who tells you that they have zero error is obviously they’re an economist and they don’t understand how markets work. So, there is always error in every calculation.

So, the reason we track error is because that serves as a feedback loop into our machine learning process. Okay? And we have feedback loops every week as we and what we’re doing right now is every Friday end of day. We will download global data process over the weekend have a new forecast on Monday morning. Okay? And so all of that error whether it’s near-term error, short-term error or say medium-term error, we feed that all back in to help correct and understand what’s going on within our process. And we have like I said, we have a multi-phase process in our machine learning platform. So, error is simply understanding the risk associated with using with using our platform.

MG: Right, which is basically how apt is a thing that you’re forecasting to that error which is again luck good or bad. I’m trying to put in sort of a qualitative framework also because I think… Yeah, there’s errors in life obviously, too. Right? And so, when they’re good or bad. But you know those elements.

TN: Right. But here’s what I would and I don’t know, I don’t want to dispute this too much but I think there is. So, you use the word luck and that’s fine but I think luck has a bit to do with the human element of a decision. Okay? We’re using math and code there’s zero human interaction with the data and with the process. And so, I wouldn’t necessarily call it luck. I mean, it literally is error like our algorithms got it wrong. So, if you want to call luck that’s absolutely fine but I would say luck is more of a human say an outcome associated with a human decision. More than something that’s machine driven that’s iterating. Again, we’re doing trillions of calculations every week to get our forecasts out there.

MG: Yeah, no that’s fair and maybe for the audience, Tony. Explain what machine learning is now.

TN: Sure.

MG: I once developed an app called “How Edition”. I was having dinner with the head developer once and he said he just came back from a conference about machine learning and he was just basically well, having drinks with me laughing and joking saying everybody use this term machine learning but it’s really just regression analysis. Right? So, talk about machine learning what is actual machine learning? How important is recent data to changes in the regression? Because I assume that’s part of the sort of dynamic nature of what you do just kind of riff on that for a bit.

TN: Okay. So, when I first started Complete Intelligence, I was really cynical about AI. And I spoke to somebody in Silicon Valley and asked the same question: what is AI? And this person said “Well AI is everything from a basic I say, quadratic equation upward.” I’m not necessarily sure that I agree that something that simple would be considered artificial intelligence. What we’re really doing with machine learning is there are really three basic phases. Okay? You have a preprocess which is looking at your data to understand things like anomalies, missing data, weird behavior, these sorts of things. Okay? So, that’s the first phase that we look at to be honest that’s the hardest one to get right. Okay?

A lot of people want to talk about the forecasting methodologies and the forecasting algorithms. That’s great and that’s the sexy part of ML. But really the conditioning and the pre-process is the is the hardest part and it’s the most necessary part. Okay? When we then go into the forecasting aspect of it, we’re using what’s called an ensemble approach. So, we have a number of algorithms that we use and let’s say they’re 15 algorithms. Okay? That we use we’re looking at a potential combinatorial approach of any individual or combination of those algorithms based on the time horizon that we’re forecasting. Okay?

So, we’re not saying a simple regression is the way to go we’re saying there may be a neural network approach, there may be a neural network approach in combination with some sort of arima approach. We’re saying something like that. Right? And so, we test all of those permutations for every historical period that we’re looking at.

So, I think traditionally when I look back at kind of quote-unquote building models in excel, we would build a formula and that formula was fairly static. Okay? And every time you did say a crude oil forecast you had this static formula that you set your data against and a number came out. We don’t have static formulas at all.

To forecast crude oil every single week we start at obviously understanding what we did in the past but also re-testing and re-weighting every single algorithmic approach that we have and then recombining them based upon the activity that happened on a daily basis in that previous week. And in the history. Okay?

So, that’s phase two the forecasting approach and then phase three is the post process. Right? And so, the post process is understanding the forecast output. Is it a flat line? Right? If it’s a flat line then there’s something wrong. Is it a straight line up? Then that there’s something you know… those are to use some extremes. Right? But you know we have to test the output to understand if it’s reasonable. Right? So, it’s really an automated gut check on the reasonableness of the outcome and then we’ll go back and correct outliers potentially reforecast and then we’ll publish. Okay?

So, there are really three phases to what we do and I would think three phases to most machine learning approaches. And so, when we talk about machine learning that’s really what we’re talking about is that that really generally three-phase process and then the feedback loop that always goes back into that.

MG: Yeah. No that makes sense. Let’s get…

TN: That’s really boring after a while.

MG: No, no, no but I think that’s it’s part of what I want to do with these spaces is try to get people to understand you know beyond sort of just the headline or the thing that is thrown out there. As a term to what does that actually mean in practice you don’t have to know it fully in depth the way the that you do. But I think having that context is important.

TN: I would say on the idea generation side and on the risk management side right now. Okay? Now the other thing that I didn’t cover is obviously we’re doing markets but we also do… we use our platform to automate the budgeting process within enterprises. Okay? So, we work with very large organizations and the budget process within these large organizations can take anywhere from say four to six months. And they take hundreds of people. And so, we take that down to really interacting with one person in that organization and we do it in say less than 24 hours. And we build them a continuous budget every month.

Once accounting close happens we get their new data and then we send them a new say 18-month forward-looking forecast for them. So, their FPA team doesn’t have to dig around and beg people for information and all that stuff. So, some of this is on the firm event could be on the firm evaluation side, as well. Right? How will the firm perform? Nobody’s using us for that but the firms themselves are using that to help them automate their budgeting process. So, some of that could be on this a filtering side and the idea generation side, as well.

So, we do not force our own GL structure onto the clients. We integrate directly with their SAP or Oracle or other ERP database. We take on their GL structure at whatever levels they want. We have found that there is very little deterioration from say, the second or third level GL to say the sixth or seventh level GL, in terms of the accuracy of our forecast. And when we started doing this it really surprised me. We do a say a team level forecast for 10, 12 billion organizations, six layers down within their GL. And we see very little deterioration when we go down six levels than when we do it at say two levels. Which is you know it really to me it speaks to the robustness of our process but would we consider Anaplan a competitor not really, they’re not necessarily doing the kind of a budget automation that we’re doing at least, that I’m aware of. I know that there are guys like Hyperion who do what we’re doing but again their sophistication isn’t necessarily. What we’re doing and they do a great job and Hyperion is a great organization. I think Oracle gave them a new name now but they’re not necessarily using the same machine learning approaches that we’re using. And our clients have told us that they don’t get the same result with using that type of say ERP originated or ERP add-on budgeting process.

Yep. So, I would say we can’t we can do company-specific information for a customer if that’s what they want. Okay? We don’t necessarily have that on our platform today aside from say individual ticker symbols. Okay? But we’re not forecasting say the P&L of Apple or something like that or the balance sheet of Apple. Something we could do in a pretty straightforward manner but we do that on a customer-by-customer basis.

So, what we’re forecasting right now are currency pairs, commodities about 120 commodities and global equity indices. Okay? We are Beta testing individual equity tickers and we probably won’t introduce those fully on the platform until we have our daily interval forecast ready to go to market. But those are still we’re still working some kinks out of those and we’ll have those ready probably within a few months.

MG: Okay. So, let’s talk about commodities here for a bit tonight. Obviously, this is where a lot of people’s attention has gone to. What kind of variables and I know you said you have a whole bunch of variables that are being incorporated here but are there certain variables in particular when it comes to oil and other commodities that have a higher predictive power than others.

TN: There are I think one of the stories that I tell pretty often and this really shocks people is when we look at things like gold. Okay? I’m not trying to deflect from your oral question but just to you know we’ve spoken with the number of sugar traders over the years. Okay? And so, we tell them that say the gold price and the sugar price there may not necessarily be a say short term say correlation there but there is a lot of predictive capability there and we talk them through why. And I think the thing that we get out of the machine learning approach and we cast a wide net. We’re not forcing correlations is that we’ll find some unexpected say drivers. Although drivers implies a causal nature and we’re not trying to imply causality anywhere. Okay?

We’re looking at kind of co-movement in markets over time and understanding how things work in a lead lag basis with some sort of indirect causality as well as say a T0 or current state movement. So, with crude oil you know there are so many supply side factors that are impacting that price right now, that I can’t necessarily point to say another commodity that is having an impact on that. It really is a lot of the supply side and sentimental factors that are impacting those prices right now.

MG: That makes a lot of sense. And I’m curious how did you mention it’s I think the intervals once a month. Right? So, given the speed with which inflation has moved and yields have moved how does a machine learning process adapt to sudden spikes or massive deltas in in variable movement. Right? Because there’s always a degree of randomness going back to error. Right? And you can make an argument that the larger move is the that may actually be more error but I think that’s an interesting discussion.

TN: So, I’ll tell you where we were say two years ago when 2020 hit versus today. Okay? So, in March of 2020, April 2020 everything fell apart. I don’t think there were any models that caught what was going to happen. It was an exogenous event that hit markets and it happened very quickly. So, in June, I was talking with someone who is with one of the largest software companies in the world and they said “Hey has your AI caught up to markets yet because ours is still lost” And you guys would be shocked if I told you who this was because you would expect them to know exactly what’s going to happen before it happened. Okay? I’ll be honest I think it was all of them but the reality is you know Michael you where you were saying that ML is just regression analysis.

I think a lot of the large firms that are doing time series forecasting really are looking at regression and derivatives of regression as kind of their only approaches because it works a lot of the time. Right? So, we had about a two-month delay at that point and part of it was because… So, by June we had caught up to the market. And we had started in February to iterate twice a month, we were doing once a month; I hope you guys can understand with machine learning two factors are we’re always adjusting our algorithms. Okay? We’re always incorporating new algorithms. We’re always you know making sure that we can keep up with markets because you cannot be static in machine learning. Okay? The other thing is we’re always adding capacity why? Because we have to iterate again and again and again to make sure that we understand the changes in markets. Okay?

So, at that time we were only iterating twice a month and so it took us a while to catch up. Guys like this major technology firm and other major technology firms they just couldn’t figure it out. And I suspect that some of them probably manually intervened to ensure that their models caught up with markets. I don’t want to accuse any individual company but that temptation is always there. Especially, for people who don’t report their error. The temptation is always there for people to manually intervene in their forecast process. Okay?

So, now, today if we look for example at how are we catching changes in markets. Okay? So, if I look at the S&P 500 for April for example, our error rate for the S&P 500 for April I think was 0.6 percent. Okay? Now in May it changed it deteriorated a little bit to I think four or six percent, I’m sorry I don’t remember the exact number offhand but it deteriorated. Right? But you know when there are dramatic changes because we’re iterating at least once a week, if not twice a week we’re catching those inflections much much faster. And what we’re having to do, and this is a function of the liquidity adjustments, is where in the past you could have a trend and adjust for that trend and account for that trend. We’re really having to our algorithms are having to select more methodologies with recency bias because we’re seeing kind of micro volatility in markets. And so again…

MG: So, kind of like the difference between a simple moving average versus like an exponential moving average. Right? Where you’re waiting the more recent data sooner.

TN: It could be. Yeah.

MG: Right.

TN: Yeah. That’s a very very simple approach but yeah it would be something like that, that’s right. Yeah. What so when we work with enterprise customers that level of engagement is very tight because when we’re getting kind of the full set of financial data from a client obviously, they’re very vested in that process. So, that’s different from say a small portfolio manager subscribing to RCF futures product where we’re doing forecasts and they have their own risk process in place. And they can do whatever they want with it. Right? But again, with our enterprise clients we are measuring our error so they can see the result of our continuous budgeting process. Okay?

So, if we’re doing let’s say, we launch with a customer in May, they close their mate books in June get them over to us redo our forecast and send it over to them and let them know what our error rate was in May. Okay? So, they can decide how we’re doing by department, by team, by product, by whatever based upon the error rates that we’re giving at every line item. Okay? So, they can select and we’re not doing kind of capital projects budgets we’re doing business as usual budgets so they can decide what they want to take and what they don’t want to take. It’s really up to them but we do talk through that with them and then over time they just start to understand how we work and take it on within their own internal process.

MG: So, back a little bit Tony. So, you mentioned you do this machine learning forecasting work when it comes to broad economics, markets and currency; of those three which has the most variability and randomness in other words which tends to have a higher error? Whenever you do any kind of machine learning to try to forecast what comes next?

TN: I would say it depends on the equity market but probably equity markets when there are exogenous shocks. So, our error for April of 2020 again, we don’t hide this from anybody it was not good but it wasn’t good for anybody. Right? And so, but in general it depends on the equity market but some of the emerging equity markets, EM equity markets are pretty volatile.

We do have some commodities like say rhodium for example. Okay? Pretty illiquid market, pretty small base of people who trade it and highly volatile. So, something like rhodium over the years our air rates there have not necessarily been something that we’re telling people to use that as a basis to trade but obviously, it’s a hard problem. Right? And so, we’re iterating that through our ML process and looking at highly volatile commodities is something that we focus on and work to improve those error rates.

MG: Here, I hope you find this to be an interesting conversation because I think it’s a part of the of the way of looking at markets, which not too many people are themselves maybe using but is worth sort of considering. Because I always make a point that nobody can predict the future but we all have to take actions based on that unknowable future. So, to the extent that there might be some data or some conclusions that at least are looking at variables that historically have some degree of predictive power. It doesn’t guarantee that you’re going to necessarily be better off but at least you have something to hang your hat on. Right? I think that’s kind of an aspect to investing here.

Now, I want to go a little bit Tony to what you mentioned earlier you had lived abroad for a while in Europe. And when I was starting to record these spaces to put up on my YouTube channel the first one, I did that on was with Dan Arvis and the topic of that space was around this sort of new world order that seemed to be shaping up. I want you to just talk from a geopolitical perspective how you’re viewing perhaps changing alliances because of Russia, Ukraine. And maybe even dovetail that a little bit into the machine learning side because geopolitics is a variable. Which is probably quite vault in some periods.

TN: Yeah, absolutely. Okay. So, with the evolving geopolitical order I would say rather than kind of picking countries and saying it’s lining up against x country or lining up with x country or what country. I would say we’ve entered an era of opportunistic geopolitics. Okay? We had the cold war where we had a fairly static order where people were with either red team or blue team. That changed in the 90s of course, where you kind of had the kind of the superpower and that’s been changing over the last say 15 years with say, China allegedly becoming kind of stronger and so on and so forth. So, but we’ve entered a fairly chaotic era with say opportunistic macroeconomic relation or sorry, geopolitical relationships and I think one of the kinds of top relationships that is purely opportunistic today is the China-Russia relationship.

And so, there’s a lot of talk about China and Russia having this amazing new relationship and they’re deep. And they’re gonna go to war together or whatever. We’ve seen over the past say three, four months that’s just not the case. And I’ve been saying this for years just for a kind of people’s background. Actually, advised the Chinese government the NDRC which is the economic planning unit of the central government on a product or on an initiative called the belt and road initiative. Okay? I did that for two years. I was in and out of Beijing. I never took a dime for it. I never took expense reimbursement just to be clear, I’m not a CCP kind of pawn. But my view was, if the Chinese Government is spending a trillion dollars, I want to see if I can impact kind of good spend for that. So, I have seen the inside of the Chinese Government and how it works and I also in the 80s and 90s spoke Russian and studied a lot on the Russian Government and have a good idea about how totalitarian governments work.

So, I think in general if we thought America first was offensive in the last administration then you really don’t want to learn about Chinese politics and you really don’t want to learn about Russian politics because they make America first look like kindergarten. And so, whenever you have ultra-ultra-nationalistic politics, any diplomatic relationship is an opportunistic relationship. And I always ask people who claim to be China experts but say please tell me and name one Chinese ally. Give me one ally of China and you can’t, North Korea, Pakistan. I mean, who is an ally of China there isn’t an ally of China.  There is a transactional opportunistic relationship with China but there is not an ally with China.

And so, from a geopolitical perspective if you take that backdrop looking at what’s happening in the world today it makes a whole lot more sense. And a lot of the doomsayers out there saying China is going to fall and it’s going to have this catastrophic impact. And all this other stuff, the opportunism that we see at the nation-state level pervades into the bureaucracy. So, the bureaucracy we hear about Xi Jinping. And Xi Jinping is almost a fictional character. I hate to be that extreme on it but there is the aura of Xi Jinping and there is the reality of Xi Jinping, just a guy, he’s not Mao Zedong. He doesn’t have the power that supposed western Chinese experts claim that he has. He’s just a guy. Okay?

And so, the relationships within the Chinese bureaucracy are purely transactional and they are purely opportunistic. So again, if you take that perspective and you look at what’s happening in geopolitics, hopefully you can see things through a different lens.

MG: Now, I’m glad you’re framing that in those terms because I think it’s very hard for people to really understand some of these dynamics when it’s almost presented like a like the story for a movie. Right? For what could be a conflict to come by the media because and it’s almost overly simplified. Right? When you hear this type of talk. So again, I want to go back into how does that dovetail into actual data. Right? Maybe it doesn’t at all. When you have some of these dynamics and you talk about market clearing data, you’re going to probably see mark movement somewhat respond off of geopolitical changes. Talk about anything that you’ve kind of seen as far as that goes and how should investors consider geopolitical risk or maybe not consider geopolitical risk?

TN: Yeah, I think, well when you see geopolitical adjustments today all that really is… I don’t mean overly simplified but it’s a risk calibration. Right? So, you know Russia invades Ukraine, that’s really a risk calibration. How much risk do we want to accept and then what opportunities are there? Right?

So, when you hear about China, you have to look at what risk is China willing to accept for actions that it takes? Keeping in mind that China has a very complicated domestic political environment with COVID shutdown, lockdowns and all of this stuff. So, having worked with and known some really smart Chinese bureaucrats over the years, these guys are very concerned with the domestic environment. And I don’t although there are idiot you know generals and economists here and there who say really stupid stuff about China should take over TSMC and China should invade Taiwan, these sorts of things. My conversations over the years have been with very pragmatic and professional individuals within the bureaucracy.

So, do I agree with their policies? Not a lot of them but they are well thought out in general. So, I think just because we hear talk from some journalist in Beijing who lives a very sheltered life about some potential thing that may happen. I don’t think we necessarily need to calibrate our risk based on the day-to-day story flow. I think we need to look at like… so there’s a… I’m sure you all know who Leland Miller is in China beige book like?

MG: Yeah, he’s not too long ago.

TN: Yeah. He has a proxy of the Chinese economy and that’s a very interesting way to look at an interesting lens to look through China or through to look at China or whatever. But so, I think that the day-to-day headlines, if you follow those, you’re really just going to get a lot of volatility but if you try to understand what’s actually happening, you’ll get a clearer picture. It’s not necessarily a connection of a collection of names in China and the political musical chairs, it’s really asking questions about how does China serve China first. What will China do to serve China first and are some of these geopolitical radical things that are said do they fit within that context of China serving China first? So, that’s what I try to look at would I be freaked out if China invaded Taiwan? Absolutely. I think everybody would right but is that my main scenario? No, it’s not.

MG: In terms of the data inputs on the machine learning side how granular is the data meaning? Are you looking at where geographically demand might be picking up or is it simply this is what the price is and who cares the source? Because again with hindsight if you knew that the source of China and kind of had a rough sense of the history of Russia-Ukraine maybe that could have been an interesting tell that war was coming.

TN: Yes or No. To be honest it had more to do with the value of the CNY. Okay? And I’ll tell you a little bit about history with the CNY. We were as far as I know, the only ones who called the CNY hitting 6.7 in August of 2019 with a six-month lead time. And so, we have a very good track record with USD-CNY and I would argue that China’s buying early in 2022 had a lot more to do with them from a monetary policy perspective needing to devalue CNY. So, they were hoard buying before they could devalue the CNY and I think that had a lot more to do with their activity than Russia-Ukraine. Okay? And if you notice they’ve made many of their buys by mid-April and once that happened you saw CNY, go to 6.8. Right? It’s recovered a little bit since then but China has needed to devalue the CNY for probably at least nine months. So, it’s long overdue but they’ve been working very hard to keep it strong so that they could get the commodities they needed to last a period of time. Once they had those commodities, they just let the parachute go and they let it do value to 6.8 and actually slightly weaker than 6.8.

MG: The point of the devaluation is interesting. I feel if I had enough space but we were talking about the Yen and what’s happened there. And this observation that usually China will start to devalue when they see the end as itself going through its own devaluation.

How does some of those cross correlations play out with some of the work that on machine learning you’re doing? Because there’s a human element to the decision to devalue a currency. Right? So, the historical data may not be valid I would think because you might have kind of a more humanistic element that causes the data to look very different.

TN: Well, they’re both export lab economies. Right? And we’ve seen a number of other factors dollar strength and we’ve seen changing consumption patterns. And so, yes when Japan devalues you generally see China devalue as well but also, we’ve seen a lot of other activities in on the demand-pull side and on the currency side especially with the US dollar in… I would say over the last two quarters. So, yes, that I would say that the correlation there is probably pretty high but there are literally thousands of factors that contribute to the movement of those of those currencies.

MG: Is there anything recently Tony in the output that machine learning is spitting out that really surprises you? That you know… And again, I understand that there’s a subjective element which is our own views on the world and of course then the pure data. But I got to imagine it’s fascinating sometimes if you’re sitting there and seeing what’s being spit out if it’s surprising. Is there anything that’s been kind of an outlier in in the output versus what you would think would likely happen going forward?

TN: Yeah. You know, what was really surprising to me after we saw just to stick on CNY for a minute because it’s the first thing that comes to mind, when we saw CNY do value to 6.8. I was looking at our forecast for the next six months. And it showed that after we devalued pretty strong it would moderate and reappreciate just a bit. And that was not necessarily what I was hearing say in the chatter. It was kind of “okay, here we go we’re going to go to seven or whatever” but our data was telling us that that wasn’t necessarily going to happen that we were going to hit a certain point in May. And then we were going to moderate through the end of the year. So, you know we do see these bursty trends and then we see you know in some cases those bursty trends continue for say an integer period. But with CNY while I would have on my own expected them. I expected the machines to say they need to keep devaluing because they’ve been shut down and they need to do everything they can to generate CNY fun tickets. The machines were telling me that we would you know we’d see this peak and then we would we would moderate again and it would kind of re-appreciate again.

So, those are the kind of things that we’re seeing that when I talk about this it’s… Oh! the other thing is this: So, in early April we had a we have people come back to us on our forecast regularly who don’t agree with what we’re saying and they complain pretty loudly.

MG: So, what do you say I talk when I hear that because whenever somebody doesn’t agree with the forecast, they are themselves making a fork.

TN: Of course. Yeah. Exactly. Right? Yeah, and so this person was telling us in early April that we’re way wrong that the S&P was going to continue to rally and you know they wanted to cancel their subscription and they hated us and all this other stuff. And we said okay but the month’s not over yet so let’s see what happens this was probably a week and a half in April. And what happened by the end of April things came in line with our forecast and like I said earlier we were like 0.4 and 0.6 percent off for the month. And so that person had they listened to us at the beginning of the month they would have been in a much better position than they obviously ended up being in. Right? And so, these are the kind of things that we see on a… I mean, we’ve got hundreds of stories about this stuff but these are the kind of things that we see on a regular basis. And we mess up guys I’m not saying we’re perfect and but the thing that we when we do mess up, we’re very open about it. Everything that we do is posted on our on our website. Every call we make, every error we have is their wars and all. Okay? And so, we’re not hiding our performance because if you’re using our data to make a trade, we want you to understand the risk associated with using our data. That’s really what it comes down to.

MG: It reminds me of back in 2011 and in some other periods I’ve had similar situations, where I was writing and I was very adamant in saying the conditions favored a summer crash. Right? I was saying that for the summer and the market should be going up and people would say oh where’s your summer crash and I would say this summer hasn’t started. Like it’s amazing how people, I don’t know, what it is, I don’t know if it’s just short-termism or just this kind of culture of constantly reacting as opposed to thinking but it is it is remarkably frustrating.

Going back to your point at the very beginning being entrepreneur don’t do it, that you have to build a business with people and customers who in some cases are just flat out naïve.

TN: That’s all right though. That’s a part of the risk that we accept. Right?

MG: Yeah, the other thing right now that happens with every industry but from the entrepreneur’s standpoint. It’s what you’re doing the likely outcome of your product of your service. You’re trying to communicate that to end clients but then in the single role of the die the guy the end client who comes to you exactly for that simply because they disagree with you know the output, now says I want out.

TN: Oh! Yeah! Well, your where is your summer call from 2011 the analogy today is where is your recession call. Right? So, that’s become the how come you’re not one of us calls right now. So, it’s just one of those proof points and if you don’t agree with that then you’re stupid.

So, I would say you never finish with that there is always a consensus and a something you’re you absolutely, must believe in or you don’t know what you’re talking about.

MG: Yeah, well, thankfully. What you’re talking about so appreciate everybody joining this space Tony the first time you and I were talking. I enjoyed the conversation because I think it said on investing and I encourage you to take a look at Tony’s firm and follow him here on twitter. So, thank everybody. Thank you, Tony and enjoy.

Categories
Week Ahead

The Week Ahead – 13 Jun 2022: CPI & “Peak Inflation”

We had a chop last week. And towards the end of the week, we had the CPI print, which put a damper on markets. In this episode, we’ll talk about CPI and peak inflation, which people have been talking about for months, but we haven’t quite hit it yet.

Of course, we’re going to talk about the hot dollar, and we’re going to talk about fuel inflation and things like refining capacity and even a nat gas plant explosion that happened here in Texas last week.

And then finally, what is going on in the week ahead?

Key themes:

  1. CPI & “Peak Inflation” – Core CPE, hand off from goods to services, Fed policy and markets.
  2. Hot dollar – DXY has only been higher in Feb 1985 and Jan 2002. Fed, Dollar, Yellen, etc.
  3. Fuel Inflation – Refining capacity, natgas explosion.

This is the 22nd episode of The Week Ahead, where experts talk about the week that just happened and what will most likely happen in the coming week.

Follow The Week Ahead experts on Twitter:

Tony: https://twitter.com/TonyNashNerd
Sam: https://twitter.com/SamuelRines
Tracy: https://twitter.com/chigrl

Listen to the podcast version on Spotify here:


Transcript

TN: Hi everybody. And welcome to The Week Ahead. My name is Tony Nash. We are with Tracy and Sam today. Albert is in an undisclosed location, so he won’t be joining. But we’ll have a good show anyway. So before we get started, please like and subscribe. And as importantly, please comment. We really appreciate those. We respond to all of them. And it’s great to have the engagement.

This week. We had chop, as Sam talked about. And towards the end of the week, we had the CPI print, which really put a damper on markets. So we’re going to talk about a few things. First, CPI and peak inflation, which people have been talking about for months, but we haven’t quite hit it yet. Of course, we’re going to talk about the hot dollar, and we’re going to talk about fuel inflation and things like refining capacity and even a natgas plant explosion that happened here in Texas last week. And then finally, what is going on in the week ahead?

So first, CPE was all of the focus for the last half of the week. Sam put out an amazing note, a couple of amazing notes this week talking about inflation and what the Fed will do. So we’re looking at a chart right now on core CPI. And Sam, can you walk us through why the core matters and what’s happening there?

SR: Sure. The core matters because it strips out food and energy, and that’s what the Fed likes to look at. Right. That’s what the market looks at for underlying inflation dynamics generally. It’s kind of a quick and easy number. Luckily, it’s accelerated by some marginal amount on a month over month, year over year basis. Cool. Nobody should really care about that, because when you break apart the actual numbers, the entirety of the deceleration and core inflation was in the good side. We know that goods are coming down, particularly on a year over year basis. They want skyrocket and to the right, that’s just not sustainable.

TN: Is that because of the inventories that were accumulated at retailers and other folks.

SR: That’s part of it. Used cars as well. There’s airline fares are in there, too. So that’s going to be somewhat of a problem as we move forward.

The interesting thing to me is when you actually dig into it. Yeah. Core goods accelerated, but core services, which are far stickier and far more difficult for the Fed to kind of get a hold of accelerated.

TN: Right. So let’s put that up now and then. Yeah. So we’ve got your chart up now about the commodities, less food and energy and then services, less energy. So can you help us understand what that means?

SR: Yeah, sure. That’s just call it the core CPI broken into services and goods. Right. So it strips out food and energy from both of them. And then you kind of get a more of a feel of what’s really happening in the underlying economy. And there was always this big debate among economists about when this hand off from goods to services was going to happen and how that was going to affect the economy. And unfortunately for the Fed and for market participants, that hand off is happening.

You can see it in the data and you can see it in the inflation data in particular. It’s happening. The problem is that you don’t have goods coming down fast enough and you have services moving up way too quickly. And those two components are unlikely to give the Fed any sort of comfort in the next six to nine months.

TN: Okay. With services moving up, does that mean that wages, say on the lower end around things like hospitality and restaurants, does it mean that those wages are going up?

SR: Not directly. There’s some implied probability that you’re beginning to see some movement there, but you’ve seen quite a bit of movement at a leisure and hospitality in particular in terms of the wage gains there.

Unfortunately, the wage gains can be pretty large in magnitude, a 5 to 9 percent type acceleration year over year in leisure and hospitality wages. But it doesn’t really move the needle in terms of overall wage gains because those tend to be the lower end of the income scale.

TN: Okay. So I saw some data this week looking at credit capacity, and it looks like US consumers put record amounts on credit cards in April and May. Does that make you nervous? And I’m not talking about the high end of consumers. I’m talking about the middle and lower end of consumers because there’s a lot more of them. Right. Does that make you nervous?

SR: Yes. And it goes to the conversation that Tracy and I are going to have in a little bit here. A lot of it is due to gasoline. Right. You don’t go to a pump and typically pay with cash. I mean, you did that 10, 15, 20 years ago. You typically go to the pump and pay with a credit card.

So when you begin to have prices like this, move this quickly on the pump side of things and grocery side of things, you tend to have a move up in credit card usage that’s translating to debt because you simply don’t have wages keeping up. Yes, wages are ticking higher, but they’re not keeping up. So the lower end of the consumption, called the lower two quartiles, they are struggling with this, and that is going directly on the credit cards.

TN: I’ve talked to a few people this week about how wages in developed economies work. And if we were in an emerging economy, middle income economy, there would be more flexibility on wages because wages rise faster generally in those economies. But in, say, the US, wages really don’t rise fast.

So on some level, it’s a bit hard for people to understand that wages in the US are generally inflexible, especially at the lower and middle ends. And so it is kind of zero sum. Right. So as gas and food prices rise, that takes away consumption from other areas, right?

SR: It does. And the other thing that it leads to is more of a trend towards unionization and other forms of labor activism. And you’re going to continue to see labor activism if wages continue to trail this far behind inflation. That is an underlying trend that I think is going to be somewhat important for understanding how markets react because labor was fairly cheap, give or take for US businesses in particular.

If you begin to have more unionization, if you begin to have more of an activist labor movement, that is going to be a thing to corporate earnings, not just for the next year. That’s going to be a thing for corporate earnings going forward.

TN: Okay. So let’s talk about corporate earnings. As we look at, say, Q2 corporate earnings, it doesn’t look good, right? I mean, generally the expectation is that their margin compression, all this other stuff really starts to sting in Q2 Is that right?

TS: It depends on the industry as well, because what we’re seeing and what I’m hearing as far as obviously oil companies are going to do extremely well so are refiners right now. But we are also seeing the hospitality industry do extremely well as far as travel is concerned, because we’re seeing a lot of pent up demand where people are not spending retail spending, but they’re still spending for trips.

If we look at US air bookings, for example, there are 93% of 2019 levels for Europe. We’re at 95% for South America. We’re at over what we were in 2019 to the Caribbean. And we’re also seeing soaring hotel bookings right now, even with cost pushing higher and ticket prices higher. So I think that Q2 is going to be very good actually, for, say, oil and gas and the hotel industry. But then as we move into Q3, I think we’re going to see a big hangover in that area in the fall.

SR: And to Tracy’s point, hotel bookings are above 2019 levels and the average price of those rooms through the roof. So you multiply those two together to get your average room rate and Occupancy, those are some big numbers that we’re going to see over the summer. To Tracy’s point, there’s going to be a lot of people that blow it out of the water in terms of earnings, and there’s going to be a lot of people that surprise the downside.

If you were a work from home darling, that was expecting work from home and those dynamics to be permanent and you’re in trouble. Right. That’s the target problem. People aren’t buying goods. They’re going places. And the bifurcation there is going to become stark as we move through the second quarter and probably into the third quarter.

TN: Really interesting. Okay. And then I guess the question that is probably overanalyzed, but people are waiting for is what does this mean for the Fed? They’re still on target for 50 in June, 50 in July and 50 in September. Is that your assessment? And maybe 25 in November? I think.

SR: 50 in November, 50 in December.

TN: 50 in November, 50 in December? Wow. So we’re going back to the 90s.

SR: Basically fully priced in the market.

TN: Is there any chance that they will accelerate beyond 50? Like, would they front load any of that just to shock the system?

SR: No, because I don’t think they want to shock the system. The Fed already has a credibility problem. If you move from 50 to 75, you create more of a credibility problem because you forward guided 50-50, and now all of a sudden you’re telling the market you’re doing 75, the market is just going to stop believing and they’re going to push the Fed and they’re just going to push back and it’s going to be a huge problem.

So I don’t think they’re surprised on that front. They may tweak the balance sheet. That’s a little bit of an easier move to make. Right. You can speed up the MBS role. You can pick up a little bit of the front end roll on US Treasuries, you can tighten that way and have it not be as much of a shock to the system.

TN: Okay.

SR: But have it be pretty interesting on the tightening front.

TN: Okay. But let’s dig into that, though. I’m sorry to spend too much time on our first topic, but if they accelerate the MBS stuff, housing is already kind of at a standstill over a two month period. Two to three month period.

A lot of people have had wealth effects because of the rapidly inflated house prices. So if they accelerate MBS, that perception of housing wealth collapses even more. Right. And so does that have relatively like a multiplier effect on the deceleration of consumption?

SR: It does. But that transmission is pretty slow generally, and you had a significant amount of call it front running against the housing market to take out equity. So I would push back a little bit on a collapse in transactions is going to have a big effect. What you really need to see is pricing actually coming down because it’s about pricing.

TN: Pricing coming down.

SR: Yeah. And pricing. The data is so delayed that it’s almost worthless.

TN: Nominal housing prices.

SR: Yes. But you’re still seeing housing prices hold up pretty well for most of the country. So until you really begin to see a crack there, I don’t think the wealth effect really takes hold from houses.

But you’re probably talking about a September, October type time frame for home prices to be weighing on people’s minds.

TN: Okay. It feels like over the past few months things have changed pretty dramatically. Expectations and these sorts of things. I know you’ve been talking about this for months, but I think the world is just catching up to it. And two months ago everyone said, oh, it’s all priced in. And then we get a day like Friday where obviously it’s not priced.

SR: I’ll stop after this but the interesting part about Friday was it wasn’t just call it the November December meetings getting priced higher for Fed rate hikes. It was March and May of next year that also saw pretty significant volumes and saw the pricing of the Fed movement get pushed pretty hard. So you’re seeing movement across a very long time horizon.

You’re talking twelve months out is kind of what people are pushing on now. So that really creates a different dynamic. But it’s a different dynamic to have eight or ten basis points priced in in September or November. It’s a bigger deal to have quite a bit of tightening priced in for December and March. Those are some out months those begin to really move markets on the margin.

TN: All of this in a midterm year. All of this in the midterm election year.

SR: It’s really painful all around, right? It’s painful all around. But I think the Fed kind of plays second fiddle to Tracy’s point on energy and how that flows through the consumer and the consumer psyche because that is critical at this point.

TN: Okay. So speaking of second fiddle let’s move on to the hot dollar and Fed playing second fiddle to Janet Yellen as Tracy has said before. We’re looking. At DXY that is the third highest it’s been ever it was very high in the mid eighty s it was very high in I think February 2002.

We’ve got that chart up now and now it’s hitting rates that it hasn’t hit for years so we have the Fed doing certain things to tame but we also have things like crude and other commodities that are rising in dollars. Terms. And it looks like the dollar is being pushed up to fend off some of that. So, Tracy, can you talk us a little bit through your view of kind of Yellen and her dollar bias and then impacts that you expect to see.

TS: She said since the beginning she wanted a strong dollar. Right. The problem is that right now this is a disastrous recipe for emerging markets right now with high energy prices and high dollar. And it’s no wonder we’re seeing huge outflows in emerging markets right now as far as investments are concerned. And so really that’s who’s going to feel the pain the most that could throw us to a global recession, for sure.

TN: Right.

SR: To that point, Europe is in a lot of trouble, and the Dixie is basically a measurement of euros and yen. That’s right. If you want to talk about a central bank that’s lost credibility, there’s none better than the ECB and Madame Lagarde and that wonderfully stupid speech that she gave this week, it was spectacularly bad.

TN: It’s what happens when you have a lawyer running monetary policy.

SR: They’re raising rates, and we have them, too. Anyway, moving on. So there is an interesting kind of dynamic there where you basically had the ECB for the first time in forever, say we’re going to raise rates like they just told us straight up they were going to do it and they got the wrong reaction across markets.

The currency didn’t go up. The currency didn’t strip. The currency looked pretty ugly that day. And then you’ve got yen sitting at 135 because they’re still doing yield curve control and it doesn’t look like they’re ever going to end it. So you have the Fed going in the exact opposite direction or much quicker than the rest of the world. In the DM world in particular.

That’s a recipe for a stronger dollar. And until you either get the ECB to smarten up or you get YCC brackets moved, yield curve control brackets moved by the bank of Japan, there’s no stopping the Dixie from moving higher. Right. It’s a two currency, two currencies basis.

TN: Remember Abenomics, when they were fighting to get 2% inflation in Japan.

SR: Yes.

TS: They’re still fighting. That’s why you can’t see inflation, it’s incredible.

TN: Yeah. Tracy, if we continue to see the dollar strengthen, do you think that has much impact on, say, crude prices and fuel prices?

TS: I know that everybody likes to think it’s a one to one correlation. Right. We think stronger dollar commodities. But it’s really not a one to one correlation, especially when you’re talking when you have actual supply demand issues. Right. Like we have a supply deficit across. So a stronger dollar is not going to hurt oil prices when you have real supply demand issues. Whereas if you look at something more like gold, the stronger dollar is not necessarily great for gold right now.

TN: Yeah. So I love it when people like talking about correlations of oil and dollar because many of them don’t realize that actually the positive correlation between oil and dollar is more frequent than many people want to admit, and it’s more persistent than many people want to admit.

So the kind of go to there’s a negative .9% correlation between oil and the dollar. It’s just not true. It’s a fiction.

SR: And the dynamic changed when the US became a major producer of oil.

TN: Right.

SR: That completely changed the dynamic. So if you’re not paying attention to the structural breaking system where the US became the world’s largest producer of hydrocarbons, you don’t know what you’re doing.

TN: Right. So who hurts the most? I think we mentioned EMs, but kind of who hurts the most, aside from Sri Lanka, which we already know? Is it like North Africa, those types of places? Is it Southeast Asia? Just off the top of your head, we didn’t rehearse this, so I’m just curious, what do you think hurts the most?

TS: I think you’re going to see a lot of problems in Africa for certain only because a lot of the OPEC producers there are struggling themselves already. Right. All of those people are the ones that are contributing majorly to the quota misses right now. So I think you’re going to see real pain there over Asia, I would say.

TN: Okay, Sam?

SR: Yeah, I would agree with Tracy. North Africa, East Africa, those look very vulnerable, particularly when you combine food costs with gasoline costs and oil. It’s kind of a toxic mix because if you have oil at 125 Brent, there’s an incentive that you want to pump and the people expect you to pump and buy them food. And if you can’t pump and buy food, then you’re basically an illegitimate government in North Africa.

TN: Right. Which is just trembling all around. Okay, let’s move on to energy prices and gasoline and petrol prices. Of course, we just hit this week again, I think three or four times this week we hit record prices for gasoline. And of course, that’s happening all around the world.

I think in the UK it’s £2 a liter or something like that. In the US, it broke $5 a gallon on average. I think 5.01 this morning, Patrick Dejan was saying that. Tracy, can you walk us through? We’ve mentioned this a couple of weeks ago, but in a bit more detail about what’s happening with refining capacity in the US and why this is such a big deal?

TS: Right. The last largest Greenfield project that we had was 1977. We’ve had a lot of brownfield projects, meaning adding to capacity to already existing refining facilities. However, right now we sort of peaked in 2018 and 19 as far as refining capacity is. And now we’re starting to come down again because we’re starting to see more closures, we’re seeing more unplanned outages.

These facilities are very old. So the operable capacity has been on the decline for the last few years. And if you look at Europe and Europe, it’s even worse. Right. So, I mean, Europe already has a problem, too, and that’s why they buy most of their diesel from Russia, which is going to affect them, because the diesel that they buy from them is seaborne. Right. All of it, which it falls under sanctions.

TN: And they can’t get insurance for those vessels.

TS: Yeah. And so they’re going to have a lot of problem. just to put a little tangible example, there’s a news here in Houston this week that I think it’s a Lyondell refinery that’s being closed, and that refinery is over 100 years old. Yes, our refineries are old. They’re aging facilities. They need a lot of maintenance. And we just really haven’t built out enough capacity for the amount that is coming offline over the last few years.

TN: So, Tracy, I know this is a little bit of a request, but we’re sending $40 billion to countries around the world to do different things. Would it not make sense to have some sort of government incentive for midstream companies to actually build refineries?

TS: Well, yeah, absolutely. I mean, infrastructure projects as far as the oil industry is concerned. If you look at the government’s complaining about oil companies are making so much money. However, where were they when they were in the red and racking up the debt? They were nowhere. How many times do we bail out the Airlines and the auto industry? The oil industry never got any help.

TN: Because they’re bad, tracy, oil companies are bad. They’re all my neighbors. But you would think they’re all bad, evil people.

TS: This is causing… Where our refinery operable at capacity? We’re at 94.2% refining right now, which is off the charts. Good. That means good news for your refining stocks if you own any. But we’re pushing it. We’re using it as much as we’re producing. Right.

TN: Let’s say somehow people came to their senses and said, look, we need to incentivize new refineries. How much just off the top of your head? Ten, $20 billion. Is it $100 billion? Just to get things started? How much do you think that would cost? Since we’re throwing money around.

TS: Since we’re throwing money around, I think if you could throw 10 billion, 20 billion at it, you could get some good projects going or tax incentives or something like that for current refineries to be able to build out or upgrade things of that nature. There’s a lot of things the government could do to help boost refining capacity.

TN: Okay. So while we’re throwing money around, would it make sense to reconfigure some of those refineries to refine light sweet Texas crude instead of, say, I don’t know, Venezuelan crude?

SR: Yes, it’s pretty simple. We built the right type of refining for a certain point, but we didn’t build the right type of refining for now. Yes, we would need to upgrade all of them, and it’s going to be a pretty significant issue.

The other really important thing that I think gets overlooked a lot is that even if you begin these projects now. It’s not a solution for several more years. By several more years, three to four at a minimum, kind of where you would expect these to begin to come online.

And the question is, what does the oil market look like at that point? What kind of mix do we have? So you have to make some fairly large assumptions about what your input mix is going to be down the road. So, yeah, I do think that it would be worthwhile to at least upgrade the current refineries, but I think that’s kind of a pipe dream.

TN: Okay. So while we’re throwing $40 billion overseas, we could take half of that and build new refineries and reconfigure refineries with American crude oil. Am I misunderstanding this?

SR: No.

TN: I just want to hammer the point home again. Okay, great. Thank you, guys. We had a really choppy week. We had a lot of kind of bad news come out. What are we looking forward to next week? Is it kind of more the same? Are we still in a really rough place and the Fed meetings this week, some announcements. I don’t think it’s going to surprise anybody, but what else are you looking for this week?

TS: Pretty much the same. I think we’re kind of stuck in this market low for a while now. So I figure you still see chop, you probably see oil sideways to up again. I expect that trend to pretty much continue into the summer until we really start to see some demand destruction, which we’re just not seeing enough yet.

So I think headed into fall, we have a better chance of seeing oil prices come down because again, I think that we’re sort of going to have a travel hangover and everybody’s going to get home and they spend a bunch of money on their credit cards and the economy is not that great. So that’s what I’m looking at. And again, for the week ahead, I think more of the same.

TN: Sam?

SR: Yeah, you have a million meetings next week of central banks. I think that’s really what the markets are going to key off of. And it really depends who says the most dumb stuff. And it’s going to be a competition because you have Powell and then you have the Bank of Japan. So we’ll see if maybe you get a little bit of a bracket move on yield curve control that would make things a little more spicy across markets. And we’ll see what Powell is capable of messing up when it comes to forward guidance during the press conference.

So I would say it’s more the same, but there’s a likelihood that markets are about as hawkish as they can be going into the meeting and that Powell doesn’t want to push markets more. So there may be a little bit of a rally off Powell just not being an uberhawk, and that might be positive, but I would say you’re in for some serious chop, particularly across the rates markets, currency markets.

And when it comes to equity markets, I think it’s going to be exactly what Tracy and I talked about earlier. It’s going to be the story of travel over retail.

TN: Okay? So next week, let’s talk about who said the stupidest central bank statement. Okay?

SR: Perfect.

TN: You got it.

SR: Does that work?

TN: Very good. Okay. Thanks, guys. Thank you very much. Have a great weekend. And have a great weekend.

SR: You, too. Tony.