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The Week Ahead – 28 Mar 2022

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We’ve seen so much about oil for rubles, gas for bitcoin, etc this week. Does it represent a fundamental shift for energy markets? And is the dollar dead? The yen fell pretty hard versus the dollar this week. Why is that happening, especially if the dollar is dead?  Bonds spike pretty hard this week, especially the 5-year. What’s going on there and what does it mean?

Key themes from last week:

  1. Oil for rubles (death of the Dollar?)
  2. Rapidly depreciating JPY
  3. Hawkish Fed and the soaring 5-year


Key themes for The Week Ahead:

  1. New stimulus coming to help pay for energy. Inflationary?
  2. How hawkish can the Fed go?
  3. What’s ahead for equity markets?


This is the 12th episode of The Week Ahead in collaboration of Complete Intelligence with Intelligence Quarterly, where experts talk about the week that just happened and what will most likely happen in the coming week. 

Listen on Spotify:

https://open.spotify.com/episode/0twcBeGGELUrzdyMS0o37U?si=4dab69b94c3e4ec9


Follow The Week Ahead experts on Twitter:

Tony: https://twitter.com/TonyNashNerd
Sam: https://twitter.com/SamuelRines
Tracy: https://twitter.com/chigrl
Albert: https://twitter.com/amlivemon


Time Stamps

0:00 Start
0:34 CI Futures
1:22 Key themes this week
1:48 Oil for rubles (death of the Dollar?)
3:15 Acceptance of cryptocurrency?
5:34 Petrodollar Petroyuan?
7:32 Rapidly depreciating JPY
10:12 Hawkish Fed and the soaring 5-year
11:58 Housing is done?
13:10 Stimulus for energy
15:53 How hawkish can the Fed go?
17:34 What’s ahead for equity markets?

Transcript

TN: Hi, everyone, and welcome to The Week Ahead. My name is Tony Nash. I’m here with Albert Marko, Sam Rines, and Tracy Shuchart. Before we get started, please, if you can like and subscribe to our YouTube channel, we would really appreciate it.

Also, before we get started, I want to talk a little bit about Complete Intelligence. Complete Intelligence, automates budgeting processes and improves forecasting results for companies globally. CI Futures is our market data and forecast platform. CI Futures forecasts approximately 900 assets across commodities, currencies and equity indices, and a couple of thousand economic variables for the top 50 economies. CI Futures tracks forecast error for accountable performance. Users can see exactly how CI Futures have performed historically with one and three month forward intervals. We’re now offering a special promotion of CI Futures for $50 a month. You can find out more at completeintel.com/promo.

Okay, this week we had a couple of key themes. The first is oil for rubles and somewhat cynically, the death of the dollar. Next is the rapidly depreciating Japanese yen, which is somewhat related to the first. But it’s a big, big story, at least in Asia. We also have the hawkish Fed and the soaring five-year bond. So let’s just jump right into it. Tracy, we’ve seen so much about oil for rubles and Bitcoin and other things over the past week. Can you walk us through it? And is this a fundamental shift in energy markets? Is it desperation on Russia’s behalf? Is the dollar dead? Can you just walk us through those?

TS: All right, so no, the dollar is not dead. First, what people have to realize is that there’s a difference. Oil is still priced in USD. It doesn’t matter the currency that you choose to trade in because you see, in markets, local markets trade gasoline in all currencies. Different partners have traded oil in different currencies. But what it comes down to is it doesn’t matter because oil is still priced in dollars. And even if you trade it in, say, the ruble or the yuan, those are all pegged to the dollar. Right. And so you have to take dollar pricing, transfer it to that currency. And so it really doesn’t matter.

And the currency is used to price oil needs three main factors, liquidity, relative stability, and global acceptability. And right now, USD is the only one that possesses all three characteristics.

TN: Okay, so two different questions here. One is on the acceptance of cryptocurrency. Okay. I think they specifically said Bitcoin. Is that real? Is that happening? And second, if that is happening and maybe, Albert, you can comment on this a little bit, too. Is that simply a way to get the PLA in China to spend their cryptocurrency to fuel their army for cheap? Is that possibly what’s happening there?

TS: It could be. Russia came out and said, we’ll accept Bitcoin from friendly countries. Mostly, they were referring to Hungary and to China. Right. And I don’t think that is a replacement for USD no matter what because not every country except for perhaps China really accepts or El Salvador really accepts Bitcoin or would actually trade in Bitcoin. Right.

TN: In Venezuela, by the way. I think. Right. So on a sovereign basis. Okay. So Sam and Albert, do you guys have anything on there in terms of Bitcoin traded for energy? Do you have any observations there?

AM: No, this is a little bit of… This is even a serious conversation they’re having? With El Salvador going to be like the global hub for Russian oil now because they can use Bitcoin?

TN: That would be really interesting.

AM: But this is just silly talk. Every time there’s some kind of problem geopolitically and they start talking about gold for oil or wine or whatever you want to throw out, they start talking about the US dollar dying and whatnot.

I mean, like Tracy, I don’t want to reiterate what Tracy said, but her three points were correct. On top of that, we’re the only global superpower.

TN: Okay.

AM: That’s it.

SR: Yeah. My two cent is whatever on Bitcoin for a while.

TN: Right.

SR: Cool.

TN: I think that all makes sense now since we’re here because we’re already here because we all hear about the death of the petrodollar and the rise of the petroyuan and all this stuff. So can we go there a little bit? Does this mean that the petrodollar is dead? I know that what you said earlier is all oil is priced in dollars. So that would seem to be at odds with the death of the petrodollar.

AM: Well, Tony, in my perspective, the petrodollar is a relic of the 1970s. Right. Okay. Today it’s the Euro dollar. It’s not the petrodollar that makes the American economy run like God on Earth at the moment. It’s the Euro dollar. Forget about Petro dollar. Right. Because it’s not simply just oil that’s priced in it in dollars. It’s every single piece of commodity globally that’s priced in dollars.

TN: And Albert, just for viewers who may not understand what a Euro dollar is, can you quickly help them understand what a Euro dollar is?

AM: They’re just dollars deposited in overseas banks outside the United States system. That’s all it is.

TN: Okay with that. Very good.

SR: And the global economy runs on them. Full stop.

AM: It’s the blood of the global economy.

TN: So the death of the petrodollar, rise of the petroyuan and all that stuff, we can kind of brush that aside. Is that fair?

TS: Yeah. I mean, even if you look at say, you know, China started their own Yuan contract rights, oil contract and Yuan futures contract. But that still pegged to the price of the Dubai contracts. Right. That are priced in dollars.

TN: Let’s be clear, the CNY and crude are both relative to dollars. Right?

TS: Right.

TN: You have two things that are relative to dollars trying to circumvent dollars to buy that thing. The whole thing is silly.

TS: Exactly.

AM: Yeah, of course. Because Tony, the thing is, if China decides to sell all their dollars and all their trade or whatever, everything they’ve got, they risk hyperinflation. What happens to the Renminbi and then what happens in the world? Contracts trying to get priced right.

TN: Exactly. It’s a good point. Okay. This is a great discussion.

Now, Albert, while we’re on currencies, The Japanese yuan fell pretty hard versus the dollar this week. Do you mind talking through that a little bit and helping us understand what’s going on there?

AM: Yeah, I got a real simple explanation. The Federal Reserve most likely green light in Japan To devalue their yen to be able to show up the manufacturing sector in case China decides to get into a bigger global geopolitical spat with the United States. Simple as that.

TN: Great. Okay. So that’s good. This is really good. And I want people to understand that currencies are very relevant to geopolitics or the other way around. Right. Whenever you see currency movements, there’s typically a geopolitical connection there.

AM: Of course. And on top of that, if it was any other time and they started to devalue the currency like this, the Federal Reserve where the President would start calling the currency manipulators. And there’d be page headlines on the financial times.

TN: Right.

AM: And because that didn’t happen, It’s an automatic signal to me that this is what’s happening at the moment. Right.

What’s also interesting to me, Albert, is we’ve seen last week we saw Japan approach the Saudis and the Emiratis about oil contracts. We saw Japan call. There’s a meeting in Japan next week, I think, with China. So Japan is becoming this kind of foreign policy arm, whether we want to admit it or not, they’re kind of becoming foreign policy arm for the US. Because the US is not well respected right now. Is that fair to say?

AM: It’s more than fair to say, I believe Biden’s conference with South Asian leaders was just canceled on top of everything else.

TS: Sorry. And we saw this week Japan and India just signed, like, a $42 billion trade deal. So it kind of seems like they’re smoothing over the rough edges because the United States kind of came after India a little bit earlier about two weeks ago.

TN: Yeah, that’s a good call, Tracy. I think Japan and India have had a long, positive relationship. It’s especially intensified over the past, say, seven or eight years as China has tried to invest in India and the Japanese have kind of countered them and giving the Indians very favorable terms for investment and for loans. And so this is kind of a second part of that investment that was, I think, announced in, say, 2014 or 2015, something like that. And again, as we talked about it’s, Japan intervening to help the US out and obviously help Japan out at the same time. Thanks for that.

Now, Sam. We saw bonds spike pretty hard this week, especially the five year. I’ve got a Trading View source up there on the five year up on the screen right now. So can you walk us through what’s happening with US bonds right now, especially the five year?

SR: Sure. I mean, it’s pretty straightforward. The Fed is getting very hawkish and the market is adopting it rather quickly. And I don’t know how forcefully to say this. The current assumption coming from city is four straight 50 basis point hikes and then ending the year with just a couple of 25. That is a pretty incredibly fast off zero move time, some quantitative tightening, and you’re somewhere around three and a half percent to 4% worth of tightening in a year. That’s a pretty fast move.

So the two year to five years reflecting that the Fed is moving very quickly, you’re likely having the long end of the curve is lagging a little bit. You saw flattening, not steepening this week. The long end of the curve is telling you that the terminal rate may, in fact, actually be at least somewhat sticky around two and a half and might actually be moving a little bit higher. And that terminal rate is really important because that is how high the Fed can go and then stay there. It is also how fast the Fed can get there and how much above it the Fed is willing to go. So I think there’s a lot of things that happened on the curve this week.

TN: Okay. Albert, what’s in on those? Yes, go ahead, Albert.

AM: Oh, I’ve heard whispers that the long bond is going to 2.8% and maybe even 3%. That’s what the whispers have been telling me about that, which is going to absolutely devastate housing.

TN: But that was my actual idea.

SR: Oh, yeah. Housing is done. I mean, you saw pending home sales were supposed to be up a point and down 4%. That’s the first signal. The next signal will be when lumber goes back to $300.

TN: Okay. It seems to me you’re saying by say Q3 of this year we’re going to see real downside in the housing market. Is that fair to say?

SR: Oh, in Q2, you’re going to see real downside in the housing market. Yeah.

TN: Wow.

SR: Pending sales are, I think, one of the most important indicators of how the housing market is going. Right. It’s a semi forward looking indicator. If you begin to see a whole bunch of these homes in the ground stay as homes that are not being built. Right. So if you begin to see just a bunch of pads out there, it’s going to become a significant problem considering a lot of people have already bought the materials to build it off. And you’re going to begin to have some really interesting spirals that go back into some of the commodity markets that have been on fire on the housing front.

TN: Wow. Okay. That’s a big call. I love this discussion. Okay, good. Okay. So let’s move on to the week ahead. Tracy, we’ve had some stimulus announced to help pay for energy. Can you help us understand? Do you expect we’ve seen California and some other things come out? Are more States going to do this or more countries going to do this, and what does that do to the inflation picture?

TS: Well, absolutely. We saw California, Delaware, Germany, Italy talking about it. Japan already. They’re coming out of the woodwork right now. There’s actually too many to list. It’s just that we’re just now this week just starting to see the US kind of joining this on a state to state basis. The problem is that this is not going to help inflation whatsoever. You’re literally creating more demand and we still do not have the supply online. So all of these policies are going to have the opposite of the intended effect that they are doing. Right. It’s just more stimulus in the market.

TN: Do we think there’s going to be some federal energy stimulus coming?

TS: They’ve talked about different options. I mean, really, the only thing that they could do right now is get rid of the federal excise tax, but that’s only really a few cents. And they kind of don’t want to do that because that goes towards repairing roads, et cetera. That doesn’t fit into their plan that they just passed back in the fall. Right. We had infrastructure plan, so they need to pay for that. That’s already passed. So they probably won’t do that.

The other options that they have that they’re weighing are more SPR release, which is ridiculous at this point because they could release it all and it would still not have a long lasting effect on the market. And that’s our national security. It’s a national security issue. And we’re experiencing all these geopolitical events right now. We have bombs in Saudi Arabia. We’ve got Russia, Ukraine. So I think that’s like a poor move altogether.

TN: So if more States are going to come in, is it suspects like Massachusetts, New York, Illinois, those types of places?

TS: Yes.

TN: Okay. So all inflationary, it’s going in the wrong direction.

TS: It’s going to create demand, which is going to drive oil prices higher because we still don’t have the supply on the market.

TN: Okay. Wow. Thanks for that. Sam. As we look forward, you mentioned a little bit about how hawkish the Fed would be. But what are you looking at say in the bond market for the next week or so? Do we expect more activity there, or do you think we’re kind of stabilizing for now?

SR: We’re going into month end. So I would doubt that we’re going to stabilize in any meaningful way as portfolios either head towards rebalancing or begin to rebalance into quarter end. So I don’t think you’re going to see stabilization. And I think some of the signals might be a little suspect. But I do think back to the housing front. I’m going to be watching how housing stocks react, how the dialogue there really reacts, probably watching lumber very closely, a fairly good indicator of how tight things are or aren’t on the housing front.

And then paying a little bit of attention to what the market is telling us about that terminal rate. If the terminal rate keeps moving higher, to Albert’s point, that’s going to be a big problem for housing, but it’s going to be a big problem for a number of things as we begin to kind of spiral through, what the consequences of that are. It will be for the first time in a very long time.

TN: Okay. So it’s interesting. We have, say, energy commodities rising. We have, say, housing related commodities potentially falling, and we have food commodities rising. Right. It seems like something’s off. Some of it’s shortages based, and some of it is really demand push based. So energy stuff seems to be stimulus based or potentially so some interesting divergence in some of those sectors.

Okay. And then, Albert, what’s ahead for equity markets? We’ve seen equity markets continue to push higher. How much further can they go?

AM: Last week they eliminated, I think, up to about $9 trillion inputs, short squeeze, VIX crush. I mean, they went all out these last two weeks. It’s absolutely stunning. From my calculations, I think they expanded the balance sheet another $150 billion. Forget about this tapering talk. There’s no tapering. They just keep on going. How high can they go? That’s anybody’s guess right now. I think we’re like 6% off all time highs. On no news.

TN: So potentially another 6% higher?

AM: Honestly, I know that there’s hedge funds waiting, salivating at 4650. Just salivating to short it there. So I don’t think they can even get close to that, to be honest with you. So I don’t know, maybe 4590 early in the week before they start coming down.

TN: Okay. Interesting. So you think early next week we’ll see a change in direction?

AM: Yeah, we’re going to have to this has been an epic run, like I said, 90% short squeeze, 10% fixed crush. You don’t see this very often. Okay, Sam, what do you think, Sam? Similar?

SR: On equities, I like going into the rip higher. I’m kind of with Albert, but a little less bearish. I think you chop sideways from here looking for a catalyst in either direction. Bonds ripping higher today, yields ripping higher today. Bond prices plummeting. That I thought was going to be a catalyst for equities to move lower. It wasn’t. That kind of gives me a little bit of pause on being too bearish here, but it’s hard for me to get bullish.

TN: Okay.

TS: What’s interesting? I’ll just throw in like, Bama, weekly flows. We actually saw an outflow from equities for the first time in weeks. It wasn’t a lot 1.9 billion. But that says to me people are getting a little nervous up here. Profit taking, as they say on CNBC.

TN: All right, guys. Hey, thank you very much. Really appreciate the insight. Have a great week ahead.

AM, TS: Thanks.

SR: You too, Tony.

TN: Fabulous. Look. I’m married. I’m a man. I don’t notice anything. I noticed the other guys laughed at that. Uncomfortably. That’s great. Okay. I’m just going to start that over, guys. And we’re going to end it.

Categories
QuickHit

QuickHit: Will China Invade Taiwan? (Part 2)

This is Part 2 of the QuickHit episode on “Will China invade Taiwan?” with Chris Balding and Albert Marko. In this second part, the guys discussed Hong Kong, the semiconductor industry, and possible actions by the Biden administration. Tony Nash is hosting this show where the two experts discuss likely possibilities for China, Taiwan and other countries that may be affected by the conflict between the two countries like the US, Japan, and South Korea.

 

In Part 1, we looked at the plausibility of China invading Taiwan and what that might look like. In Part 2, we look at is Hong Kong a precedent for China potentially taking over Taiwan? We also look at the global semiconductor industry and firms like TSMC. What kind of impact would Chinese action on Taiwan have toward TSMC and also how would we expect the US to react and what would the different reactions do to US credibility in East Asia?

 

You can watch the Part 1 here: https://www.completeintel.com/2021/01/27/quickhit-will-china-invade-taiwan-1/

 

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This QuickHit episode was recorded on January 26, 2021.

 

The views and opinions expressed in this Chinese invasion of Taiwan QuickHit episode are those of the guests and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any content provided by our guests are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

 

Show Notes

 

CB: What you’re saying about body bags makes perfect sense. Is Xi that directly rational? Because it would seem like there would be a better way to handle Hong Kong than what has taken place?

 

AM: Hong Kong was a little financial center with no military, no nothing. There’s just a bunch of woke millennials running around, thinking they can hold off the PLA. That doesn’t work like that in real life. You got to come at them with guns to earn your freedom. It was a circle by China. It was inevitable.

 

TN: Since ‘97, there hasn’t been a question as to whether Hong Kong is China. Hong Kong is China. And people have shrugged their shoulders since ‘97 and said look, it’s China. It’s a matter of time. It’s a special zone.

 

CB: Maybe my meaning was lost a little bit. The cost-benefit of what Xi has done in China or in Hong Kong, he clearly probably could have reaped more benefit by saying we’re gonna let Hong Kong continue to be Hong Kong for another 10 years or something. There wasn’t really a need for him to move. It’s probably going to create bigger problems internationally. There’s probably assets that are going to move out of Hong Kong and other places, Singapore. So what if we look at a strict cost-benefit, there wasn’t really a reason for Xi to do that.

 

TN: There was. The protests that would come, first every five years, then every two years, and so on, it was becoming increasingly embarrassing to Beijing. The official channel to as an inward or outbound investment lane through Hong Kong, it’s still there. But Beijing couldn’t take the embarrassment of this and what they didn’t want is to have some rogue police brigade kill a bunch of 25-year-olds on accident. I believe they had to pull the trigger and I think this has been planned and architected over years and it seems like something sudden that people are like “wait, what’s going on?” They’re rolling military and this has been planned for years.

 

CB: What you’re getting at is this was embarrassing domestically and he basically said to hell with the consequences internationally? If we apply that same basic line of thinking to Taiwan, the question would then become, well, they’re willing to deal with the international consequences. We know that in colossal range barriers. What other domestic issues are at play here about Taiwan?

 

TN: I think it’s backwards. It was more embarrassing internationally because the CCP plays international media like a fiddle. Xi Jinping goes into Davos or speaks at a WEF event. Everyone walks away, enlightened and they play international media like a fiddle. They were less worried about what international media would think and even less worried about what domestic populations would think over time.

 

They just needed to rip the band-aid off so that kind of righteous reporters in Hong Kong wouldn’t keep raising this story because it’s inconvenient. They knew that at some point, they were going to take over, and so they just did it and that it’s inevitable that’s going to happen. They just did it.

 

And global media? They’ve fallen in line over the last nine months. Nobody talks about Hong Kong anymore and the rights and being trampled upon and all that stuff. International media have fallen in line on this. They don’t care. They want to make China happy. Why? Because the CCP and their companies are going to buy supplements in their newspapers and in their online forums and they’re going to pay for their think tank pieces and all that stuff.

 

CB: There are specific media outlets that are decidedly less critical of China than they used to be as an editorial line.

 

AM: I agree and I love that analogy of like ripping the band-aid off because Hong Kong was ripping a band-aid off but Taiwan would be like ripping duct tape off a Greek guy’s chest. That’s the problem here, and that’s what we think we have to understand that not only is it economically damaging, it’s politically damaging internationally, militarily. The risks, just in my opinion, way outweigh the benefits of trying to take over Taiwan.

 

TN: Let’s say this happened. Let’s say six, nine months, something happens. What happens economically? I know there’s cross holdings with CCP princes and stuff but let’s look at say semiconductors, TSMC. The otherfoundries are disrupted for a period of time.

 

AM: I know where you’re going with this and this would actually make me flip my position if I was advising China. If they wanted to hit the West and create even a bigger semiconductor shortage, then you absolutely destroy Taiwan. This is where I’m going. You absolutely would do that.

 

TN: Right. So, does it make SMIC relevant and does it make the Chinese foundries relevant? What is in that gap? TSMC, all the execs are moving to Phoenix. What happens then?

 

CB: Taiwan and TSMC are in the very awkward space. At this point, they’re probably like THE manufacturing firm. The other places do the design and stuff like that. There’s a lot of firms that are in the mid and low end. But when it comes to your high-end stuff, it’s pretty much TSMC. I think you could make a case that Beijing says, “screw it!” Forget about Taiwan. If we can capture TSMC, we’ve got it all.

 

TN: We just invade Hsinchu, right?

 

AM: The Chinese, for all the negative things that I have to say about them, are really good asymmetrically combating the West especially the United States where they’ve weaponized Caterpillar, weaponized multiple American companies within China to hit the United States politically and economically. That would make perfect sense from the Chinese perspective to just cut off the semiconductors specifically because those semiconductors go to Apple, to the big three automobile sector, which is the only thing right now that’s going to be able to get unemployment back down to a decent level for the Biden administration.

 

TN: If that did happen, would that present an opportunity for Japanese, Korean firms to fill that void to circumvent Chinese control or has that ship sailed years ago and there’s no way they can recover that?

 

AM: I don’t think that they’d be able to recover especially in the near term. I think the chip shortage would be so, so damaging to the entire global economy that it would be pretty devastating for a while.

 

CB: And the people I talk to in chips basically say, when it comes to manufacturing of higher end chips, it’s basically TSMC. Not even Intel these days is manufacturing their own chips. So even if TSMC is Chinese tomorrow, it would probably take five years before Korean and Japanese firms at the earliest would be producing high-end chips that could compete with TSMC.

 

TN: If China threatens to invade Taiwan and the West is like “look, do whatever you want, we just want to make sure we have our chips.“ Is that really a plausible negotiating point?

 

AM: I don’t think the West could even trust China in that respect. Has the Chinese ever given us assurances and anything like that ever?

 

TN: Let’s act like this happens. Something happens in June, July whatever. What does the US Navy do? Will they protect Taiwan or will they distance and reevaluate?

 

AM: The US would probably let Taiwan defend itself for a certain period of time and float in a carrier strike group just to deter China at some point. They’d have to walk defense there. That’s not an easy solution. You’re talking about going up against China within proximity of their borders, which they would have an advantage of.

 

CB: They’re not going to do something like this just launching a couple volleys of low-grade missiles. This is moving all your chips to the center of the table. And so basically, the question that the US Navy would have to ask is are we going to move all our chips to the middle of the table otherwise, let China have it.

 

TN: If the US says, “fine, we’re not going gonna move our chip to the side of the table. Let China have it,” then does that destroy US credibility in East Asia because the obligation of the US to defend Japan, Korea and so on, those are gone then, because US has an obligation to defend Taiwan.

 

AM: The South Korea would be the biggest problem immediately after that.

 

CB: One of the first comments about by the administration foreign policy was the Japanese defense minister saying China is a real problem, you boys need to get your big boy pants on. That was a month ago or a couple weeks ago. That was pretty much the Japanese saying, “you know this isn’t 2008 boys. We’ve got to be ready.”

 

The other thing was, is over the past couple years, there’s been a shift in the US Military. Basically, all the US Military in Korea is now way far down the peninsula. And South Korea knows that. The US Military is in a position where if the North Korea decides to stream across the border, they can pretty much pack up their personnel and be gone in a couple of hours. If something happens, Tokyo and Seoul are absolutely going to be paranoid. Doesn’t stand right there and start firing back.

Categories
QuickHit

QuickHit: Will China Invade Taiwan? (Part 1)

Albert Marko and Christopher Balding are back for another #CageMatch special episode for QuickHit, where the two experts discuss the million dollar question: Will China invade Taiwan? Tony Nash is hosting this episode with Marko and Balding sharing what they think the two countries will do. Does China have the capability (and money) to invade Taiwan? If ever, will Taiwan ever retaliate? Can they afford to go to war? And how will the US fit in all these? Will this be another war waiting to happen?

 

This China and Taiwan conflict is Part 1 of 2 episodes. Subscribe to our Youtube Channel and signup to the CI Newsletter to be among the first to know when the second part is out.

 

The China-Taiwan relations was briefly discussed in the first ever #CageMatch episode. Watch the Part 1 here. 

 

💌 Subscribe to CI Newsletter and gain AI-driven intelligence.

📺 Subscribe to our Youtube Channel.

📊 Forward-looking companies become more profitable with Complete Intelligence. The only fully automated and globally integrated AI platform for smarter cost and revenue planning. Book a demo here.

📈 Check out the CI Futures platform to forecast currencies, commodities, and equity indices

 

This QuickHit episode was recorded on January 26, 2021.

 

The views and opinions expressed in this Chinese invasion of Taiwan QuickHit episode are those of the guests and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any content provided by our guests are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

 

Show Notes

 

TN: We’ve seen some build up of China’s activity toward Taiwan especially over the last month and we wanted to have a deeper discussion about one of the big questions that is out there which is “Will China invade Taiwan?” and is that a viable likely possibility or is it just saber-rattling to shake things up a little bit. With the new Biden administration and the change over there, there is potentially an opportunity for China to take a more aggressive stance toward Taiwan, the region and, the U.S.

 

We’re joined by Chris Balding and Albert Marco to talk about this. Let’s go through your basic thesis. Chris, what’s your position China preparing to invade Taiwan? Do you think it’s something that is possible and or likely?

 

CB: I would put what we think of as a full-scale invasion, where there’s soldiers and rubber rafts storming the beaches of Taiwan. I think that is relatively unlikely as a scenario. But I do think what is much more likely, and I would put it above 50% is some type of escalated conflict either in the East or South China Sea over the next 18 months as distinctly possible.

 

And when I say that, let me emphasize, we’re talking a range of possibilities. This could be everything from a PLA navy boat ramming a Taiwanese fishing boat. It could mean blowing up a shoal or something like that they’re fighting with Vietnam about. There’s a range of possibilities, but some type of conflict within the next 18 months is distinctly possible.

 

The reason I say 18 months is Xi will be going up for election of his third term in about 18 months. That is a very important time period. And I guarantee you, Xi and those around him know what basically they’re looking to accomplish within those 18 months. You have a number of complicating factors. It’s not uncommon for Chinese leadership to say: “Hey there’s a changeover in the U.S. Let’s see what we can get away with”. That’s not why they would do it. The timing is fortuitous.

 

So, I do think some type of escalation in the East and South China over the next 18 months is likely.

 

TN: Okay. Albert, what do you think?

 

AM: China likes the poke and they like the prod and they like to test the perimeters of defenses like most nations. When it comes to offensive capabilities, they want to test their adversary’s defensive capabilities.

 

Do I think that there’s going to be some kind of escalation? Well, I kind of agree with Chris there. Something might happen along those lines. But I don’t think it would be anything very serious. China would need an assurance of a quick and decisive victory if they were to attempt something like that. Obviously, a full-scale invasion is definitely not going to happen.

 

But even blowing up a shoal or taking out a couple fishing trawlers or whatnot, they certainly don’t want to sit there and affect their shipping lanes. Taiwan straits in that entire region, is the world’s biggest trading lanes for ships. You can’t have the United States running there with an armada just to protect Taiwan. It would adversely affect the Chinese economy. Xi at that point in 18 months, like he’s running up for election like Chris said, he can’t afford any kind of hiccups right now in the Chinese economy. And most of the CCPs elite are ingrained with Taiwanese companies. So, for them to sit there and disrupt that wealth, I just don’t see it happening.

 

TN: We saw over the last week where the Chinese government said that they can now defend itself in its claimed territorial waters. And with China expanding its claims, whether it’s with India, South China Sea, wherever it is, it seems to me that they’re telegraphing a more aggressive stance. Do we expect that as a warning? That is fairly hollow but they just want to put it out there or is that something that we believe they’ll act on against the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, Japan or something like that. Could we see the claim over, maybe, the Senkaku Islands go hot at some point for some phosphorous hills or whatever?

 

CB: A lot of this follows a very similar pattern of what we call “salami slicing,” is over the course of a couple years, they just continue to slice away and slice away and slice away, until the last logical step in progression of some type of escalation. That’s a similar type of strategy. That’s part of why I say a full-scale invasion of Taiwan, likely no, I don’t think it is. I generally agree with Albert in that sense that I would put it as a very low probability type of event.

 

Are there other types of conflicts that may take place? Whether that is Taiwan or Chinese navy and fishing vessels circle islands and stuff like that. Absolutely. I think it’s relatively likely 50 percent over the next 18 months.

 

There’s been very under-the-radar moves in the sense that within the past year, maybe 18 months, Xi replaced key generals that oversaw the southern and eastern areas, which are very closely tied to Taiwan.

 

If there’s not some type of conflict, they’ve taken all the move that seemed to indicate signal that yes, they are at the very least they want to stick out their chest a lot more in these areas. And I think probably the one area where I would fundamentally disagree with Albert is that I think he’s perfectly right on “why would China do this this? This could mess up their shipping lanes they’re invested in Taiwan.?” And the reason I disagree is not that I think Albert is wrong. But I think, it’s the wrong type of rationale.

 

If we look at why is China picking a fight with India in a frozen ground on the Himalayas at 25,000 feet? It makes no sense. I mean there’s little logical reason. They’ve successfully turned India against. They’re kicking out in India. They’re kicking out Chinese apps as fast as they can find them. And they’re looking to start an Indian smartphone market. Very little action is proven has provoked a very large reaction from India. Albert’s rationality, in a way, is perfectly accurate. I don’t think that necessarily captures the reality of what I would call Chinese rationality of the logic that they’re using to make those decisions and the risks they’re willing to take.

 

TN: If we take the Hong Kong scenario and we talk about the salami slicing that Chris talked about. After the umbrella revolution in 2014, intel I was hearing out of China was that the decision was made in Beijing that Hong Kong would lose its status as a global financial center. And it was just a matter of time, right? And we’ve hit that point effectively. Okay? Hong Kong is not a place where you, unless you want risk, where you’re going to necessarily park your assets. It’s taken five years. They were patient and it seems to me they’re beyond the tipping point. It was that kind of salami-slicing approach to taking away the credibility of Hong Kong, but also injecting the inevitability of Chinese ownership. Is it possible that can happen with Taiwan?

 

AM: Well, of course, it is certainly possible. There’s no question about that. Do I think it’s possible in the next 18 months? Absolutely, like even Chris agrees. I don’t think that’s going to happen in 18 months.

 

There’s no Chinese build up militarily for Taiwan invasion. If you were to look at every single military offensive project has logistics involved. There’s just none piling up. The United States would see that in satellite images well in advance.

 

However, back to the Himalayas, which I think is something we should rather key on. If you want to talk about India’s slicing away stuff, there is a rationale for the Himalayan conflict. It’s the watershed. They need that water and they they’ve been piping that water into agricultural areas in China for years now and they haven’t done too much of it because it’s going to really upset India. You have a billion people in India versus a billion people in China that needs fresh water. It’s going to be a problem. They’ve built mountaintop bases. They have built up a military presence there. That’s where I would actually focus in the next 18 months as a real skirmish.

 

This Taiwan thing, I completely agree. It’s well within the Chinese game playbook to slice away and just wait for their time. But a Taiwanese invasion would be extremely costly for the Chinese. The risk-reward for the Chinese right now to even think about adventuring into Taiwan would cost them significant military losses, significant economic losses. It would ruin some BRI projects. It would ruin the perception of China as a growing superpower. There’s just so many negatives that I can’t see any real generals in the PLA telling Xi that this is a good idea. Now that’s not to say that Xi won’t do it anyways because…

 

CB: Tony, let me ask a question. So, Albert, 70 people I’ve talked to say they actually see the military risks increase significantly to Taiwan based upon hardware that’s getting onboarded in the PLA. They see the risks to Taiwan’s increase significantly post about 2022. Okay. Would you share a similar outlook?

 

AM: You have to understand, when it comes to offensive versus defensive capabilities, the defense always has a clear-cut advantage, right? Offensively, it takes seven dollars per one dollar of defense of offensive spending to actually take over. Now without a doubt, China would win over the long term. But at what cost will the PLA navy take? The Taiwanese defenses are no joke. They’re well equipped to at least hold them off for quite a long time and invading. Even the PLA. The PLA officers, that’s a social structure. That’s a social ladder realistically. How would it look like for Xi if the firstborn son of some of these elite families are coming home in body bags?