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The Fed & ECB Playbooks: What are they thinking right now? (Part 1)

Fed & ECB Playbooks: What are they thinking right now? (Part 2)

Geopolitics experts Albert Marko and Nick Glinsman are back on QuickHit for a discussion on the Federal Reserve, the ECB, and central banks. What are they thinking right now?

 

Albert Marko advises financial firms and some high net worth individuals on how politics works in D.C.. He worked with congressional members and their staff for the past 15 to 20 years. In his words, Albert basically is a tour guide for them to figure out how to invest their money.

 

Nick Glinsman is the co-founder and CIO of EVO Capital LLC. He does a lot of writing and some portfolio management. He was a macro portfolio manager in one of the big micro funds in London for quite a few years. Prior to that, Nick was with Salomon Brothers. Now, he concentrates on providing key intel, both economics and politics on a global level to finance managers and politicos.

 

You can go here for Part 2 of the discussion.

 

 

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This QuickHit episode was recorded on July 29, 2021.

 

The views and opinions expressed in this The Fed & ECB Playbooks: What are they thinking right now? (Part 1) QuickHit episode are those of the guest and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any contents provided by our guest are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

 

Show Notes

 

TN: Today we’re talking about central banks and given where we are in “the cycle”, whatever that means at this point, post or late Covid, we’ve had waves of support coming from finance ministries and treasuries and central banks around the world. Central banks seem to be in a very weird position right now. So I’d really love to understand your point of view particularly what the Fed and the ECB thinking about right now and what are some of the biggest dilemmas they have? Nick, if you want to go first and frame that out a little bit and then Albert, will obviously go to you.

 

NG: Well, given how long I’ve been doing this, I’m more of a traditional, black coated central bank watcher. And I would say a couple of key comments to make right now is I think they’ve lost their independence to a large extent. Harder for the ECB to lose its independence. But with the commission, you have that loss.

 

I also think that we are, defective monetary financing. And again, I’ll go back to the ECB, who literally for the last month, for everything that was issued in Europe and this reluctance by the Fed to, even they admit talking about talking about tapering, but this reluctance to even consider a pullback on the mortgage-backed securities. The jest, pretty much the same, and it’s very clear with a lot of the actions that I’m in, my interpretation is, one, they’re working in cahoots with the political arm.

 

So treasury in the US, commission in Europe. Bank of England is a slight exception about to happen, but we can cover that later. So that’s clearly going on. And I think now Albert might do a lot of work together and I think this Albert came out with a comment a while back saying Yellen wants six trillion dollars fiscal. And the excuse that was given, aside from the political bias, was the Treasury market needs it.

 

And interesting enough, we saw the change to the Repos yesterday. This was after criticism by a committee that was published in the F.T. yesterday. And even Bill Dudley’s commented on Today suggesting that a lot more work needs to be done to ensure that the normal functioning of the plumbing behind the form of safe assets.

 

So it’s clear to me that things are being worked on in a politically coordinated way that impacts monetary policy. Now, I think they’ve got themselves into an economic or policy black hole. I think the mind set, and it’s been like this since probably ’08, which is they’re not prepared to accept the economic cycle anymore.

 

So back to one of my previous appearances on on your pod, the Fed not doing anything? Yeah, it seems to me that that’s an acceptable process, regardless of inflation is way above their forecast. And forecasting that’s a whole ‘nother bad area for the… Fed’s forecasts are terribly wrong. The ECB’s forecasts have been wrong for, you know, since time immemorial.

 

The ECB is more dangerous because they have a bias that keeps them on their policy’s wreck.

 

TN: So first on forecasts, if any central bankers are watching, I can help you with that. Second, when you say they don’t believe in the business cycle anymore, do you mean the central banks or do you mean the political folks?

 

NG: The central banks and government. I mean, funnily enough, I’m reading a biography on Jim Baker right now. And when you look at Reagan, when he came in and Volcker, economic data was pretty bad back at the beginning of the 80s. That. No way, no politician is prepared to accept that anymore. To be honest, I think the central bankers are prepared to accept that anymore. Any of the people leading the central banks being political appointees, of course.

 

TN: So this is kind of beyond a Keynesian point of view, because even Keynesians believed in a business cycle, right?

 

NG: It’s a traditional Keynesian point of view. The modern day, neo Keynesian, yes, you’re right. Way beyond what they’re thinking.

 

TN: There’s a lot of detail in that, and I think we could spend an hour talking about every third thing you said there. So I really do appreciate that. Albert. Can you tell us both Fed and ECB, what are they thinking about right now? What are the trade offs? What are the fears they have?

 

AM: We’ll start with the ECB. The ECB is not even a junior player right now in the central bank world. I know people want to look at the EU and say, oh, it’s a massive trading bloc, so and so. But the fact is, that it’s completely insolvent. Besides the Germans and maybe the French in some sectors, there’s nothing else in Europe that’s even worth looking at at the moment.

 

As for the ECB’s standpoint, you know, they’re still powerless. I mean, the Federal Reserve makes all the policy. They first will talk to the Anglosphere banks that are on the dollar standard basically. I mean, the Pound and the Australian dollar and whatnot. They’re just Euro Dollar tentacles. But, for the ECB, they’re frustrated right now because they see that the Euro keeps going up and their export driving market is just taking a battering at the moment. But they can’t do anything because the Fed goes and buys Euros on the open market to drop the price of the Dollar to promote the equities in the United States. And that’s just happening right now.

 

When it comes to the Fed, we have to look at what is the Fed, right? Normally what everyone is taught in school is that they are an independent entity that looks over the market and so on and so forth. Right. But these guys are political appointees. These guys have money and donors. They play with both political parties. Right now, the Democrats have complete control of the Federal Reserve. And everyone wants to look at Jerome Powell as the Fed chair, but I’ve said this multiple times on Twitter, the real Fed chair is Larry Fink. He’s got Powell’s portfolio under management of BlackRock. He’s the one making all the moves on the market, with the market makers and coordinating things behind the scenes. He’s the guy to look at, not Jerome Powell.

 

I mean, have anyone even watched Jerome Powell’s speech yesterday? It was appalling. He was overly dovish. That’s the script that he was written. He’s not the smart guy in this playing field, in this battleground.

 

TN: He needs a media training, actually. I think.

 

AM: He’s being set up to be scapegoated for a crash. He’s just no one to show. He’s a Trump appointee. So next time there’s a crash, whether it’s one week from now or one month from now, it’s going to be pointed on him that, you know, he’s the Fed chair. Look at the Fed chair. Don’t look at everything else that the political guys have made and policies in the past four or five years that have absolutely just decimated the real economy.

 

TN: This time reminds me, and I’m not a huge historian of the Fed, but it really reminds me of the of the Nixon era Fed where Nixon and his Fed chair had differences and they were known, and then the Fed chair ended up capitulating to do whatever Nixon wanted to get back in his good graces. Does that sound about right?

 

AM: No, that’s a perfect example. I mean, this idea that’s floated around by economists that economics and politics are separate entities is absolute fantasy. And it just it doesn’t exist in the real world.

 

NG: Just to pop in on this one because actually there is a new book out which I started three days at Camp David. Because it’s coming up to 50 years since that decision of the gold standard. Now, it’s just interesting you brought it up, because if you think of one of the rationales for coming off the gold standard, there’s several, but one that struck me as I was reading actually the review, the back cover show Percy.

 

This enables the government to stop printing in terms of fiscal, fiscal, fiscal. That’s what it did in effect. First of all, that’s one of the biggest arguments against people who argue for a return to the gold standard because that would decimate things or cryptos being in a limited supply of crypto as the new reserve currency because the gain that would be pulling against the elastic and you wouldn’t get, the economy would just boom. Right.

 

So that’s where I think it’s just huge, you know. I’ve always said that actually what we have is what we’re going to ultimately see is exactly the same cost that came with Lyndon Johnson paying for the Vietnam War, Covid. And then the Great Society, which is Joe Biden’s what I call social infrastructure and green ghost plan. So. Going back to that, Nixon was paying part of the price for all of that. With Volcke right. So I actually sit there thinking, well. There are similarities right now, and we’re seeing effectively a central bank and the Treasury, wherever you want to look, untethered from what used to be, well before I started in this business, to be part of the discipline. But even when they came off the gold standard, there was discipline. As you referred earlier, to, traditional Keynesians believed in the economic cycle of boom, bust. You know, boom, you tap the brakes a little bit, take the punch all the way. That’s gone.

 

That is to me what’s gone on recently, I don’t know whether you would say since the 08 or more recently is the equivalent of that ’73 meeting where they came off the gold standard. People just said no more cycles. Tapping the brakes and now the central banks are in a hole and politicized, they’re not independent because there are no.

 

AM: Yeah, yeah, that that’s real quick, Tony. That’s exactly right. I mean, even like, you know, I was on Twitter saying we’re going to go to 4400. We’re going to go to 4400 and people are like “No way. We’re in a bear market. This thing’s going back down 37, whatever charts and whatever Bollinger bands they want to look at. But the fact is because of the politics has a necessity to pump the market and then crash it to pass more stimulus packages. The only way was to go up to 4400 plus, right.

 

TN: Right. OK, now, with all of that in mind, Nick, you did a piece recently about the Fed and housing and some of the trade offs that they’re looking out looking at with regard to the housing market. Now, housing is an issue in Australia. It’s an issue in the UK. It’s an issue in the US and other places. Can you walk us through a little bit of your kind of reasoning and what you were thinking about with regard to the Fed and housing?

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QuickHit

Inflation: Buckle up, it may get worse (Part 1)

Nick Glinsman and Sam Rines are back in this QuickHit episode special Cage Match edition about inflation. Where are we in the inflation and what is the horizon? Both guests have different views and they explain exactly why they have such views. And what about China’s manipulation of CNY through hoarding metals and commodities? Is that a valid way of looking at inflation?

 

Part 2 of this discussion can be found here: https://www.completeintel.com/2021/05/06/quickhit-inflation-part-2/

 

Want the audio version? Play this on Spotify or find us in other podcast players. You can also find us in other podcast audio streaming services. Just search “QuickHit”.

 

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This QuickHit episode was recorded on April 28, 2021.

The views and opinions expressed in this nflation: Buckle up, it may get worse QuickHit episode are those of the guests and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any content provided by our guests are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

 

Show Notes

 

TN: Today we’re talking about inflation. It’s been on everyone’s mind for the last couple months and we’ve got two macro geniuses to talk to us about it today. We’ve got Nick Glinsman from EVO Capital and we’ve got Sam Rines from Avalon.

 

We look at copper. We look at a lot of these indicators of inflation and it’s been on everyone’s mind over the last few months. A year ago, people were worried about deflation. Now the worry is inflation. Obviously we’ve seen a lot of monetary and fiscal policy in the interim.

 

So, Nick, can you give us your view on where we are with inflation and what that looks like over what horizon? Is it months? Is it five years? Is it, you know, how does this play out?

 

NG: The horizon is a little bit tougher. But my my thesis is based on looking back at historical precedence and I focused on the LBJ Vietnam War spending, combined with his great society fiscal spend, which ultimately led in the early 70s Paul Volcker’s fame containing huge inflation there was at that period.

 

And I’m sitting here having spent the last year but actually building this thesis up for a couple of years thinking that the equivalent of the Vietnam expenditure is Covid and the relief spending that’s been has combined Trump and now Biden, and then the great society equivalent would be Biden’s green infrastructure spending which, I slightly tongue-in-cheek called the green ghost plan, which is enormous. Amazing.

 

When I find myself agreeing with Larry Summers on inflation. I think his odds of a third in terms of this creating inflation, I would suggest a higher. In terms of timeline, it took five to seven years for the inflation to really kick in during the 60’s leading to Volcker. I think this time around, it will be much quicker due to the differences, a lot of globalization and supply chain management.

 

TN: Sam, can you kind of give us your view of where we are in inflation and what’s the duration that you kind of expect this to play out?

 

SR: I have a very different view. If you look at the lumber market, copper, et cetera, these are things that tend to sort themselves out rather rapidly. Being in Houston, the best cure for high prices and energy is high prices. We will pump more if oil ever goes to 80. It’s very similar with lumber and copper. Most of the mills are becoming much more efficient in lumber, for instance.

 

So we will see that begin to roll over and that will roll over in a very meaningful way as we begin to work through these supply chain issues that we know are coming in the summer and we know are probably going to persist in the fall. But as we get into the fall and we get into early 2022, even if we have a couple trillion dollars infrastructure, it’s going to be spread over the better part of 10 years infrastructure.

 

It’s not a fast spend and it will not save us from the fiscal cliff. It will not save us from the lower employment numbers that we’ve been seeing on an overall basis. Yes, unemployment is moving lower, but employment is not keeping up with the employment figures.

 

Once the economy begins to have to stand on its own two legs, even if it has a touch of a tailwind from the government, it’s still going to be very difficult to continue to see consumption going through the roof, continue to see the types of disruptions that we’ll see for the next six to nine months in terms of supply chain that will have one-off price implications.

 

But that to me says we’re probably getting towards the peak of the sugar high as we get into the summer and the other side of the sugar high is going to be very painful in terms of going back to a one and a half to two and a half percent growth rate in the US inflation that will be very difficult to get higher simply because it’s difficult to have sustained disruptions in supply and demographics that aren’t changing anytime soon. So we will continue to have a number of those headwinds. And I think that’s what the US 10-years is telling you, US tenure at 1.5 is telling you that the market’s looking through this summer and saying the next decade doesn’t look as good as the last decade in a lot of ways.

 

It’s something to at least keep in the back of our minds that the Fed doesn’t have great control over the 10-year. The fed has great control over zero to two-year timeframe. But nothing beyond that.

 

TN: Okay, so let’s look at common areas. It seems to me that both of you see inflation continuing to rise maybe not in terms of the rate of rise but certainly continue to rise until, let’s say say Q3 Q4? Do we at least have comic around there?

 

SR: Yeah.

 

NG: Yes, absolutely.

 

TN: When we look at some of the the pressures in inflation, part of my assertion has been, and I’m sure you’re both going to tell me I’m wrong, but as we’ve seen the CNY strengthen, my hypothesis has been with a strong CNY, Chinese manufacturers are stocking up on industrial metals, food, other things because it’s in dollar terms. They can get it pretty cheaply and they’re waiting for CNY to devalue again when their buying power will decline.

 

What I’m hearing is that a lot of these things are really going to China to be hoarded and as a play on a potentially devaluing CNY. What do you think of that hypothesis aligned with a lot of the central bank easing? Is that a valid way of looking at inflation? Meaning this is stockpiling more than it is demand pull?

 

NG: My view on China is that, if you look at food firstly, there is a food shortage crisis. And we all know what the CCP are most scared of, which is society unrest. And we can take the examples of the Arab Spring, food is the key. But I also wonder whether the Chinese are stockpiling in anticipation of decoupling? I think of rare earths, of which they have a large control of the refining thereof being problematic. Semiconductors, there is an issue there.

 

So if I extrapolate further, my view is I think the supply chain issues are much longer standing now because of various geopolitical forces creating a decoupling with China for sure. And we have this Anglosphere grouping that’s clearly beginning to take shape, which now looks like that will include India because of the health crisis there.

 

If we look at that, then the question is what happens with Europe? Again, I think that’s part of the supply chain problem whilst they decide which site they go to. Is it china-centric or is it anglers-centric?

 

So I think the supply chain issue is much longer standing, hence I suspect that we’ve got China positioning, because nothing goes on which in China without the government knowing about it, quite frankly. In terms of anticipating a supply chain issue, because all the commodities they’re importing they’re short off.

 

TN: Okay, Sam, first of all, what do you think about my hypothesis and then Nick’s qualification around the supply chain issues being much longer term on the back of decoupling?

 

SR: I would take the argument that decoupling isn’t an action. It’s a process, and the process takes a very, very long time. And that creates in my mind a much longer time frame for the United States to build out its portion of the supply chain, for instance semiconductors, et cetera. So I would say I don’t disagree that there is a decoupling underway. In my opinion or my argument would be that it will take much longer than a few years to really get that process to move and it’ll be particularly under this administration a much more diplomatic and less blunt force tools than we’ve seen in the past being used. So I don’t disagree with the supply chain eventually being at least somewhat disentangled from China. I would just argue that it will take quite a while to really begin to become an issue unto itself.

 

On your point that China stockpiling, that does appear to be happening. It does appear to be a hedge against a weaker CNY to come including with lumber. One of the reasons that lumber prices are spiking is because China’s buying a lot of lumber in the US. That is a significant problem. And I would point to, when they stop stockpiling, that tends to have a significant effect on the price of commodities in the opposite direction. We’ve seen that with copper a couple of times during their infrastructure builds.

 

The interesting thing right now is you’ve actually seen a pullback from infrastructure spending. From the peak in China, they’ve begun to do their form of policy tightening on that front already. Suspected will continue at least on the margin and that will be a significant headwind for those commodities that have been stockpiled when less of them are being used on the margin as well. So that that does play into a 2022 disinflationary type environment versus 2021.

 

TN: Given that we have all these different pressures, whether it’s supply chains, whether it’s stockpiling, whatever it is, what the people in the middle, so that the manufacturers, what capacity do they have to absorb these price rises? What are you guys seeing when you talk to people, when you read? Are you seeing that manufacturers can absorb the lumber prices, the copper prices and other things? Or are they passing that directly along?

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QuickHit

QuickHit: The Anglosphere and the Multi-Speed Recovery

Macro specialist, geopolitics and history commentator Nick Glinsman joined us for the first time on QuickHit to discuss how the Anglosphere compares to the world in this multi-speed recovery in the wake of Covid.

 

Nick is based in Brazil and he brings decades of experience to macro, markets, and politics. His background is basically London and New York with a bit of Europe and, Australia and Hong Kong. He worked with the Salomon Brothers and Merrill Lynch. He’s doing a lot of advisory work and the ability to express views on the markets, geopolitics and macroeconomics in the market.

 

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This QuickHit episode was recorded on April 8, 2021.

 

The views and opinions expressed in this The Anglosphere and the Multi Speed Recovery? QuickHit episode are those of the guests and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any content provided by our guests are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

 

Show Notes

 

TN: Nick, for a while you’ve talked about this concept called the anglosphere. Can you help us understand what you mean by the anglosphere?

 

NG: I’ll dig into it. I like the fact that you’re talking about the link between geopolitics and economics because with Trump and Brexit, that’s where what was a very boring macro environment suddenly started to become differently exciting. The politics would start to drive some of the macro markets and actually what’s interesting is  Brexit and Trump, part of the anglosphere. Not the formative part of the anglosphere.

 

So what we mean by the anglosphere is looking at countries that are historically tied via culture but critically also via common law, legal system, because that defines how the economy and how commerce can run. If you go back in history, there is a big difference between common law countries and roman law countries. Common law countries think of European Union countries and that construct. So what we mean by the anglosphere is being, better start with the UK because it is the mother country, it’s still the mother country for where you are currently still. If the US were now part of the commonwealth. You’re looking at an anglosphere. Now typically when I refer to it, I’m talking about UK, US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand. Five Eyes.

 

You could loosely add two countries. One of which has an anglo-saxon common law — India. The other one works much closer as a defeated entity country in World War II — Japan. So you’re getting the quad, which I would maintain is part of an angular influence, at least, if not anglosphere entity.

 

Let’s stick with that grouping. You’re looking at countries that have a similar legal system, similar financial structure, they have banks, central banks that are lenders of last resort and traditional backups, concept. Remember the European Union doesn’t have banks.

 

Back to common law. Common law also in this environment. This is where it’s getting critical. So Five Eyes is I would posit it’s the ultimate defense alliance.

 

TN: Even New Zealand, still? Ah, you know. Long discussion. That’s so much sarcastically.

 

NG: I know what you’re saying. Although she has the relation in the State of Victoria in Australia, who is actually not known as Kim Yong Dan. But if you look at what they’ve just done with the central bank, there is still a similarity there. And of course the travel corridor that’s about to open on the 16th I think it is, is between Australian and New Zealand. So as much as she kowtows to the panda in Beijing, they are still part of that structure.

 

So back to the common law and the financial. So you’ve got countries with central banks that act as lenders of last resort with independent monetary policy, you have independent fiscal policy and I would include of course in both these, Bank of Japan, RBI in India and so on so you’ve got independent fiscal policy, independent monetary central bank, which you don’t have in Europe.

 

There’s been no Hamiltonian moment there. So you have that flexibility and you can see that flexibility. You also have much more, common law enables Schumpeter’s creative destruction and thus reconfiguration. Much easier chapter 11 in the US or bankruptcy and start again. Right. Not so easy to either stop or start on the roman law. So that when you think of where we are now, you’ve gone through a pandemic where inexplicably a lot of countries have remained closed, the reopening is going to need that reconfiguration.

 

You’ve also been the countries that are advancing with the vaccine quickest of those that took a very commercial view as governments in terms of getting them… so you had operation walk speed in the US and you had a vc person take over the procurement policy and the vaccine policy in the UK. Private Sector innovation. And in fact, in the UK, you have that triangle, Oxford, Cambridge, London, that’s without biotech and so on and so forth, very flexible. You even have a situation where the famous Astrazeneca factory in Holland was financed by the British. Not by the Dutch.

 

We can get into that on another episode of the great vaccine debacle. But I think that’s part of the precautionary Roman Law System that the EU runs versus the go get innovative system that comes with the anglo-ceric countries, the common law system and the structure of finance business so and so forth.

 

TN: Okay. So it sounds to me like when you talk about the anglosphere and you look at it kind of post pandemic or at least post first wave of disaster in the pandemic as we enter a recovery, it sounds like you see a widening divergence between those with say common law and relatively independent central banks versus the other law formed be it roman and in independent fiscal policy as well.

 

So help me understand the… so we just had this IMF report come out earlier this week about 5.1% growth or whatever this year and everything’s amazing and which we know, given, it’s all base effects and if you do a three-year average, it doesn’t look good at all. In Europe, the only one, over that three years, the only one with positive growth is The Netherlands. Not even the UK. But I would argue there, they lean toward you know more of a British style than other styles.

 

So if we’re having a two-speed or multi-speed recovery, would it be fair for me to say that you believe the anglosphere will recover faster than the other spheres?

 

NG: Absolutely. Absolutely. You’re better expert on sinosphere than I would be. But I think the growth is going to disappoint because they’ve pushed so hard on the string of debt. Okay.

 

In terms of the Euro, Europe, I think there’s a very simple way of looking at things. It’s extent of vaccination and compare those and what does that mean? It’s now being said out of UCL, University College of London. UK’s herd immunity on Monday, 73%.

 

You can see there’s data coming out of the UK that is explosive as there is in the US. People are looking at the European and thinking, okay let’s close until August or beyond because this vaccine debacle is even worse. Everybody’s going to take Astrazeneca in Europe even though for the young women of age below 30, the chance of getting a blood clot is 1 in 600,000. Where the child’s getting Covid is substantially greater.

 

Because Europe and the Roman legal system has this precautionary black bent. It’s clear that this whole debacle in Europe has delayed that coming out of meltdown. The European summer season as the Germans would say is kaput.

 

TN: If we have this kind of two-speed recovery or multi-speed recovery, and let’s say Japan is part of the anglosphere, would you say Japan would be leading Asia out instead of China? Now I’m talking about real data. I’m not talking about Chinese 8.1% growth numbers like fictional. I’m talking about actual real performance with actual real usable output and you know all this other stuff.

 

NG: I’ve got so that’s going to be the case actually. I really do have that sense and I also, given the belligerence of the Chinese regime right now. You’ve got vocal and slightly belligerent actions against Taiwan, of course, which I’m with Albert on that. They’d have already invaded if they were going to do it. And you’ve got what’s going on in the Philippine islands with all these ships tied together.

 

I remember a very famous situation where chief ancient China economist from HSBC came into the office and talking about China and then we asked coming into that particular office, name unmentioned, always an aggressive to and fro Q&A, and then we have one of us asked about China, how’s the recovery going after Fukushima. Blood was coming out of this chad’s mouth having to talk a bit about China.

 

And we know that there is a much more passionate… we have passion against Germany or France as a Brit or as an Englishman come soccer. But, we love each other.

 

TN: Maybe that’s a bit strong. But we’ll use that.

 

NG: Maybe strong for Germans but with the French, there is a deep passion there and somebody keeps reminding the agent. But in the Far East, there has been that, you see that tension with the South Koreans and Japanese. However, the Chinese are forcing people out away from some of this stuff.

 

Japan with Australia and India will enable a lot of these countries to look elsewhere. Isn’t it ironic going back to the anglo-sphere link and that publicly is United Arab Emirates who are being given credit for getting India, Pakistan talking together. I have no doubt behind the show, the English are very active there because you’ve got a cricketer in charge. She made this game… So there’s stuff going on that gives you signals as to what could be happening.

 

It was rather like a mutual friend of ours, we were discussing India in terms of trade and I was saying, the UK and India are going to have a free trade deal as soon as it’s possible once they’ve overcome some of the agricultural stuff. And that person said India will do a trade with the EU well before they do it with the UK. And I’m saying hold your horses. No way!

 

TN: It’s familiar.

 

NG: One, it’s familiar. Two, one of the problems that the EU’s have with trade deals with anglospheres countries is legal interpretation thereof. And you know, I think they’ve been discussing it for 8, 10 years, EU and India, they’ve got a sub agreement already in the UK after several months.

 

TN: Just coming back to this kind of overall topic of the anglosphere and the multi-speed recoveries, so it does sound like you almost have this triangulated recovery from your perspective from India, Japan and Australia that’s leading the way in Asia. You have the UK, which is leading the way for Europe and then you have the US that’s kind of leading the way for the Americas. Is that kind of how you see things?

 

NG: I tend to think that’s the case. But I wonder whether one can justify the idea of UK leading the way for Europe given the tensions between the UK and the EU.

 

TN: I think the EU will play through… The EU will feel pain until they get tired of it and then they’ll relent, I think.

 

NG: There’s one big problem and this came up yesterday there was a meeting of the EU commission about article 122 vaccine export ban. Belgium, Holland, Sweden and Ireland said no way. All the others were saying we’re okay with it. With Germany covering itself with a few conditions. The damage to Europe’s role in the global supply chain is irreparable. They will not be able to go back to this.

 

And there’s another little fact of it which makes me wonder what will happen with Ireland because there’s tension building up in Northern Ireland again. Article 122, that export ban is specifically aimed at UK, US, Canada, Australia. They’ve stopped shipping to Australia already. US, UK, they’re saying well you’re not exporting anything. Paid for everything but not exporting everything. Canada just gets lumped in with the US and the UK.  So I think that’s really shattered the role of Europe in the global supply chain.

 

You’ll have people producing goods for Europe from European input but how can you possibly? Now going to Ireland where the UK has already said we’ll give the Republic of Ireland 3.7 million vaccines because it’s secures Northern Ireland in the coming out of lockdown. That’s an interesting overthought process.

 

Because you have a situation where Ireland is under attack like the Netherlands and Switzerland from Joe Biden’s global tax. If they come out, I would not be funny.

 

TN: It seems to me that what you’re also saying is there’s likely some kind of regionalization or re-regionalization that may emerge from this. Am I putting words in your mouth or is that?

 

NG: I would go and say US and commonwealth EU for as long as it stays stable, which may be problematic and then as you say Asia.

 

TN: Okay. Yeah, I mean I think that we’re coming to a place and I’ve been talking about this since about 2015, where you have global supply chains for goods that are long-term commoditized goods and then you have regional supply chains for the higher value goods.

 

NG: And that’s consistent with the decoupling that’s got to take place against China. And then you have that floater which you and I touched on before we got online, which is Russia and I have a slightly different view of where I can go, which will be, you know.