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Quick Hit Cage Match: Van Metre vs Boockvar on Inflation (Part 2)

Van Metre vs Boockvar on Inflation (Part 2)

This is Part 2 of the inflation discussion with Steven van Metre and Peter Boockvar with your host Tracy Shuchart. In this second part, they talked about the possibility of the Fed tapering this year or early in 2022. How about the possible rate hike and what will possibly happen in other parts of the world like Bank of Japan and Bank of England if ever this happens? What is Powell doing exactly and why? Is there a possibility of a new Fed chair next year? And what do they think about stagflation?

 

For Part 1 of this QuickHit Cage Match episode, please go here. 

 

Steven van Metre is a money manager who have invented a strategy called Portfolio Shield. He also has a YouTube show that discusses economic data and the news three days a week.

 

Peter Boockvar is the Chief Investment Officer and portfolio manager at Bleakley Advisory Group. He has a daily macromarket economic newsletter called The Boock Report.

 

💌 Subscribe to CI Newsletter and gain AI-driven intelligence.

📊 Forward-looking companies become more profitable with Complete Intelligence. The only fully automated and globally integrated AI platform for smarter cost and revenue planning. Book a demo here.

📈 Check out the CI Futures platform to forecast currencies, commodities, and equity indices

 

This QuickHit episode was recorded on October 14, 2021.

 

The views and opinions expressed in this Quick Hit Cage Match: Van Metre vs Boockvar on Inflation Part 2 episode are those of the guest and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any contents provided by our guest are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

Show Notes

 

TS: Do you see the Fed tapering? And if they do, how much is this going to affect inflation? And also, I know the market is saying the Fed is going to raise rates in ’22, 2023. But is this a reality at all?

 

But before we jump into that, I just wanted to remind you to please subscribe to our YouTube channel.

 

PB: I think the Fed will at least start the taper and see how it goes. The thing that is different with this taper is that it’s coinciding with central banks around the world that are also beginning to remove accommodation. However slow, however glacial that process is, they’re all outside of the BOJ. They’re all doing it at once.

 

So if the Fed starts to taper in December, which they basically told you that they will, well, the Bank of England could be raising rates in December. We recently got a rate hike from Norway a month or two ago from South Korea. We’ve had Canada and Australia trimmed QE. Even the ECB has trimmed QE. So there’s a global shift to tightening. And I do believe tapering is tightening to define that. Just as we saw last year, the past 18 months obviously massive global easing.

 

Now I can’t even discuss the rate hike situation because I’m not even sure that they’re going to be able to get through the tapering. If you look back to 2010, every single notable market correction in equities and also fixed income markets outside of Covid and the one evaluation in August 2015 coincided with the end of QE, where it was a hard stop QE1 and QE2. And then obviously you had the taper 2013 and then obviously around rate hikes. Every single one coincided with a tightening of policy. And even again, it was gradual. It still affected markets. And we’re going to have it again to think that we’re going to somehow get through tapering without any accidents, I think, is delusional. And you believe that there’s a free lunch and it’s a matter of what kind of accident occurs by this.

 

Now QE itself essentially, at the end of the day, it’s an asset swap. And yeah, does some of that money sort of filter into markets? Yeah, maybe, I guess. But a lot of it’s psychological, but it also does help to, at least on the short end, suppress interest rates to where they would be otherwise. That said, when QE has been on, you’ve been paid to steepen the curve when QE is off, it pays to flatten it. And I think we’ve seen some recent flattening in the yield curve. And I think that that has been the right trade to do when QE is about to turn off.

 

But to Steve’s point about the bottom 50%. Well, if you get a short equity market correction, well, the top 50% is going to feel that as well. And yeah, can that filter into how they spend for sure? But that doesn’t necessarily resolve the supply issues.

 

That’s how this inflation story is going to recalibrate. The supply side is going to take a couple of years, and it’s going to be less demand. That is going to recalibrate this inflation story. And I think that is. No central bank wants to preside over a declining economy. But unfortunately, you’re going to have to have a trade off. You want lower inflation and a slower economy or an economy, as is but fast inflation, that’s going to hurt the people that can least afford it.

 

SVM: Yeah, this balance sheet taper thing is really interesting because I will be on record. I’ll hold on record still, and I don’t think the Fed’s going to do it. Although, as Peter mentioned, you just said that you think that the Fed is going to start and then quit. I’ve had to come to your side of the fence on that deal, mainly because when Powell spoke at Jackson Hole, it seemed like he was saying, we can’t make this mistake. We got to keep easing because we could let off the gas too soon.

 

And then for whatever reason, there’s this massive pivot between that and the last meeting. And he’s going to have a disadvantage going into the November F-O-M-C. And not have the non farm payroll report because he concludes me on Wednesday. Nonfarm payroll is out on Friday. Maybe he’s got some early access, who knows? But it seems like all of a sudden he’s in a panic to start tapering.

 

Now, could this be because we know the treasury is going to reduce their issuance of notes and bonds as we borrow less money, and he doesn’t want to be over purchasing? Sure. Could it be, as Peter mentioned, that the other central banks are tapering and starting to raise hike rates. And that’s interesting, because the way I look at it is that would be a catalyst if the Fed doesn’t start tapering, that the dollar goes higher.

 

Well, there’s part of the inflation story that almost nobody is looking at. What if the dollar gets up into 96, 97, maybe even close to 100? I mean, we’re talking about destroying the inflation story just from the dollar alone. And is this one of those things where we had coordinated easing? So now we need to have coordinated tapering to keep the dollar from going up too much? I’m not sure what his motivation is, but I will say this. There’s no way that they get to the end of that taper. There’s a 0% chance they’re going to raise rates. And even if they did, it doesn’t matter. They’ve effectively given the banks a pass by saying, look, there’s no reserve requirement because, well, you’ve got all these QE reserves you don’t need anymore.

 

The whole idea that we’re going to get this balance sheet unwound. I think the bond market is telling us the Fed’s making a mistake. I think, Peter, you and I agree that we don’t know how many months they’re going to go? The only question is, at what point is there a payroll report or some data that comes out that the Fed goes, “Oh, my God, we made a big mistake.”

 

PB: I’ll tell you why he’s doing this. Well, first of all, the whole purpose of monetary policy, as we know, is to push the demand side. And if you look at what are the two most interest rate sensitive parts of the economy — it’s housing and autos. So is Powell with a straight face going to say, I need to pedal to the metal, continue to stimulate the demand for housing and autos, when you can’t find an auto and the price of the home is worth 20% more than last year? They need to take their foot off that demand pedal. And he does not want to be Arthur Burns. He does not want to be Arthur Burns. And right now he is headed towards being Arthur Burns.

 

And the Fed is going to reach a pivot point, where if inflation still remains sticky and persistent, but growth is really decelerating to a greater extent than it already is. And we know that the Atlanta Fed third quarter GDP number has one handle on it. He’s going to have to reach a point, do I try to come inflation, but then risk further weakness in the economy and a fall in asset prices, which JPowell obviously inflated. Where is he going to just not really respond quick enough. And being in Washington, we can be sure he probably leans towards trying to save the economy, but then that creates its own problems.

 

The one thing in the dollar, the dollar is going to get tied into this, too, because if he remains too easy for too long, well, that may sacrifice the dollar. If he is more aggressive at dealing with inflation, well, then you can see a faster move in the dollar. So he’s just been an absolutely no win situation here. But there is going to be a pivot point where he’s going to reach that we’ll have to see, does he go down the Paul Volcker route, or is he going to go continue down the Arthur Burns route?

 

SVM: See, Peter, you just said it best. He didn’t know what his situation. And all we’re debating is, at what point does he back off and quit because he realizes it’s not working? I mean, we can look at the velocity of money and see the monetary policy is not functioning properly.

 

I mean, there was a lot of people that predicted at the end of the last quarter that as economy reopen, velocity would pop. But it didn’t because of the fact that monetary policy is not transmitting into the economy. And so now the real issue is if he starts tapering and it does do what it’s supposed to do, does he inadvertently tighten financial conditions? I mean, this is such a mess of what he’s got to deal with. And I don’t know if you’ll agree with me honest, but I don’t think they have a clue what they’re doing.

 

I think they’re just betting that this is all going to work out, that Powell, as himself, is going to get renominated. And somehow, in the end, either he’s going to look like a superhero and say, look, see, I did it and go out as one of the most celebrated Fed chairs ever. Or he’s going to find someone else to blame this on when it doesn’t work.

 

PB: The Fed has been winging it for decades, and this all goes back to Greenspan. In 1994, he raised rates aggressively. We know he blew up Mexico, he blew up Orange County, California, and he took that at heart. He learned a lesson. And so you go into the late 90s when everything is on fire. Stock market bubble. We know he was very slow to raise interest rates because he didn’t want to repeat 1994.

 

And then, of course, you have the blow up. And he’s obviously quick to raise interest rates. But remember the mid 2000s, every single. When he started raising interest rates, he did it every single meeting, and in every single statement, it said, we are doing this at a measure pace, because he didn’t want to repeat 1994.

 

And then what we have, obviously, the housing bubble and so on and so on. And then now you take Powell. We know Janet Yellen was afraid to raise interest rates. Took them seven years to get off zero. And then after finally raising, took them another twelve months to finally raise rates again. And then Powell started to pick up the pace. And then he blew himself up in the fourth quarter of 2018. And then that helps to explain why they’re going so slow now.

 

Then you throw in, of course, the whole social justice. The Feds become the Ministry of Social Justice now and how they view monetary policy. But yeah, to your point, they are winging it. And they’ve been winging it for decades.

 

SVM: And you bring up an interesting point about 2018. I’m really glad you did, because a lot of people forgot that we started easy to the point that it didn’t really make a lot of sense from the outside look in it. And so now this whole notion, and I don’t know what your reaction was, but I remember hearing the press conference when he’s like, okay, when Powell said, “We’re going to gradually unwind the balance sheet by mid 2022.” I’m like, since when is “gradual” six months. There’s no way this is going to work for you, buddy, but good luck if you’re going to pull it off.

 

PB: Yeah. And the Fed got lucky for a period of time. They got lucky in 2017 because the markets rallied and ignored Fed rate hikes and the beginning of the shrinking of their balance sheet. They were double tightening and they got bailed out because everyone focused on the corporate income tax cut. That obviously happened at the end of 2017. But that entire year, the Vix got down to eight. Every dip was bought because everyone was pricing in that tax cut. But once that tax cut was in place, the Fed then raised interest rates again in January 2018. And then we immediately shift back to the Fed is double tightening here between the balance sheet and rates. And that obviously coincided with the fourth quarter of 2018.

 

So we know in the Fed tapering, the Fed tightens until they hit a wall. The Fed tightens until something breaks, and you can be sure something will break in 2022. It’s just a matter of how deep they get. And also one last point here is that having low inflation gives central banks that Wayne’s World Concert pass that all access to do anything they want for how long as they want, when there’s no inflation. But once you get inflation into the numbers, into the economy, their flexibility is greatly diminished. And that will be an interesting sort of tug of war as they get further into the tapering and something eventually breaks.

 

TS: One last question, a couple of last question. How do you feel about Stagflation? I kind of amend the Stagflation camp. Do you think that’s a cop out or how do you feel about that?

 

SVM: I think it’s temporary. I mean, we’re supposed to be rising unemployment. I mean, I guess with people coming off the ranks, I don’t know. Maybe it’ll go back up. I don’t think that’s likely to happen. And then you tend to get that with higher prices. But when we start looking at the bond market. The bond market is starting to tell us that, hey, this Stagflation is going to be transitory. And then the risk that I see is that we get into outright deflation from here.

 

PB: To me, I just look at stagflation as just slower growth and higher inflation. And in an economist textbook, they think that slow growth means lower prices. Faster growth means higher prices. I’m just looking at the Bank of Japan. The Bank of Japan said we need to get inflation at 2%, and somehow that will then generate faster growth. To me, they’ve got that backwards. You need stable prices in order to develop and sustain healthier growth.

 

So right now. But the Stagflation it’s sort of intertwined in the sense that it’s the inflation and what is driving it. So it’s the inflation itself that is beginning to impact consumer spending. And it’s the factors that are creating the inflation, like the supply bottlenecks that in itself, are also creating slower growth.

 

TS: Excellent. One last question, just for a thought experiment. I mean, say Powell does leave the Fed next year and we have find a Dove, right. So what does the Fed look like at that point if we have a dove as a Fed chair?

 

PB: Well, 2022 becomes completely politicized. The Fed’s already politicized, but it becomes Uber politicized in 2022 because of the elections in November. And if a Lael Brainard becomes the next Fed chair in February, 2022, you can be sure that Steve and I are right, that there’s no chance in hell they’re going to finish this taper because the second something breaks, you know, they’re going to back off and they’re going to do their best to, or at least the Democrats headed by the Lael Branard will do their best to maintain control of Congress.

 

SVM: Yeah. I’ll put that as a low probability chance that Powell is out. If he does, I’m 100% agree.

 

PB: I agree. I think he stays as well.

 

SVM: Yeah, 100% agree. I think it’s a big risk for the Biden administration to pull him. He hasn’t really done anything wrong. But if he does, again, I think Peter is spot on. I mean, now it becomes even more political than the Fed is supposed to be. And he’s right, as soon as something goes wrong, I mean, we’re going to 120 billion a month. Yeah, right. It’ll be multiples of that in a second.

 

TS: All right. Well, I want to thank you both again for everything you shared with us today. Can you each tell us where we can find you on social media or otherwise?

 

PB: Well, I just want to say thank you to Tracy and Steve. Thank you for having me in this debate and discuss this with you. It was definitely a fun time. If you want to read my daily readings, you can subscribe to boockreport.com. boockreport.com And our wealth management business is at bleakley.com.

 

TS: Excellent.

 

SVM: I want to thank you as well. Peter, you and I know this has been a long time coming for us to be on the same screen together. I had a blast. Totally looking forward to the next time. If you want to find more about me, you could go to my website. stevenvanmetre.com On Twitter @MetreSteven. On YouTube at @stevenvanmetrefinancial.

 

TS: Great. And for everyone watching, please don’t forget to subscribe to our YouTube channel and we look forward to seeing you on the next QuickHit.

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QuickHit

Quick Hit Cage Match: Van Metre vs Boockvar on Inflation (Part 1)

Van Metre vs Boockvar on Inflation (Part 1)

This special QuickHit Cage Match edition is joined by opposing sides of inflation versus deflation with Steven van Metre and Peter Boockvar. Why one thinks we’re having deflation and the other believes in inflation? How soon will this happen and to which commodities and industries?

 

This is the first part of the discussion. Subscribe to our Youtube Channel to get notified when Part 2 is out.

 

Part 2 is out. Watch it here.

 

Steven van Metre is a money manager who have invented a strategy called Portfolio Shield. He also has a YouTube show that discusses economic data and the news three days a week.

 

Peter Boockvar is the Chief Investment Officer and portfolio manager at Bleakley Advisory Group. He has a daily macromarket economic newsletter called The Boock Report.

 

 

💌 Subscribe to CI Newsletter and gain AI-driven intelligence.

📊 Forward-looking companies become more profitable with Complete Intelligence. The only fully automated and globally integrated AI platform for smarter cost and revenue planning. Book a demo here.

📈 Check out the CI Futures platform to forecast currencies, commodities, and equity indices

 

This QuickHit episode was recorded on October 14, 2021.

 

The views and opinions expressed in this Quick Hit Cage Match: Van Metre vs Boockvar on Inflation episode are those of the guest and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any contents provided by our guest are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

Show Notes

 

TS: I kind of want to start broadly here. So if you could give me your two minute elevator pitch on your view on whether you’re an inflationist or deflationist, even though we already know who is who. And how fluid is your view?

 

PB: So if we just break down, inflation is just the simple, too much money chasing too few goods. We certainly have too few goods with supply challenges around the world and too much money with a lot of fiscal spending over the past 18 months financed by the Federal Reserve buying most of that debt that the treasury issued to finance a lot of this fiscal spending. So it’s combining with inflation situation where it’s really just a good side. That is the part of the debate.

 

Services inflation is rather persistent. For the past 20 years leading into Covid, services inflation XNERGY is averaged almost 3%, but goods have been basically zero. And it’s always that trade off that has resulted in an inflation rate of 1% to 2% over the last couple of decades. But now you are back on trend with services inflation, and I’ll argue that will accelerate from here because of rents. And now you combine that with a period of goods inflation. Now, goods inflation is typically cyclical, if history is any guide. But how long of a cyclical rise we have really is the question. And I just think it’s not going to be so short term that it could last a couple of years.

 

SVM: Yeah. So I think that the inflation story is going to be more, at least the former Fed’s view of being on the transitory side, and I take that view strictly from my understanding of how the monetary system works, looking at the velocity of money, the fiscal stimulus cliff going away.

 

While I do agree that Peter will be right and that we will likely see higher inflation, and I agree in where he thinks it’s coming from in terms of the supply chain. I completely agree with that. But I do think ultimately those higher prices will get rejected without a sustained amount of new money coming in from fiscal or other means or from lending growth. And so even though we’ll see rising prices and they will probably go up a bit more, ultimately, I think the consumer will reject them just like we saw during the great financial crisis and that we are more likely to see inflation turn down pretty hard and perhaps even into the deflation.

 

TS: Either one of you can jump in here. Where do you see inflation, deflation hitting the soonest and the hardest? We’re looking at commodities that are still running very hot, supply chains that are very stressed. At what point do you think we see demand destruction? And how long do you think that we’re going to see these extremes in the destruction and supply chains that are causing much of this current inflation?

 

PB: Well, we’re already seeing some demand responses. We are seeing a slowdown in economic growth. Part of that is a pushback against these price increases. If you look at the housing market, there’s particularly the first time home buyer that has sticker shock and doesn’t want to pay for a home that’s priced 20% more than it was a year ago. And they’re saying, okay, let me take a pause here.

 

So there is some of that. But then, of course, there’s also some forced demand destruction because enough product can’t be delivered and that an auto plan has to shut down an assembly line because they can’t get enough parts, and they’re not sure when they’re going to be able to get enough. Or it’s Nike that can’t deliver enough store product to foot locker because it’s going to take 80 days to get it from their factory in Vietnam rather than 40 days.

 

Now, at some point, goods, inflation is going to be temporary. The question is, how long does it take to resolve itself? And one of the things that I think will unfold here is that let’s just take transportation costs, because that is a main factor in the rise in inflation, because every single thing that’s made in this world ends up on a plane, a ship, a truck or a railroad to get it from point A to point B.

 

So let’s just say I’m a toy manufacturer, and my transportation costs are now 35% year of year on top of the cost of my wholesale cost to actually get the product, and my cost of labor is up 5% to 7% year over year. Well, I’m not going to recoup that all in one shot by raising prices to Walmart by 10%. It could take me a couple of years to recoup that. But I promise you, I’m going to do my best to do so, and I’m going to space that out. I’m going to try my best to cushion the blow to that end, buyer who’s buying for their kids for Christmas by spacing out that price increase. But I know I’m going to have visibility because everyone else is going to be doing the same thing for the next three years in raising prices so I can recapture, I may not be able to regain completely, but recapture some of my lost profit margin. So that’s one of the reasons why I think this is going to be sticky.

 

And to Steve’s point, yes, there’s going to be a fiscal fall up next year to some extent. We’ll see how much of the lost transferred payments are going to be offset by both the child tax money, plus people going back to work. We saw jobs claim have a two handle today for the first time since pre-Covid and to what extent wage increases can offset the rise in the cost of living? And yeah, we’ll have to see that. But the question is, how much do prices come back in?

 

You take lumber, for example, and I’ll give it to Steve right after this, lumber prices in the heart of the housing bubble in the mid 2000s was about $300. Now it went up to $1600 now it’s about 650. The cost of a home, construction wise, and what a builder would charge their customer is not going back to where it was. They are going to use this and fatten their margin as best they can, and it’s going to take years for that buyer to experience what is truly reflected at 650 lumber, but that’s even more than double where it was. So it’s still multiple years of price increases that are going to flew through the chain.

 

SVM: Yeah. Peter, you bring up some absolutely excellent points about how long this could go. And that’s something I really haven’t considered that it could run a couple of years because I look at this fiscal cliff and to me, you go back to the pandemic and we know all this was driven by fiscal stimulus. And without it, and I know we still have the child tax credit for a bit. I’m just concerned that this drop off comes a lot stronger than most people are expecting. And I do realize a lot of these goods are sitting off ports waiting to get shipped in, waiting for truckers to take them to warehouses and eventually on the stores.

 

The question I keep asking is when those goods hit the shelves, will consumers be there with money? Do they have the money to spend? Are they going to go back to work fast enough? And even though, as you mentioned, we had a two handle today, we both know that that’s almost 50% higher than normal.

 

So the question is we still see this huge amount of job openings everywhere. We’re not seeing people go back to work. We saw the jolt state. I know you looked at that recently from the other day where people are quitting their jobs. And so I keep coming back to the same question is will consumers come and spend and keep these prices up? If they don’t, then we get the reversal. But that’s my question. Do they come?

 

PB: It’s a great question of whether that will be the case. I don’t think the labor market is going back to where it was pre Covid. And all you have to do is look at the participation rate to confirm that, particularly for the age group of 25 to 54 year olds, which is sort of the core wage earning population, and it’s still well below where it was in February 2020. So, yeah, we’re not going back to a 3.5% unemployment rate with the same number of employed people anytime soon.

 

Now, what is replacing a lot of the lost sort of or not made up fiscal money that has been spent, particularly December 2020 with Trump’s last fiscal package and then repeated just a few months later with Biden, is that eventually we do have that child tax money that’s going out. We do have an increase in food stamps. Basically that reservation wage, which is basically the wage level at which someone has a tough choice of whether do they go take that job or do they collect all the government handout? That continues to go up.

 

So that person who may not want to go back to work while they’re getting a lot of benefits elsewhere. And while the aggregate, we’re going to probably see some sort of fiscal drop off. The question is, is that enough from the demand side to offset what’s going on in the supply side?

 

Now, again, supply side is going to normalize at some point. There’s no question about it. Just a matter of when. Taiwan semi is spending billions of dollars that just broke ground in June in Arizona to build a semi plant. Well, it’s not going to be done until 2024.

 

Now, there could be a lot of double ordering, triple ordering that’s going on in Semis right now. We’re going to have this major inventory hangover. We’re already actually seeing it in DRAM, for example. And that could happen. And there’s going to be a mess at the other end of this. I just think that this drags out and also a key part of this inflation debate, too, is in what context is this coming in?

 

If we had a Fed funds rate in the US of 3%, if we had a ten year at four to five, if we didn’t have such thing as negative interest rates, I’d say, “you know what the world can handle about of higher inflation because interest rates are higher. If equity valuations weren’t as extreme as they are and they were more in line with history,” I would say, okay, “we can absorb it.” But that’s not the case right now. We have valuations that are excessive in a variety of different things. Obviously, we have zero interest rates, negative interest rates, QE and so on. So even if inflation decelerated to, let’s just say a 3% rate for a year or two. I just don’t think that the world is positioned for that.

 

SVM: Yeah. I’m not worried about the upper 50%. I’m really curious about the bottom 50%, who is really the big recipients. I know a lot of people got the fiscal checks, but my wife is a fourth grade teacher, and one of the problems they’re having in schools right now, and you’ve probably been hearing about this is a kid or a staff or a teacher gets Covid, and next thing you know, they’re quarantining out segments of the classroom. They’re sending them home. And the parents are really struggling with this because they want to go back to work. But then all of a sudden, their kids back and they can’t.

 

And so they’re forced to stay at home and they don’t have the family support. Maybe they don’t want to send the kids to grandma and grandpa because they don’t want them to get sick in case their kid has it. And so I keep wondering, without all this fiscal support from the government is the natural expectation, particularly with higher energy prices, as we go into the winter, that these cash-strapped households are going to ultimately make the choice to I’ve got to buy food. We all know that’s gone up. We have to pay for energy. We know that’s gone up. As Peter, as you mentioned earlier, that rents are probably going up. So what does that leave in terms of discretionary income to spend to drive inflation?

 

And I kind of wonder, without their spending power, how is this going to last? And that’s my big concern is I don’t think it does. I think consumers are going to reject it. I don’t think they have the income. I don’t think the money supply is growing fast enough. And then you start looking at the dollar and interest rates and you would want to see the dollar going down. You want to see interest rates going up and we keep seeing the dollar fighting to go higher.

 

We keep seeing interest rates trying to press back lower, and it’s telling us that financial conditions are tight. And, of course, the Feds potentially about to taper and start to remove their support of that. And I just keep kind of shaking my head going, like, how are we going to get through the holiday season unless consumers come out and spend a big way? I’m just not convinced.

 

TS: Well, perfect segue into what I kind of wanted to get into next was talking about the Fed tapering. So first, because everybody’s talking about this. Do you see the Fed tapering? And if they do, how much is this going to affect inflation? And also, I know the market is saying the Fed is going to raise rates in ’22, ’23. But is this a reality at all?

Categories
QuickHit

Sentiment has soured: How will governments and companies respond? (Part 2)

Sentiment has soured: How will governments and companies respond? (Part 2)

In this second part, Sam and Marko discussed possible tapering, what can the government do to help private companies, how the consumer sentiment is looking right now, what should you do with your investment in this Delta variant scare? Are vaccines really effective? And what is this thing that the Biden administration needs to do right or they’ll be dead?

 

Please go here for the first part. 

 

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📊 Forward-looking companies become more profitable with Complete Intelligence. The only fully automated and globally integrated AI platform for smarter cost and revenue planning. Book a demo here.

📈 Check out the CI Futures platform to forecast currencies, commodities, and equity indices

 

This QuickHit episode was recorded on August 19, 2021.

 

The views and opinions expressed in this Sentiment has soured: How will governments and companies respond? (Part 1) QuickHit episode are those of the guest and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any contents provided by our guest are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

Show Notes

 

TN: Sounds like both of you agree that China is going to do more stimulus. I think they’re late. I think they should have started five or six months ago. But better now than never. Right. So it sounds to me like you believe that there will be the beginning of a taper, maybe a small beginning of a taper late this year. Is that fair to say?

 

SR: Yeah, I think it’s fair to say that there will be some form of taper. Okay. I don’t know, even if it’s just rhetoric, as we move into 2022, at least with what we know right now, I don’t think they should. But what I think they should do and what they’re likely to do are two wildly different things.

 

TN: So even if it say 10 billion a month, which is nothing compared to the entire kind of stimulus, monetary stimulus are doing right now, that would have a dramatic sentimental chain. Is that your view?

 

SR: Yes. So it’s all about that incremental change in Cinnamon. It’s not about the incremental change in the addition to the portfolio.

 

TN: Right. Marko, are you the same? Do you think there’s a change in the sentiment of the Fed and there’s going to be a move toward tapering late in the year?

 

MP: I mean, I think tapering happened in June at the FRC meeting. And so that’s… Because that’s when the Fed incrementally turned hawkish. The DXY dropped quite significantly after the meeting. So I think that the risk in your view is that a lot of the things that we’re talking about right now have been slowly priced in over a period of time. And while oil prices and S&P 500 haven’t really corrected to this view reality. You know, so S&P 500 is reaching a new high, except for the last two days. Oil prices have started to come down finally.

 

 

 

 

Brent Crude Oil
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Now the 10-year has actually been pretty stable through the last couple of weeks worth of volatility. And that tells me a couple of things. I think the bottom market price, a lot of the things we’re talking about already. The second issue is that fiscal policy is really tricky when we talk about it.

CBOT 10-year US Treasury Note
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And here’s what I mean. 1953 we had a fiscal cliff recession after the Korean War. But that’s because the fiscal cliff was very clean, very simple. We spend a lot of money on bullet casings and tanks and airplanes during the Korean War, and then that fiscal spend stayed on the Korean Peninsula. We couldn’t take it back with us in 1953. In other words, we got a fiscal cliff recession.

 

This time around, the 1.9 trillion, you know, fiscal stimulus we had earlier this year, that actually, in a curial mathematical terms, shows up as a huge fiscal cliff next year. But that actually lives on on household balance sheets. And so that’s where I would say that like, let’s see how the Delta variant issue resolves itself, because in one month, here’s what I know.

 

I know the savings rate in the United States, the personal savings rate is still elevated at 9.6%. I know that revolving credit is going through the roof, and the households are re-leveraging themselves in a way that they have it for ten years. The US consumer is acting in the ways they acted in the 90s and 2000s.

 

If you look at household debt, percent of GDP, you got this long period of deleveraging for the past ten years. And now it’s coming back up. And so to me, that’s where I think the fiscal cliff of next year is overstated. And the reason that even a ten year fiscal package matters is because you’re talking about a ten-year bond. If I’m going to hold a ten-year bond, that on the back end of that 10-year, there is Trump tax cut level of unnecessary fiscal stimulus.

 

Let me say that again, what this fiscal spend right now is going to produce a similar procyclical fiscal thrust that we had during the Trump administrations in the last two years, through doc cuts, this time through infrastructure spending. That’s going to create a modest fiscal thrust, positive fiscal thrust for the duration of the asset that you’re holding. And I think that the market will still have to respond to that, even though next year there’s no way to avoid mathematical fiscal flip.

 

TN: Interesting. So. All of these things together, just going back to the reason I initially contacted you guys. I was hearing companies telling me that their Q3 revenues were really, they were downgrading them, and they’re really worried about their performance in Q3. And I think we’ve seen that or I’ve seen it anecdotally.

 

We saw tourism not necessarily be what we thought it would be. We’ve seen a lot of things happen that we didn’t really think would happen over the summer or not happen that we thought would happen. So how are you seeing these policies or how do you expect these policies to manifest at the company level? And when do you expect them to help companies to move forward?

 

MP: Well, I don’t think any policies will help companies. I think what will help companies is once Covid cases go down, and people kind of stop being afraid of the Delta wave.

 

Right now, if you look at hotel stocks. Hotel stocks are back through, like November 20th level, like they’re back to pre-Pfizer result levels. And I think that that’s a great investment opportunity. I would be long COVID place right now because, you know, the data from Israel, the data from Iceland, the data from a lot of different places that are fully, almost fully vaccinated are pretty clear, which is that vaccinated people can absolutely get Covid, and very few of them have adverse effects. The efficiency is actually at very high levels. A lot of people misinterpret, a lot of people… Sorry, the media is misinterpreting the data. And once you account for age disparities and so on, the efficiency here is like in the 90s.

 

TN: So it’s amazing.

 

MP: Yeah. Look, it’s a simple fact. Now that’s going to take some time as Sam said, I think that’s going to be articulating the data for the next month. I think that you have a great entry point into the Covid place right now. And I don’t think that any of the policies we’re really talking about are going to have much of an effect on earnings over the next quarter.

 

TN: I’ll give you a data point that I was looking at earlier today. Texas right now has the same number of cases that it had in Feb of ’21. Okay. But the daily fatalities are 60% lower than they were in Feb. Okay. So the case counts are just as high, but the fatalities are dramatically lower. And that’s good news, right.

 

Texas Covid cases and fatalities

 

MP: Look, Tony, I would study really the case of Israel, because if you study the overall numbers in Israel, you come up with a figure. I think it’s 60% effectiveness for Pfizer, which is lower than advertising, but that’s actually a mathematical concept called a Sisyphus paradox.

 

And what’s happening is that we need to segregate the different age cohorts not just average them together.

 

TN: That’s right.

 

MP: You know, because the elderly tends to be more vaccinated. You have a larger pool of older people who tend to have received a vaccine. They also tend to go to a hospital more often with a respiratory disease, even though they’re vaccinated.

 

So you can’t just average everyone together. The actual vaccine efficacy is in the 90s for all cohorts. Except in the 80s for some of the much older, over 80. It’s, like, about 80% effective. And so, yeah, I think a lot of this is… You know where I want to compare Covid to? And I think Sam will appreciate this. I compared it to the Euro area crisis.

 

You could have made a call in 2010 that this thing was over. Like once Germany like bit the bullet and bailed out Greece the first time? Like it was over, guys. But every time a new country showed up, he was like, Whoa. Here goes Portugal. Oh, my God! The world’s gonna end! And it’s like, similarly COVID, like, we know where we’re headed. Like, every wave is gonna cause sentiment issues and so on. But I would just bet against those.

 

TN: That’s a good call. I like that. I like the optimism there, and I like the perspective there. I think that’s really interesting. Sam, what do you think?

 

SR: I think there’s a combination of two things. One, I think Marco is 100%, right? That this is an awful lot like the Euro area crisis. Every single time, like Greece was the first big bang. Then you had the ripple effect to Portugal. Then it was Spain. And everybody was wondering what the next set of fall was and had the correction of 2011. That was fun. You had these longer term kind of ripples.

 

I think there’s going to continue to be ripples this time around. And the question is in my mind, it’s really difficult to predict what people sentiment around those ripples are going to be. I think we can look through them for the next five to ten years and say it’s all going to be fine. This is the way it’s going to play out.

 

The real question is, how does the American consumer mindset, how does that actually grasp this ripple to move through it? And how does China react? How does Europe react? Right. There’s a number of factors that play in here, but I think the really difficult and maybe not as priced in as they should be. To Marco’s point. I think this is a really long term, very strange kind of predicament that we’re in where vaccines are really good. They work really, really well.

 

How do people’s minds begin to grasp it? And do they begin to look through? We get the higher vaccine rates? Do we really power through this in a meaningful way, very, very quickly, or does it continue to be highly volatile on the consumer sentiment front? Because if consumer sentiment continues to fall, it’s going to be a big problem for the back half of this year. And that I mean. It’s kind of…

 

TN: We’re right there at the back there in the back half of the year, right? That. This is a terrible time for consumer sentiment to fall because we’re at the precipice of kind of holiday season buying. Not quite there yet, but if it stays for two more months, it gets pretty bad.

 

SR: It does get pretty bad. But I think this is also one of those points that I think could really be a tailwind to Marko’s earlier comments about fiscal stimulus and fiscal stimulus being higher than anticipated. You continue to have consumer sentiment fall. You continue to have people fearful of Delta, you have a couple of bad job prints, and all of a sudden you’re going to have much higher fiscal spend. You’re going to have a very dovish Fed.

 

TN: Right.

 

SR: I think that’s the risk to call it “the market.” That’s the risk to kind of my side of Marko and I’s bet is if all of a sudden this fear actually really ingrains itself within individuals, it’s going to be a huge, huge issue as we move into the Christmas buying season for companies, Christmas buying season for consumers, and you’re going to get big checks written out of Washington, regardless of the geopolitical situation, regardless of whether or not people want to say Biden might be lame duck because of Afghanistan, etc.

 

All of a sudden you’re going to have a Fed that’s very concerned, thinking it was a ripping economy with incredible inflation that wasn’t going anywhere. You’re going to have them reverse very, very quickly. You’re going to have senators on both sides of the aisle very concerned that they just, they might get blamed for a recession.

 

It’s going to be a really interesting queue for.

 

TN: It is.

 

MP: That’s why it’s a dynamic environment. Right. And and what I would say is like, look, I have certainty on the Delta wave. Certainty. Every wave we’ve had has crested, other than in emerging markets because their testing is poor. So it’s actually a mega wave that we constantly think is over, but it isn’t.

 

In the US we know how the story plays up. We know it. It’s a four to six week wave. The challenge here Tony, is that we’re talking in the middle of this wave. We have probably another two to three weeks of upswing, and then we’re going to have a down swing in cases. And by the way, I know this with a science, like, a hundred percent certainty because we had waves collapse even before we had vaccines.

 

So this is a really important point, because if the Fed reacts to something that is extremely impermanent, something that’s over in three weeks, if the Fed at Jacksonhole and subsequently in September waivers, you know, I mean, that will just set, I think the market alight, in my view. I think that will collapse the dollar and they will sell the bond, because it will have been using this, you know, temporary blip in sentiments to justify a changing course.

 

The other thing I would say is, like, so Sam mention Afghanistan. I think he’s right to mention it. I think it’s really significant, and it’s significant because of this. I think… I’ve always expected that during the summer, the fiscal policy would get much more challenging. And now, because of the Republicans, I think moderate Democrats in the Senate versus progressive Democrats in the House were always going to try to eat each other alive.

 

But now, with this utter failure in Afghanistan, that looks really, really bad, they are going to circle the wagons on fiscal calls because the last remaining, the last remaining lever of the Biden administration is this fiscal package. If they don’t get it through, guys. Yeah. The Biden administration is done. And I mean, I’m not talking about midterms either. So they have to do something on fiscal. Right.

 

So this is why the stakes have now become much higher. They’re gonna pay Mansion. They’re gonna pay Cinema. They’re gonna get deep water ports in Arizona and West Virginia to get their compliant with a fiscal deal. You know what I mean? Like, there’s gonna be so much more. I wish I was living in West Virginia. I mean, they’re gonna have ice rinks in every little town. It’s gonna be amazing.

 

And so this is something to keep in mind, I think on that front, too. So I agree with Sam. I think it’s a really good point of how these things are very dynamic and they reinforce each other. And I just think that the political pack of lease resistance in every single issue we’re talking about here leads to more profligacy.

 

TN: Yeah, I think you’re right. I think at least for the near term, that’s the bias, is exactly in that direction.

 

Okay. Guys. Thank you so much. Again, I think we could go on for hours with this, and I love this discussion, but I really appreciate your time.

 

For everyone who’s watching. Please subscribe to our YouTube channel, where we need a few more subscribers to bring you a few more capabilities on our channel. If you don’t mind, please subscribe.

 

And Sam and Marko. Really appreciate your time. Thanks very much.

 

MP: Thank you. Thank you.

 

TN: Let’s do it again, and I want to come back in January and see who wins.

 

MP: Yeah, sure. We should definitely do that. We didn’t tell people when we been into, but it’s like a really nice steak dinner, I think was the… If the 10-year is at like between one point 49 and one point 51, I think we just…

Categories
QuickHit

QuickHit Cage Match: Time to Taper?

QuickHit Cage Match: Time to Taper?

This is a special QuickHit Cage Match edition with returning guest Albert Marko, and joining us for the very first time Andreas Steno Larsen to talk about tapering. Will the Fed taper this year? If yes, when, how, and why? If no, why not? Also discussed are the housing market, China GDP, and corporate earnings.

 

Andreas is the chief global strategist at Nordea Bank, which is mostly a Nordic bank, but has a presence in large parts of Europe, but also in the US. He speaks on behalf of the bank on topics surrounding global markets and in particular bond markets.

 

Albert Marko is a consultant for financial firms and high net worth individuals trying to navigate Washington, DC and what the Fed and Congress are up to.

 


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This QuickHit episode was recorded on August 16, 2021.

 

The views and opinions expressed in this QuickHit Cage Match: Time to Taper? QuickHit episode are those of the guest and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any contents provided by our guest are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

 

Show Notes

 

TN: So Andreas, I noticed you guys, you and Albert kind of in a Twitter fight last week about tapering, and that’s what really drew me to this discussion. I wanted to give you guys a platform to talk through this. So help me understand, you know. So what is your position? Why do you think it’s going to happen? When do you think it’s going to happen?

 

ASL:  Well, I think tapering is right around the corner, and the basic reason is that I expect marked sequential improvements in the labor market in the US over the coming two or three quarters. If you look at it, very simply speaking, right now, there are more job openings than unemployed in the US. I know I disagree with Albert on this as well. But in the old world, that would at least have let the Fed to turn very, very hawkish when they can see such a rate between job openings and unemployed as we have right now.

 

I basically have a case that once these extraordinary benefits, they will end across the US during September. Then we will have an explosion in a positive sense in the US Labor market. And that is exactly what is needed to convince the Fed of tapering.

 

So my base case is a decision taken in September and then an implementation starting already in December this year. And I expect them to be done already during the first half of next year with the tapering process. So it’s fairly aggressive compared to the scenarios I’ve seen painted by by other analysts.

 

TN: That’s really interesting. I just want to clarify one thing. When you say explosion the labor market, you mean more people coming into the market?

 

ASL: Yeah. And they come into the market and fill these job openings right now, we have a low labor market mobility due to a lot of temporary factors. And once they’re gone, then we should expect employment to be almost running at full speed before New Years.

 

TN: Okay. Okay. Very interesting. Albert, take it away. Help me understand what you’re thinking.

 

AM: Well, I mean, I would agree with him in the old days. Right. But we are in a situation where these tapering assumptions are based on Fed rhetoric and the public comments that they’ve been making specifically addressing his unemployment, unemployment boost or surge.

 

You know, we still have COVID lockdown patchwork across the world happening at the moment. Australia, Japan, Taiwan, and most importantly, China, because no one’s looking right now in China, but China’s GDP looks like it’s not going to surpass two or 3% for the next four or five quarters. With that in mind, where the United States going to get inventory for the holiday season and have this boost in employment surge that we usually get on holiday season.

 

It’s just, to me, there’s so many negatives, so many variables with negative connotations towards it. I can’t see the Fed tapering and just absolutely obliterating the market right before mid term season coming up in 2022. It’s just for me, it’s just inconceivable for them to do such a thing like that.

 

TN: Okay. Understood. So, Andreas, what do you think? Let’s say it doesn’t happen in September. What is the Fed thinking through and what mechanisms do they have to use, say, instead of a taper? Are there other things they can do aside from taper that will basically bring about the same intended outcome?

 

ASL: Well, I want to first of all, address what Albert said on China. I perfectly agree with the view on China right now. China is slowing massively. But I actually find it very interesting that the Federal Reserve is now even more behind the curve when it comes to its reaction function compared to earlier cycles, given that they want to see realized progress in labor markets and not forecasted progress.

 

And we know that labor markets, they lack the actual economic development. So it’s almost a given in my view, that we have a surge in employment over the coming couple of quarters as a consequence of what happened during the first half of the year. So that’s one thing.

 

And the second thing is that what we see right now in China is another wave of restrictions that will lead to renewed supply chains disruptions across the globe. And again, we will have a wave of supply side inflation, which is the exact kind of inflation that we are faced with right now. And given how the Fed communicated just three months back, you have to be amazed by how scared they are of the supply side inflation, even though it’s not the kind of inflation that they like.

 

So I still think that they will react to this, even though it’s supply side driven. What they have in sort of the toolbox ahead of September is obviously that they could hint that the interest rate path further out could be hiked. But otherwise, I think the most obvious tool is to look at the purchases of mortgages. Since we currently have a situation where most US consumers, they are very worried or even scared of buying a house. Timing wise right now, as a consequence of the rapid rise we’ve seen in the house prices. And I guess that’s directly linked to what the Fed is done on mortgages.

 

TN: Yeah. I can tell you just from my observation here in Texas where we have a lot of people moving in. House prices have taken a pause for probably the last two or three months where things even two, three months ago wouldn’t stay on the market for, like, three days. We’ve started to see things on the market for longer.

 

And so, I’m seeing what you’re saying, Andreas, about the housing market. And the question is, can that stuff pick up again, and is it justified? Albert, what’s your response to Andreas statement?

 

AM: The best comparison that we have is the 2013 economy to today’s economy. No one can sit there and argue that today’s economy is stronger than 2013. And look what Tapering Tantrum did to 2013 market. It was an absolute debacle. Yellen was so put off by Bernanke’s Tapering that she refused to do it in 2015. And in 2017, when they even mentioned it again, the market took a leg down. So, with that, right? And especially with Andres mentioning the word inflation, which is an absolute bad word to talk about in DC, tapering would have to have the Fed admit wrongdoing on sticking inflation.

 

When have we ever seen the US Federal Reserve ever take blame for something that’s negative in the markets? They just simply don’t do that. In fact, what I think they’re going to end up doing is allowing a market correction late into the fall and then unleash another $3 trillion of QE with Yellen and Powell to support the markets. So which would be completely opposite of tapering.

 

TN: Yeah, that’s interesting. You have completely opposite views. And what’s your view on the possibility of QE? I mean, is it possible?

 

ASL: Well, I don’t think Albert and I disagree a whole lot on the structural view or outlook, since that QE is a permanent instrument and it’s needed to fund the debt load of the US Treasury. There is no doubt about it. The point being here that the Federal Reserve needs a positive excuse to start tapering. I agree with that as well. And that exact positive excuse will be another couple of very strong labor market reports.

 

That’s exactly what they’ve been telling us. That they want to see between 800K and 1 million jobs created a month would be enough for them to launch a Tapering decision in September. Whether they will succeed with the entire tapering process is whole different question, but I’m looking for that decision in September. And then I guess Albert and I will agree a lot on the market takeaways if they take such a decision.

 

AM: Let me ask you a question Andreas. What would happen if the United States Congress refuses to deal with the debt ceiling and have no fiscal at that point? What would happen then?

 

ASL: Well, in such case, there is a whole lot of issues that you need to take care of as a Fed Reserve. So first of all, I’m not too scared of that scenario. I consider very low probability. I’m interested if you have another opinion.

 

AM: I personally don’t think it happens until at the very earliest November.

 

ASL: Yeah, but, I mean, obviously, every time there’s a debt ceiling deadline, we know that the true deadline is not the suspension deadline, its the deadline when the US Treasury is not able to run on fuels any longer, right? And that would be sometime during late October, there about I agree with you on that. So we basically have a window right now without a whole lot of issuance due to the debt ceiling being in place. And I actually think that’s a decent window for the Federal Reserve to utilize if they want to start tapering, since there is a smaller issuance for the private sector to swallow in such case.

 

TN: Interesting. Okay. What are you guys seeing on the corporate side? Are you seeing strength on the corporate side? I know we just had earnings season and they were very strong, but are you seeing a justifiably strong corporate position to start to taper?

 

AM: Right now, I really don’t. I mean, the University of Michigan Consumer Confidence had collapse. I think today, New York’s Manufacturer Index came in at 18.3, which was an astounding collapses in itself. You know, I personally deal with a couple of hedge funds, and they have been well behind the curve in returns right now.

 

I think the best ones are sub 10% for the year, so they’re gonna have to move back into cyclicals, and they’re gonna have to move back into small caps to make up the difference before the year end. Simply just even discussing that option, it makes tapering, you know, even less of a likely outcome just because it would ruin the market.

 

ASL: Obviously, if you go long small caps right now into a tapering scenario, you will end up losing. I agree with that. That would be kind of the worst. Yeah, exactly. But otherwise, I have to agree that the corporate sector is more doubtful, I would say, than the US Treasury in terms of a tapering decision. I’m much more scared of the corporate debt load than I am of the US Treasury debt load.

 

The State’s currency issue is they can always get rid of such a scenario. But the corporate sector is bigger trouble than the US Treasury into this scenario that I depict.

 

AM: Yeah. I completely agree with that one.

 

TN: Wow. We end on agreement. Guys. Thank you so much for this. Thanks so much for your time. I really look forward to it. Andreas, I look forward to having you back. Albert, of course, we look forward to having you back. Have a great week ahead, guys. Thank you very much.

 

And for all you guys watching. Thanks for taking the time. Please subscribe to our channel. And we’ll see you next time. Thanks very much.

Categories
QuickHit

Inflation: Buckle up, it may get worse (Part 2)

Nick Glinsman and Sam Rines are back in this QuickHit episode special Cage Match edition about inflation, part two, where we start looking into things like raw materials cost versus processing and manufacturing bottlenecks. Also discussed are the wage inflation and labor availability and how long these impacts will last. And finally, we start talking about central banks. What will the Fed do? Will it do anything? When will it do it?

 

For those who prefer to listen to a podcast, here’s the Spotify link for you: https://open.spotify.com/episode/3CK3SNwMK97oWLy1DMRQnD?si=uV1As8VsTxSVrQNE0iYuiA You can also find us in other podcast audio streaming services. Just search “QuickHit”. Thank you!

 

Part one covered a lot around specific commodity inflation and why it’s happening.

 

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This QuickHit episode was recorded on April 28, 2021.

 

The views and opinions expressed in this nflation: Buckle up, it may get worse QuickHit episode are those of the guests and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any content provided by our guests are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

 

Show Notes

 

TN: What the people in the middle. So the manufacturers, what capacity do they have to absorb these price rises? What are you guys seeing when you talk to people when you read? Are you seeing that manufacturers can absorb the lumber prices, the copper prices and other things, or are they passing that directly along?

 

NG: Sorry, Sam. I’m jumping in here. The beauty of that question right now is there was a major headline, the Financial Times talking about margin compression of how US corporates are going to be increasing prices. It was today. You have the likes of Chipotle. We’ll go on to that. That’s a labor cost issue. But the other company, you know, J&J, various bare necessities manufacturers for nappies for kitchenware also they’re saying they’re going to have to put price pressure through to the consumer and as we were discussing just before we started, there’s the elasticity of price increases is very high.

 

The elasticity of price decreases is extremely low. And I would contend that this becomes a rolling, snowball effect as these prices get passed through to the consumer. There are other costs that will be passed through to which we can talk about later on labor side. But this clearly, one of the signals that our well worth watching, on the margins in the corporate reporting, and all of them are suggestive of higher prices to the consumer.

 

Then you look at the ISM prices paid. I have a chart, a model that looks at that versus the CPI. And if that sticks to what it’s done over the last couple of decades, it’s indicative of CPI, actually, the big figure having a getting up to somewhere around four, maybe even higher.

 

TN: Which was kind of a China 2011 scenario of four to six percent CPI.

 

NG: Correct. But also also the the process of decoupling, as long as it may be, that process has created a demand because of the supply shock.

 

There’s a supply shock in the system. The demand is adjusting there, too, so that work as additional demand to fill in the gaps, so if the decoupling replacement process is long standing, the demand is still there, it’s a matter and then catching up. There’s a price disparity caused by that.

 

TN: Yeah, we definitely have a mismatch, at least in the short term. And will those supply chains catch up? That’s a real question. Sam, what’s your view on that in terms of manufacturers being able to absorb these cost and margin pressures?

 

SR: So I’ll jump to the housing market as my example, which I think is one of the more interesting ones filtering, filtering through down into lumber.

 

A very close friend of mine in Houston is delaying the start of one hundred and ninety homes that were supposed to be going into, well… He has the pads laid. He won’t build those homes until lumber prices go down. It’s the largest backlog he’s ever had. And that got us talking and kind of working through the market. And when you look at the market for pine studs in the US, it’s an intriguing look into kind of where the cost pressures are coming through, where mills are making mills that make the two by fours are making an absolute fortune off of the disruption.

 

But if you own a pine stand of several thousand acres, the tree that you are cutting off of it is the exact same price that it was a year ago. You have seen none of the prices at all.

 

TN: So there’s not a supply, a raw materials supply issue. It’s a processed materials issue.

 

SR: Yes. Exactly. So it’s the supply chain breaking down. You didn’t have enough. You didn’t have the mills up and running for a couple of months. You had about 40 percent of the capacity offline. And that created a shock to the system that eventually will be sorted out at some point.

 

We didn’t destroy any capacity for two by fours. We’re building even at the current rate, we’re building one point seven million homes. That’s nowhere near what we were doing in 2005. And yet lumber is four times where it was. So, yeah.

 

NG: May I ask a question because you’re obviously in touch with that level on a micro basis? So one of the things that I’ve been told by several different sources is they don’t disagree with your number coming down eventually. The problem the homebuilders now have is labor shortage.

 

SR: That might be a problem in the northeast. That might be a problem in a kind of coastal problem in the US, where I have fewer contacts in construction. But in the south, there’s no labor shortage. Wages are still very strong. You have some projects that were delayed for large oil which created a supply of able bodied plumbers, electricians, where there’s a shortage elsewhere. So I would say that’s probably very true for parts of the country.

 

There’s anecdotally, Beth. Beth Iron Works? One of the major boat docks in the north, northeast is driving around an RV trying to recruit people to come, trying to recruit welders. That was a problem before Covid that was and will remain a problem. The trades will be a big issue. Common labor, particularly in the South, does not appear to be an issue. That is an issue in the north.

 

NG: I’ve heard it’s an issue in Florida, actually, which is back to you point about coasts. Sorry, I interrupt.

 

TN: We’re in Texas. It’s the Promised Land. I mean, I think you…

 

NG: Would agree with you on that one.

 

TN: OK, so we’ve gone long. I know these are very detailed issues, but I’m going to ask another question. I did ask for some questions over Twitter.

 

So one of them came in from Brent. This was around supply chain disruptions, which we’ve already talked about. There’s another from Jerrett Heath. He says, “Will it be velocity or magnitude that causes the Fed to react to inflationary pressures?”

 

So what do you guys think? Are we going to see kind of the magnitude inflation push the Fed to react or what’s going to push the Fed to react to start to taper a little bit, if they do at all?

 

NG: I would say both at the same time. My great fear is that there is, and this was actually covered by the Wall Street Journal, but I’ve written and spoken about this as well. I sit there looking at the Fed becoming reactive rather than proactive, and the punch bowl analogy is gone, and that worries me enormously because they have great confidence in something that they’re forecasting as transitory and we know what their forecast record is, and if you really want a bad forecast record, just go to Frankfurt and see what the ECB is all about.

 

Now, it’s interesting to me that the conventional wisdom, the consensus forecast is for tapering to the end of this year as opposed to next year. It seems like the more people talk about the inflation pressure, the greater it is. But I wonder whether we will get tapering. That’s what worries me about the Fed.

 

I’ve been really working hard on looking at what Claudia Sahm has written and said over the last couple of weeks. She wrote an op ed in The New York Times and Bloomberg. She’s said… She’s an ex-economist for the FOMC and the Board of Governors, actually. And you get the feeling that the priorities are unemployment with equity, racial equity as opposed to equality. Furthermore, you get the feeling that financial stability… Both of those more important than inflation.

 

Now, if that’s the case and we start to see any signs of a taper tantrum, I worry that this Fed is going to do a proactive. Either stop the idea of tapering or do a twist or something that eases this market. I think they’ve got themselves, we have a very political Fed that, if it’s reactive by nature, it could be procyclical by action. And that’s where I find I really worry about it.

 

Then, we’ve got Powells term expiry February. Well, Lail Brainard is one of Janet Yellen’s favorite people. And if she gets in, we’re going full MMT. So those are my concerns about the tapering, its focus on financial stability and the risk that reactive policy will be procyclical.

 

TN: Interesting. OK, that’s great. Thank you. Sam. Help me understand, what’s your point of view on this? What gets the Fed to react and how do they react?

 

SR: Yeah, so I would go with neither of those will get the Fed to react. It’s not a question of should they or, you know, what they think they should do. But it’s a question of will they. And they won’t react to inflation. They do not care about the magnitude. They do not care about the velocity. And they won’t care for at least another nine months because we know the combination that they’re going to look through, the combination of basic facts and supply chain disruptions, at least through the end of the third quarter. They do not care. And then they will start the clock on their four quarters of inflation above or at two percent, and they want full employment before they raise. That’s four percent at least on measured unemployment.

 

So I would say, it, whatever you want to look at for inflation numbers, they don’t care. And maybe they should, but they don’t.

 

TN: So they don’t care yet. Or they don’t care period?

 

SR: They don’t care, period, until it’s been until it’s been a year of around 2 percent in this summer and fall don’t matter to them.

 

NG: Let me add one or it’s too late.

 

SR: Yes.

 

NG: I’m with you. You and I seem to agree. I mean, that is exactly the impression I got from Claudia Sahm’s words. I mean it was just straight up. And that’s where I worry, you know, I have a huge respect for Lail Brainard. She is a very, very accomplished economist. But she’ll go full MMT is what Janet Yellen wants. It’s what the Democrats want and I really worry about that.

 

Plus, you combine this with here we go back to Larry Summers. You combine this with this fiscal effort and one thing that, so in American terminology, progressive policies typically have historically been inflationary. In English terminology, is what I am, these socialist policies have a history of inflation. More government intervention, more pushing against the string of inefficient allocation of resources. Labor restrictions, minimum wage, universal basic income. It all leads to in one direction.

 

So I agree with you, Sam. I think the Fed doesn’t care and I think, hence, the reactive. When they react, it’s going to be, in my view, potentially too late. It’s already started.

 

TN: So I just sent out on Twitter a chart that Sam published about three weeks ago from another source on the negative impact of fiscal stimulus, and as we end up ’21, like in Q3, Q4 of ’21, that fiscal stimulus starts to have a negative impact. And certainly in ’22, the US fiscal stimulus has a negative impact.

 

So, you know, there are a number of things to worry about, not just with inflation, but with the efficacy of some of this fiscal stimulus that’s going into the market.

 

So with that, I want to thank both of you guys. Honestly, we could talk about this for hours. I would love to have this discussion with you guys again, you know, even in a couple of weeks to talk about other issues. So let’s see where this goes. But thank you so much. Thank you very much for your time on this. I really appreciate it.

 

We’ll get this out as quickly as possible. Thanks to everyone who’s watching this. Thanks for everyone who submitted questions. For those who did submit questions, for the questions we used, we’ll give you guys a month of CI Futures and look forward to the next time. Thanks for joining us.

 

Categories
QuickHit

Inflation: Buckle up, it may get worse (Part 1)

Nick Glinsman and Sam Rines are back in this QuickHit episode special Cage Match edition about inflation. Where are we in the inflation and what is the horizon? Both guests have different views and they explain exactly why they have such views. And what about China’s manipulation of CNY through hoarding metals and commodities? Is that a valid way of looking at inflation?

 

Part 2 of this discussion can be found here: https://www.completeintel.com/2021/05/06/quickhit-inflation-part-2/

 

Want the audio version? Play this on Spotify or find us in other podcast players. You can also find us in other podcast audio streaming services. Just search “QuickHit”.

 

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This QuickHit episode was recorded on April 28, 2021.

The views and opinions expressed in this nflation: Buckle up, it may get worse QuickHit episode are those of the guests and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any content provided by our guests are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

 

Show Notes

 

TN: Today we’re talking about inflation. It’s been on everyone’s mind for the last couple months and we’ve got two macro geniuses to talk to us about it today. We’ve got Nick Glinsman from EVO Capital and we’ve got Sam Rines from Avalon.

 

We look at copper. We look at a lot of these indicators of inflation and it’s been on everyone’s mind over the last few months. A year ago, people were worried about deflation. Now the worry is inflation. Obviously we’ve seen a lot of monetary and fiscal policy in the interim.

 

So, Nick, can you give us your view on where we are with inflation and what that looks like over what horizon? Is it months? Is it five years? Is it, you know, how does this play out?

 

NG: The horizon is a little bit tougher. But my my thesis is based on looking back at historical precedence and I focused on the LBJ Vietnam War spending, combined with his great society fiscal spend, which ultimately led in the early 70s Paul Volcker’s fame containing huge inflation there was at that period.

 

And I’m sitting here having spent the last year but actually building this thesis up for a couple of years thinking that the equivalent of the Vietnam expenditure is Covid and the relief spending that’s been has combined Trump and now Biden, and then the great society equivalent would be Biden’s green infrastructure spending which, I slightly tongue-in-cheek called the green ghost plan, which is enormous. Amazing.

 

When I find myself agreeing with Larry Summers on inflation. I think his odds of a third in terms of this creating inflation, I would suggest a higher. In terms of timeline, it took five to seven years for the inflation to really kick in during the 60’s leading to Volcker. I think this time around, it will be much quicker due to the differences, a lot of globalization and supply chain management.

 

TN: Sam, can you kind of give us your view of where we are in inflation and what’s the duration that you kind of expect this to play out?

 

SR: I have a very different view. If you look at the lumber market, copper, et cetera, these are things that tend to sort themselves out rather rapidly. Being in Houston, the best cure for high prices and energy is high prices. We will pump more if oil ever goes to 80. It’s very similar with lumber and copper. Most of the mills are becoming much more efficient in lumber, for instance.

 

So we will see that begin to roll over and that will roll over in a very meaningful way as we begin to work through these supply chain issues that we know are coming in the summer and we know are probably going to persist in the fall. But as we get into the fall and we get into early 2022, even if we have a couple trillion dollars infrastructure, it’s going to be spread over the better part of 10 years infrastructure.

 

It’s not a fast spend and it will not save us from the fiscal cliff. It will not save us from the lower employment numbers that we’ve been seeing on an overall basis. Yes, unemployment is moving lower, but employment is not keeping up with the employment figures.

 

Once the economy begins to have to stand on its own two legs, even if it has a touch of a tailwind from the government, it’s still going to be very difficult to continue to see consumption going through the roof, continue to see the types of disruptions that we’ll see for the next six to nine months in terms of supply chain that will have one-off price implications.

 

But that to me says we’re probably getting towards the peak of the sugar high as we get into the summer and the other side of the sugar high is going to be very painful in terms of going back to a one and a half to two and a half percent growth rate in the US inflation that will be very difficult to get higher simply because it’s difficult to have sustained disruptions in supply and demographics that aren’t changing anytime soon. So we will continue to have a number of those headwinds. And I think that’s what the US 10-years is telling you, US tenure at 1.5 is telling you that the market’s looking through this summer and saying the next decade doesn’t look as good as the last decade in a lot of ways.

 

It’s something to at least keep in the back of our minds that the Fed doesn’t have great control over the 10-year. The fed has great control over zero to two-year timeframe. But nothing beyond that.

 

TN: Okay, so let’s look at common areas. It seems to me that both of you see inflation continuing to rise maybe not in terms of the rate of rise but certainly continue to rise until, let’s say say Q3 Q4? Do we at least have comic around there?

 

SR: Yeah.

 

NG: Yes, absolutely.

 

TN: When we look at some of the the pressures in inflation, part of my assertion has been, and I’m sure you’re both going to tell me I’m wrong, but as we’ve seen the CNY strengthen, my hypothesis has been with a strong CNY, Chinese manufacturers are stocking up on industrial metals, food, other things because it’s in dollar terms. They can get it pretty cheaply and they’re waiting for CNY to devalue again when their buying power will decline.

 

What I’m hearing is that a lot of these things are really going to China to be hoarded and as a play on a potentially devaluing CNY. What do you think of that hypothesis aligned with a lot of the central bank easing? Is that a valid way of looking at inflation? Meaning this is stockpiling more than it is demand pull?

 

NG: My view on China is that, if you look at food firstly, there is a food shortage crisis. And we all know what the CCP are most scared of, which is society unrest. And we can take the examples of the Arab Spring, food is the key. But I also wonder whether the Chinese are stockpiling in anticipation of decoupling? I think of rare earths, of which they have a large control of the refining thereof being problematic. Semiconductors, there is an issue there.

 

So if I extrapolate further, my view is I think the supply chain issues are much longer standing now because of various geopolitical forces creating a decoupling with China for sure. And we have this Anglosphere grouping that’s clearly beginning to take shape, which now looks like that will include India because of the health crisis there.

 

If we look at that, then the question is what happens with Europe? Again, I think that’s part of the supply chain problem whilst they decide which site they go to. Is it china-centric or is it anglers-centric?

 

So I think the supply chain issue is much longer standing, hence I suspect that we’ve got China positioning, because nothing goes on which in China without the government knowing about it, quite frankly. In terms of anticipating a supply chain issue, because all the commodities they’re importing they’re short off.

 

TN: Okay, Sam, first of all, what do you think about my hypothesis and then Nick’s qualification around the supply chain issues being much longer term on the back of decoupling?

 

SR: I would take the argument that decoupling isn’t an action. It’s a process, and the process takes a very, very long time. And that creates in my mind a much longer time frame for the United States to build out its portion of the supply chain, for instance semiconductors, et cetera. So I would say I don’t disagree that there is a decoupling underway. In my opinion or my argument would be that it will take much longer than a few years to really get that process to move and it’ll be particularly under this administration a much more diplomatic and less blunt force tools than we’ve seen in the past being used. So I don’t disagree with the supply chain eventually being at least somewhat disentangled from China. I would just argue that it will take quite a while to really begin to become an issue unto itself.

 

On your point that China stockpiling, that does appear to be happening. It does appear to be a hedge against a weaker CNY to come including with lumber. One of the reasons that lumber prices are spiking is because China’s buying a lot of lumber in the US. That is a significant problem. And I would point to, when they stop stockpiling, that tends to have a significant effect on the price of commodities in the opposite direction. We’ve seen that with copper a couple of times during their infrastructure builds.

 

The interesting thing right now is you’ve actually seen a pullback from infrastructure spending. From the peak in China, they’ve begun to do their form of policy tightening on that front already. Suspected will continue at least on the margin and that will be a significant headwind for those commodities that have been stockpiled when less of them are being used on the margin as well. So that that does play into a 2022 disinflationary type environment versus 2021.

 

TN: Given that we have all these different pressures, whether it’s supply chains, whether it’s stockpiling, whatever it is, what the people in the middle, so that the manufacturers, what capacity do they have to absorb these price rises? What are you guys seeing when you talk to people, when you read? Are you seeing that manufacturers can absorb the lumber prices, the copper prices and other things? Or are they passing that directly along?

Categories
QuickHit

QuickHit: Will China Invade Taiwan? (Part 1)

Albert Marko and Christopher Balding are back for another #CageMatch special episode for QuickHit, where the two experts discuss the million dollar question: Will China invade Taiwan? Tony Nash is hosting this episode with Marko and Balding sharing what they think the two countries will do. Does China have the capability (and money) to invade Taiwan? If ever, will Taiwan ever retaliate? Can they afford to go to war? And how will the US fit in all these? Will this be another war waiting to happen?

 

This China and Taiwan conflict is Part 1 of 2 episodes. Subscribe to our Youtube Channel and signup to the CI Newsletter to be among the first to know when the second part is out.

 

The China-Taiwan relations was briefly discussed in the first ever #CageMatch episode. Watch the Part 1 here. 

 

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This QuickHit episode was recorded on January 26, 2021.

 

The views and opinions expressed in this Chinese invasion of Taiwan QuickHit episode are those of the guests and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any content provided by our guests are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

 

Show Notes

 

TN: We’ve seen some build up of China’s activity toward Taiwan especially over the last month and we wanted to have a deeper discussion about one of the big questions that is out there which is “Will China invade Taiwan?” and is that a viable likely possibility or is it just saber-rattling to shake things up a little bit. With the new Biden administration and the change over there, there is potentially an opportunity for China to take a more aggressive stance toward Taiwan, the region and, the U.S.

 

We’re joined by Chris Balding and Albert Marco to talk about this. Let’s go through your basic thesis. Chris, what’s your position China preparing to invade Taiwan? Do you think it’s something that is possible and or likely?

 

CB: I would put what we think of as a full-scale invasion, where there’s soldiers and rubber rafts storming the beaches of Taiwan. I think that is relatively unlikely as a scenario. But I do think what is much more likely, and I would put it above 50% is some type of escalated conflict either in the East or South China Sea over the next 18 months as distinctly possible.

 

And when I say that, let me emphasize, we’re talking a range of possibilities. This could be everything from a PLA navy boat ramming a Taiwanese fishing boat. It could mean blowing up a shoal or something like that they’re fighting with Vietnam about. There’s a range of possibilities, but some type of conflict within the next 18 months is distinctly possible.

 

The reason I say 18 months is Xi will be going up for election of his third term in about 18 months. That is a very important time period. And I guarantee you, Xi and those around him know what basically they’re looking to accomplish within those 18 months. You have a number of complicating factors. It’s not uncommon for Chinese leadership to say: “Hey there’s a changeover in the U.S. Let’s see what we can get away with”. That’s not why they would do it. The timing is fortuitous.

 

So, I do think some type of escalation in the East and South China over the next 18 months is likely.

 

TN: Okay. Albert, what do you think?

 

AM: China likes the poke and they like the prod and they like to test the perimeters of defenses like most nations. When it comes to offensive capabilities, they want to test their adversary’s defensive capabilities.

 

Do I think that there’s going to be some kind of escalation? Well, I kind of agree with Chris there. Something might happen along those lines. But I don’t think it would be anything very serious. China would need an assurance of a quick and decisive victory if they were to attempt something like that. Obviously, a full-scale invasion is definitely not going to happen.

 

But even blowing up a shoal or taking out a couple fishing trawlers or whatnot, they certainly don’t want to sit there and affect their shipping lanes. Taiwan straits in that entire region, is the world’s biggest trading lanes for ships. You can’t have the United States running there with an armada just to protect Taiwan. It would adversely affect the Chinese economy. Xi at that point in 18 months, like he’s running up for election like Chris said, he can’t afford any kind of hiccups right now in the Chinese economy. And most of the CCPs elite are ingrained with Taiwanese companies. So, for them to sit there and disrupt that wealth, I just don’t see it happening.

 

TN: We saw over the last week where the Chinese government said that they can now defend itself in its claimed territorial waters. And with China expanding its claims, whether it’s with India, South China Sea, wherever it is, it seems to me that they’re telegraphing a more aggressive stance. Do we expect that as a warning? That is fairly hollow but they just want to put it out there or is that something that we believe they’ll act on against the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, Japan or something like that. Could we see the claim over, maybe, the Senkaku Islands go hot at some point for some phosphorous hills or whatever?

 

CB: A lot of this follows a very similar pattern of what we call “salami slicing,” is over the course of a couple years, they just continue to slice away and slice away and slice away, until the last logical step in progression of some type of escalation. That’s a similar type of strategy. That’s part of why I say a full-scale invasion of Taiwan, likely no, I don’t think it is. I generally agree with Albert in that sense that I would put it as a very low probability type of event.

 

Are there other types of conflicts that may take place? Whether that is Taiwan or Chinese navy and fishing vessels circle islands and stuff like that. Absolutely. I think it’s relatively likely 50 percent over the next 18 months.

 

There’s been very under-the-radar moves in the sense that within the past year, maybe 18 months, Xi replaced key generals that oversaw the southern and eastern areas, which are very closely tied to Taiwan.

 

If there’s not some type of conflict, they’ve taken all the move that seemed to indicate signal that yes, they are at the very least they want to stick out their chest a lot more in these areas. And I think probably the one area where I would fundamentally disagree with Albert is that I think he’s perfectly right on “why would China do this this? This could mess up their shipping lanes they’re invested in Taiwan.?” And the reason I disagree is not that I think Albert is wrong. But I think, it’s the wrong type of rationale.

 

If we look at why is China picking a fight with India in a frozen ground on the Himalayas at 25,000 feet? It makes no sense. I mean there’s little logical reason. They’ve successfully turned India against. They’re kicking out in India. They’re kicking out Chinese apps as fast as they can find them. And they’re looking to start an Indian smartphone market. Very little action is proven has provoked a very large reaction from India. Albert’s rationality, in a way, is perfectly accurate. I don’t think that necessarily captures the reality of what I would call Chinese rationality of the logic that they’re using to make those decisions and the risks they’re willing to take.

 

TN: If we take the Hong Kong scenario and we talk about the salami slicing that Chris talked about. After the umbrella revolution in 2014, intel I was hearing out of China was that the decision was made in Beijing that Hong Kong would lose its status as a global financial center. And it was just a matter of time, right? And we’ve hit that point effectively. Okay? Hong Kong is not a place where you, unless you want risk, where you’re going to necessarily park your assets. It’s taken five years. They were patient and it seems to me they’re beyond the tipping point. It was that kind of salami-slicing approach to taking away the credibility of Hong Kong, but also injecting the inevitability of Chinese ownership. Is it possible that can happen with Taiwan?

 

AM: Well, of course, it is certainly possible. There’s no question about that. Do I think it’s possible in the next 18 months? Absolutely, like even Chris agrees. I don’t think that’s going to happen in 18 months.

 

There’s no Chinese build up militarily for Taiwan invasion. If you were to look at every single military offensive project has logistics involved. There’s just none piling up. The United States would see that in satellite images well in advance.

 

However, back to the Himalayas, which I think is something we should rather key on. If you want to talk about India’s slicing away stuff, there is a rationale for the Himalayan conflict. It’s the watershed. They need that water and they they’ve been piping that water into agricultural areas in China for years now and they haven’t done too much of it because it’s going to really upset India. You have a billion people in India versus a billion people in China that needs fresh water. It’s going to be a problem. They’ve built mountaintop bases. They have built up a military presence there. That’s where I would actually focus in the next 18 months as a real skirmish.

 

This Taiwan thing, I completely agree. It’s well within the Chinese game playbook to slice away and just wait for their time. But a Taiwanese invasion would be extremely costly for the Chinese. The risk-reward for the Chinese right now to even think about adventuring into Taiwan would cost them significant military losses, significant economic losses. It would ruin some BRI projects. It would ruin the perception of China as a growing superpower. There’s just so many negatives that I can’t see any real generals in the PLA telling Xi that this is a good idea. Now that’s not to say that Xi won’t do it anyways because…

 

CB: Tony, let me ask a question. So, Albert, 70 people I’ve talked to say they actually see the military risks increase significantly to Taiwan based upon hardware that’s getting onboarded in the PLA. They see the risks to Taiwan’s increase significantly post about 2022. Okay. Would you share a similar outlook?

 

AM: You have to understand, when it comes to offensive versus defensive capabilities, the defense always has a clear-cut advantage, right? Offensively, it takes seven dollars per one dollar of defense of offensive spending to actually take over. Now without a doubt, China would win over the long term. But at what cost will the PLA navy take? The Taiwanese defenses are no joke. They’re well equipped to at least hold them off for quite a long time and invading. Even the PLA. The PLA officers, that’s a social structure. That’s a social ladder realistically. How would it look like for Xi if the firstborn son of some of these elite families are coming home in body bags?