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QuickHit

QuickHit: Will China Invade Taiwan? (Part 2)

This is Part 2 of the QuickHit episode on “Will China invade Taiwan?” with Chris Balding and Albert Marko. In this second part, the guys discussed Hong Kong, the semiconductor industry, and possible actions by the Biden administration. Tony Nash is hosting this show where the two experts discuss likely possibilities for China, Taiwan and other countries that may be affected by the conflict between the two countries like the US, Japan, and South Korea.

 

In Part 1, we looked at the plausibility of China invading Taiwan and what that might look like. In Part 2, we look at is Hong Kong a precedent for China potentially taking over Taiwan? We also look at the global semiconductor industry and firms like TSMC. What kind of impact would Chinese action on Taiwan have toward TSMC and also how would we expect the US to react and what would the different reactions do to US credibility in East Asia?

 

You can watch the Part 1 here: https://www.completeintel.com/2021/01/27/quickhit-will-china-invade-taiwan-1/

 

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This QuickHit episode was recorded on January 26, 2021.

 

The views and opinions expressed in this Chinese invasion of Taiwan QuickHit episode are those of the guests and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any content provided by our guests are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

 

Show Notes

 

CB: What you’re saying about body bags makes perfect sense. Is Xi that directly rational? Because it would seem like there would be a better way to handle Hong Kong than what has taken place?

 

AM: Hong Kong was a little financial center with no military, no nothing. There’s just a bunch of woke millennials running around, thinking they can hold off the PLA. That doesn’t work like that in real life. You got to come at them with guns to earn your freedom. It was a circle by China. It was inevitable.

 

TN: Since ‘97, there hasn’t been a question as to whether Hong Kong is China. Hong Kong is China. And people have shrugged their shoulders since ‘97 and said look, it’s China. It’s a matter of time. It’s a special zone.

 

CB: Maybe my meaning was lost a little bit. The cost-benefit of what Xi has done in China or in Hong Kong, he clearly probably could have reaped more benefit by saying we’re gonna let Hong Kong continue to be Hong Kong for another 10 years or something. There wasn’t really a need for him to move. It’s probably going to create bigger problems internationally. There’s probably assets that are going to move out of Hong Kong and other places, Singapore. So what if we look at a strict cost-benefit, there wasn’t really a reason for Xi to do that.

 

TN: There was. The protests that would come, first every five years, then every two years, and so on, it was becoming increasingly embarrassing to Beijing. The official channel to as an inward or outbound investment lane through Hong Kong, it’s still there. But Beijing couldn’t take the embarrassment of this and what they didn’t want is to have some rogue police brigade kill a bunch of 25-year-olds on accident. I believe they had to pull the trigger and I think this has been planned and architected over years and it seems like something sudden that people are like “wait, what’s going on?” They’re rolling military and this has been planned for years.

 

CB: What you’re getting at is this was embarrassing domestically and he basically said to hell with the consequences internationally? If we apply that same basic line of thinking to Taiwan, the question would then become, well, they’re willing to deal with the international consequences. We know that in colossal range barriers. What other domestic issues are at play here about Taiwan?

 

TN: I think it’s backwards. It was more embarrassing internationally because the CCP plays international media like a fiddle. Xi Jinping goes into Davos or speaks at a WEF event. Everyone walks away, enlightened and they play international media like a fiddle. They were less worried about what international media would think and even less worried about what domestic populations would think over time.

 

They just needed to rip the band-aid off so that kind of righteous reporters in Hong Kong wouldn’t keep raising this story because it’s inconvenient. They knew that at some point, they were going to take over, and so they just did it and that it’s inevitable that’s going to happen. They just did it.

 

And global media? They’ve fallen in line over the last nine months. Nobody talks about Hong Kong anymore and the rights and being trampled upon and all that stuff. International media have fallen in line on this. They don’t care. They want to make China happy. Why? Because the CCP and their companies are going to buy supplements in their newspapers and in their online forums and they’re going to pay for their think tank pieces and all that stuff.

 

CB: There are specific media outlets that are decidedly less critical of China than they used to be as an editorial line.

 

AM: I agree and I love that analogy of like ripping the band-aid off because Hong Kong was ripping a band-aid off but Taiwan would be like ripping duct tape off a Greek guy’s chest. That’s the problem here, and that’s what we think we have to understand that not only is it economically damaging, it’s politically damaging internationally, militarily. The risks, just in my opinion, way outweigh the benefits of trying to take over Taiwan.

 

TN: Let’s say this happened. Let’s say six, nine months, something happens. What happens economically? I know there’s cross holdings with CCP princes and stuff but let’s look at say semiconductors, TSMC. The otherfoundries are disrupted for a period of time.

 

AM: I know where you’re going with this and this would actually make me flip my position if I was advising China. If they wanted to hit the West and create even a bigger semiconductor shortage, then you absolutely destroy Taiwan. This is where I’m going. You absolutely would do that.

 

TN: Right. So, does it make SMIC relevant and does it make the Chinese foundries relevant? What is in that gap? TSMC, all the execs are moving to Phoenix. What happens then?

 

CB: Taiwan and TSMC are in the very awkward space. At this point, they’re probably like THE manufacturing firm. The other places do the design and stuff like that. There’s a lot of firms that are in the mid and low end. But when it comes to your high-end stuff, it’s pretty much TSMC. I think you could make a case that Beijing says, “screw it!” Forget about Taiwan. If we can capture TSMC, we’ve got it all.

 

TN: We just invade Hsinchu, right?

 

AM: The Chinese, for all the negative things that I have to say about them, are really good asymmetrically combating the West especially the United States where they’ve weaponized Caterpillar, weaponized multiple American companies within China to hit the United States politically and economically. That would make perfect sense from the Chinese perspective to just cut off the semiconductors specifically because those semiconductors go to Apple, to the big three automobile sector, which is the only thing right now that’s going to be able to get unemployment back down to a decent level for the Biden administration.

 

TN: If that did happen, would that present an opportunity for Japanese, Korean firms to fill that void to circumvent Chinese control or has that ship sailed years ago and there’s no way they can recover that?

 

AM: I don’t think that they’d be able to recover especially in the near term. I think the chip shortage would be so, so damaging to the entire global economy that it would be pretty devastating for a while.

 

CB: And the people I talk to in chips basically say, when it comes to manufacturing of higher end chips, it’s basically TSMC. Not even Intel these days is manufacturing their own chips. So even if TSMC is Chinese tomorrow, it would probably take five years before Korean and Japanese firms at the earliest would be producing high-end chips that could compete with TSMC.

 

TN: If China threatens to invade Taiwan and the West is like “look, do whatever you want, we just want to make sure we have our chips.“ Is that really a plausible negotiating point?

 

AM: I don’t think the West could even trust China in that respect. Has the Chinese ever given us assurances and anything like that ever?

 

TN: Let’s act like this happens. Something happens in June, July whatever. What does the US Navy do? Will they protect Taiwan or will they distance and reevaluate?

 

AM: The US would probably let Taiwan defend itself for a certain period of time and float in a carrier strike group just to deter China at some point. They’d have to walk defense there. That’s not an easy solution. You’re talking about going up against China within proximity of their borders, which they would have an advantage of.

 

CB: They’re not going to do something like this just launching a couple volleys of low-grade missiles. This is moving all your chips to the center of the table. And so basically, the question that the US Navy would have to ask is are we going to move all our chips to the middle of the table otherwise, let China have it.

 

TN: If the US says, “fine, we’re not going gonna move our chip to the side of the table. Let China have it,” then does that destroy US credibility in East Asia because the obligation of the US to defend Japan, Korea and so on, those are gone then, because US has an obligation to defend Taiwan.

 

AM: The South Korea would be the biggest problem immediately after that.

 

CB: One of the first comments about by the administration foreign policy was the Japanese defense minister saying China is a real problem, you boys need to get your big boy pants on. That was a month ago or a couple weeks ago. That was pretty much the Japanese saying, “you know this isn’t 2008 boys. We’ve got to be ready.”

 

The other thing was, is over the past couple years, there’s been a shift in the US Military. Basically, all the US Military in Korea is now way far down the peninsula. And South Korea knows that. The US Military is in a position where if the North Korea decides to stream across the border, they can pretty much pack up their personnel and be gone in a couple of hours. If something happens, Tokyo and Seoul are absolutely going to be paranoid. Doesn’t stand right there and start firing back.

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QuickHit

QuickHit: Will China Invade Taiwan? (Part 1)

Albert Marko and Christopher Balding are back for another #CageMatch special episode for QuickHit, where the two experts discuss the million dollar question: Will China invade Taiwan? Tony Nash is hosting this episode with Marko and Balding sharing what they think the two countries will do. Does China have the capability (and money) to invade Taiwan? If ever, will Taiwan ever retaliate? Can they afford to go to war? And how will the US fit in all these? Will this be another war waiting to happen?

 

This China and Taiwan conflict is Part 1 of 2 episodes. Subscribe to our Youtube Channel and signup to the CI Newsletter to be among the first to know when the second part is out.

 

The China-Taiwan relations was briefly discussed in the first ever #CageMatch episode. Watch the Part 1 here. 

 

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This QuickHit episode was recorded on January 26, 2021.

 

The views and opinions expressed in this Chinese invasion of Taiwan QuickHit episode are those of the guests and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any content provided by our guests are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

 

Show Notes

 

TN: We’ve seen some build up of China’s activity toward Taiwan especially over the last month and we wanted to have a deeper discussion about one of the big questions that is out there which is “Will China invade Taiwan?” and is that a viable likely possibility or is it just saber-rattling to shake things up a little bit. With the new Biden administration and the change over there, there is potentially an opportunity for China to take a more aggressive stance toward Taiwan, the region and, the U.S.

 

We’re joined by Chris Balding and Albert Marco to talk about this. Let’s go through your basic thesis. Chris, what’s your position China preparing to invade Taiwan? Do you think it’s something that is possible and or likely?

 

CB: I would put what we think of as a full-scale invasion, where there’s soldiers and rubber rafts storming the beaches of Taiwan. I think that is relatively unlikely as a scenario. But I do think what is much more likely, and I would put it above 50% is some type of escalated conflict either in the East or South China Sea over the next 18 months as distinctly possible.

 

And when I say that, let me emphasize, we’re talking a range of possibilities. This could be everything from a PLA navy boat ramming a Taiwanese fishing boat. It could mean blowing up a shoal or something like that they’re fighting with Vietnam about. There’s a range of possibilities, but some type of conflict within the next 18 months is distinctly possible.

 

The reason I say 18 months is Xi will be going up for election of his third term in about 18 months. That is a very important time period. And I guarantee you, Xi and those around him know what basically they’re looking to accomplish within those 18 months. You have a number of complicating factors. It’s not uncommon for Chinese leadership to say: “Hey there’s a changeover in the U.S. Let’s see what we can get away with”. That’s not why they would do it. The timing is fortuitous.

 

So, I do think some type of escalation in the East and South China over the next 18 months is likely.

 

TN: Okay. Albert, what do you think?

 

AM: China likes the poke and they like the prod and they like to test the perimeters of defenses like most nations. When it comes to offensive capabilities, they want to test their adversary’s defensive capabilities.

 

Do I think that there’s going to be some kind of escalation? Well, I kind of agree with Chris there. Something might happen along those lines. But I don’t think it would be anything very serious. China would need an assurance of a quick and decisive victory if they were to attempt something like that. Obviously, a full-scale invasion is definitely not going to happen.

 

But even blowing up a shoal or taking out a couple fishing trawlers or whatnot, they certainly don’t want to sit there and affect their shipping lanes. Taiwan straits in that entire region, is the world’s biggest trading lanes for ships. You can’t have the United States running there with an armada just to protect Taiwan. It would adversely affect the Chinese economy. Xi at that point in 18 months, like he’s running up for election like Chris said, he can’t afford any kind of hiccups right now in the Chinese economy. And most of the CCPs elite are ingrained with Taiwanese companies. So, for them to sit there and disrupt that wealth, I just don’t see it happening.

 

TN: We saw over the last week where the Chinese government said that they can now defend itself in its claimed territorial waters. And with China expanding its claims, whether it’s with India, South China Sea, wherever it is, it seems to me that they’re telegraphing a more aggressive stance. Do we expect that as a warning? That is fairly hollow but they just want to put it out there or is that something that we believe they’ll act on against the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, Japan or something like that. Could we see the claim over, maybe, the Senkaku Islands go hot at some point for some phosphorous hills or whatever?

 

CB: A lot of this follows a very similar pattern of what we call “salami slicing,” is over the course of a couple years, they just continue to slice away and slice away and slice away, until the last logical step in progression of some type of escalation. That’s a similar type of strategy. That’s part of why I say a full-scale invasion of Taiwan, likely no, I don’t think it is. I generally agree with Albert in that sense that I would put it as a very low probability type of event.

 

Are there other types of conflicts that may take place? Whether that is Taiwan or Chinese navy and fishing vessels circle islands and stuff like that. Absolutely. I think it’s relatively likely 50 percent over the next 18 months.

 

There’s been very under-the-radar moves in the sense that within the past year, maybe 18 months, Xi replaced key generals that oversaw the southern and eastern areas, which are very closely tied to Taiwan.

 

If there’s not some type of conflict, they’ve taken all the move that seemed to indicate signal that yes, they are at the very least they want to stick out their chest a lot more in these areas. And I think probably the one area where I would fundamentally disagree with Albert is that I think he’s perfectly right on “why would China do this this? This could mess up their shipping lanes they’re invested in Taiwan.?” And the reason I disagree is not that I think Albert is wrong. But I think, it’s the wrong type of rationale.

 

If we look at why is China picking a fight with India in a frozen ground on the Himalayas at 25,000 feet? It makes no sense. I mean there’s little logical reason. They’ve successfully turned India against. They’re kicking out in India. They’re kicking out Chinese apps as fast as they can find them. And they’re looking to start an Indian smartphone market. Very little action is proven has provoked a very large reaction from India. Albert’s rationality, in a way, is perfectly accurate. I don’t think that necessarily captures the reality of what I would call Chinese rationality of the logic that they’re using to make those decisions and the risks they’re willing to take.

 

TN: If we take the Hong Kong scenario and we talk about the salami slicing that Chris talked about. After the umbrella revolution in 2014, intel I was hearing out of China was that the decision was made in Beijing that Hong Kong would lose its status as a global financial center. And it was just a matter of time, right? And we’ve hit that point effectively. Okay? Hong Kong is not a place where you, unless you want risk, where you’re going to necessarily park your assets. It’s taken five years. They were patient and it seems to me they’re beyond the tipping point. It was that kind of salami-slicing approach to taking away the credibility of Hong Kong, but also injecting the inevitability of Chinese ownership. Is it possible that can happen with Taiwan?

 

AM: Well, of course, it is certainly possible. There’s no question about that. Do I think it’s possible in the next 18 months? Absolutely, like even Chris agrees. I don’t think that’s going to happen in 18 months.

 

There’s no Chinese build up militarily for Taiwan invasion. If you were to look at every single military offensive project has logistics involved. There’s just none piling up. The United States would see that in satellite images well in advance.

 

However, back to the Himalayas, which I think is something we should rather key on. If you want to talk about India’s slicing away stuff, there is a rationale for the Himalayan conflict. It’s the watershed. They need that water and they they’ve been piping that water into agricultural areas in China for years now and they haven’t done too much of it because it’s going to really upset India. You have a billion people in India versus a billion people in China that needs fresh water. It’s going to be a problem. They’ve built mountaintop bases. They have built up a military presence there. That’s where I would actually focus in the next 18 months as a real skirmish.

 

This Taiwan thing, I completely agree. It’s well within the Chinese game playbook to slice away and just wait for their time. But a Taiwanese invasion would be extremely costly for the Chinese. The risk-reward for the Chinese right now to even think about adventuring into Taiwan would cost them significant military losses, significant economic losses. It would ruin some BRI projects. It would ruin the perception of China as a growing superpower. There’s just so many negatives that I can’t see any real generals in the PLA telling Xi that this is a good idea. Now that’s not to say that Xi won’t do it anyways because…

 

CB: Tony, let me ask a question. So, Albert, 70 people I’ve talked to say they actually see the military risks increase significantly to Taiwan based upon hardware that’s getting onboarded in the PLA. They see the risks to Taiwan’s increase significantly post about 2022. Okay. Would you share a similar outlook?

 

AM: You have to understand, when it comes to offensive versus defensive capabilities, the defense always has a clear-cut advantage, right? Offensively, it takes seven dollars per one dollar of defense of offensive spending to actually take over. Now without a doubt, China would win over the long term. But at what cost will the PLA navy take? The Taiwanese defenses are no joke. They’re well equipped to at least hold them off for quite a long time and invading. Even the PLA. The PLA officers, that’s a social structure. That’s a social ladder realistically. How would it look like for Xi if the firstborn son of some of these elite families are coming home in body bags?

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QuickHit

QuickHit: Understanding the Covid Vaccine Supply Chain

Blue Maestro co-founder Kirstin Hancock joined us this week on QuickHit to explain the sensitivities around transporting the Covid vaccines. How vaccine manufacturers are adjusting to the special handling requirements, and how technology helps make sure that these are delivered in perfect condition?

 

Kirstin is the co-founder of Blue Maestro, which was set up eight years ago. Blue Maestro designs and manufactures Bluetooth sensors and data loggers. These are very small devices that have a PCB chip in them that use Bluetooth technology to communicate with smartphones to measure variations of the environmental conditions such  as temperature, humidity, barometric pressure, etc.

 

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This QuickHit episode was recorded on December 11, 2020.

 

The views and opinions expressed in this QuickHit episode are those of the guests and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any content provided by our guests are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

 

 

Show Notes

 

TN: Great. Okay. That sounds really interesting and I’ve been looking at you guys for a long time and what I’m really interested initially to talk about as we look at the environment with Covid and a number of other things happening this week and next week, I’d really like to understand what you’re seeing around the vaccine supply chains because I know you guys do some work there and I know it’s critical to see your types of products in those supply chains. Otherwise, we don’t get live vaccine, right? So, can you talk to us about a little bit of the work that you’re doing there?

 

KH: One of the criteria for the CDC is that sensors and data loggers are able to measure temperature in real time and that this is able to be recorded over a period of time and that maximum and minimum temperatures can be seen throughout the time.  Our sensors and data loggers are all unique.

 

They have a unique MAC ID address on them and they can be named, and logging intervals can be set at specific intervals. So, within the storage and transportation of vaccine, Tempo Disc in particular, is a really useful tool because it does all of these things. Now, we have actually been using Tempo Disc in a number of different countries to transport vaccines already.

 

We’ve been working with the UN this year, 2020, to deliver vaccines in developing countries in Africa through a project that they’ve been working on and that’s been very successful.

 

TN: Very good. So, what are the considerations like how long are these things usually in transport? I mean, what variability are… are there huge temperature swing variabilities? Are there huge… What are the kinds of things that the vaccine makers are really worried about because this seems like a really delicate supply chain?

 

KH: What vaccine makers are really concerned about is that the vaccines go out of their temperature range. Now, using our app for Tempo Plus 2, you can see real-time data. So, you can see exactly what the temperature is of the container that the vaccines are being put in and that’s generally what our users are doing.

 

They’re using Tempo Disc in the containers and they’re labeling them according to that batch of vaccines and that’s really important so that they’ve got the traceability from when they go from the manufacture of the vaccine right out to the pharmacies, the nurses, the clinics where these vaccines are administered.  And I think that’s probably the number one concern that these vaccines go out of temperature range because when they do, there is an emergency procedure that goes into place and basically, all of the vaccines have to be disposed of.

 

TN: Interesting. Okay. I really wanted to talk to you because with all of the talk of this distribution, I know this is probably something that there’s not a lot of thought from kind of your average consumer. But it’s such an important part of what’s happening here that I wanted to get some understanding of that. So, can you also tell me or help me understand… Blue Maestro does a lot of other work around healthcare and we’re an artificial intelligence company, we use a huge amount of data. You guys are an IoT company. You do the same. So outside of the vaccine supply chain, how are people using your products around health care and life sciences?

 

KH: We have a number of different use cases for Tempo Disc in a number of different healthcare applications. We work with a number of different US companies to monitor specific environmental conditions and I’ll just give you a couple of examples. We’re working with Boston O&P Orthopedics and Prosthetics to develop a solution where Tempo Disc is used in prosthetics to monitor how long people are wearing their prosthetics.

 

We also work with a company called GoGoband on a device that monitors when children or people with disabilities have wet themselves at nighttime because then their parents can get alerted. So, there’s a variation. We work with some international companies to actually monitor and record the pharmaceutical equipment that they have throughout the factory and then for its transportation to particular pharmacies within a number of different countries.

 

TN: Interesting. So, with the pharmacy activity, I mean that’s very precise manufacturing processes. As we get more into say precision manufacturing, how are manufacturers using your devices to understand precision around their manufacturing processes? Because again, as we have more sophisticated products, manufacturers have to know this stuff. It reduces defects. But it also creates ultimately better products for customers. So, can you help us understand a little bit about that?

 

KH: So, we issue conformity certificates and calibration certificates. They’re a little bit different. But basically, what they do is they track the PCB devices from the very start of the manufacturing process. So then when they’re programmed by our team, we have each device has a unique ID so that particular device can be tracked right from its manufacturing cycle right to its end user.

 

Now this is really important for traceability within the supply chain because the end user knows exactly which product they’re using for what purpose. So, if they’re looking at just temperature, they can have an ID that they can trace all the way through. And this ID is, it’s embedded in the electronics firmware. But then the end user can also change this so they can give it its own name.

 

So, if you’ve got a vaccine batch, then you can give it that idea of the vaccine batch. But then you can trace it right back. Now, our calibration certificates are two-point temperature calibration certificates. They’re very accurate.  Our devices use a product called si7020 silicon labs sensor. It’s one of the most accurate on the market. Its accuracy is 0.3 percent and we’ve had that tested and very verified by labs and our devices are very accurate.

 

TN: Very interesting, Kirstin. I think we could go on for a couple hours talking about this stuff. But I just wanted to kind of get a quick overview out to people so they understand what’s happening particularly with vaccines but also with other aspects of the manufacturing supply chain. So, thanks so much for your time today. I really appreciate it.

 

For anybody who’s watching, please check out the details in the bottom of the page. Also follow us on Youtube. Thanks very much. Have a great day.

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QuickHit

QuickHit: $70 Crude & $5 Copper are coming

Returning guest Tracy Shuchart graced our QuickHit this week with interesting and fresh insights about oil and gas. What is she seeing on the industry — is it coming back to the normal levels, or better? Why she thinks oil will reach 70+ USD per barel? What’s happening on copper and why does its price going up? And is she seeing any surprises under the Biden administration?

 

Tracy Shuchart is the energy and material strategist for Hedge Fund Telemetry and she is a portfolio manager for a family office. She’s pretty active on Twitter with a large following. Check out her on Twitter: https://twitter.com/chigrl

 

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📺 Subscribe to our Youtube Channel.

📊 Forward-looking companies become more profitable with Complete Intelligence. The only fully automated and globally integrated AI platform for smarter cost and revenue planning. Book a demo here.

📈 Check out the CI Futures platform to forecast currencies, commodities, and equity indices

 

This QuickHit episode was recorded on November 24, 2020.

 

The views and opinions expressed in this QuickHit episode are those of the guests and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any content provided by our guests are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

 

 

Show Notes

 

TN: We’re seeing a lot happening in markets on the energy side and in things like industrial metals. We’re starting to see some life back into energy not just food but even in energy companies who come a fair bit off of their loads that we saw in Q2 and Q3. Can you help us understand what’s happening there? Why are we seeing, if we see people walking down again in the US and locking down in Europe, why are we starting to see life in energy?

 

TS: Part of that reason is we are seeing a little bit of that rotation into value from growth and the energy sector has been really beat up. It’s finding a little bit of love just from that kind of rotation. But also, we’re seeing these lockdowns and things like that, but what people aren’t really realizing, because of all these lockdowns and things of that nature, we’re actually seeing demand up in other areas where there really was not so much demand before.

 

So everyone’s talking about nobody’s driving anymore. Nobody’s flying anymore. When you know in fact, everybody’s online, e-commerce, we’ve got cargo ships full in the port of Los Angeles. They’re lined up there. That’s shipping fuel. And it’s not just in Los Angeles. Asia’s seeing the exact same thing. Singapore. Trucking has become huge if you you know look at the truck index. It’s basically exploding from 2019-2018 levels because you you have trucks that have to go from the port of LA to all the way to Atlanta. You have everybody ordering on Amazon so you have all sorts of trucking going on. And even down to the little things like propane. They’re actually seeing double propane demand right now merely because everybody’s dining outside and it’s getting cold.

 

So demand showing up in these little places that typically didn’t have as much demand before. Recently, they were talking about the airlines this holiday season. That air travel is picking up in the United States. Domestic travel is almost completely back to normal in Asia and in China, particularly. So things aren’t as bad as it seems.

 

TN: So when we talk about oil and gas companies, we’re really starting to see some of those oil and gas companies to come back as well. We’ve spoken over the past six or nine months a couple times and it seemed like there were fundamental operating issues with those companies. Are you seeing those oil and gas companies cycle through their issues?

 

TS: A lot of the Q3 calls that I was on, a lot of these companies are changing their tune a little bit. We’ve also had a lot of of mergers and acquisitions in this space. We’ve had a lot of bankruptcies in the space. That pile, it’s gotten smaller. Only stronger surviving and not that I don’t think that they’re 100 in the clear, but the bigger names and the bigger companies are finding a little bit of love right now especially you see that in refining right now, because heating oil is actually pulling up that whole sector right now. The whole energy sector. Refiners were the first ones to really take off because refining margins are getting better as oil prices get higher and things of that nature. So that kind of started leading and then of course, they’re the safe havens likePBX, XOM, BP, Equinor…

 

Once people see oil getting some sort of footing, they’re more likely to move into those stocks. They’re beaten up. If you’re looking for value stocks, you want to look for something that’s 80 percent off the ties. It’s a bargain.

 

TN: We had also talked about crude prices would stay depressed into Q2 or something of next year of 21. Does that seem about right, still? Do we still expect things to stay in the low to mid 40s until Q2? Obviously, we’ll see bouncing around. I’m not saying I’ll never go above that. But do you expect people will think to stay in that range for the next two quarters or has that moved forward a little bit?

 

TS: That’s moved forward a little bit. I remember when we spoke last, we were talking it to the end of this year and I saw the upper 38s. Obviously that averaged this quarter so far. We’ll be a little bit higher. So I think that we’re still in that range. We’re not going to see a huge bounce in oil. Not yet, but it’s coming.

 

TN: You say it’s coming. What brings that about? Is it demand? Is it supply? Is it a massive shortfall? Where’s the pressure that would bring about that 70 plus?

 

TS: We’re going to have a supply shock just like we had a demand shock this time. We’ll have a supply shock just because of the sheer lack of Capex in the market and the sheer amount of companies that have gone under. I don’t think that you’re going to see shale back at 13.5 million barrels per day anytime in the near future ever again. A lot of those wells are closed. They’re gonna open them up again. It’s just not cost effective. So we lost a lot of producing capacity just because that. So as we move on and we move forward in time and flights come back and we start having more and more demand, I think we’re gonna find a shortfall so I wouldn’t be surprised if we see 60, 70 dollars a barrel in 2022.

 

TN: We’ve seen copper have just a stellar few months and given the demand issues that we’ve seen in the markets probably a little bit surprising. So can you talk us through some of those dynamics and help us understand is this here to stay? Are these elevated prices here to stay? Or is this something that we’ll see for a relatively quick cycle then it will turn back?

 

TS: With copper, we really had a supply issue because a lot of the mines were closed during the summer. China by that time had already been pretty much back up and running and ordering what they normally order. That’s kind of lifted prices off of that like two dollar level initially because we had a supply problem and then I think the expectation is, there’s a lot riding on electric vehicles, which require a lot of copper.

 

Manufacturing is rebounding in a lot of places. Maybe not Germany. But it is rebounding here. It is rebounding in Asia, not just China. It’s rebounding in Australia. There is that anticipation of demand. We’re starting to get supply back online and yet you know prices are still going higher. I don’t think we’re gonna go straight to five dollars by stretching the imagination. But that’s kind of where copper lost its disconnect with the market. When you know markets started coming down, copper’s still shooting up because it’s generally considered a gauge of the health of the global economy. But that kind of correlation went out of whack when we had a whole bunch of supply problems.

 

TN: And based on copper prices today, I would think everyone was back to work, we’re all traveling, probably with disposable income. So there is that weird disconnect right now and I’m not sure that it’s necessarily an indicator that a lot of people really point to.

 

So we’ve just had a big change in the US as well with the election and some shifting around. What are you expecting over the next few months? Are you expecting big surprises, big moves or what are you looking at over the next few months?

 

TS: Everybody pretty much knows Biden. Everybody knows his voting record. I looked at it as an energy strategist, obviously. I’m looking at his voting record and went on his past history and is the new green deal going to dictate the markets or how is he prone to be? He’s been in the office since the 70s. So we already know him. All his picks so far have been in been in DC forever, right. Whether it’s in an Obama administration, etc. So I don’t think there’s really a whole lot of surprises, which is why I think the market is so calm right now, because the election’s basically over. We don’t have that anymore. We’ve got this vaccine and the people that are going to be taking office in January are people that everybody’s familiar with. So I think that’s also giving the markets a little bit of complacency at this point.

 

TN: Right. It does feel a little bit complacent to be honest. I think you’re right. I think you’re right. So let’s see if there’s a surprise over the next few months.

 

TS: Right? You never know.

 

TN: Tracy, hey, thanks again for your time. It’s always great to talk to you. We really appreciate everything you say. I just want to ask everyone watching if you could follow us on YouTube. We look forward to seeing you next time. Great! Thanks.

Categories
QuickHit

QuickHit: Decentralized Finance and Crypto

JP Baric, of Aurum Capital Ventures, joins Tony Nash for this week’s QuickHit episode where he discussed crypto currencies and how it plays in decentralized finance or de-fi. Also, what is stranded energy and how is it mined? What is the future of crypto and why is its fiat currency value is very volatile? Was the industry affected by Covid? If so, how?

 

Aurum Capital Ventures is a company that’s focused on using stranded energy to mine cryptocurrency and other digital currencies and building a yield generation or building a way to generate yield through the mining process for consumers and for institutional investors.

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***This QuickHit episode was recorded on November 4, 2020.

 

The views and opinions expressed in this QuickHit episode are those of the guests and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any content provided by our guests are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

 

Show Notes:

 

TN: Okay. Very interesting. So I want to go into a couple things about cryptocurrency. But first, I want to ask what is stranded energy?

 

JB: Sure. So stranded energy is energy that is either not accessible to the grid so it can’t connect to the standard power grid or energy that’s been built up in areas where the federal subsidies for wind and solar farms have basically built these infrastructure that wasn’t needed in one area but it was built there because of those subsidies and in return the power prices are actually going negative during the night because there’s over supply and not enough demand. So that’s where we target when we build out mining sites.

 

TN: Very interesting. Okay. Thanks, JP. So let me ask you this. Just in terms of some crypto basics, okay. Is cryptocurrency, is it an asset or is it a currency? And so by that, you know gold is an asset, right? You know you can’t really go to 7/11 and spend gold. Dollar’s a currency. You can go to 7-eleven and spend a dollar.

 

So is cryptocurrency is it an asset? Is it a currency? Is it both? Is it moving from one to another? How do you think of it?

 

JB: Yeah, the more I look and think about Bitcoin is the more I think it’s actually an asset less than a currency. I’ve used bitcoin to buy laptops that you know 12 bitcoins for a laptop and then you realize that’s worth more than a house eventually. So I think the Bitcoin as an asset is really where how I view it. It’s a way to store value digitally that can easily be separated and transferred anywhere in the world and you also, it’s an asset that we know there’s a finite supply of it. We know how much there’s going to be, how many new bitcoins are going to be every day for the next 100 years and there’s not, that’s something you can’t really get without saying many other assets.

 

The reason why I don’t think it’s a currency is because we’ve seen other people have built on the Bitcoin blockchain and built on top of it as a way to build stable coins or other ways to transact, which are just more efficient and don’t have the price fluctuations that you do with using Bitcoin as a medium of exchange.

 

TN: Okay. So one of the things I’m really puzzled about with Bitcoin is, you know, normally with software, it’s the newer versions that are more desirable and more valuable, okay. Bitcoin is kind of the, you know, Windows 3.1 or something like that I mean it’s the OG of cryptocurrencies, right. So why is Bitcoin more desirable and valuable than other coins?

 

JB: So my opinion really comes down to first the miners. The miners are the ones who are allocating the most amount of capital in the space, who are taking the risk to capture this Bitcoin. You have to put that capital up uh millions of dollars when building out the infrastructure before they even see return. So because the miners are centrally focused around Bitcoin, it’s um you know the top currency for miners. I’ve seen that network effect um has really grown Bitcoin to keep its position and its power.

 

The amount of computing power protecting the Bitcoin network is ten times if not a hundred times more than any of the other networks out there. That would always say the first thing. The second thing is the on-ramps. To use a digital currency like bitcoin we need um on-ramps that have been put together over the past 10 years and have been focused solely on building on-ramps for this cryptocurrency.

 

Bitcoin works in the way and it functions as that secure digi secured and digital store of value. Other currencies have tried to do that. But the reason why it’s a store of value goes back to my first point which is the miner spending all that capital and infrastructure to secure the network using that energy on a day-to-day basis and giving Bitcoin that
floor price.

 

TN: Okay. So when you say on-ramps, what do you mean? So if I have a new coin, I need to have a way to be able to uh uh mine it and distribute it. Is that what you’re talking about?

 

JB: I was uh when I was referring to on-ramps, I was actually referring to fiat on-ramp. So basically, how does fiat currency come into the space. So US Dollars, Euros, Japanese Yen, how do they come into the space and then from there how does that get turned into this digital currency?

 

Those are on-ramps. Then also custody solutions, insurance. All right. Okay. All of that being on ramps.

 

TN: Okay. Very good. Okay. So um also in terms of crypto, what I’m really interested also also is when I look at the current environment, we’re in the wake of an election in the US. It’s a little bit uncertain. We’ve got, we’re in the wake of Covid. There’s a lot of uncertainty, you know. Is there kind of an optimal, say, environment for cryptocurrencies? Um, uh you know. Do we see say um uh confidence in traditional currencies waning and people moving to cryptocurrencies?

 

Is it in either or world or you know. Is it both and and what does that environment look like for people to turn their attention to cryptocurrencies?

 

JB: So I think the the as you mentioned the two different types of pandemic. The Covid pandemic and the election has really pushed crypto to the forefront as another asset class, as a safe haven. I don’t think cryptocurrency necessarily follows uh the same, you know, SP500 or other type of cycles out there when it comes to economics and social cycles. Bitcoin to me really follows the having events, which happen every four years. And so that would, that in my mind is what brings the momentum required to push Bitcoin to a new price. And in those having events is when Bitcoin miners receive half of the amount of Bitcoins they were getting every day just simply because it’s past
the four years and the issue and schedule is set.

 

So as I mentioned, we’ll know exactly how many coins are coming out. That in my opinion, is what creates these price rises about every four years, which then drives new interest to Bitcoin which then drives more speculation and which then drives the community growing at massive scale. And then shrinking because the people that are just speculators, just coming in to make a quick buck, they make their quick buck or they lose a lot of money. But the people who then now start to understand the technology and understand how much better of a monetary system it is because it empowers the user.

 

It provides them a steady base that they can build their life on. A steady-based currency that they know is not going to be inflated away and don’t they know it’s going to retain its value over the long period of time.

 

TN: Okay and so when you talk about having events, what happens around those having events in terms of say processing power, in terms of the the computing requirements. Are there cycles to build up more equipment and less as it ages and and what does that look like?

 

JB: So right now, they’re the cycle. There’s definitely there are cycles to build up equipment and the in May, when was that that having event occurred, the the amount of machines came down by about 15% 20%. And those machines were turned off because they were just older generation. The newer machines are coming in line. They’re being deployed. But we see it as in, if you want to get into Bitcoin mining, the next two years after the having event are the best time to get in because as I mentioned, that momentum will start to build up the Bitcoin price will continue to rise. You’ll have a great two years of profitability and you’ll be very very profitable and you’ll be a big arbitrage there. But then as Bitcoin price rises to an extreme height, there’s not enough actual bitcoin miners available for everyone to buy and acquire.

 

We don’t have enough semiconductors and so what happens is the value of those machines will rise rapidly and the people that are just coming into the space that are new are trying to pick them up and grab them and buying these machines for a really top dollar. The problem is, is that bitcoin price will crash. But you still have new machines on order for maybe six or nine months out. Those machines will continue to come online, will continue to run until it squeezes the profitability of all the miners and then you see a crash in difficulty usually in correlation as the bitcoin price is continuing to push down back to a normalized you know area and not in the hundred thousand dollars ranges or really overvalued where we see it uh once it kind of starts that on ramp.

 

TN: Okay. So when you say there’s a hardware replacement after the having event. So my understanding is this, you’re getting half the amount of Bitcoin for doing the same amount of work. You have old equipment. It’s it’s uh utilizing the same energy it did at double the price. So you have to cycle out that old equipment so you can still be profitable in your Bitcoin mining. Is that?

 

JB: That’s exactly right. That’s exactly. We either cycle the equipment or we move to lower cost power about half the cost in order to stay competitive. Those machines aren’t necessarily going to immediately become unprofitable after having. But they will become unprofitable very quickly after the having. And now, because Bitcoin price has risen, those machines you actually can turn back on and make a few pennies depending on what your power rates are.

 

TN: Okay. And so, since it’s so equipment intensive and we have supply chains bottleneck through Covid out of Asia, what has that done to the Bitcoin mining environment? Is it, has it, has Bitcoin risen in price as a result of it? Or are people using less efficient machines and maybe losing money or coming close to losing money on mining?

 

What’s happening as a result of the supply chain issues that we saw out of Asia earlier this year and also is there still kind of pent-up demand for that equipment?

 

JB: Yeah. So right now, the you know, with Covid and the supply chain issues that have occurred, the machines got backed up, the factories had to close, and so those orders that were maybe supposed to deliver in December of this year aren’t going to deliver until January or February. So they have been backed up by two months. Also due to 5G and the new phones coming out, the the amount of chip production capacity that is allocated to Bitcoin miners from the fabrication facilities like TSMC that has gone down as well um and they’re not able to get as many chips as they would like.

 

Right now, if you’re buying miners and you’re doing a project like we’re looking to do one in Oklahoma to buy 50 megawatts worth of miners or 15 000 machines, it’s going to take us about four months to acquire those machines and get them delivered to the United States in multiple batches. So that’s the, you know, the expected timeline to wait for these newer machines. But as they do ship from bitmain and from the manufacturers, we expect that hash rate to continue to grow and as Bitcoin price grows faster, it’s going to create more demand and it’s that vicious cycle.

 

TN: Interesting. Okay. So as you look out at the next year, are there certain things you’re looking for like are there coins that that you’re interested in? Are there you know, where is your attention going and what do you see over the next say six months in the crypto cryptocurrency environment?

 

JB: So over the next six months you know I’m I’m really focused on bitcoin particularly. But I do think decentralized finance. So de-fi has a lot of opportunity. There’s a lot of very cool projects. One of them being a token called lend token. L-E-N-D. And that token has something called a flash loan. And what flash loans are is that a concept that liquidity is no longer an issue for anyone that can prove there’s an arbitrage opportunity on in the market. And so, when these Ethereum contracts are written, um they basically have to balance the price points and if the prices start to become a little bit off, someone can go in and balance that contract and take the reward for balancing that contract. Before, you might have to put up the capital yourself to do these balances so that you can make the profits from balancing this contract and getting that arbitrage there. No longer do you need to do that with protocols like LEND, which are really trying to decentralize the credit problem. Decentralize uh what is credit look like on the blockchain. How do we give credit to companies.

 

How do we ensure that um we can lend to them without necessarily having to verify uh everything and do the, you know, do the verification process we have currently but how do we do that on chain in a contract. So protocols like that are what I’m really focused on. I think decentralized finance is going to blow up. I think it’ll be the next ICO hype as we would say in 2016, 2017. There’ll be good projects and there’ll be projects like we saw with Sushi that, you know, the developer just ran away with the funds because the contracts weren’t audited. That’s another big thing. If you’re investing in a project or investing anything, you want to make sure that it’s backed by you know VC companies in the United States that are these very popular VC companies in China and Europe or that it’s been audited by reputable sources in the community.

 

TN: Great. Okay JP. Thanks so much for your time today. I know you’ve got a lot going on so uh thanks so much for joining us and talking about this. Really appreciate this. Wish you all the best um over the next six months as all those things come to come to pass. I also want to thank our viewers and remind you please subscribe to our YouTube page. Please subscribe to our newsletter. Both are in the foot of the video. Thanks very much.

Categories
QuickHit

QuickHit: The Great Decoupling and the Future of US-China Relations (Part 2)

This is Part 2 of the first ever QuickHit #CageMatch with political-economic advisor Albert Marko and China expert Christopher Balding on the great decoupling of US and China. The second part of this is on the Belt And Road Initiative and the answer that the US may have to the BRI. We also talked about the corporate activities — are the US and China targeting corporates? How does that work and how would that play within the environment of decoupling.

 

For the first part, we’ve covered the US foreign policy, looking at Latin America, Africa, and parts of Asia. We looked at US-China trade and a number of other aspects around the US-China relationship. 

 

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This QuickHit episode was recorded on October 14, 2020.

 

The views and opinions expressed in this QuickHit episode are those of the guests and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any content provided by our guests are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

 

SHOW NOTES

 

TN: Now let’s let’s move along a little bit more into economics and talk about the Belt and Road Initiative, which something that I actually worked on for about a year and a half. There’s been some talk in the last few months about the anglosphere and will the West have an answer to the BRI. Does the US need a response to the BRI as a government initiative and if so, do you think they can do it? That question is from @Sw33tYams.

 

CB: Just as rappers get shown to the VIP room, if you’re a country and you are offering goodies, you’re gonna get shown to the VIP room in whatever country you go to. That doesn’t mean it has to be the Trump and air initiative. We do need to think about and we should absolutely put effort into how can the US provide positive things to countries.

 

Why don’t we set up an office that says, I have a company in China that makes XYZ product and they want to move out of China. We have a database of where to go. I know bankers in Vietnam that we’re like, “hey we’re just getting slammed. Why doesn’t the US have an office of infrastructure for emerging markets like Vietnam to help get migrating Chinese companies, those types of goodies, even in a lot of different forms it could take, are going to open a lot more doors than just saying it’s the right thing to do.

 

AM: I agree. But it’s also gonna need a little bit of help from our partners specifically Australia, the UK plus Japan. Basically five I’s plus Japan. It’s going to need shared cost. Supply chains have to move. It’s going to take a little while. It’s going to take a little bit effort from everybody.

 

TN: So it’s basically a government kind of somewhat directed but not necessarily directly involved. What you’re saying is Americans will take a a little easier hand than the Chinese kind of very direct hand in say
these multilateral or multi-country activities. Is that fair to say?

 

CB: I can give one example I was told about and this is something I’m surprised hasn’t gotten more attention. The Commerce Department apparently has a tariff waiver program where if you say, “look, we have this plant in China. It’s facing tariffs. Here’s our 180-day plan to get to move our production to Vietnam, Sri Lanka, Africa wherever.” The Commerce Department will give you a waiver for, whatever time period if you give them a plan. That’s the kind of stuff that should be more publicized and the US government is taking an active role to partner with business to say, “you take the lead and if you’re doing it, we’ll help you.”

 

TN: Let me throw you the next question, Albert. This is from @Ellis_Greenwood. How long will it take the US to decouple from China? So if we assume what Chris just talked about with some of the say Commerce Department activities, these other things, does the US really wanted to decouple from China fully and if so, how long will it take to get either to that level or to say a desired level that that US companies would want to?

 

AM: A desired level is the right term. We’re not going to fully decouple from China. That’s just absurd. When they’re talking about moving supply chains, I’ve heard all sorts of 15, 20 years to one year and it actually depends on each sector. It’s a lot easier to move a software gaming company rather than a pharmaceutical manufacturing company. It can take anywhere from one year to ten to fifteen years.

 

TN: What do you think about that, Chris?

 

CB: I think that’s generally accurate. A lot of the stuff that China was known for over the years, like let’s say low-wage manufacturing, assembly, that type of stuff… I mean Apple set up, a plant in India, which can make iPhones in about 18 months. As Albert pointed out, people think of decoupling as there’s not going to be trade between the US and China. I think what you’re really seeing is this move to bipolar supply chain worlds especially in tech. So there’s going to be a China-specific manufacturing world for tech stuff and a non-China because, you can already see the US government and other governments and even companies saying, “hey, your tech is not been touched by China.”

 

TN: Frankly, I believe that’s what China has wanted all along is their own Chinese ecosystem and then a rest of world ecosystem so they can control that technology and the messaging over that technology. That’s what they had 20 years ago, and there’s been the things overlapping for the last 10 years and I believe that deep down, they really want a separation of those things.

 

This is @candideXXI, “what will be the political and economic pressures outcomes produced by the ending of Chinese investment and the debt expansionary cycle,” which is an interesting question but maybe going to one or two things. Underlying that question is, is that expected to happen? A lot of people have this question on their brain but I don’t necessarily see that happening in the next three to five years. These things tend to go a lot longer than many people assume.

 

CB: Let’s assume that China went to 0% debt growth right now. Honestly, China would be in flames by the end of the day. It would explode. Xi would be lynched by the end of the day. The number that I saw and it’s a staggering number, is debt to GDP in China this year is going to increase by upwards of 30%. So it’s going to go from 300% to 330% in one year. That’s a staggering number. I don’t see they’re going to keep this going as long as possible. For them to get this under control is going to be at least a 10, 20 year cycle at best. And in all likelihood, they’re headed for North Korean financial system with Japanese debt. That’s the only logical outcome. Because if they were to open up the capital markets, the RMB would drop 50% easy.

 

TN: So what you’re saying is, there’s a possibility that CNY could be a global currency?

 

CB: That’s exactly what I’m saying, yes. Exactly what I’m saying.

 

AM: Yeah I agree with Chris here. China’s well within the Euro Dollar system. They need dollars. They can’t get away from Dollars. They need it for their debt. They multiply it out to issue more Renmimbis out to the emerging markets. They’re not leaving and they’re not getting out of the system.

 

TN: Let’s take it more into the corporate realm as well. When we look at like Huawei and Tiktok and some of the Chinese companies that have a large international presence, given the dynamics at home, if the US continues to cut off these companies and some of their crucial activities overseas, how does that bend back onto China? How dire is it? Is it not a big deal or is it pretty dire not just in terms of acquiring technology but in terms of actually making money and keeping the home markets floating?

 

AM: That’s the name of the game is making money for them. They need dollars from overseas desperately. Without that, their entire financial system implodes. They go out to Africa and then they loan out Renminbis and they expect money paid back in dollars at all times. So without the dollar, they’re just buying time.

 

CB: Especially in the tech sector, these are guys that maybe have been abroad for a fair amount of time. They want to emulate the Googles. They want to be international. They think of themselves as cosmopolitan even if they grew up in the system. And so, even though they might be pro-China, which is different than like pro-CCP, they want to be a part of that global tech scene. To have those limitations on them is a constraint that they don’t necessarily like. But that’s the reality of the system that they find themselves in.

 

TN: So will they change their behaviors to align with the constraints outlined by the US or will they remain true to what the CCP tells them to do and their business will suffer internationally?

 

CB: Business will suffer internationally because the reality is, as a Chinese business, you can’t get away from that. As soon as Jack Ma says I’m gonna obey the SEC and file this type of audit, they get blown up in China.

 

AM: They can walk a tight rope until they absolutely get pressured by the Chinese government and then they have to fall in line. There’s no other choice for them.

 

TN: We’ve seen more Chinese IPOs in the four years of Trump than we saw under the eight years of Obama. First of all, why is that? Are they just trying to cash in and get dollars into their companies or is there some other reason? Is it possible to continue that pace?

 

AM: I think they’re just taking advantage of the market and being able to cash in and cash out as fast as they possibly can. Do I think it’s sustainable? Absolutely not. This market’s overbought and eventually there’ll be a correction and on top of that I think that the US government needs to have some reasonable accounting standards for Chinese companies that refuse to open their books for transparency. It boggles my mind. At this point, why should I just go to China, buy a company and list it on the NASDAQ for some absurd amount of money. There’s nothing saying that I need to open my books. It’s absolutely crazy.

 

CB: This is one of the most frustrating arguments by the China apologists because when you make the same argument that Google, Goldman whoever is not subject to the SEC or US jurisdiction on US financial markets, you make that argument, then I will entertain your argument about Chinese companies. Until then, it’s nonsensical.

 

TN: Okay. So let me just sum this up. China is the biggest US foreign policy issue. China is in an untenable position of having their companies locked down or some of their companies locked down by the US. They have a shortage of dollars. They have unsustainable debt and if the current US policies continue, at least Albert thinks that Chinese leadership is in peril. So, what glass half full view am I not seeing?

 

CB: This is in a way very predictable in the sense that they sit down in November, December and they say, “Okay this is our target for 2021” whatever it is. And because you can see that those numbers are almost so stunningly predictable and what’s amazing is they have a very good idea of what their leakages are going to be. That money that gets leaked out in Macau gaming chips or Bitcoin and all that other good stuff, they know what they have to hit. My favorite thing of all this is that almost nobody knows that they’re already rationing US dollars. Most banks in China have the one-to-one rule that you have to bring in a dollar to send out a dollar. As long as they can continue to balance those books through, it can keep up for a while.

 

AM: I’m at a loss for words almost on that one. For the Chinese, you would hope that they understand how bipolar systems work and understanding the Apple versus Microsoft component as like let the one guy be big and you fill in the gaps and everybody be copacetic. I don’t know if I can buy that for very long. But
that’s my only hope is Xi, if Trump is elected, which I am speculating that he is, comes to this realization and says, “let’s tone down the pressure. Let’s fulfill the Phase One Deal, Phase Two Deal” whatever they want to go into. Make inroads and just ratchet down the tensions.

 

TN: Last question guys. Albert, I know you’ve done a lot of forecasting for the presidential election. What do you think is going to happen? You have some really interesting views and I’d love to hear why and Chris also as he’s talking, it’s your first time to be back here. What are some of your observations and expectations as well.

 

AM: I know we’re seeing all sorts of polling numbers that are just eye-popping and just I cannot believe publishers actually put this out to print. 15 points for Biden. 11 points for Biden.

 

CB: Just today, I actually saw this poll saying Biden up 17.

 

AM: It boggles my mind how these people just either they miss statistics class or just don’t know how to add. But for Biden to be up 17 points, you would have to assume the Democrats come out in some kind of record 80 turnout and on top of that have the republicans, 15 of them either not show up or vote for Biden.

 

TN: But even Reagan’s 84 blowout wasn’t a 17-point win, was it?

 

AM: No. This is what’s boggling to me. I just don’t understand it.

 

We know what California is going to do. We know what New York’s going to do. We just toss those aside. If you look at Florida, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Wisconsin and Arizona, those are the states that you really have to look at and in almost every single state, the Republicans have gained hundreds of thousands of new registrations. And even in the polling that’s done out there, there’s a few pieces of data that 96 or 94 of Republicans have an approval of Donald Trump. How do you get to 17 point lead, when 94% of Republicans support Donald Trump. That’s just unbelievable to me. The Economist has been my favorite lately of the 99.9% victory for Joe Biden over Donald Trump.

 

These are just silly numbers people throw out there. Coming out of lockdowns, they’re doing 100 phone polling so they have no opportunity to go out to the public and see who they’re talking to. And study after study has shown that Republican voters have been not just shy vote, but actually spiteful of the pollsters and purposely saying that they’re going to vote for Biden. That’s how you get to these 17 point numbers.

 

CB: I try to stay away from politics as much as possible especially on China and stuff like that because whether it is Trump or Biden, I see what we’re in with China as a 20 to 40-year type of challenge. So at some point, there’s going to be Republicans, at some point there’s going to be Democrats. Just from a social perspective and Tony I think you can identify with this. Man, America’s crazy.

 

TN: Democracy is messy, right?

 

CB: I’m a live and let live kind of guy. So if you’re a Democrat, if you’re a Republican, if you’re a Green or a Libertarian, I don’t really care. We can still sit down and smoke a cigar. And I think the thing that just amazes me is America just seems angry and it seemed really angry for a long time.

 

We can all talk about Trump, but both parties can point to things that the others have done that is unethical, that is abnormal. We need to be better citizens to each other. We need to accept losses that, it’s not going to be our time all the time. The political golden rule is don’t advocate a policy that you don’t want used against you.

 

AM: I attribute the hate that we’re seeing now, the polarization, squarely on the weaponization of social media. Completely. Because we can sit there and put out a viral post of someone, take a phrase taken out of context and making that person look like just a demonic figure and then dox the guy, show him his address and have 15 people show up to the house with pitchforks and and torches. It’s just insane. There’s got to be some kind of accountability on social media by either the government or social media standards themselves.

 

TN: Social media doesn’t have standards, Albert, because I know you’re both active on social media.

 

CB: The way I always think about it is, a country or a political party is like a family barbecue. We’ve all gone to those family barbecues and go, “who are these losers that are at this family barbecue?” And if you aren’t going to your own political party or your own country and going, “dang these are some losers I’m hanging out with,” okay I mean, you’re doing it all wrong.

Categories
QuickHit

QuickHit: The Great Decoupling and the Future of US-China Relations (Part 1)

This is the first ever QuickHit #CageMatch with a returning guest, political-economic advisor Albert Marko, and China expert Christopher Balding with us for the first time. This is Part 1 of a 2-part discussion. Visit this page for the second part.

 

Albert Marko helps a couple of financial firms, members of congress, and a couple governments  to manage and navigate their way through the beltway and the legislative issues and the politics and how the economic, how the federal reserve and all the economic policies filter down. Albert is also the co-founder and COO of Favore Media Group.

 

Christopher Balding spends most of his time on the phone talking to people about the data about China. He is a two-time winner of Lifetime Achievement awards and a Professor at Fulbright University Vietnam.

 

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Follow Tony on Twitter: https://twitter.com/TonyNashNerd

Follow Albert on Twitter: https://twitter.com/amlivemon

Follow Chris on Twitter: https://twitter.com/BaldingsWorld

 

This QuickHit episode was recorded on October 14, 2020.

 

The views and opinions expressed in this QuickHit episode are those of the guests and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any content provided by our guests are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

 

Show Notes

 

TN: We’ve got a bunch of questions off of Twitter and the first one is from @AxeRendale: If you were in charge of U.S. foreign policy. What are the top things you would change from the status quo? They asked about five things. I don’t think we have that much time. So, what are a couple things? Let’s say two things in terms of U.S. foreign policy that you would change. Of course we have the election coming up but regardless of the individual. We’ve seen some status quo upheaval over the past few years but what would you really change not just the top line but the way the U.S. acts?

 

AM: I would immediately start looking at South America and Africa and identifying and eliminating or at least hampering Chinese and Russian interests there, specifically Venezuela would be my number one choice right now. The Chinese and the Russians, they have a field day there. There’s almost no U.S. intervention in there and the same goes for parts of Africa. I know we have troops in Mali and Niger and a couple places to deal with terrorism but just solidifying some of the countries out there like Morocco, Angola and preventing the Chinese from making inroads. I would put make that a priority.

 

CB: So I would agree with Albert in general terms but maybe take it in a slightly different direction. The Trump administration has done a good job shifting the focus to the larger problems and China and taking those policy steps that are well within their grasp.

 

What needs to be the next step, and whether this is under a Trump administration or Biden administration, is the reality is that you can’t handle these issues on the cheap. The Germans and Asian countries are not just going to be persuaded by the moral rightness of confronting China.

 

Just to give you two examples of where you might see something. If the U.S. was to offer even to European countries to fund 5G rollout at like 0% interest loans because that what China is doing. This the way they run the finances is basically giving away the 5G gear. If the U.S. made like 0% interest loans, you could fund that if it was in some type of like a levered development finance corporation structure, where with a couple billion dollars a year honestly, globally. You could do that entire project globally and on the U.S. budget, a couple billion dollars a year is almost couch cushion money.

 

TN: Right, and this is similar to how Japan is competing with China for infrastructure in parts of Asia, right? They’re giving no interest or extreme like 0.3% interest loans for infrastructure, right?

 

CB: Yeah, exactly. Like in Vietnam, where I can speak a little bit more authoritatively, they’re not fans of China. At the same time, they recognize they have to work with China. It’s a very pragmatic approach. At the same time, they we want to give the French certain pieces of the pie, also the Americans. Vietnam is actively trying to balance where their economic investment comes from so that they don’t become too dependent on any one source.

 

TN: Yep, it’s smart.

 

AM: The only issue I have with that is that you’re absolutely correct and that’s exactly what should be done  but it’s depending on the European partners to even come to play ball. Because, within the European Union themselves, there’s competing interests on all sides. And it’s difficult for the United States to try to compete with the Chinese who give 99-year loans for infrastructure in Africa to dictate which European Nation gets a slice of the pie when they’re all conflicting with themselves to begin with. So that’s the only thing I’d have to
say about that.

 

TN: That’s an interesting point. China is very successful in terms of foreign policy by peeling off one member of a block at a time and there’s no better example than the way they peeled off Cambodia from ASEAN in order to break the voting block that’s necessary to get anything through there. They’ve done the same with the E.U. with say Portugal or Greece, right? Do you see the U.S. being able to do that, go and interrupt a block by getting say a single or a couple of allies there? Because I haven’t seen the U.S. do that all that successfully say for 20 years. Do you think we can do that successfully again?

 

AM: I think that we absolutely can be that successful if we actually had the will to do it. The problem is the Chinese are just literally filling in the gaps. The vacuums that the United States have left, and this is something that the United States just needs to get over the dirty word of intervention and just get on with business and solidify U.S. interests abroad.

 

CB: I would actually slightly differ from Albert on this and I see it in a very structural in a very structural way. If you take the E.U. to basically take to move against Chinese interests in Europe, there’s an asymmetry here. The U.S. has to get everybody to agree. China only has to get one to disagree, okay?

 

TN: Why does the U.S. have to get everyone to agree?

 

CB: Because basically, if the E.U. for instance is going to pass a let’s say a regulation blocking Huawei gear, it’s a unanimous vote, okay? That’s the only way it gets through the E.U. is through a unanimous vote. So the U.S. has to get everybody to agree. China only has to get one to disagree.

 

If you look at like the U.N. with the human rights council, we can talk about the U.S. should do this or that with the human rights council. The reality is that China till the end of time is going to have enough votes to put Russia, Venezuela, Libya, etc. on the human rights council because of the the number of countries that there are in the number of countries that they can get to agree with them. So people talk about, “well, it’s a Trump issue.” No. That’s the reality that’s the systemic nature of the international system.

 

AM: And one of the things that the United States has absolutely not done is use the United States Dollar as a weapon to combat that. But that’s a whole different topic and we can get all sidetracked on that one but…

 

TN: Yeah, we can spend a lot of time on that. Here’s a question from @RemaniSrikanth: How much is China policy hinged on who wins the U.S. election? Do you believe that fundamentally the democrats and republicans would have different China policies?

 

CB: After the Russian debacle that they had in the Obama administration and the people that came out of that, I would be surprised if they did like a complete reset, okay? I don’t think democrats really have any real agreement about what they want to do with China. Even within people within the Biden administration or what would supposedly be a Biden administration. You have people that are people that honestly I think would be, if they weren’t democrats, would probably fit well within a Trump administration and you have people that would practically be German in their approach in that there’s no concession. You’ve heard things about well they want to focus on climate change and this 2060 promise is great. We have something to go with here. I don’t think anybody really has a good idea.

 

My own personal suspicion would be more than anything the Trump administration has actually been very deliberate in turning up continuing generally speaking across policy domains and turning up continuing to turn up the pressure slowly, like a pressure cooker. I don’t think you would see that under Biden administration. I don’t think necessarily you would see a rollback of most Trump policies.

 

TN: Albert, do you agree?

 

AM: Yeah, I agree with Chris wholeheartedly. Xi is at a do or die moment with Trump being re-elected. If trump is re-elected and the pressure’s maintained or even raised, I do not think he lasts two or three years in there. As for a Biden presidency, what it would look like? All we have to do is go back to the track record of the Obama presidency and see what they’ve done. They just ignore whatever China does and let them run around the world and do whatever they want. We sat there for two years in 2013 watching China militarize islands while there was absolutely no response. Having Samantha Power back, Valerie Jarrett, Susan Rice doesn’t give me any confidence whatsoever into dealing with dealing with the Chinese.

 

TN: I was in Asia during that time jumping up and down and was told that I was overly aggressive so I share your frustration. Here’s a question from @JamesRoberta7: What does a Xi Jinping and China situation look like if Trump is elected and Pompeo stays at state? What does that look like the first say 24 months of of that type of situation?

 

AM: It really depends on the actions of the Trump administration. Do they ramp up tariffs again? Do they start pressuring them in China? Do they pressure them in Vietnam, in the Philippines? I think they do.

 

The Chinese are going to have to respond to safeguard their own interests. What do they do? Maybe cause a skirmish with the Indians again. Threaten the Taiwanese a little bit more. They can’t really act militarily. They just don’t have the capacity to do that and they’d be completely embarrassed. That’s a whole different argument to itself but like I said, the days are numbered, if Trump is reelected, for Xi. I don’t think the elite families within the Guangdong province would put up with further losses of their wealth.

 

TN: I think that’s something that’s lost on a lot of the American analysts. There is not a monolithic kind of Chinese Communist Party. There are facts within the CCP. There are different power centers. A lot of even the think tankers in America act as if there is this single head at the CCP. He has definitely solidified some power but there are still some very powerful factions. Chris, what do you think about that if there’s a kind of a Trump-Pompeo, that partnership continues, what do you think that looks like for China and the CCP?

 

CB: So, I’m going to slightly diverge from from Albert here in that what we’ve basically seen in the first four years of Trump, especially in the past two years is that Trump is taking a lot of things that are well within the executive purview that he can do. Whether that’s sanctions of different kinds. Although you know in a way the amount of pain that he can cause China within that basket of tools is at this point, it’s increasingly limited. In different ways probably, the biggest thing that he could do is do something that really blocked like IPO or really crimped dollar access.

 

Crimp dollar access is an enormous weapon. But I think the next step is, and you’re actually seeing a lot of groundwork being laid is and you just saw for instance some comments out of India where the U.S. state department is talking about really ramping up its alliance with India. And you’re starting to see a lot of these very foundational type of stuff. So whether it’s increased congressional spending to military things, alliances, different stuff like that, that would be likely where you would see a lot of the focus, especially, legislatively to get authorization to do those types of activities.

 

TN: Okay, that’s a great point as you bring up India to ask this question from @dogthecynic: “How durable do you think the China-Russian alliance is?” And I bring that up because India and Russia traditionally have had a strong alliance post-war. If the U.S. and India continue to get closer at some point, will Russia have to choose between China and India as an ally? Is that even a choice? Let’s start with how strong is that China-Russia alliance? Is it just a resources for weapons type of alliance or is it really a tighter alliance?

 

AM: If you look at it historically, it’s nothing more than cyclical friends with benefits, if you want to call it that. It comes and goes. Their interests are aligned in one area, they conflict on another. Right now, they’re conflicting in Africa quite a lot more than people understand. The Indians, they’ve used Russia as a counter balance to the to the Chinese for decades. It’s quite clear.

 

I don’t think the Chinese and the Russians trust each other. They never will. The Chinese have been encroaching on their borders. Is it strong? No. Can India-U.S. alliance possibly tip it more in their favor? I really don’t think so. I don’t think the Indians are ignorant to the fact that they need Russia as a counterbalance just as much as they need the United States security blanket.

 

CB: The way I would phrase it is that there is what is the honor among thieves. They clearly are frenemies. The Russians know that China is stealing plane designs and engine designs and all this kind of good stuff at the same time, Huawei is working with Russia to hire local hackers and setting up things in Russia to engage in cyber warfare and whatnot because they have a very common enemy. As long as there’s a common enemy for them to focus on and it benefits them to fight that common enemy, I think absolutely that partnership is at least to a plausible degree is going to exist for the sake of the kids, for lack of a better term.

 

TN: Okay, I’ve got some very similar questions from @gabrielfox1 @jschwartz91 and @americacapitalone about Taiwan. So China, Taiwan, U.S. pretty delicate relationships and a lot of the questions are really about the kinetic conflict but also the business aspect of China-Taiwan relations and increasingly Taiwan-U.S. relations with some of the semiconductor activity that the U.S. has undertaken against China. So can you open that up a little bit for us?

 

First of all do you think a China-Taiwan conflict in the next say 24 months is more than say 30% possible? Which it’s just a hedge right? I mean is it realistically possible? That’s kind of a yes or no. But do you think there will be more difficult commercial relationships between China and Taiwan or do you think this is just something that is kind of window dressing and they need each other?

 

AM: Do I think there’s a conflict brewing in the next 24 months? Absolutely not. I don’t think the Chinese have the capabilities. I don’t think they want to be embarrassed furthermore. The Chinese elite, they have money wrapped up in Taiwan. They’re not going to sit there and cut off their their money supply just because Xi wants to prove a point that I don’t believe they can win a war quickly. It would hurt.

 

CB: I will disagree with with Albert here. My understanding of the military capabilities actually align with Albert and what the people I trust have basically said, it’s really going to be 2022, 2023 before they probably have the capabilities necessary.

 

Albert said something very interesting, which I think is worth repeating. They don’t want to be embarrassed. Well let’s look at how China’s behaved in the past year, okay? I don’t think you can project that level of rationality on Xi Jinping. Why the hell are they fighting over some frozen tundra in the Himalayas? It logically makes zero sense, right? I’m not saying that there’s going to be a war. It could be some type of low-level conflict. There’s a lot of different ways that it could be. This doesn’t necessarily mean full-scale invasion
but I would definitely put some type of event conflict distinctly higher.

 

TN: I think it’s unlikely but given my exposure to mid-levels of Chinese ministries they are not the rational, thoughtful, wise organizations that many Americans think and Xi Jinping as you say Chris, why are you fighting over some icy hills in northern India? It’s just stupid, right?

 

So I don’t believe the Chinese government is as thoughtful and wise as many westerners suspect. They make stupid mistakes like everyone else. I’m not saying they’re more stupid than anyone else. I think they’re just as they’re human beings.

 

Now let’s move along a little bit more into economics and talk about the Belt and Road initiative, which something that I actually worked on for about a year and a half. There’s been some talk in the last few months about the anglosphere and does the west have an answer to the BRI? This is really aN eight-year-old question, but my first question is, does the U.S. need a response to the BRI as a government initiative and if so do you think they can do it?

Categories
QuickHit Visual (Videos)

QuickHit: Permanent demand destruction in fuels markets

Patrick De Haan, Head of Petroleum Analysis at GasBuddy, joins us for this week’s QuickHit episode where he discusses the loss of demand in gasoline (petrol) and fuels markets in the wake of Covid-19. How much gasoline demand has been lost and when will it recover? How far have prices fallen – and how long will they remain low? Patrick explains the dark clouds that have formed around petroleum and when we’ll get back to a “sense of normal.”

 

GasBuddy helps motorists save at the pump by showing low gas prices across North America and down under in Australia. Patrick has been with GasBuddy for over a decade basically helping millions of users understand what goes into what they’re paying at the pump and to understand how complex issues can influence their annual fuel bill.

Follow Tony on Twitter: https://twitter.com/TonyNashNerd

Follow Patrick on Twitter: https://twitter.com/GasBuddyGuy

Check out the CI Futures platform to forecast currencies, commodities, and equity indices: https://www.completeintel.com/ci-futures/

 

***This QuickHit episode was recorded on September 16, 2020.

Last week’s QuickHit was with TankerTrackers.com co-founder Samir Madani explaining half a billion barrels of oil going to China right now.

 

The views and opinions expressed in this QuickHit episode are those of the guests and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any content provided by our guests are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

 

Show Notes:

 

TN: I was following you particularly in the last couple of weeks going into the U.S. Labor Day weekend in early September and then coming out of it. It seemed to me that consumption going into Labor Day seems pretty strong but coming out of it seemed like things really fell off even on an annualized basis. Can you talk us through what is that telling you if anything meaningful and is that telling you anything about the recovery from COVID, the consumption recovery?

 

 

PD: We’re just entering this post-summer time of year. That we really get a good idea of where we’re going and obviously, COVID19 has really influenced every angle of what’s normal for this time of year.

 

 

What’s normal is that demand for gasoline typically drops off notably. Kids are back in school. Vacations are done. Americans are staying closer to home. But this year, a lot of what we’re seeing in the media, the current events headlines are playing into how Americans are feeling and that plays into where they go. How often they do and so all of this is really factored in and probably one of the top economic indicators of what to expect.

 

 

And so far in the week after Labor Day, we did see a nice run up to Labor Day. I think it was probably one of the best summer holidays, which gave us some glimmer of optimism. But now, we’re coming down from the sugar crash and we are starting to see demand fall off. Where we go from here? I think, we’re at a turning point. Will we see demand continue to kind of plunge or will we start to see a little bit more optimism? I think obviously a vaccine would be the holy grail. But for now, really we’re kind of looking at seasonal trends that may be enhanced by a lot of the restrictions motorists are contending with state by state.

 

 

TN: Next to my office is a commuter lot, and that commuter lot has been closed. We’re outside of Houston. So, people get on a bus to go into downtown Houston for work. That’s been closed since February. Yesterday, I noticed they’re mowing the lawn. They’re getting it ready to reopen. How much of an impact are those commuters, who are driving, who would normally use bus into a downtown? Is that having an impact on the consumption and on the demand or is it pretty marginal at this point?

 

 

PD: At this point, we’ve seen a lot of demand come back. We were at one point down 55% in March or April and basically everyone stayed home. Now we have rebounded. We’re still down about 15 to 20% compared to last year. But it’s that last 15% percent that’s probably going to take more than a year, maybe, two years to fully come back as businesses slowly reopen. That’s a really good benchmark of how quickly that last 15 percent in demand is going to take and I think at this case, it’s going to take quite a long time for people to be comfortable getting on mass transit.

 

 

I have the same thing here in Chicago. I was recently down in Northwest Indiana. There’s a lot of commuters that come up from Indiana during the day. And again a massive parking lot satellite imagery shows that parking lot filled for the last 10 years consistently, suddenly it’s empty. Some of the big businesses, they’re not really talking about getting a lot of people back into the offices by the end of the year. All the focus really is going to be on early next year or if there’s a major disruption like a vaccine that would cause businesses to move their timelines up. But for now, when it comes to gasoline, distillates even jet fuel, it looks rather bleak.

 

 

TN: Yeah, I think so and I think we’re getting to that point of the year. Even if there was a vaccine tomorrow, I don’t know if people would necessarily call everyone back before the end of the year. It just seems like we’re getting into a really awkward time where it’s hard to tell people to come back. Is that the sense you get as well? I mean JP Morgan aside, right? You know, they’ve called everyone back on September 21st but do you see, are you seeing much activity around other people heading back into the office?

 

 

PD: Not a whole lot. It’s really interesting actually. I was talking to my wife this morning, who does investment bacon and she said that some of the JP Morgan traders had been called back earlier only to be now sent back home because of a coronavirus in the office. That’s kind of the risk that businesses are taking here. That’s why it’s going to take a while for us to get that confidence back to go in offices.

 

 

Now even more so than ever, businesses are becoming accustomed to this new era and telecommuting is likely to really surge. That could mean a permanent demand destruction of at least 5% maybe even more than that. Maybe we don’t get 10% of demand back and it takes years for us to start building up our confidence to get back on planes, to get back on trains and that’s where the dark clouds are forming for petroleum is that the longer we remain in this era, the longer it’s going to take us to get that confidence back to go back to some sort of sense of normal.

 

 

TN: Since you focus on gas prices, petrol prices. What does that do if we don’t recover that 10% in commuter consumption or driver consumption? Putting even the jet fuel stuff aside. What does that do for overall gasoline pricing in the U.S.? Are we at a kind of a step lower than we’ve normally been or do we still see say intermittent seasonal volatility where we go up to normal prices? What does that look like for the average consumer?

 

 

PD: I think it was back in 2015 at some point when OPEC opened the Spigot up and oil prices were low. We all had this phrase “it was lower for longer.” That’s a phrase that may be in a different use here but that’s what we may be looking at for both gasoline and distillate prices lower for longer because of this very slow return of demand. And so I foresee that gasoline prices will struggle for quite some time. Maybe, a period of years to get kind of back into where they normally would go and it’s because of this demand destruction that could stick around. I think most of this winter motorists will be looking at prices under $2 a gallon. Of course barring the traditional high-taxed, high-priced states like California and Hawaii where the sun is shining and unfortunately right now they have a lot of forest fires but for everyone else it’s going to be a sub $2 gallon winter. Next summer is probably going to be another good one. But the future next summer does get a little murky if we do get some demand back. Keep in mind that we’re making a lot of permanent decisions today on the era wherein that is oil production has been shut down, drilling is offline, even some refineries in Europe are shutting down. And if we do get some sort of bounce, that could lead these shutdowns today, could lead to higher prices whenever we do turn that corner.

 

 

TN: Just for context when you say sub $2 a gallon? How much is that off of normal prices? What are normal prices? Is it 2.53 dollars?

 

 

PD: It typically is in the last few years we’ve held remarkably stable somewhere in the mid to upper two dollar gallon range nationally. So, very, very rarely with the exception of I believe early 2016 and early 2015 have we seen the national average spend a considerable amount of time under two dollars.

 

 

TN: So you’re saying 30% off of what had been traditionally normal prices? Is that fair to say for the next maybe 12 months or something?

 

 

PD: Yeah, I think six to 12 months and potentially beyond that and the amazing thing about those prices is before this, that would entice motors to hit the road. Now, it’s not really doing a whole lot.

 

 

TN: If gasoline prices are 30% off of normal but commuting is down these sorts of things. Is there an upside? What are you telling your clients about this?

 

 

PD: The upside here potentially and my clients at GasBuddy members so we’re looking at this a little bit differently. Is that low prices probably here to stick around? I think given the situation, low prices will actually keep America using more petroleum than the early era 2014, 2013 when motorists were really looking at Prius’s, EVs. I think that’s going to really slow down given the environment of low prices kind of incentivizing motorists not to ditch their fossil fuel cars at this point.

Categories
QuickHit Visual (Videos)

QuickHit: There are a quarter billion barrels of oil headed to China right now

Co-Founder of TankerTrackers.com Samir Madani joins us for this week’s QuickHit episode where he talked about where the oil is coming and going, explained the volatility around oil and VLCCs, and if China has the capacity to store the quarter billion barrels of oil that they are buying on the cheap.

 

TankerTrackers.com is a service that Sam started with a couple of friends from four years ago. They track tankers that carry crude oil and gas condensates, to give the moms and pops of this world a heads up on what’s happening in the oil flow situation. The company aims to deviate from the black-and-white narrative in mass media to show the world the grey area that oil is not always the cause of war.

 

Follow Tony on Twitter: https://twitter.com/TonyNashNerd

Follow Sam on Twitter: https://twitter.com/Samir_Madani

Check out the CI Futures platform to forecast currencies, commodities, and equity indices: https://www.completeintel.com/ci-futures/

 

***This QuickHit episode was recorded on September 2, 2020.

Last week’s QuickHit was with political economic consultant Albert Marko where he explained about this “perceived recovery” and the artificial market.

 

The views and opinions expressed in this QuickHit episode are those of the guests and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any content provided by our guests are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

 

Show Notes

 

TN: Crude oil and trade have a lot to do with economic health globally. We’ve just gone through COVID. We’ve gone through a lot of government-mandated closures and there’s been quite a lot of discussion about the rate at which economies are coming back. You see this every day, right? You see the crude trade, you see international trade. How do things look from your perspective?

 

SM: What we’ve noticed is that since January to now, exports have (except the USA) fell from 19 million barrels a day in exports to around 14 million barrels a day. 4.5 million barrels a day in drop between January and now. That’s a lot. That’s 120 million barrels a month, which is not shipped out now.

 

We see immense amount of barrels heading over to China because they are buying on the cheap. We saw around a quarter billion barrels of oil headed towards China right now. And of that quarter billion, half of it is already in their Anchorage area. They have over 100 million barrels that are just floating and waiting to get on to shore.

 

The reason for this is because of the flooding in China, which slows down consumption of gasoline. But it picks up consumption of diesel for the heavy machines that are going to move on the land and so on.

 

Refinery runs worldwide right now are much lower than the year on year because of the fact that gasoline consumption is down.

 

What I’m waiting for in the EIA report is not how much inventory has been removed or added, but the refinery runs. How much gasoline is being created out of the food processing? So I’m waiting for a moving average because you shouldn’t rely on the weekly numbers. You should look for the moving average. Wait for that number to cross 15 million barrels per day. That’s my threshold to say that the U.S. economy and the whole thing is coming back roaring again. So because there’s only a small window between 15 and 18 and around 17.5, 18 when it was actually at peak. So I’m very positive that we’ll come across 15 probably in the new year for sure.

 

TN: In the new year. So Q1, you think things are coming back?

 

SM: Definitely. Definitely.

 

TN: Brent is in the mid 40s now. We see both Brent and WTI climbing slowly through the end of the year. Our view is that pricing will tick up in Q1 and then we see it trailing off a little bit later in the year. But we really do see a build through Q1. So it’s good. Thank you for confirming what we’re seeing.

 

You’re saying China’s got a quarter billion barrels in Anchorage and in transit, right? What’s their storage capacity? Is their storage capacity in excess of that, or will this stuff stay in floating storage?

 

SM: We did an actual manual survey. We went to storage farm of the storage farm with satellite imagery. And as compared to 2 years ago, you will actually see on Google Earth around 250 to 300 million barrels more than what it had. We have day-fresh images from Planet Labs and we were able to go in and see that year on year, China has the ability to add around a quarter billion barrels of free space. This is a drag and drop method with the standard size storage tanks of 100,000 cubic meters, which is 620,000 barrels. They just drop farms and you see just a whole new farm will pop up.

 

Since the consumption is down, there’s no pressure for them to do more. But we saw around 1.4 billion barrels of space and 1.1 billion barrels of occupancy. That was two years ago.

 

TN: Two years ago. It just seems like there’s so much supply and burning off that supply is still a challenge. We spoke with somebody from the Panama Canal about a month ago when she was talking about how LNG was redirected from the US to China to Europe or something. Are you still seeing redirection of shipments? Or are we back to almost normal trade patterns?

 

SM: In crude oil, we actually see a dog-eat-dog situation going on right now. For instance, Venezuela’s exports are down. It’s a toilet flush. It went down to a quarter million barrels a day now in our latest report. We’re using visual confirmation and I’ve never seen the number that low out of Venezuela. But here we are, we’re under 300 thousand for sure. For the average this year, it was around over half a million barrels a day.

 

But now lately, what happened is it just completely plummeted. A lot of the exports are going just to other countries so that they can bring in gasoline in exchange. It’s a barter.

 

What happens is, because they are shipping heavy sour crude oil, somebody else is going to eat their lunch. China wants to import that. India wants to import that. A lot of other countries in the Far East, they have heavy sour because they need the asphalt, they need the diesel. Why? Because they’re expanding their infrastructure.

 

What happened is that Iran started sending off a lot of the heavy sour lately. I noticed a lot of barrels heading out over that way. They’re getting assistance from other fleets from outside the country. The Chinese refiners and so on, they are dispatching vessels to pick up the oil. It’s not just the national running tanker company that’s delivering the oil.

 

TN: I’m really interested in that Iran-China trade lane. And you covered that a lot. With the circumvention of different agreements and embargoes, I see a lot of coverage of that. Do you see a growing dependence on Iranian oil out of China or does that seem to be declining? Do you see a diversity of suppliers? Of course, China has never had a single supplier. But do you see a growing number of suppliers and a growing dependence, say on Iranian crude? Or is it the other way around? Is Iran becoming increasingly dependent on China as an export market?

 

SM: Iran is growing more dependent on China because they’ve had four decades to prepare the whole Plan B for sanctions and so on. So they’ve really polished it up. They’ve smoothened out all the rough edges when it comes to sanctions so they know what they’re doing. But now, when I see how many barrels are leaving the country, and they look at the ratios of where it’s being sent, yes, they do send a lot to Syria, but it’s no more than usually around 100,000 barrels a day.

 

Once in March, a saw over a quarter million barrels a day. That’s because they have so much production going on in Iran and so little storage space. They have to get rid of it. And they are shipping a lot. So the current media narrative is that they’re exporting about somewhere between 70,000 and 200,000 barrels a day. That’s because those factories are only using AIS data, which is automatically picked up by systems. But what we do is the visual confirmation with satellite imagery, and we see around three to five times that. Somewhere between 600 and a million. And 600,000 barrels a day, that’s a lot. That’s 30 million barrels a month.

 

And so they have to get rid of these barrels because if they don’t, their production will have to drop even more to a point where they can’t revive those mature oil wells. It’s very costly to kick them back into action once sanctions do get listed.

 

And with the virus, what they do is they consume a lot domestically. They make it very cheap. And, because they’ve got to get rid of it, they store as much as they can. If they ran out of storage space on land, they put it on the vessel and they put on many vessels.

 

But now I’ve seen that the floating storage has dropped and shipped out a lot. China is the big buyer and there’s so many ways to deliver it to China. You can either go straight or you can meet another vessel halfway in the Strait of Malacca and so it’s a ship to ship transfer.

 

So, yes, Iran is more dependent on China than vice versa. And China does report their barrels is coming in from whoever the last port call was. So it’ll be Malaysia, it’ll be Indonesia, or someplace in between. It’s not coming in as Iranian anymore. Although in the latest monthly report, they had to show something, because this was obviously direct.

 

TN: You mentioned floating storage and VLCC market and it’s gone from a quarter million dollars a day back in April to like 6,000 dollars a day now. What happened there and why is that price just collapsed?

 

SM: It just deflated so rapidly. That thing was so much more volatile than Bitcoin back in 2017, 2016. The first thing you heard was the sanctions scare, the volume type of fleets back when, it’s almost a year ago or so. And so the Dalian Tanker Fleet was a large fleet or VLCC supertankers. 2 million dollars a piece and about 40 of them. So that created a scare hype in the market that there’ll be a shortage of vessels which were allowed to go to certain ports or most ports.

 

What happened was that the US, they used that as a means to improve the negotiation when it comes to the Phase 1 Trade Deal. And so they loosened up on those waivers, and eventually that was the main issue.

 

Then came the floating storage situation as a result of COVID and then that spike the price again. After that, it has come down quite a lot. So that’s moving a lot of oil back in Q2. And then it just quickly plummeted because Saudi just went from over 9 million barrels a day down to 6. That killed off the demand.

 

We saw occupancy of the VLCCs go from more than 50% down to early 40s. And these are 802 operating VLCCs worldwide, 600 something Suezmas and 1,053 Aframax. It’s a lot of barrel space out there available still today. So obviously, the prices have dropped.

Categories
QuickHit Visual (Videos)

QuickHit: “Perceived Recovery” and the Artificial Market

Political economic consultant Albert Marko joins us for this week’s QuickHit episode where he explained about this “perceived recovery” and how this artificial boost in markets help the economy. He also shares his views on the 2020 US Presidential Election and the chance of Trump winning or losing this year. What will happen if his scenario plays out, particularly to the Dollar, Euro, and others?

 

Albert Marko advises congressional members and some financial firms on how the machinations of what D.C. does and how money flows from the Fed, Treasury or Congress out to the real world. He is also the co-founder and COO of Favore Media Group.

 

This QuickHit episode was recorded on August 25, 2020.

 

Last week’s QuickHit was with independent trading expert Tracy Shuchart on the end of “buy everything” market and the unknowns and apprehensions.

 

The views and opinions expressed in this QuickHit episode are those of the guests and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any content provided by our guests are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

 

Show Notes

 

TN: We’ve seen a lot of intervention in markets from the Fed and the Treasury. I’d really love to hear what you’ve seen and what your assessment is of that activity.

 

AM: First off, we have to understand that politics and economics are tied to the head. You can’t deviate from the two of them. I don’t like when people try to disassociate the two from that. The Fed and the Treasury had to work on financial stability of the markets. That is the ground game right now. The only way to do such a thing would be to congregate all the market makers and select certain equities and pump those equities until the market had a perceived recovery at that point.

 

TN: So perceived recovery, that’s an interesting, interesting word. When you say market makers or strategists got together and plan this, what concentrations have you seen in markets? Is it possible to focus on a specific number of companies and make sure that the rest of the market moves based on their coattails?

 

AM: Of course. This is not a new strategy. We’ve done this in 1907, and done this in nineteen eighty seven with Buffett and Goldman and we’re doing it now. It’s just the way it is.

 

The way the strategy works is you take a couple equities, say a dozen of them, maybe a little bit less. Tesla would be one. Nvidia, Adobe, all of these companies that don’t really have international peers to compare with and valuations that they can pump and the market takes over and comes up with all sorts of fancy ideas of why Tesla is at a $400 billion valuation.

 

But the fact of the matter is, if you look at the pricing and you look at all the call options that have happened over the last four months, it’s pretty clear that this was completely done artificially.

 

TN: It seems the US markets lead global equities. Is there some linking of this? And again, are there international coattails that follow on to US equities coattails or is that what you’ve seen in recent months?

 

AM: That is absolutely correct. There are a couple of markets that would support the US market specifically. That obviously would be the U.K. But the one I like to look at is the Swiss National Bank. They have their minions and their people intertwined within US hedge funds and working with the Fed and the Treasury for years. So if something is going on, they would probably be the next people to hear about it. And you can actually see this by looking at their portfolio buys in Q1 and Q2, as opposed to the 2018. You’ll see that those certain equities like Apple and Tesla had just gotten ridiculous amount of eyes.

 

TN: How successful is that been? As we look at the depths of the pullback in April? Crude oil was at negative $37 in April and it fell $99 from January through April. WTI did at least, right? Equities obviously had a lot of problems. So from your perspective, how has that been executed? How has it been pulled off? Is it okay? Is it good? Are we seeing, at least in equity markets, are we seeing a “V” and do you think that translates into the real economy whatever that is?

 

AM: I use the word “perceived recovery” before as this is artificial. It does support the markets. They’ve done exactly what the Fed was mandated for financial stability. Loretta Mester says that quite often in her speeches. In that respect, yes, they absolutely stabilize the market. Now comes the challenge of rotating out into value stocks and the actual financials or retail or something that’ll actually create jobs later on. They’re going to have to do that. But again, this is basically to stabilize not only the markets, but also the political class that’s supporting it.

 

TN: When you talk about the political class… We’re in the middle of an election cycle. This is my first election to be back in the US since the first Bush election. I was overseas for a long time. So I’m seeing things I haven’t had a front row seat to for a long, long time. How does all the things we’ve been talking about with supporting markets and and really having this kind of quasi recovery, how does that segue into the election? How do you see the election playing out?

 

AM: The people that are in charge now are appointed by the political class in charge at the moment. So those two are going to protect themselves at all costs. Trump appointing Mnuchin. Mnuchin doing what he has to do for financial stability. Now we’re looking at Trump ”losing in the polls” — highly questionable when you look at the methodology about those polls. Right now, I would have Trump winning — about a 60 percent chance at the moment.

 

TN: But the president isn’t the only office, right? So do you have an opinion on the Senate and the House as well? Do you think we’re going to see a flip in either of those places?

 

AM: No, I think the Republicans will actually take back anywhere between eight and 10 seats in the House and they’ll lose possibly two, maybe three seats in the Senate. So they’ll still control the Senate, although that’s when the political calculations come into work where one senator, two senators can block an entire policy of the president. Trump is going to have to do more executive orders going forward, which I personally don’t like, and nobody really should actually advocate for that. But this is the time that we live in.

 

TN: If your scenario plays out, how does that impact US foreign policy for the next four years? What do you see is the major… I would say trade was a big issue in the first four years of Trump, right? And bringing China to the four was one of the big issues. What would you say would be the big foreign policy issues under a second Trump administration if it comes to pass?

 

AM: The big one is China. China is quite intelligent. They hire former congressional members to go and talk politics so they understand how it works. They’re going to start hedging their bets. If they see that Trump is possibly going to win, Phase One Agriculture deals will be flying. They’ll make some concessions on intellectual property rights and whatnot. So you’ll see some of that happening from China.

 

The Europeans are absolutely in denial of what can actually happen if Trump gets elected. The only reason I see the Euro at these levels is because they’re on vacation and the US has just negative news pounding us day in and day out with the Dollar dropping to the low 90s. But I don’t see that sticking around. I think that as soon as Trump gets re-elected, I think the dollar’s back up north of 97.

 

TN: I think you’re right. I think that’s feasible.

 

Well, thank you so much for your time. I really appreciate this. Obviously you have a lot going on and you have a lot of information. This is hugely valuable for us. So I’d like to check in maybe before the election, maybe after the election so that we can do an assessment of how would the changes, whether it’s Biden or Trump, how does it impact markets and how does it impact geopolitics? That would be a fascinating discussion. So thanks for your time. Really appreciate it.

 

AM: Thank you. Thank you, Tony.