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BFM: Of Trade and Tech

In this discussion with BFM 89.9, Tony Nash shares views on the latest on trade and tech. How will the US-China trade relations look like under a Biden administration and what is China hoping to accomplish with the recent antitrust regulations on its tech giants? Also, is now a good time to rotate on cyclicals with the successful vaccine trials? And is it possible to have a double-dip recession?

 

This podcast first appeared and originally published at https://www.bfm.my/podcast/morning-run/market-watch/of-trade-and-tech on November 12, 2020.

 


BFM Description

 

What will US-China trade relations look like under a Biden administration? What is China hoping to accomplish with the recent antitrust regulations on its tech giants? We speak to Tony Nash, CEO of Complete Intelligence, on these and more.

Produced by: Mike Gong

 

Presented by: Lyn Mak, Wong Shou Ning

 

Show Notes

 

WSN: To help us make sense of this, we have on the line with us Tony Nash, CEO of Complete Intelligence. Biden has not outlined any concrete policy plans for the U.S. China trade relations. But do you think both countries will resolve some of the issues this time around, or will competing interests continue to dominate the narrative?

 

TN: I think it’s going to be hard. Obviously, the Biden family has deep ties to China, but I think the political environment in the U.S. isn’t really amenable to an easy fix. I know the foreign policy community in the U.S. really wants to just revert back to 2015, 2016, but the voters in the U.S. just won’t let that happen. So whether the administration likes it or not, they’re saddled with much of the positioning that the U.S. has taken over the last few years.

 

WSN: Now, what about China’s end game, you know, behind the new regulations targeting the tech sector? What are the potential impacts behind those changes, actually?

 

TN: Well, I think, you know, there’s nervousness both in the U.S. and China over the power of big tech. And I think China is nervous about the information that these tech companies are tracking, about the power they have over markets and behaviors. And I think they’re cracking down. There will be a perception that it will limit things in for Chinese companies in the short term. It certainly hurt the U.S. IPO and other things. But I think there’s a move globally to crack down on big tech. So I wouldn’t be surprised to see moves to crack down on big tech in the U.S. as well. It won’t happen until next year, probably. But there is a move globally and nervousness globally around a power that big tech has.

 

WSN: Yeah, but, Tony, if you look at the share price of big tech, especially in the U.S., so the likes of Facebook, there has been actually no change to the share price is still continues to do extremely well.

 

TN: Yeah, absolutely. But that is there are a number of factors that go into that. Part of that is Central Bank activity. Part of that is micro accounts and small investors moving into to these things. Part of that is a perception of things that may or may not happen within the next administration. So we look at Twitter, for example, it’s up 2.8 percent today. But, you know, there’s a lot happening that we believe there will be downside on that going into the end of the year.

 

So a number of things have changed with the expectation that we’ll have a vaccine relatively soon and that we’ll have continued stimulus and questions around where that stimulus will go. We can look at companies like Palantir, which are up, I don’t know, 60 percent since their IPO six weeks ago. So there are you know, that’s a twenty five billion dollar company now. It’s incredible. So, you know, there are companies like Facebook, Twitter, other companies that that there is a lot of nervousness about in the U.S., Google and so on.

 

And so I think what the Chinese government is doing and what the U.S. government is doing, although they’ll take different forms, I think they reflect similar concerns.

 

WSN: And, Tony, you did highlight the vaccine. So do you think now is a good time to rotate into cyclicals like aviation and banking? Is it too early?

 

TN: I think it’s a bit early. I think we you know, we had expected this stuff to come earlier, but I’m not necessarily we expect there to be a lot of excitement to going into January, but we’re afraid that we might have a false start going into the middle of Q2. So it’s probably a bit early to go in as aggressively as people have gone in. Obviously, it depends on expectations and the terms of their investment in a number of other things. But we would be really patient here. And, you know, we expect things to come a little bit later, although even a small opening is very exciting at this point.

 

WSN: Yeah, but related to this, Tony, is the fact that Covid-19 cases, especially in the U.S., are increasing every day and it’s the same case in Europe. So I see a new elford, the alphabet being used to describe the economy, a W, which is on the back of a face of a double dip recession. Do you think that’s a possibility?

 

TN: I think it’s a possibility. But I you know, at least in America, I don’t go to Europe. I haven’t been there for a year. But at least in America, most people aren’t really worried about Covid anymore. They just want to move on. And what people are worried about is hospitalization and death. They’re not actually worried about the virus itself. So the incidence is a bit of in the eyes of, you know, a number of people who I talk to, the incidence of Covid is less concerning than the hospitalizations and deaths. And so the number that people are really keeping an eye on is the hospitalizations and deaths, not necessarily the broad incidence number, which may or may not show may or may not have an impact. It’s really when things get hospitalizations and death. And so the treatment of Covid has taken huge strides in the past six months.

 

WSN: All right. Thank you for your time. That was Tony Nash, CEO of Complete Intelligence, giving us his views on the US economy, whether it’s as a possibility for a double dip recession, which he thinks is highly unlikely because it’s not the number of Covid cases, but unfortunately, the number of deaths and hospitalizations.

 

LM: Yeah, Tony’s a little also a little bit more cautious when it comes to whether or not it’s time to rotate into cyclicals. Right. Because we have seen a lot of excitement, even as he points out, a lot of excitement going into other stocks as we have seen news of vaccines coming out of Pfizer and an optimism vaccine, optimism has started to creep up again that we might see something by early next year. So he’s of the opinion that it’s going to that the rise in cyclicals is going to come a little bit later. So it means he’s going to hold off for the time being.

Categories
QuickHit

QuickHit: The Great Decoupling and the Future of US-China Relations (Part 2)

This is Part 2 of the first ever QuickHit #CageMatch with political-economic advisor Albert Marko and China expert Christopher Balding on the great decoupling of US and China. The second part of this is on the Belt And Road Initiative and the answer that the US may have to the BRI. We also talked about the corporate activities — are the US and China targeting corporates? How does that work and how would that play within the environment of decoupling.

 

For the first part, we’ve covered the US foreign policy, looking at Latin America, Africa, and parts of Asia. We looked at US-China trade and a number of other aspects around the US-China relationship. 

 

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This QuickHit episode was recorded on October 14, 2020.

 

The views and opinions expressed in this QuickHit episode are those of the guests and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any content provided by our guests are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

 

SHOW NOTES

 

TN: Now let’s let’s move along a little bit more into economics and talk about the Belt and Road Initiative, which something that I actually worked on for about a year and a half. There’s been some talk in the last few months about the anglosphere and will the West have an answer to the BRI. Does the US need a response to the BRI as a government initiative and if so, do you think they can do it? That question is from @Sw33tYams.

 

CB: Just as rappers get shown to the VIP room, if you’re a country and you are offering goodies, you’re gonna get shown to the VIP room in whatever country you go to. That doesn’t mean it has to be the Trump and air initiative. We do need to think about and we should absolutely put effort into how can the US provide positive things to countries.

 

Why don’t we set up an office that says, I have a company in China that makes XYZ product and they want to move out of China. We have a database of where to go. I know bankers in Vietnam that we’re like, “hey we’re just getting slammed. Why doesn’t the US have an office of infrastructure for emerging markets like Vietnam to help get migrating Chinese companies, those types of goodies, even in a lot of different forms it could take, are going to open a lot more doors than just saying it’s the right thing to do.

 

AM: I agree. But it’s also gonna need a little bit of help from our partners specifically Australia, the UK plus Japan. Basically five I’s plus Japan. It’s going to need shared cost. Supply chains have to move. It’s going to take a little while. It’s going to take a little bit effort from everybody.

 

TN: So it’s basically a government kind of somewhat directed but not necessarily directly involved. What you’re saying is Americans will take a a little easier hand than the Chinese kind of very direct hand in say
these multilateral or multi-country activities. Is that fair to say?

 

CB: I can give one example I was told about and this is something I’m surprised hasn’t gotten more attention. The Commerce Department apparently has a tariff waiver program where if you say, “look, we have this plant in China. It’s facing tariffs. Here’s our 180-day plan to get to move our production to Vietnam, Sri Lanka, Africa wherever.” The Commerce Department will give you a waiver for, whatever time period if you give them a plan. That’s the kind of stuff that should be more publicized and the US government is taking an active role to partner with business to say, “you take the lead and if you’re doing it, we’ll help you.”

 

TN: Let me throw you the next question, Albert. This is from @Ellis_Greenwood. How long will it take the US to decouple from China? So if we assume what Chris just talked about with some of the say Commerce Department activities, these other things, does the US really wanted to decouple from China fully and if so, how long will it take to get either to that level or to say a desired level that that US companies would want to?

 

AM: A desired level is the right term. We’re not going to fully decouple from China. That’s just absurd. When they’re talking about moving supply chains, I’ve heard all sorts of 15, 20 years to one year and it actually depends on each sector. It’s a lot easier to move a software gaming company rather than a pharmaceutical manufacturing company. It can take anywhere from one year to ten to fifteen years.

 

TN: What do you think about that, Chris?

 

CB: I think that’s generally accurate. A lot of the stuff that China was known for over the years, like let’s say low-wage manufacturing, assembly, that type of stuff… I mean Apple set up, a plant in India, which can make iPhones in about 18 months. As Albert pointed out, people think of decoupling as there’s not going to be trade between the US and China. I think what you’re really seeing is this move to bipolar supply chain worlds especially in tech. So there’s going to be a China-specific manufacturing world for tech stuff and a non-China because, you can already see the US government and other governments and even companies saying, “hey, your tech is not been touched by China.”

 

TN: Frankly, I believe that’s what China has wanted all along is their own Chinese ecosystem and then a rest of world ecosystem so they can control that technology and the messaging over that technology. That’s what they had 20 years ago, and there’s been the things overlapping for the last 10 years and I believe that deep down, they really want a separation of those things.

 

This is @candideXXI, “what will be the political and economic pressures outcomes produced by the ending of Chinese investment and the debt expansionary cycle,” which is an interesting question but maybe going to one or two things. Underlying that question is, is that expected to happen? A lot of people have this question on their brain but I don’t necessarily see that happening in the next three to five years. These things tend to go a lot longer than many people assume.

 

CB: Let’s assume that China went to 0% debt growth right now. Honestly, China would be in flames by the end of the day. It would explode. Xi would be lynched by the end of the day. The number that I saw and it’s a staggering number, is debt to GDP in China this year is going to increase by upwards of 30%. So it’s going to go from 300% to 330% in one year. That’s a staggering number. I don’t see they’re going to keep this going as long as possible. For them to get this under control is going to be at least a 10, 20 year cycle at best. And in all likelihood, they’re headed for North Korean financial system with Japanese debt. That’s the only logical outcome. Because if they were to open up the capital markets, the RMB would drop 50% easy.

 

TN: So what you’re saying is, there’s a possibility that CNY could be a global currency?

 

CB: That’s exactly what I’m saying, yes. Exactly what I’m saying.

 

AM: Yeah I agree with Chris here. China’s well within the Euro Dollar system. They need dollars. They can’t get away from Dollars. They need it for their debt. They multiply it out to issue more Renmimbis out to the emerging markets. They’re not leaving and they’re not getting out of the system.

 

TN: Let’s take it more into the corporate realm as well. When we look at like Huawei and Tiktok and some of the Chinese companies that have a large international presence, given the dynamics at home, if the US continues to cut off these companies and some of their crucial activities overseas, how does that bend back onto China? How dire is it? Is it not a big deal or is it pretty dire not just in terms of acquiring technology but in terms of actually making money and keeping the home markets floating?

 

AM: That’s the name of the game is making money for them. They need dollars from overseas desperately. Without that, their entire financial system implodes. They go out to Africa and then they loan out Renminbis and they expect money paid back in dollars at all times. So without the dollar, they’re just buying time.

 

CB: Especially in the tech sector, these are guys that maybe have been abroad for a fair amount of time. They want to emulate the Googles. They want to be international. They think of themselves as cosmopolitan even if they grew up in the system. And so, even though they might be pro-China, which is different than like pro-CCP, they want to be a part of that global tech scene. To have those limitations on them is a constraint that they don’t necessarily like. But that’s the reality of the system that they find themselves in.

 

TN: So will they change their behaviors to align with the constraints outlined by the US or will they remain true to what the CCP tells them to do and their business will suffer internationally?

 

CB: Business will suffer internationally because the reality is, as a Chinese business, you can’t get away from that. As soon as Jack Ma says I’m gonna obey the SEC and file this type of audit, they get blown up in China.

 

AM: They can walk a tight rope until they absolutely get pressured by the Chinese government and then they have to fall in line. There’s no other choice for them.

 

TN: We’ve seen more Chinese IPOs in the four years of Trump than we saw under the eight years of Obama. First of all, why is that? Are they just trying to cash in and get dollars into their companies or is there some other reason? Is it possible to continue that pace?

 

AM: I think they’re just taking advantage of the market and being able to cash in and cash out as fast as they possibly can. Do I think it’s sustainable? Absolutely not. This market’s overbought and eventually there’ll be a correction and on top of that I think that the US government needs to have some reasonable accounting standards for Chinese companies that refuse to open their books for transparency. It boggles my mind. At this point, why should I just go to China, buy a company and list it on the NASDAQ for some absurd amount of money. There’s nothing saying that I need to open my books. It’s absolutely crazy.

 

CB: This is one of the most frustrating arguments by the China apologists because when you make the same argument that Google, Goldman whoever is not subject to the SEC or US jurisdiction on US financial markets, you make that argument, then I will entertain your argument about Chinese companies. Until then, it’s nonsensical.

 

TN: Okay. So let me just sum this up. China is the biggest US foreign policy issue. China is in an untenable position of having their companies locked down or some of their companies locked down by the US. They have a shortage of dollars. They have unsustainable debt and if the current US policies continue, at least Albert thinks that Chinese leadership is in peril. So, what glass half full view am I not seeing?

 

CB: This is in a way very predictable in the sense that they sit down in November, December and they say, “Okay this is our target for 2021” whatever it is. And because you can see that those numbers are almost so stunningly predictable and what’s amazing is they have a very good idea of what their leakages are going to be. That money that gets leaked out in Macau gaming chips or Bitcoin and all that other good stuff, they know what they have to hit. My favorite thing of all this is that almost nobody knows that they’re already rationing US dollars. Most banks in China have the one-to-one rule that you have to bring in a dollar to send out a dollar. As long as they can continue to balance those books through, it can keep up for a while.

 

AM: I’m at a loss for words almost on that one. For the Chinese, you would hope that they understand how bipolar systems work and understanding the Apple versus Microsoft component as like let the one guy be big and you fill in the gaps and everybody be copacetic. I don’t know if I can buy that for very long. But
that’s my only hope is Xi, if Trump is elected, which I am speculating that he is, comes to this realization and says, “let’s tone down the pressure. Let’s fulfill the Phase One Deal, Phase Two Deal” whatever they want to go into. Make inroads and just ratchet down the tensions.

 

TN: Last question guys. Albert, I know you’ve done a lot of forecasting for the presidential election. What do you think is going to happen? You have some really interesting views and I’d love to hear why and Chris also as he’s talking, it’s your first time to be back here. What are some of your observations and expectations as well.

 

AM: I know we’re seeing all sorts of polling numbers that are just eye-popping and just I cannot believe publishers actually put this out to print. 15 points for Biden. 11 points for Biden.

 

CB: Just today, I actually saw this poll saying Biden up 17.

 

AM: It boggles my mind how these people just either they miss statistics class or just don’t know how to add. But for Biden to be up 17 points, you would have to assume the Democrats come out in some kind of record 80 turnout and on top of that have the republicans, 15 of them either not show up or vote for Biden.

 

TN: But even Reagan’s 84 blowout wasn’t a 17-point win, was it?

 

AM: No. This is what’s boggling to me. I just don’t understand it.

 

We know what California is going to do. We know what New York’s going to do. We just toss those aside. If you look at Florida, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Wisconsin and Arizona, those are the states that you really have to look at and in almost every single state, the Republicans have gained hundreds of thousands of new registrations. And even in the polling that’s done out there, there’s a few pieces of data that 96 or 94 of Republicans have an approval of Donald Trump. How do you get to 17 point lead, when 94% of Republicans support Donald Trump. That’s just unbelievable to me. The Economist has been my favorite lately of the 99.9% victory for Joe Biden over Donald Trump.

 

These are just silly numbers people throw out there. Coming out of lockdowns, they’re doing 100 phone polling so they have no opportunity to go out to the public and see who they’re talking to. And study after study has shown that Republican voters have been not just shy vote, but actually spiteful of the pollsters and purposely saying that they’re going to vote for Biden. That’s how you get to these 17 point numbers.

 

CB: I try to stay away from politics as much as possible especially on China and stuff like that because whether it is Trump or Biden, I see what we’re in with China as a 20 to 40-year type of challenge. So at some point, there’s going to be Republicans, at some point there’s going to be Democrats. Just from a social perspective and Tony I think you can identify with this. Man, America’s crazy.

 

TN: Democracy is messy, right?

 

CB: I’m a live and let live kind of guy. So if you’re a Democrat, if you’re a Republican, if you’re a Green or a Libertarian, I don’t really care. We can still sit down and smoke a cigar. And I think the thing that just amazes me is America just seems angry and it seemed really angry for a long time.

 

We can all talk about Trump, but both parties can point to things that the others have done that is unethical, that is abnormal. We need to be better citizens to each other. We need to accept losses that, it’s not going to be our time all the time. The political golden rule is don’t advocate a policy that you don’t want used against you.

 

AM: I attribute the hate that we’re seeing now, the polarization, squarely on the weaponization of social media. Completely. Because we can sit there and put out a viral post of someone, take a phrase taken out of context and making that person look like just a demonic figure and then dox the guy, show him his address and have 15 people show up to the house with pitchforks and and torches. It’s just insane. There’s got to be some kind of accountability on social media by either the government or social media standards themselves.

 

TN: Social media doesn’t have standards, Albert, because I know you’re both active on social media.

 

CB: The way I always think about it is, a country or a political party is like a family barbecue. We’ve all gone to those family barbecues and go, “who are these losers that are at this family barbecue?” And if you aren’t going to your own political party or your own country and going, “dang these are some losers I’m hanging out with,” okay I mean, you’re doing it all wrong.

Categories
QuickHit

QuickHit: The Great Decoupling and the Future of US-China Relations (Part 1)

This is the first ever QuickHit #CageMatch with a returning guest, political-economic advisor Albert Marko, and China expert Christopher Balding with us for the first time. This is Part 1 of a 2-part discussion. Visit this page for the second part.

 

Albert Marko helps a couple of financial firms, members of congress, and a couple governments  to manage and navigate their way through the beltway and the legislative issues and the politics and how the economic, how the federal reserve and all the economic policies filter down. Albert is also the co-founder and COO of Favore Media Group.

 

Christopher Balding spends most of his time on the phone talking to people about the data about China. He is a two-time winner of Lifetime Achievement awards and a Professor at Fulbright University Vietnam.

 

Subscribe to CI Newsletter and gain AI-driven intelligence.

Subscribe to our Youtube Channel.

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Check out the CI Futures platform to forecast currencies, commodities, and equity indices

Follow Tony on Twitter: https://twitter.com/TonyNashNerd

Follow Albert on Twitter: https://twitter.com/amlivemon

Follow Chris on Twitter: https://twitter.com/BaldingsWorld

 

This QuickHit episode was recorded on October 14, 2020.

 

The views and opinions expressed in this QuickHit episode are those of the guests and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any content provided by our guests are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

 

Show Notes

 

TN: We’ve got a bunch of questions off of Twitter and the first one is from @AxeRendale: If you were in charge of U.S. foreign policy. What are the top things you would change from the status quo? They asked about five things. I don’t think we have that much time. So, what are a couple things? Let’s say two things in terms of U.S. foreign policy that you would change. Of course we have the election coming up but regardless of the individual. We’ve seen some status quo upheaval over the past few years but what would you really change not just the top line but the way the U.S. acts?

 

AM: I would immediately start looking at South America and Africa and identifying and eliminating or at least hampering Chinese and Russian interests there, specifically Venezuela would be my number one choice right now. The Chinese and the Russians, they have a field day there. There’s almost no U.S. intervention in there and the same goes for parts of Africa. I know we have troops in Mali and Niger and a couple places to deal with terrorism but just solidifying some of the countries out there like Morocco, Angola and preventing the Chinese from making inroads. I would put make that a priority.

 

CB: So I would agree with Albert in general terms but maybe take it in a slightly different direction. The Trump administration has done a good job shifting the focus to the larger problems and China and taking those policy steps that are well within their grasp.

 

What needs to be the next step, and whether this is under a Trump administration or Biden administration, is the reality is that you can’t handle these issues on the cheap. The Germans and Asian countries are not just going to be persuaded by the moral rightness of confronting China.

 

Just to give you two examples of where you might see something. If the U.S. was to offer even to European countries to fund 5G rollout at like 0% interest loans because that what China is doing. This the way they run the finances is basically giving away the 5G gear. If the U.S. made like 0% interest loans, you could fund that if it was in some type of like a levered development finance corporation structure, where with a couple billion dollars a year honestly, globally. You could do that entire project globally and on the U.S. budget, a couple billion dollars a year is almost couch cushion money.

 

TN: Right, and this is similar to how Japan is competing with China for infrastructure in parts of Asia, right? They’re giving no interest or extreme like 0.3% interest loans for infrastructure, right?

 

CB: Yeah, exactly. Like in Vietnam, where I can speak a little bit more authoritatively, they’re not fans of China. At the same time, they recognize they have to work with China. It’s a very pragmatic approach. At the same time, they we want to give the French certain pieces of the pie, also the Americans. Vietnam is actively trying to balance where their economic investment comes from so that they don’t become too dependent on any one source.

 

TN: Yep, it’s smart.

 

AM: The only issue I have with that is that you’re absolutely correct and that’s exactly what should be done  but it’s depending on the European partners to even come to play ball. Because, within the European Union themselves, there’s competing interests on all sides. And it’s difficult for the United States to try to compete with the Chinese who give 99-year loans for infrastructure in Africa to dictate which European Nation gets a slice of the pie when they’re all conflicting with themselves to begin with. So that’s the only thing I’d have to
say about that.

 

TN: That’s an interesting point. China is very successful in terms of foreign policy by peeling off one member of a block at a time and there’s no better example than the way they peeled off Cambodia from ASEAN in order to break the voting block that’s necessary to get anything through there. They’ve done the same with the E.U. with say Portugal or Greece, right? Do you see the U.S. being able to do that, go and interrupt a block by getting say a single or a couple of allies there? Because I haven’t seen the U.S. do that all that successfully say for 20 years. Do you think we can do that successfully again?

 

AM: I think that we absolutely can be that successful if we actually had the will to do it. The problem is the Chinese are just literally filling in the gaps. The vacuums that the United States have left, and this is something that the United States just needs to get over the dirty word of intervention and just get on with business and solidify U.S. interests abroad.

 

CB: I would actually slightly differ from Albert on this and I see it in a very structural in a very structural way. If you take the E.U. to basically take to move against Chinese interests in Europe, there’s an asymmetry here. The U.S. has to get everybody to agree. China only has to get one to disagree, okay?

 

TN: Why does the U.S. have to get everyone to agree?

 

CB: Because basically, if the E.U. for instance is going to pass a let’s say a regulation blocking Huawei gear, it’s a unanimous vote, okay? That’s the only way it gets through the E.U. is through a unanimous vote. So the U.S. has to get everybody to agree. China only has to get one to disagree.

 

If you look at like the U.N. with the human rights council, we can talk about the U.S. should do this or that with the human rights council. The reality is that China till the end of time is going to have enough votes to put Russia, Venezuela, Libya, etc. on the human rights council because of the the number of countries that there are in the number of countries that they can get to agree with them. So people talk about, “well, it’s a Trump issue.” No. That’s the reality that’s the systemic nature of the international system.

 

AM: And one of the things that the United States has absolutely not done is use the United States Dollar as a weapon to combat that. But that’s a whole different topic and we can get all sidetracked on that one but…

 

TN: Yeah, we can spend a lot of time on that. Here’s a question from @RemaniSrikanth: How much is China policy hinged on who wins the U.S. election? Do you believe that fundamentally the democrats and republicans would have different China policies?

 

CB: After the Russian debacle that they had in the Obama administration and the people that came out of that, I would be surprised if they did like a complete reset, okay? I don’t think democrats really have any real agreement about what they want to do with China. Even within people within the Biden administration or what would supposedly be a Biden administration. You have people that are people that honestly I think would be, if they weren’t democrats, would probably fit well within a Trump administration and you have people that would practically be German in their approach in that there’s no concession. You’ve heard things about well they want to focus on climate change and this 2060 promise is great. We have something to go with here. I don’t think anybody really has a good idea.

 

My own personal suspicion would be more than anything the Trump administration has actually been very deliberate in turning up continuing generally speaking across policy domains and turning up continuing to turn up the pressure slowly, like a pressure cooker. I don’t think you would see that under Biden administration. I don’t think necessarily you would see a rollback of most Trump policies.

 

TN: Albert, do you agree?

 

AM: Yeah, I agree with Chris wholeheartedly. Xi is at a do or die moment with Trump being re-elected. If trump is re-elected and the pressure’s maintained or even raised, I do not think he lasts two or three years in there. As for a Biden presidency, what it would look like? All we have to do is go back to the track record of the Obama presidency and see what they’ve done. They just ignore whatever China does and let them run around the world and do whatever they want. We sat there for two years in 2013 watching China militarize islands while there was absolutely no response. Having Samantha Power back, Valerie Jarrett, Susan Rice doesn’t give me any confidence whatsoever into dealing with dealing with the Chinese.

 

TN: I was in Asia during that time jumping up and down and was told that I was overly aggressive so I share your frustration. Here’s a question from @JamesRoberta7: What does a Xi Jinping and China situation look like if Trump is elected and Pompeo stays at state? What does that look like the first say 24 months of of that type of situation?

 

AM: It really depends on the actions of the Trump administration. Do they ramp up tariffs again? Do they start pressuring them in China? Do they pressure them in Vietnam, in the Philippines? I think they do.

 

The Chinese are going to have to respond to safeguard their own interests. What do they do? Maybe cause a skirmish with the Indians again. Threaten the Taiwanese a little bit more. They can’t really act militarily. They just don’t have the capacity to do that and they’d be completely embarrassed. That’s a whole different argument to itself but like I said, the days are numbered, if Trump is reelected, for Xi. I don’t think the elite families within the Guangdong province would put up with further losses of their wealth.

 

TN: I think that’s something that’s lost on a lot of the American analysts. There is not a monolithic kind of Chinese Communist Party. There are facts within the CCP. There are different power centers. A lot of even the think tankers in America act as if there is this single head at the CCP. He has definitely solidified some power but there are still some very powerful factions. Chris, what do you think about that if there’s a kind of a Trump-Pompeo, that partnership continues, what do you think that looks like for China and the CCP?

 

CB: So, I’m going to slightly diverge from from Albert here in that what we’ve basically seen in the first four years of Trump, especially in the past two years is that Trump is taking a lot of things that are well within the executive purview that he can do. Whether that’s sanctions of different kinds. Although you know in a way the amount of pain that he can cause China within that basket of tools is at this point, it’s increasingly limited. In different ways probably, the biggest thing that he could do is do something that really blocked like IPO or really crimped dollar access.

 

Crimp dollar access is an enormous weapon. But I think the next step is, and you’re actually seeing a lot of groundwork being laid is and you just saw for instance some comments out of India where the U.S. state department is talking about really ramping up its alliance with India. And you’re starting to see a lot of these very foundational type of stuff. So whether it’s increased congressional spending to military things, alliances, different stuff like that, that would be likely where you would see a lot of the focus, especially, legislatively to get authorization to do those types of activities.

 

TN: Okay, that’s a great point as you bring up India to ask this question from @dogthecynic: “How durable do you think the China-Russian alliance is?” And I bring that up because India and Russia traditionally have had a strong alliance post-war. If the U.S. and India continue to get closer at some point, will Russia have to choose between China and India as an ally? Is that even a choice? Let’s start with how strong is that China-Russia alliance? Is it just a resources for weapons type of alliance or is it really a tighter alliance?

 

AM: If you look at it historically, it’s nothing more than cyclical friends with benefits, if you want to call it that. It comes and goes. Their interests are aligned in one area, they conflict on another. Right now, they’re conflicting in Africa quite a lot more than people understand. The Indians, they’ve used Russia as a counter balance to the to the Chinese for decades. It’s quite clear.

 

I don’t think the Chinese and the Russians trust each other. They never will. The Chinese have been encroaching on their borders. Is it strong? No. Can India-U.S. alliance possibly tip it more in their favor? I really don’t think so. I don’t think the Indians are ignorant to the fact that they need Russia as a counterbalance just as much as they need the United States security blanket.

 

CB: The way I would phrase it is that there is what is the honor among thieves. They clearly are frenemies. The Russians know that China is stealing plane designs and engine designs and all this kind of good stuff at the same time, Huawei is working with Russia to hire local hackers and setting up things in Russia to engage in cyber warfare and whatnot because they have a very common enemy. As long as there’s a common enemy for them to focus on and it benefits them to fight that common enemy, I think absolutely that partnership is at least to a plausible degree is going to exist for the sake of the kids, for lack of a better term.

 

TN: Okay, I’ve got some very similar questions from @gabrielfox1 @jschwartz91 and @americacapitalone about Taiwan. So China, Taiwan, U.S. pretty delicate relationships and a lot of the questions are really about the kinetic conflict but also the business aspect of China-Taiwan relations and increasingly Taiwan-U.S. relations with some of the semiconductor activity that the U.S. has undertaken against China. So can you open that up a little bit for us?

 

First of all do you think a China-Taiwan conflict in the next say 24 months is more than say 30% possible? Which it’s just a hedge right? I mean is it realistically possible? That’s kind of a yes or no. But do you think there will be more difficult commercial relationships between China and Taiwan or do you think this is just something that is kind of window dressing and they need each other?

 

AM: Do I think there’s a conflict brewing in the next 24 months? Absolutely not. I don’t think the Chinese have the capabilities. I don’t think they want to be embarrassed furthermore. The Chinese elite, they have money wrapped up in Taiwan. They’re not going to sit there and cut off their their money supply just because Xi wants to prove a point that I don’t believe they can win a war quickly. It would hurt.

 

CB: I will disagree with with Albert here. My understanding of the military capabilities actually align with Albert and what the people I trust have basically said, it’s really going to be 2022, 2023 before they probably have the capabilities necessary.

 

Albert said something very interesting, which I think is worth repeating. They don’t want to be embarrassed. Well let’s look at how China’s behaved in the past year, okay? I don’t think you can project that level of rationality on Xi Jinping. Why the hell are they fighting over some frozen tundra in the Himalayas? It logically makes zero sense, right? I’m not saying that there’s going to be a war. It could be some type of low-level conflict. There’s a lot of different ways that it could be. This doesn’t necessarily mean full-scale invasion
but I would definitely put some type of event conflict distinctly higher.

 

TN: I think it’s unlikely but given my exposure to mid-levels of Chinese ministries they are not the rational, thoughtful, wise organizations that many Americans think and Xi Jinping as you say Chris, why are you fighting over some icy hills in northern India? It’s just stupid, right?

 

So I don’t believe the Chinese government is as thoughtful and wise as many westerners suspect. They make stupid mistakes like everyone else. I’m not saying they’re more stupid than anyone else. I think they’re just as they’re human beings.

 

Now let’s move along a little bit more into economics and talk about the Belt and Road initiative, which something that I actually worked on for about a year and a half. There’s been some talk in the last few months about the anglosphere and does the west have an answer to the BRI? This is really aN eight-year-old question, but my first question is, does the U.S. need a response to the BRI as a government initiative and if so do you think they can do it?

Categories
QuickHit Visual (Videos)

QuickHit: “Perceived Recovery” and the Artificial Market

Political economic consultant Albert Marko joins us for this week’s QuickHit episode where he explained about this “perceived recovery” and how this artificial boost in markets help the economy. He also shares his views on the 2020 US Presidential Election and the chance of Trump winning or losing this year. What will happen if his scenario plays out, particularly to the Dollar, Euro, and others?

 

Albert Marko advises congressional members and some financial firms on how the machinations of what D.C. does and how money flows from the Fed, Treasury or Congress out to the real world. He is also the co-founder and COO of Favore Media Group.

 

This QuickHit episode was recorded on August 25, 2020.

 

Last week’s QuickHit was with independent trading expert Tracy Shuchart on the end of “buy everything” market and the unknowns and apprehensions.

 

The views and opinions expressed in this QuickHit episode are those of the guests and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any content provided by our guests are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

 

Show Notes

 

TN: We’ve seen a lot of intervention in markets from the Fed and the Treasury. I’d really love to hear what you’ve seen and what your assessment is of that activity.

 

AM: First off, we have to understand that politics and economics are tied to the head. You can’t deviate from the two of them. I don’t like when people try to disassociate the two from that. The Fed and the Treasury had to work on financial stability of the markets. That is the ground game right now. The only way to do such a thing would be to congregate all the market makers and select certain equities and pump those equities until the market had a perceived recovery at that point.

 

TN: So perceived recovery, that’s an interesting, interesting word. When you say market makers or strategists got together and plan this, what concentrations have you seen in markets? Is it possible to focus on a specific number of companies and make sure that the rest of the market moves based on their coattails?

 

AM: Of course. This is not a new strategy. We’ve done this in 1907, and done this in nineteen eighty seven with Buffett and Goldman and we’re doing it now. It’s just the way it is.

 

The way the strategy works is you take a couple equities, say a dozen of them, maybe a little bit less. Tesla would be one. Nvidia, Adobe, all of these companies that don’t really have international peers to compare with and valuations that they can pump and the market takes over and comes up with all sorts of fancy ideas of why Tesla is at a $400 billion valuation.

 

But the fact of the matter is, if you look at the pricing and you look at all the call options that have happened over the last four months, it’s pretty clear that this was completely done artificially.

 

TN: It seems the US markets lead global equities. Is there some linking of this? And again, are there international coattails that follow on to US equities coattails or is that what you’ve seen in recent months?

 

AM: That is absolutely correct. There are a couple of markets that would support the US market specifically. That obviously would be the U.K. But the one I like to look at is the Swiss National Bank. They have their minions and their people intertwined within US hedge funds and working with the Fed and the Treasury for years. So if something is going on, they would probably be the next people to hear about it. And you can actually see this by looking at their portfolio buys in Q1 and Q2, as opposed to the 2018. You’ll see that those certain equities like Apple and Tesla had just gotten ridiculous amount of eyes.

 

TN: How successful is that been? As we look at the depths of the pullback in April? Crude oil was at negative $37 in April and it fell $99 from January through April. WTI did at least, right? Equities obviously had a lot of problems. So from your perspective, how has that been executed? How has it been pulled off? Is it okay? Is it good? Are we seeing, at least in equity markets, are we seeing a “V” and do you think that translates into the real economy whatever that is?

 

AM: I use the word “perceived recovery” before as this is artificial. It does support the markets. They’ve done exactly what the Fed was mandated for financial stability. Loretta Mester says that quite often in her speeches. In that respect, yes, they absolutely stabilize the market. Now comes the challenge of rotating out into value stocks and the actual financials or retail or something that’ll actually create jobs later on. They’re going to have to do that. But again, this is basically to stabilize not only the markets, but also the political class that’s supporting it.

 

TN: When you talk about the political class… We’re in the middle of an election cycle. This is my first election to be back in the US since the first Bush election. I was overseas for a long time. So I’m seeing things I haven’t had a front row seat to for a long, long time. How does all the things we’ve been talking about with supporting markets and and really having this kind of quasi recovery, how does that segue into the election? How do you see the election playing out?

 

AM: The people that are in charge now are appointed by the political class in charge at the moment. So those two are going to protect themselves at all costs. Trump appointing Mnuchin. Mnuchin doing what he has to do for financial stability. Now we’re looking at Trump ”losing in the polls” — highly questionable when you look at the methodology about those polls. Right now, I would have Trump winning — about a 60 percent chance at the moment.

 

TN: But the president isn’t the only office, right? So do you have an opinion on the Senate and the House as well? Do you think we’re going to see a flip in either of those places?

 

AM: No, I think the Republicans will actually take back anywhere between eight and 10 seats in the House and they’ll lose possibly two, maybe three seats in the Senate. So they’ll still control the Senate, although that’s when the political calculations come into work where one senator, two senators can block an entire policy of the president. Trump is going to have to do more executive orders going forward, which I personally don’t like, and nobody really should actually advocate for that. But this is the time that we live in.

 

TN: If your scenario plays out, how does that impact US foreign policy for the next four years? What do you see is the major… I would say trade was a big issue in the first four years of Trump, right? And bringing China to the four was one of the big issues. What would you say would be the big foreign policy issues under a second Trump administration if it comes to pass?

 

AM: The big one is China. China is quite intelligent. They hire former congressional members to go and talk politics so they understand how it works. They’re going to start hedging their bets. If they see that Trump is possibly going to win, Phase One Agriculture deals will be flying. They’ll make some concessions on intellectual property rights and whatnot. So you’ll see some of that happening from China.

 

The Europeans are absolutely in denial of what can actually happen if Trump gets elected. The only reason I see the Euro at these levels is because they’re on vacation and the US has just negative news pounding us day in and day out with the Dollar dropping to the low 90s. But I don’t see that sticking around. I think that as soon as Trump gets re-elected, I think the dollar’s back up north of 97.

 

TN: I think you’re right. I think that’s feasible.

 

Well, thank you so much for your time. I really appreciate this. Obviously you have a lot going on and you have a lot of information. This is hugely valuable for us. So I’d like to check in maybe before the election, maybe after the election so that we can do an assessment of how would the changes, whether it’s Biden or Trump, how does it impact markets and how does it impact geopolitics? That would be a fascinating discussion. So thanks for your time. Really appreciate it.

 

AM: Thank you. Thank you, Tony.

Categories
Podcasts

Economies are sputtering, which means trade war will intensify

Here’s another guesting of our founder and CEO Tony Nash in BFM Malaysia, talking about trade war between US and China. Can these two countries actually decouple? Or is the current supply chain too dependent to do that? Can the economy have the V-shaped recovery that everyone is dreaming of, or is it just an illusion? What can the policymakers do to improve the economic outlook for this year? What can his firm Complete Intelligence see happening based on the algorithms and AI?

 

We also discussed regionalization of supply chain as a result of the Trade War in this QuickHitQuickHit episode with Chief Economist Chad Moutray of National Association of Manufacturers.

 

BFM Description:

The trade wars between the US, China and the Eurozone seem to be gaining momentum. Tony Nash, CEO, Complete Intelligence, offers some insights, while also discussing European industrial activity.

 

Produced by: Michael Gong

Presented by: Wong Shou Ning, Khoo Hsu Chuang

 

Listen to the “Economies are sputtering, which means trade war will intensify” podcast in BFM: The Business Station.

 

Show Notes

 

This is a download from BFM eighty nine point nine. So is the station. Good morning. This is BFM eighty nine point nine. I’m considering that I’m with one shotting bringing you all the way through the 10:00 o’clock in the morning and Rano 76. We are talking about markets, but well above 50 bucks sort of because of that with about 15 minutes time, we’re talking to call you. Ling was an independent panel, a political economist at Ciggy and I’m advisers will be discussing palm oil.

 

BFM: So last night in America, the stock market slumped. Investors are cautious, right How did the markets do?

 

Not so well, because there’s been clearly a resurgence in virus cases in multiple states, which puts into question the economic recovery. So, unsurprisingly, the Dow closed down three percent and S&P 500 closed down 2.6 percent, while the Nasdaq closed down 2.2 percent. Meanwhile, in Asia yesterday, only Shanghai was up, which was up 0.3 percent, while the Nikkei 225 closed down marginally by 0.07 per cent. Hang Seng was down 0.5 percent, Singapore down 0.2 percent, and KLCI was down 0.3 percent.

 

So for more clarity into the whys and wherefores of markets, we’ve got it on the line with us Tony Nash, who is the CEO of Complete Intelligence. Now, Tony, thanks for talking to us. Trump’s getting tough on China rhetoric highlights, well, obviously, the American’s concerns about being too reliant on China. And, of course, we can see that being manifested in the list of 20 companies, which is deems suspicious. In your opinion, can the two economies decouple or other interests in supply chains too heavily aligned?

 

TN: Well, I don’t think it’s possible to completely decouple from China. I think the administration are really being hard on each other. And I think the hard line from the US, you know, it’s relatively new. It’s a couple years old. But I don’t think it’s possible, regardless of the hard line for those economies to decouple and for the supply chain to decouple. We had some comments over the weekend out of the U.S. saying that they could decouple if they wanted to. But that’s just the hard line and unaware of the possibilities. We’ve been talking about, for some time, probably two and a half, three years, is regionalization of supply chains. And what we believe is happening is the US-China relations have just accelerated regionalization. It means manufacturing for North America, moving to North America. Not all of it, but some of it. And manufacturing for for Asia is largely centered in Asia. Manufacturing for Europe, some of it moving to Europe. And that’s the progression of the costs in China. And some of the risks are relative risks to supply chains highlighted by COVID} coming to the realization of manufacturers.

 

BFM: U.S. markets corrected sharply last night. So is the market actually now waking up to the reality that COVID 19 is going to be a problem for economic recovery? And this V-shaped that what many investors thought is probably a pipe dream?

 

TN: I think what markets are realizing is that it’s not a straight line. Well, we’ve been saying for a couple months is that end of Q2 or early Q3, we would see a lot of volatility. Then people started to understand how the virus would play out. Until we’ve had some certainty around the path, we will have days like today. And we’ll have a danger with an uptick as optimism comes back, what’s happening is markets are calibrating. People are trying to understand not only the path of COVID, but what those actors mean—the governments, the companies, the individuals—will do to respond, how quickly the markets come back. But what are people going to have to do? What mitigations that we’re going to have to take? What monetary and fiscal policies will governments take as well? We’re not done in that respect. So more of that’s to come, but we don’t know what’s to come there exactly. Markets have moved a lot on new case count. I don’t believe that it’s the case counts itself because a lot of these are are really mild cases. It’s just the uncertainty around how long it will last. The magnitude and the mitigation that people will take around it. There’s more of this volatility to come.

 

BFM: Tony, you might have seen the IMF‘s growth forecast, which was just announced a few hours ago. They’ve now said that global growth will shrink 4.9 percent for 2020. That’s nearly two percent worse than what they originally thought. And I think the U.S. also marked by an expectation of a negative 8 percent, down from negative 6o.1 percent. Do you think this might cause the policymakers to have an even more vigorous policy response and liquidity into the system?

 

TN: It might. I think the U.S. has shown that it’s not really afraid to be pretty aggressive. I think you may see more aggressive policy responses in other places. Obviously, Japan is very active on the monetary policy side. But we need to see more actual spending and more direct support of individuals and companies to make it through this. So, I do think that, obviously, IMF’s forecast concern people and get policymakers attention. I do think that they’re probably a little bit overblown to the downside, though. So I wouldn’t expect 8 percent decline. I wouldn’t expect a global decline as acute as they’ve stated today.

 

BFM: If you look at oil prices declined last night and I think this is on the back of U.S. crude inventories increasing. But is this also a function of COVID-19 fears in terms of how that may impact the economy’s going forward and consumption of oil again?

 

TN: Yeah, that’s interesting. The oil price is our… I think there are a number of things. The storage, of course, as you mentioned. But there’s also how much are people starting to drive again? What do traffic patterns look like? Also, how much are people starting to fly again? We really need to look at like Google Mobility data. We need to be looking at flight data. We need to be looking at looking to really understand where those indicators are headed. So when we compare a $40 a barrel of oil at $39 s barrel for WTI today, compared to where it was a month ago. The folks in oil and gas are really grateful to have that price right now. And it’s a real progress from where we were a month or two months ago. So I think what people are looking at today is the progress and then the expectation. They’re not even necessarily looking at the real market activity today. It’s all relative to a couple of months ago and it’s all expectations about a couple of months from now.

 

BFM: Last question on perhaps the data that your algorithms generated, Complete Intelligence. What kind of signs and indicators does our technology and the AI tell us about the direction the market’s going forward?

 

TN: Yeah, well, this is where we we pulled our assertion of volatility. We we really expected things to be pretty range traded for some time. So, you know, crude oil is a good example. We were saying back in February, March, the crude oil would end the quarter in the low 40s. This is WTI and here we are. So, with volatility, we’re not necessarily trying to capture the high highs and the low lows. We’re just recognizing that the markets are trying to find new prices. So it’s interesting when you look at things like the dollar. The dollar is a relative indicator for, say, emerging market‘s uncertainty and troubles as well. We did expect a dollar rise toward the end of Q1, early Q2, as we saw. But we haven’t expected the dollar to come back to strengthen until, say, September. So there are a number of indicators around trade or on currencies. And what we’re finding generally with our client base, for global manufacturers generally, are the algorithms… We’ve found that our average-based forecasting has an error rate that is about nine percent lower on average than consensus forecasts. So when we had all of the volatility of the last three, four months, consensus forecasts in many cases were 20 to 30 percent off. Ours were about nine percent better than that. Nobody expected the COVID slowdown. If we look at that from a few months ago, the bias that’s in normally of doing things, negotiating, procurement, supply chain, the revenue, that sort of thing. We take that out and this passionate… I would suggest that there is a lot of passion in the analysis from day to day when you look at three percent fall in markets today, but you can’t extrapolate today into forever. And what we can do with AI is taking emotion out of this, take a rational view of things. And really remove, not all of the error, of course, nobody can remove the error. There area a lot of the error from the outlooks in specific assets, currencies, commodities and so on.

 

BFM: All right, Tony, thanks so much for your time. And that was Tony Nash, chief executive for Complete Intelligence talking from Texas, USA. Interesting that this kind of stuff that he does at his business, tries to remove the emotional, the emotive side of the markets and give something a predictor over the future. But I think that sometimes you can’t discount too much of human emotion because it’s all driven by essentially two emotions, right? Greed and of fear.

 

But you know, basically his nugget is it’s going to be volatile. Right. Hang onto your seats. Right. Because we really don’t know. There’s too much uncertainty out there at the moment. This is a scene where it’s for oil prices or even for equity markets.

Categories
Podcasts

US-China Phase One Trade Deal Signed

Tony Nash, CEO and Founder of Complete Intelligence gives his analysis on the main takeaway from the US-China phase one trade deal and when could a phase two deal takes place.

 

Tony is a guest commentator in Singapore’s Money FM 89.3.

 

Listen to the podcast at Money FM 89.3.

 

Categories
Editorials

Tariffs – ASTRA Toy Times (November 2019 issue)

We were mentioned in the November 2019 issue of ASTRA’s Toy Times. The following excerpt can be found in page 10:

 

The on-again, off-again speculation about new tariffs on Chinese imports has been dizzying. For months, the President’s negotiations with China has had both the stock market, and consumers, in flux.

 

The President recently announced that he was delaying some new tariffs until December 15 in hopes of not disrupting the Christmas shopping season. Although the tariffs have been moved back, make no mistake – they’re still coming. The round of tariffs coming in December will cover $160 billion of imports. The bottom line is, for the first time, President Trump’s trade war with China will likely raise prices directly for U.S. homes on items like clothing, shoes, toys and electronics.

 

Only 18 percent of toys imported from China are being affected right now by tariffs, but that number will soar to 100 percent when the December 15 tariffs hit, according to the Peterson Institute for International Economics (PILE). Starting on December 15, U.S. companies will find that 100 percent of their imports from China, in nearly all product categories, are being targeted by Trump’s tariffs. That’s why many ASTRA toy stores around the country are stocking up on merchandise now to avoid the massive round of tariffs that loom in the coming weeks.

 

“What you’ll likely see is more inventory buildup in the middle, and towards the end of Q4 this year,” said Tony Nash, CEO at Complete Intelligence. Nash is an economist and expert on China who has been frequently featured on CNBC, Yahoo Finance and the BBC. “And then you’ll see imports to the U.S. from China, at least in regards to toys, slow in Q1. Even if the tariffs are lifted, it will still stay slow because the toy importers have already bought what they’re going to buy.”

 

ASTRA and the Toy Association have joined forces with a broad coalition of American businesses and trade organizations. The work continues in Washington to work on trade policy and other issues that impact the toy industry. The ultimate goal of the partnership and coalition is to make sure that voices are heard, business models are understood, and that the economic impact nationwide is recognized.

 

Read the ASTRA Toy Times November 2019 issue here.

Categories
Editorials

Trump, TPP, yuan SDR make US-China Joint Commission trade talks a very different scene

22 November 2016 | CNBC

As the annual trade talks U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) gets underway in Washington D.C., the backdrop could hardly be more different from a year ago.

 

In 2015, each side in the series of annual meetings that cover everything from agriculture to cybersecurity had its own policy advantages, and policy continuity was the result of years of work by both sides.

Just a year ago, enthusiasm for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) also remained strong, with an official signing ceremony in Auckland, New Zealand, just months away. The agreement was positioned as America’s last, best hope to stay relevant in Asia’s economies.

 

And by design, the agreement positioned China as an outsider in its own neighborhood, instead of lining Asian countries up behind aging American assumptions around trade, intellectual property, and services in the world’s fastest-growing region.

Read more in CNBC