Complete Intelligence

Categories
Week Ahead

The Week Ahead – 04 Jul 2022: Metals Meltdown

Get 3 months FREE of CI Futures: https://www.completeintel.com/2022Promo

We’ve all seen many chops in the markets, especially on the energy side, with the fuel and oil shortages. That was a little bit unexpected to people. Equity markets are struggling and there are a lot of talks this week about recession and trying to move the Fed into being more accommodative, which is 180 degrees from where we were two weeks ago.

Copper is hurting and down 28% since March. What is this telling us about metals, generally, and drivers of metals demand? Is this telling us that China – the largest buyer of industrial metals – won’t really bounce back? Does the market doubt China’s stimulus announcements?

We also discussed Europe, its slowing economy, rising unemployment, and gas shortages.

Lastly, is the Fed anchoring inflation?

Key themes:

  1. Metals Meltdown
  2. How badly is Europe hurting?
  3. Fed inflation anchors
  4. What’s ahead for next week?

This is the 24th episode of The Week Ahead, where experts talk about the week that just happened and what will most likely happen in the coming week.

Follow The Week Ahead experts on Twitter:

Tony: https://twitter.com/TonyNashNerd
Sam: https://twitter.com/SamuelRines
Albert: https://twitter.com/amlivemon/

Time Stamps

0:00 Start
1:45 Key themes for this episode
2:23 Metals meltdown – what are they telling us?
3:48 Will there be a comeback of automotive?
5:09 Does the market believe China’s promise of a stimulus?
7:25 How much is China’s manipulation be beneficial for China?
9:26 What about Japan?
12:00 Europe’s economy and inflation
15:21 Europe’s concentration risk on the sale side
19:42 Europe’s problems stem from this
20:32 Fed and anchoring inflation
25:50 What’s for the Week Ahead?

Listen to the podcast version on Spotify here:

Transcript

TN: Hi everybody, and welcome to The Week Ahead. I’m Tony Nash. Today we’re joined by Sam Rines and Albert Marko. Tracy is out for the long holiday weekend. Before we get started, please don’t forget to like and subscribe the video and please comment on the video. We look at them, we engage. We want to hear your feedback. Also, while you’re here, we have a promo for CI Futures. This is our markets forecasting tool. Our promotion is three months free on a twelve-month subscription. That promotion ends on July 7. So please take a look at it now and get our best promo ever.

So, key theme for this week. We’ve all seen the markets a lot of chop as we talked about. We saw a lot, especially on the energy side, kind of negative with the fuel shortages and oil shortages. I think that was probably a little bit unexpected to people. Equity markets are struggling and there’s a lot of talk this week about recession and trying to move the Fed into being more accommodative, which is 180 degrees from where we were two weeks ago. So a few things we’re talking about.

First is the metals meltdown. Second, Albert Marco, although he’s been in an undisclosed location, he has been in Europe. And we’re going to talk a little bit about how badly Europe is hurting right now. And then we’re going to look at inflation and how the Fed is potentially anchoring inflation.

So first, let’s look at the metals meltdown. If we look at copper. Copper has been a lot of buzz around copper over the last few days and copper is down 28% since March. But I think we could speak to metals more broadly. We’ve got the copper chart on the screen right now. So Albert, if you don’t mind, what are metals telling us generally about markets and the drivers of demand?

AM: Well, I mean, it’s pretty clear that the manufacturing sector across multiple industries is hurting at the moment and has taken a toll in the metals market. There just simply isn’t any demand for consumer products. There’s not going to be any demand for metals probably until the Chinese really start to stimulate.

It’s pretty clear. And then on top of that, they have pressure from the dollar that just keep on charging along trajectory to 110. So those things are really weighing on the metal market. I mean, copper specifically, like you mentioned, aluminum taken some hits just across the board.

TN: Right. So if we look at things like automotive, automotive is held up because of semiconductor supply chain issues which are working out, but automotive manufacturing slowed pretty dramatically. If we see, say, the chip issues get worked out for, say, automotive, do you expect to see more like a comeback of automotive, of car manufacturing, which will pull metal prices along?

AM: No, I don’t. And I don’t think that’s even going to be the case for the next 18 to 24 months. I mean, the auto sector is actually in a really bad shape, And it’s not specifically just because of the chips, like everyone assumes, but you have rubber shortages, you have polyurethane shortages, you have shortages across the board for the entire auto sector, for the manufacturing process. So until all of those supply chain issues get settled, there’s just no hope at the moment, which is interesting because there hasn’t been really any layoffs yet.

I know they’re artificially keeping these people on payroll and doing whatever they want to do with the shifts and manipulating that. But at some point and i’ve been arguing about this specifically the auto sector, there will be layoffs because of all this.

TN: Just for the people who don’t know. Albert is from Detroit, so he pays attention to the auto sector pretty closely, and he knows he has pretty close relationships there. So we’re talking to a man who really does kind of pay attention to what’s going on. Sam, as we see metals prices fall, we’re also seeing china become more aggressive in making statements about economic stimulus and other things. Are the metals prices right now telling us that the market doesn’t believe that china is going to put in the stimulus that they claim to be?

SR: I would say it’s a show me game with China. There’s been way too many people that have been burned way too badly, listening to the rhetoric and trying to get ahead of things on the ground, and then nothing actually happens, or they do something a little different than what they said they were going to do, and you end up with an investment profile that’s completely different.

I think that’s one of the big things to keep in mind is, yes, China is probably going to have to do something into or around the party congress this fall in terms of stimulus. They have to look at going into it. So there’s going to be some stimulus. The question is, what is it and when does it hit and what does it look like? Is it a tax cut? Because in that case, who cares, right?

It’s not going to be that big of a deal for picking up the manufacturing side in a meaningful manner. Is it going to be reopening? Right. Because if they’re sending out checks but not reopening, that’s not going to allow their manufacturing sector to get back to work, which is going to Albert’s point, going to continue to clog the supply chains for autos and auto manufacturing significantly, whether you’re us. Based manufacturer or your South Korean manufacturer, et cetera.

This is a longer term problem where I think you’re not necessarily going to have the pop and metals until people actually see the real data from either Australia or the us. Or even in Mexico. But that’s a significant amount of the auto sector assembly. You’re going to actually have to see the data before people.

TN: Right. And so what I hear about metals in China and I’ve mentioned this before, but what I’m told by people, especially in the copper sector, is that the warehouses in China are actually full, although we’re told that they’re not. They are. And words that warehouses empty out from time to time is simply to manipulate the market up. But there’s ample, say, copper and other industrial metals in warehouses in China, given the demand that the world has.

AM: Let me ask you both little question here. How much is China’s manipulation of their stimulus on and off due to them trying to force the Fed into lowering the rate hikes or putting them into a position where it’s beneficial for China overall?

TN: Sam, what do you think?

SR: I would say they definitely have a calculus instead of the ECB, instead of a certain extent the BOJ when they.. they all have to take that into account and they all have to either front run or attempt to talk their markets one way or the other. That’s why I’m saying it’s definitely part of the calculus. I don’t know how much of the fiscal side is directly related to counteracting with that and how much is directly related to keeping the people happy. I would say those are the two primary catalysts.

TN: Yeah, I think that’s right. I think any Chinese stimulus that’s going to be effective in the short term has to be cash in, say, local government accounts, people’s accounts, company’s accounts. As Sam said, that tax cuts not going to cut it, indirect payments are not going to cut it. Announcing a new rail stimulus, which they do every other year, is not going to cut it. They actually have to just churn cash out in markets. But with the US dollar and rates, I think they’re really careful right now about how quickly they devalue CNY. And I think that is one of the things that they’re being careful of. They don’t want to devalue it too quickly because Chinese exports have surged over the past six weeks. And so if they can continue to make money at the rate they have, they’ll put off the DeVal as long as they have to. But if the dollar continues to appreciate, they may have to accelerate the evaluation and they’re in a tough spot. China is not the all seeing, all knowing planner that many people think, well.

AM: Part two of that would be what about Japan? Because they devalued the Yen and they’re kind of combating whatever China is trying to try and propose and stimulus. So how does that all come into the equation?

SR: And I’ll just pop out that one of the interesting pieces to kind of throw into the puzzle is not copper sending one signal that China is maybe not going to stimulate, et cetera. But you look at Chinese Equities X, the state owned entities, and guess what? You had a plus almost 7% second quarter for those equities. So the market is sniffing something out there. There might be a little bit of a hedge of, well, if you’re not going to build a bunch of stuff, you might hand out checks, like you said. And if you hand out check, it’s going to benefit the Internet and Chinese tech companies more than it’s going to benefit the metals industry.

TN: Right. And if they want to stimulate the top echelon of Chinese society, they could just goose equities and focus on a trickle down theory, which is very anticommunist, but it’s something that they can do pretty quickly. They did it in 2015, they’ve done it at other times, and they can do that. But going back to your Japan question, Albert, it’s an interesting one because China is such a supply chain risk going forward, the uncertainty there, that Japan is selling itself as a secure alternative to China. And that’s why one of the reasons why they’re devaluing so strongly is so that it’s just a no brainer to get stuff done in Japan. Right?

AM: Yeah, of course. That’s a great explanation. It’s very concise and simplistic, and I had known this, but I wanted you guys to explain this to the viewers because it’s a critical thing that most people don’t really take into account. They always see China. China. And they ignore Japan and South Korea.

TN: Yeah, Japan and South Korea have been devaluing. It’s more depreciating than devaluing. I know there’s a nerdy difference between those two, but they’ve been pushing depreciation because they wanted to be seen as a safe alternative to China. But then you also look at Southeast Asia, places like Vietnam, other places, things in Vietnam, all those exports are done in dollars, not in dong, so they can’t really play the currency card to do values.

SR: It’s also worth remembering that Japan exports a lot of machinery to China, and so if they don’t, if they strengthen their currency while China is devaluing, that puts them in there.

TN: That’s right. Great questions, Albert. Thank you for that. Okay, let’s move on to Europe. Albert, so you’ve been there. Let’s start by looking at inflation. So we’ve got on the screen right now a comparison of inflation rates in, say, the US. Europe and China. And PPI, especially in Europe, is blistering hot. It’s 40%. And CPI, of course, is accelerated as well. It’s ten plus percent, if you believe that. I think it’s higher than that. But as you’ve been there, can you walk through some of your observations of what’s happening in Europe right now and how it’s affecting companies and the way people spend and so on?

AM: Well, from the bottom up, for the general public, that’s just pure desperation. The media just doesn’t want to cover it because it’s just bad news for every single political party out there. Inflation is running rampant. Food, it’s running rampant. And every single product they have, they’re used to high gas prices to begin with, but like the United States, there’s a certain amount where the strain is just too much for families.

I believe the UK. One out of four people were skipping meals because of food inflation prices. One out of four? That’s stunning. And that will have long term health effects down the road. But we’re talking about the year now. Europe’s manufacturing sector is an absolute shambles. Their export engine into China is just nonexistent. They haven’t built out any overseas networks into Africa or other emerging markets to be able to compete. They have no military to sit there and actually push the trade issues their way. They’re secondary. Not secondary. They’re behind Russia and China in that aspect, not to Mention The United States. So, I mean, I complain about the auto sector in the United States. The manufacturing and the auto sector in Germany is absolutely dead.

TN: Okay, I want to pull that Apart a little bit. Okay, so the manufacturing in Germany is dead or dying, largely because of concentration risk in Russian gas as a feed fuel, right, for electricity.

AM: The energy prices have skyrocketed. Corporations And Private businesses are struggling to keep up with margins to cover their costs. And the governments are just like. They’re just making things worse in Germany, I believe they’re handing out money to every single person, refugee or youth person, that think that will vote for them in the future. That makes inflation worse. I can go down the list of different things that they’re doing an error, but I don’t see how Europe pulls out of this specifically in the fall and going into 2023. I mean, their gas shortages are such a problem here right now that I can’t even fathom what the problems are going to be in Germany and Italy and France going forward.

Actually, in Germany and Austria, they’re running out of wood to heat their homes because people are stockpiling that already, and this is July. So I mean, there’s going to be some serious repercussions of Europe. And this is why I targeted Europe to be a problem, possibly for financial crisis and contagion leading back into the United States. It’s just a big problem across the board.

TN: That PPI chart is just so stunning. Now we talk about concentration risk on the supply side. Let’s look at concentration risk on the sales side. Right. Europe has really over concentrated a lot of its sales requirements in China. China has been the market for a lot of European companies. Right. And outsource manufacturing. So they’re as concentrated in China or more concentrated in China than many US companies are, first of all.

AM: By far.

TN: And they’re more dependent on China as a sales market in many cases, than many US companies are, right?

AM: Yeah. This is the problem that I’ve had with Germany specifically. I want to pick on Germany because they are economic. That’s just the fact of the matter. But the Germans, they go out and they see China as a huge market, and they start pushing out their high tech trains and their windmill technology and so on and so forth. Well, the Chinese, all they did was order that stuff, buy it, piece it apart, copy it, and then they sell that to the Africans for one fourth of the cost of the Germans could possibly sell it to the Africans.

So not only is Germany losing out long term with Chinese trade in the market, because that’s stagnating, but now they have no chance to go into the African market because it’s flooded with Chinese parts.

TN: Sure.

AM: They made such critical errors for the years, and they were just so drunk on cheap money out of China that now for the next decade or two, they’re going to have problems.

TN: Yeah, but my overarching points are that Europe is over concentrated on the energy side with Russia, and they’re over concentrated on the manufacturing and then market side with China. And aside from that, they’re kind of out of bullets. They don’t have a lot. And I think that is a lot of the basis for the reason we’re seeing PPI just explode in Europe.

AM: Yes, of course. The only country that even has the only country… The French are smart. I don’t want to hear anything from the Americans be like, Oh, the French are weak and put up the white flag on the Eiffel Tower, whatever these jokes are. But the French have nuclear power and they have food security for their entire nation.

Two of the biggest problems right now in Europe, France has a grasp on. The rest of Europe is total chaos. But those two issues in France are absolutely secure, and the French are smart and they’re looking for long term gains to push the Germans out of the way and take over the EU, and that will actually end up happening. But in the near term, inflation is almost worse there than it is here. Their housing market is mainly cash based, so it’s not as bad of a bubble, but everything else.

TN: So you don’t see much let up in Europe for the rest of 22. You think it continues to be pretty dire in Europe for the rest of 22?

AM: Oh, absolutely. I think the only reason that it’s even somewhat stable at the moment is the tour season has kicked up, and then that’s created other problems where you’re going to cancel flights and overbooked hotels.

TN: Right. Sam, do you have a similar view on Europe at least for the remainder of the year? It continues to be really difficult for the remainder of the year.

SR: Oh, yeah. And the only other place that I would point out is Italy. I mean, Italy is in a pretty rough spot here too. Even with Mario Draghi at the helm, they’re still in a pretty tight spot, and part of it is natural gas and pretty tight there. But the other part is that when it took Legarde about 35 seconds of saying, we’re going to tighten up a little bit here, from negative rates to maybe zero to almost blow up the bond market in the BBB market, it was insane what was going on, and it was a very small move, and you still had yields blow out across the Italian government deck. It’s one of those situations where things move very quickly, things break very quickly, and it doesn’t have a whole lot of bullets in the site.

TN: It’s not like they can go to their version of the permian and drill again. Just to bring this back to something really basic. A lot of Europe’s problem stems from the fact that it has a very old population. So they don’t have young, productive people to keep up with the commitments to very old people in very simple sense. Does that make sense? Is that right?

AM: Oh, absolutely. Looking at just the Italian demographic, all those young Italian guys have bolted for the UK, London, and New York and Miami. They’re gone.

TN: So until they either have a lot of babies, automate, or have a lot of new immigrants, Europe continues to have the same issue?

AM: 100%.

TN: Okay, good.

SR: Demographics don’t change quickly.

TN: No, they don’t.

SR: It’s about 18 years.

TN: That’s right. Okay, so let’s move on to the Fed and inflation anchoring. Sam, you had a great piece in your newsletter, which I’ve referenced many times, and people always ask me how they get their hands on it. So it’s one of the most exclusive newsletters you can get in America. But you had a great piece on Fed Anchoring. Now, I put a chart up on five year inflation expectations. The only reason I put this up is because they really peaked back in late February. Okay? And after that, the five year inflation has really broken down a lot, almost to normal ranges. Okay. So I know you’re looking shorter term, but can you walk us through a little bit about the Fed Anchoring inflation and what you expect? Kind of the near term impact?

SR: Sure. So kind of the point of what I was trying to get across. There’s really two things that you needed anchored for markets to begin to find some footing in the US. At least. And that was you needed to have inflation expectations begin to become anchored. And I think we’ve seen that. Right. You see that chart and it peaked in March, give or take, and has fallen back towards call it normal ranges, if not slightly below what you would expect in this type of environment. That makes sense, right?

In five years, we’re not going to have this type of solution. I’ll be willing to accept that no problem unless we have another flare up somewhere. But I think that’s a fairly reasonable thing to do. But also you have to have the expectations for the Fed anchored as well, because you had two unanchorings that were really happening side by side that was highly problematic for markets.

One, you had inflation unanchoring very quickly, and that’s problematic for markets generally. But you also have the Fed expectations becoming unanchored, and the market was pushing, pushing, pushing for whatever it could get in terms of hikes. Right. It was 75-75-50-50-50. Adding an item to somewhere around four and a quarter percent at the peak. And as of today, you’re back to having the terminal rates or where the Fed raises interest rates to happen by December of this year, and it’s 3.25% 3.5%, and then it cuts next year, is the expectation.

So you’ve begun to have, call it a pricing that’s similar to 1994 hike and then cut style of Fed. That is pretty interesting. That’s a pretty anchored expectation for the Fed. It’s a reasonable expectation of the towards neutral. You’re probably somewhat towards real rates at that point being somewhat positive just because you have inflation of about 3.2 and you have a Fed funds rate a little bit above that. nThat’s why I think that’s a fairly reasonable place for it on the inflation expectations front, that’s largely specifically going to call it close in inflation expectations under a year.

Those are largely call it oil and gasolated and groceries.

TN: Very much energy.

SR: Yeah, this is US. This is not Europe. But as long as in the US, you don’t continue to have those rise in a dramatic fashion, people tend to stop extrapolating. Those forward in their inflation expectations either stabilized or declined back to what they call it normality. And that normality would be somewhere between two and a half and two so that we could spot.

TN: So if gas prices, gasoline prices in the US stopped at, say, 490 or whatever they’re selling at now as a national average, let’s say we plateaued there for three or four months, people would adjust and it would be livable?

SR: It would be livable, yeah, it would be livable. So long as the not accelerating higher.

TN: As long as what, sorry?

SR: As long as they’re not accelerating higher.

AM: Yeah, Sam is right. The risk is as long as they stabilize, I completely agree with Sam. We have one hurricane in the Gulf of Mexico. We have a problem, like a real problem, looking at like $5.50 to $6 gas, and then inflation becomes absolutely just insane.

Going back to the inflation number that they printed out last time, they’re using this ridiculous 5% for housing and shelter and the CPI equation. It’s a little bit hard for me to swallow, but if they can do some kind of magic and keep inflation somewhat steady over the next few months I agree with Sam.

TN: It’s kind of a short at that point.

SR: The interesting part about that is you create an interesting duality in calling risk markets, where the US risk market looks very attractive. If you’ve peaked on Fed pricing, if you peaked on the PE killing. PEs are down 35% year over year. That’s a bigger drop than we’ve seen for several corrections.

You can have a really interesting US risk market going into the back half of the year across markets. The curve, on the other hand, that could be two spends to get very interested very quickly.

TN: Very good. Okay, good guys. What are we looking for for the week ahead? We’ve got a holiday here on Monday. We’ve started to see, say, gasoline prices perk back up in markets on Friday. Are we going to start to see potentially in the near term gas prices rise post July 4?

AM: I think so. One of the things that’s not being said, I don’t think we touched upon, I think last time we did, but the Saudis come in with lower than expected barrels per day, lower capacity, and this must have been stemmed from McCrone and Biden trying to price cap them. Come on, you do that to us, we’re going to do this to you. It’s a game at this point. And the Russians are certainly pulling strings of the Saudis and the Iranians to make this a little bit more chaotic for the US. So I think gas does go does start to trend a little bit higher over the next two weeks.

You’re certainly going to hear noise from people with July 4 prices for barbecues coming up. So that’s going to be all over the news.

TN: Okay, interesting. Sam, what are you looking for during the week ahead?

SR: To build on what Albert was talking about? I think it’s really interesting that spare capacity from OPEC just doesn’t appear to be there whatsoever. But at the same time, you’re also probably going to have at least somewhat of a call, a permanent impairment of Russian oil fields if you continue to have sanctions, that puts a floor long term in global energy prices, period. And if you don’t have US service firms keeping those fields going, we’ve seen what happens when you send Chinese and Russian oil services firms to Venezuela just before you destroy the oil industry.

So look forward to that. On the other side, I’m really looking forward to the conversations that a bunch of millennials have to have with their parents, the crypto markets this July 4.

TN: You are a millennial.

SR: But I am looking forward to some glorious Twitter cons that Tuesday.

TN: Fantastic. Okay, guys, thanks very much. Have a great holiday weekend and have a great weekend.

AM: Thanks, Tony.

SR: Thanks, Tony.

Categories
QuickHit

What happens to markets if China invades Taiwan? (Part 1)

Get 94.7% accuracy on your markets forecasts with CI Futures. Subscribe for only $50/mo for a limited-time only: http://completeintel.com/2022Promo

In this QuickHit episode, we’re joined by Mike Green to talk about what will happen if China invades Taiwan? We’re not saying that China is going to invade Taiwan, but what if it is to happen? What will be the impact to markets?

Mike Green is the chief strategist and portfolio manager for an ETF firm called Simplify Asset Management. They specialize in derivative overlays and derivative structures that modify the traditional market exposures. Their flagship products are things like US equities with downside protection.

His background prior to Simplify, has been in hedge funds for about 15 years and have built an expertise or a degree of renowned for the work that he does in primarily the derivatives and volatility space and have managed traditionally in what’s referred to as a discretionary global macro style. The assets that he purchases or that he monitors exist around the world, including places like China, Taiwan, et cetera.

A lot of the discussions Tony and Mike have had around Taiwan are tied to some geopolitical observations and some dynamics that exist in which Mike played a role less under the Biden administration. But in the prior administration had an advisory capacity to some components of the Department of State and Department of Defense.

📊 Forward-looking companies become more profitable with Complete Intelligence. The only fully automated and globally integrated AI platform for smarter cost and revenue planning. Book a demo here.

📈 Check out the CI Futures platform to forecast currencies, commodities, and equity indices

This QuickHit episode was recorded on December 2, 2021.

The views and opinions expressed in this What happens to markets if China invades Taiwan? Quickhit episode are those of the guest and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any contents provided by our guest are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

 

Show Notes

TN: So today we hear or any day, pick a day. We hear that China is invading Taiwan. What are the first things that come to your mind as the news crosses the wires?

MG: Well, I think there’s a couple of things that are really important about the question of is China invading Taiwan, right. And so what we have seen very clearly, and this is fact, not speculation, is a dramatic escalation of China’s incursion on what would traditionally be thought of as Taiwan sovereignty or independence. Right.

We’ve seen a dramatic increase in boats transitioning across the international marine borders. We have seen a dramatic increase in incursion of both fighter jets and bombers into Taiwanese airspace. And in general, the strategy that you see China engaged in is what is typically thought of as a precursor to an invasion. They’re effectively forcing Taiwan to maintain alertness and readiness, which slowly degrades the quality of defenses.

If you have to constantly scramble jets, there’s only so many hours that you can actually have them in the air. There’s only so many hours you can have pilots operating before their capability deteriorates. That is very clearly what is in play here.

Now, it’s an unknown question whether they go to the next step, whether they take what is currently a largely psychological and relative resource advantage to degrade Taiwan’s capabilities, whether they turn that kinetic as compared to hoping for a psychological collapse where Taiwan effectively decides to sue for the best possible deal they can get is unclear.

And I think that’s really what we’re all debating. I mean, China has come out very clearly. Others have made this observation, and it’s not dissimilar to my former employer, Peter Thiel’s observation about Donald Trump, right. That everyone takes him literally, but not seriously. I would flip that on its head. And everyone say everyone takes Xi seriously, but not literally when he says we will reunify with Taiwan in one form or another within the next five years.

And that’s the core of the question. Are they going to do this in a peaceful fashion? Are they going to do it in a kinetic military fashion? What are the ramifications of each of those two strategies and what’s the state of gameplay that is in place right now, as each side including the allies of Taiwan in the form of Japan, the United States, et cetera, evaluates how they want to respond to it.

TN: Right. What is that? What are those initial responses that you think happen, setting aside battle plans, of course. Honestly, I don’t believe that Min Def or DoD know 100% of whether this will happen or not. I think everything is a potential.

What do you think those reactions are initially in terms of, say, markets, investments, even things like trade? Those are like, what do you think happens right away?

MG: Well, I think there’s a couple of things that are worth hitting on. Right. So the first is why does China want Taiwan or why does it matter? Right. So one component is just the psychological final victory over the Republic, the Taiwanese Republic, what is known as the Republic of China outside of the area.

When you think about that dynamic, this is a final victory that would allow Xi to place himself permanently on par with the founders of the Chinese Communist state. Right. The Mao’s, et cetera, of the world. So this is a huge accomplishment.

I think there’s a huge misunderstanding that the objective is to obtain the semiconductor resources, right. To me that feels, one, extremely unlikely to expect that they could do that successfully, and two, I’m not sure it’s actually entirely relevant. Right. But that does then speak to the indications that the game is being taken much more seriously.

And so one of the things that I would point to people is the dramatic expansion of capabilities and investment that Taiwan is making in Arizona, where they’ve effectively doubled on a nameplate capacity and potentially up to 5x the capacity of TSMC in Taiwan. Now, that’s a huge implication.

If we were to put ourselves back into the 17th century, it would be the akin of a European sovereign entity, a small Principality, taking the Crown jewels and shipping them for safekeeping somewhere further away when they were faced with a threat, taking the error apparent and shipping them abroad so that there’s a base of operations. If you think about TSMC’s investment in Arizona, that can be very easily thought of as a base of operations and a source of income for a government in exile. Right. So I don’t think Taiwan is planning on going away.

It also opens up kind of the interesting angle of how effective is China’s strategy, because I think that China broadly looks at it and says, we can wear them down and I would point to it and say, yeah, your best opportunity was actually probably a year ago to use the element of surprise. Now you’ve pretty well telegraphed it. Taiwan has made significant advances. The US Department of Defense, in particular, I would argue, would have been caught very much off guard a year to a year and a half ago. Today they’re pretty much on top of this, right.

The Pacific Theater has been opened pretty widely. You’re actively hearing expressions of support from South Korea, Japan, et cetera. So to me, it feels like the element of surprise has been lost, and now it just becomes a question of, is this ultimately going to happen? It seems extremely unlikely to me that it will be a long term successful component.

Then you have to ask yourself the last question, which is, why does China care beyond simply the moral victory or the desire for that? And that’s where you and I have been through these maps. And I don’t know if we’re doing this in a visual format, but I could share it if you wanted to.

The way the world looks at China is not the way China looks at itself. Right. So the traditional map that we think of with China when we look at it, we see this large access into the Philippines and in the Pacific Ocean. It looks like China has a coastline that is similar to the rest of the similar to the other great powers like the United States. The reality is that their entire access to the Pacific Ocean is framed and blocked by barrier Islands, Taiwan being the most prominent of those. Japan to the north, being another equally important one. The Philippines come into play. Okinawa comes into play there, et cetera. Right. What they’re really trying to do in terms of expressing a desire to take over Taiwan is to break into the Pacific Ocean and pick up that Deepwater Navy capability that is absolutely mandatory for an “Empire to express power.”

Map of China and countries surrounding it. Image from Google Maps.

So I think we’re at kind of a point of maximum uncertainty where it feels like they may have missed the best opportunity to do so. But as you and I have talked about, I’m not sure that China is actually as good at this game as everybody thinks.

TN: I’m with you on that. Yeah, I don’t think they are, either. And one of the things that I’m seeing more and more of two years ago, a year and a half ago, as you mentioned, China was winning diplomatically, not everything. But there was more of a positive bias toward China.

Today, they’re just annoying people. And so if they take an action like that, it seems like they start from a negative position, and it’s hard for them to get to a positive position out of that when Xi Jinping was going to the left to talk and all this other stuff, he had a lot of positive momentum behind him, and he actually could have done a lot of really terrible things, which, if you look at what’s happening in Xinjiang and other things, he did a lot of terrible things. He could have done more, actually. And I think the world would have turned the other way. But now I think it’s really hard for them to turn the other way. Does that make sense to you?

MG: No. I actually think that’s true. I think that they may have gained a degree of false confidence off of the failure to react to Hong Kong. But absolutely, with the exception of… Australia has clearly turned. The UK has recognized that it has to turn. Europe continues to enjoy the schadenfreude of the US’s relative standing having deteriorated. I think Europe is slowly waking up to the risks of their reliance on Russia, particularly for energy supplies.

And an interesting angle, and again, you and I have talked about this offline, would be the dynamic of a simultaneous move in both directions by Russia to expand into Ukraine and China, to expand into Taiwan and the immediate aftermath of the Chinese Olympics in Beijing this winter, which is February. From a purely mechanical standpoint, it’s almost impossible to mount any form of attack on Taiwan until May due to weather conditions, and an amphibious assault would make no sense, you could certainly see an airborne one.

I think there’s a very real chance that we see at least an increase in the drumbeats associated with that to test it out. But Europe will eventually turn, right. They have to understand at their core that they are an exposed peninsula on the Eurasian continent, and they really can’t allow China and Russia to become as dominant as they are expressing at least their interest of becoming.

TN: That’s right. Okay. So you bring up an interesting analog when you mentioned Hong Kong. Okay. So Hong Kong and Taiwan used to be this kind of holdouts from the mainland, and people looked at them as these democracies-ish, although Hong Kong, whether it was a democracy or not as questionable. But the takeover of Hong Kong is one that happened.

I was telling people in 2014 that it was already done. That this was going to happen. And for five years that I talked about it, people said, no, you’re crazy. It’s not going to happen. There’s too much money that goes through Hong Kong and so on and so forth. But it happened. And now in the wake of it, people just kind of shrug their shoulders like, okay, whatever it happened. Do you think that a takeover of Taiwan would be similar? Do you think people would just kind of shrug shoulders and say, “they invaded Taiwan. It was going to happen anyway, let’s just move on.?”

MG: No, I think it’s much harder for people to look at it in that context. Now, I would frame it, if we’re going to use a World War 2 analogy. And you always got to be careful with Godwin’s law about this, but it would be the analog to Nazi invasion or the German invasion, more accurate of the Sudettan land, which ostensibly was done in a manner very similar to Russia’s invasion of Crimea and the Dunbas region, were there to protect the Russian speakers.

We’re not actually there to have any form of substantive gain, and the world has broadly moved on from it. Right. Same thing I would argue with Hong Kong. Well, of course it was ours, right? You didn’t actually expect us to sit around 2047 and wait for this. There had to be a gradual progression in that direction.

Now, if this is the definition of gradual, I’d hate to see the definition of sudden. But again, the world has largely ignored it and moved on because for the most part, those outside the region have not experienced a significant shift. And again, if you were to look at foreigners in Berlin around the invasion of Sudetenland, they wouldn’t have seen anything different either. Right. Maybe they would have seen the riding on the wall and gotten out. But as we know, many didn’t.

There’s the risk that this is similar because the reality is if China were to decide to invade Taiwan, and now we can kind of get into the market impact, I don’t think the west can do anything about it. Right. Remember, this is 100 miles, give or take off the 100 km. I’m sorry. Off the coast of China. The US cannot Mount a credible defense and certainly not the ability to take back that region once China has taken it.

And I think that’s kind of the interesting feature associated with this is that like the actions of Germany and Sudetenland or the Blitzkrieg into Paris or any of these components, it’s going to be very hard to undo this. And so the minute it happens, it becomes a much longer protracted extended dynamic. And that’s the reason we care. It’s not so much that are we going to win or lose? Right. Almost any credible analysis of it says that China can indeed take Taiwan.

Taiwan is unique and in terms of its mountainous dynamics, et cetera. It’s uniquely suited in a lot of ways for guerrilla warfare. So my guess is they will be playing an Afghanistan type dynamic for decades if they take it. And the US would certainly be working in ways to resupply that and create harassment and everything else. But it is unrealistic to think that it can be stopped if they truly decide that they’re going to do that.

And that’s kind of the thing that, to me is more interesting is that how do the pieces start to fall together in a puzzle if they were to do that and what is properly priced under those scenarios? And I think, Ironically, people will point to US equity markets and say, oh, they’re going to fall or the dollar would be affected, et cetera.

I think there’s some truth to that certainly on a short term basis. But as you know, I don’t really think that the fundamentals matter all that much in the US equity markets right now. Are Americans going to lose their jobs and stop contributing to their 401k plans? And is the Federal Reserve suddenly going to step away from markets and stop engaging in supportive activity? To me, that seems very low probability. And so while there could very well be a correction, I’d be surprised if it moved in that direction. But I do think there’s other trades that are particularly interesting. Right.

So we mentioned Hong Kong. The Hong Kong dollar has been completely unaffected, both in terms of the absolute level of the dollar and its relationship with the US dollar. In other words, they continue to trade, basically a parody with very minor exception. But also the volatility associated with that. So taking bets against that relationship have retreated to near the lowest levels in years.

TN: Sure.

MG: If China were to make a play for Taiwan, it would be almost impossible for me to imagine a scenario in which that relationship didn’t fray violently. Same thing becomes true for Japan, right. Because Japan has two separate issues. One is they are a client state of the United States, and now they are directly in the face of a kinetic war that requires them to rapidly increase their government spending and to do so under somewhat existential risk. And at the same time, they have to write off, basically the minute they do that, they have to write off all of the collateral that most of their corporates have invested in China, which has become the single largest source of their external investment. Right.

So those to me, the area across Asia feels mispriced for this risk. Even if we’re just talking about a volatility spike, it feels that that area is much more mispriced than the US equity markets, for example.

TN: Interesting. So what you say about Japanese companies riding off their investments in China with the same go you think for, say, Korean companies as well?

MG: Oh, absolutely. You’re effectively placing them in a very difficult situation for sovereign reasons and for very obvious political reasons. Those are regions: South Korea, Philippines, Japan that really can’t get on board the China train. Right. Because it creates too powerful of an entity, and one that you point out is increasingly unliked. It places too powerful of an entity in their backyard.

TN: Okay. So something like 37, we all kind of know this 37% or something of global manufactured goods are made in northeast Asia. Right.

MG: Right.

TN: And if you look at electronics, it’s a lot more than that. I don’t know the number a lot more than that. So you have a manufacturing base, and especially in electronics, you have a manufacturing location where risk all of a sudden is amped up. Okay. What does that do? I know this is kind of an obvious question, but I want to get a little bit into details. What does that do to supply chains, especially around electronics?

MG: Yeah. Well, the quick answer is obviously it throws them into chaos. Right. And the most important point on the electronics that I would make is that while China holds a fraction of the world’s IP on electronics, again, the commentary around semiconductors, they are massive in the assembly process. Right. They’re basically the assembly line or the finishing stop. And so you have a ton of semiconductors that get shipped into China and then shipped out in the form of flat panel TVs, computers, iphones, et cetera.

That would unquestionably be disrupted. Right. And it creates an interesting, there’s an interesting game theory associated with it, which is you’re effectively talking about splitting the world in two at that point in a manner that is very similar to the breakdown of the alliance between the Soviet Union and the United States following World War II. Right.

TN: Right. This is what I’m not sure a lot of people, especially in the corporate world, understand, is how acute and how distinct that break could be if this happens.

MG: Yeah. I agree with you broadly. Now, the irony, of course, is part of the reason that they can’t embrace that is that redundancy costs money.

If I’m going to build a diversified supply chain, it places me at a disadvantage to competitors that do not do so in the interim. It potentially positions me for a knockout punch for a true winning of the game. But even there, you start to have to ask yourself questions. Would it be politically feasible given the likely response in terms of price controls and everything else that would kick in? Right.

I mean, I find it highly likely that a Biden administration or a Republican administration. Remember, the price controls were instituted by Nixon, not by Johnson. When you start talking about those types of dynamics, the game theory doesn’t really support the desire to fully diversify your resources. It places you at a disadvantage to your peers in the immediate future, and the potential rewards associated with it are somewhat in doubt as well because it becomes politically unacceptable to raise prices in response to that type of event.

TN: Right. Everyone else is going to be knocked out. I’ll be knocked out, too. So there’s no advantage or disadvantage to me to have a redundant supply chain.

MG: Correct. There’s a disadvantage if it doesn’t happen, right? You’re maintaining something more expensive.

So it’s hard to look at those who would be most impacted and say that they’re behaving in an irrational way. Right. Like the game theory is actually very much. Don’t do anything. Don’t do anything. Don’t do anything. Panic.

TN: Right. Okay. So we have a lot of risk in, say, Northeast Asian markets. We have a lot of risk to the electronic supply chain. I know this may seem like a secondary consideration, but maybe it’s not. What about Europe? Does Europe just kind of stand by and watch this happen, or are they any less, say risky than any place else? Are they insulated somehow?

Categories
QuickHit

QuickHit: What China is thinking right now?

China expert Chris Balding joins us this week for #QuickHit to discuss “What China is thinking right now?” What is the state of the Chinese economy? Are they really doing well in Covid? How about the deleveraging process, is that even real? And what’s happening to CNY? Also talked about are the politics around China especially how it relates to Afghanistan.

 

Subscribe to our Youtube Channel.

💌 Subscribe to CI Newsletter and gain AI-driven intelligence.

📊 Forward-looking companies become more profitable with Complete Intelligence. The only fully automated and globally integrated AI platform for smarter cost and revenue planning. Book a demo here.

📈 Check out the CI Futures platform to forecast currencies, commodities, and equity indices

 

This QuickHit episode was recorded on August 24, 2021.

 

The views and opinions expressed in this Sentiment has soured: How will governments and companies respond? (Part 1) QuickHit episode are those of the guest and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any contents provided by our guest are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

Show Notes

 

TN: Hi, everyone. Thanks for joining us for another QuickHit. My name is Tony Nash with Complete Intelligence. Today we’re talking with Christopher Balding about what is China thinking now.

 

Chris, thanks for joining us. Can you let us know a few things about yourself? Give us a little background?

 

CB: Sure. I was a professor at Peking University in China for nine years and then two years in Vietnam at the Fulbright University Vietnam. And today I am a super genius in the United States.

 

TN: Yes, you are. Thanks for taking the time, Chris. You’re one of the very few people I know who’ve actually had on the ground experience in China with a Chinese government organization.

 

So I think it’s really important to go to people like you, who had experience like you to understand what kind of China or the Chinese government is thinking now. Of course, it’s not monolithic. There are a lot of different opinions, but it’s good to have that insider’s view.

 

So I want to start off as we look at where we are in COVID, we’re a year and a half into it, depending on the school of thought, maybe it did or didn’t start in China, but we hear that Chinese economy is doing great and they’ve come out of COVID really well, all these other things. I’m really curious your view on the state of the Chinese economy right now. And what are Chinese economic planners thinking right now as they kind of potentially go into year two of Covid.

 

CB: So I think there is a couple of highlights out of the Chinese economy. First of all is that they’ve resorted to the pretty similar playbook that they go back to every year, which is pump credit, pump construction and infrastructure type spending.

 

In the early part of this year, we saw a significant amounts of credit growth. That’s softened as we’ve moved into summertime. That’s primarily due to because there’s a very clear summer and fall building season that allows builders in China to do things because the weather becomes inclement in significant parts of the year. And then if you add in the Corona backlog, that kind of is essentially almost trying to put two years of expected growth into one year.

 

We actually saw a lot of that. And that front loaded a lot of the credit and demand for things like commodities. This is why you’ve seen such demand for things like coal and steel, which were quite high. We’ve seen that soften as firms built their inventory and really ramped up during the summer building season as the demand for credit has softened and some of the building has actually been undertaken. You’ve seen a softening of that which has caused you’ve already seen talk of maybe there’s going to be unleashing or the economy is a little bit softer than the planners would like. So there’s talk of unleashing some additional credit growth trying to stimulate different parts of the economy. We’ll have to wait and see if that happens.

This chart of ICE Rotterdam Coal is generated from CI Futures, an app forecasting nearly a thousand assets across currencies, commodities, market indices, and economics using artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies. Curious how it can you and your business? Book a time with our expert and get free trial.

 

 

 

This chart of Steel is generated from CI Futures, an app forecasting nearly a thousand assets across currencies, commodities, market indices, and economics using artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies. Curious how it can you and your business? Book a time with our expert and get free trial.

 

 

 

Generally speaking, the rule is, if there’s a debate about whether or not they’re going to unleash credit growth, I would definitely take the over.

 

TN: By about three times. Right. So one of the interesting things you mentioned is that you said that they expended credit in the early part of this year. But what I read from investment banks and what I’ve read from other people who look at China is that China just underwent this big deleveraging process. Is that real? I’m just not sure, because I see on one side that there’s this talk about deleveraging, but my gut tells me it may not necessarily be happening. Is it happening, or is it something that’s just happening on paper or what’s your view?

 

CB: It’s tough to understand the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics and PBOC’s math as to how they arrived at that, because if you’re just running more generalized numbers, it’s very clear that debt at all levels has continued to outpace GDP. So it’s very difficult to understand how they’re estimating a leveraging. And it’s important to note that we did not see, let’s say, the rapid, rapid expansion of economic growth that you saw, for instance, in the United States.

This chart of China GDP is generated from CI Futures, an app forecasting nearly a thousand assets across currencies, commodities, market indices, and economics using artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies. Curious how it can you and your business? Book a time with our expert and get free trial.

 

 

 

And what I mean by that is, whereas any United States, maybe growth went from two or three to 5% relative, almost doubling, you know. You probably saw Chinese growth go for maybe like 5% last year to seven or 8% with the Corona boost where you have that base effect. And so you didn’t see it go to, like, 10, 12, 15% that you might have seen if it had really in relative terms, they doubled from the previous year.

 

And so it’s very difficult to understand how they arrive at those deleveraging numbers. And as we all know, China is famous for fudging their numbers. So it’s very difficult to understand how they’re arriving at those numbers.

 

TN: Right. No, I agree. I haven’t believed it when I’ve heard it, but I kind of nod along as if it’s real. But I think, you know, the Chinese economic data a lot more intimately than I do, but I just don’t see where it’s happening, where it’s actually materializing instead of just being debt transfers.

 

Okay. So earlier you said that Chinese economy is slowing. Now, from my perspective, that’s worrisome partly because you’re going into a big export season, and we’ve got some ports that are stopped up. We’ve also got an election next year with Xi Jinping being reelected, whether that’s in square quotes or not, but Xi Jinping being reelected next year.

 

In terms of the resources put towards stimulus this time around, do you expect that to be more intensive than normal?

 

CB: Typically, what you see. And you saw this the first time Xi was elected, you saw this second time Xi was elected. What you typically see is a pretty significant boost to fiscal outlays. And so I think if history is any guide, I think you’re probably going to see going in the fall and the first of year, it’s very, very likely you’re going to see some type of significant boost to fiscal outlays. And this pattern goes back many, many years well before Xi that when there are these elections. And I’m not sure if it’s a scare quotes or air quotes, but both seem to…

 

TN: Yeah.

 

CB: So I think it is very, very likely that you’re likely to see that. And one of the things I think that a lot of people have missed out on is yes, there were absolutely corporate, let’s say, bailouts or corporate funds for Corona. But one of the things is that in the United States, there were the large amounts of transfers directly to households. China has not enjoyed those transfers directly to households.

 

And so actually, consumer spending in China is actually pretty soft. And those are buying inflated data standards. And so I think that is something that is very important to note when we’re talking about the health of the Chinese consumer.

 

TN: Yep. That’s great. Okay. So I also want to talk about the supply chain issues. And I was just reading a story today about how Pudong Airport has been shut down. Cargo on Pudong Airport is going to be much slower for a period of time because of anothe Covid outbreak. This sort of thing. Do you see ongoing port capacity issues related to COVID? Is that something that you’re kind of concerned about?

 

CB: I think that is something that you’re going to be seeing for definitely the foreseeable future. And I should say it’s not just China. You’re seeing a lot of this in other parts of the world that I know, specifically Vietnam, the Middle East. I’ve heard of similar things in Europe where they are just straining at capacity. Sometimes it’s due to COVID shut down. Sometimes it’s due to other issues. But absolutely, these are issues that I think are not going away anytime soon.

 

And it is, I mean one of the debates in the United States right now is transitory or structural inflation. And I think, not to be capping out on the issue, but I do think it is kind of a mix of both. And I think the supply chain issues don’t be surprised if we’re looking at very likely two years before all these issues are really worked through, because when people went to, let’s say, just in time or contract manufacturing, what that did is that gave you less wiggle room. So you did not just have a massive warehouse of supply that you inventory, and then you could draw down as necessary where it would give you three months to make a mistake. Now people were essentially saying, I got one week of inventory, and if that one week gets shot, I’m in deep trouble.

 

So the chips are, there’s chips, there’s car, there’s Corona shutdowns, there’s capacity issues at some ports. And so it’s going to take a couple of years, probably to work through all these issues to return to what we think of as some degree of normalcy.

 

TN: Right. What’s interesting to me about that is the previous administration of the US tried to bring manufacturing businesses back to the US.

 

Now, with COVID because of the global supply chain issues and the intermittent supply issues, there’s more of a move to bring things back, at least to North America. I know lots going into Mexico right now. Some’s going into the US to minimize the disruption of things, especially in electronic supply chain.

 

So it seems like regardless of the kind of official policy, whether it’s trade policy or just say public health policy, it looks like more of this regionalization is happening. Does that make sense to you?

 

CB: Yeah, absolutely. I mean, look, nobody is going to announce that they’re leaving China for many reasons. But nobody’s going to announce that they’re leaving China. But you do absolutely see a spread of manufacturing capabilities.

 

Whether that is because they want to have multiple manufacturing bases, they want to be more diversified, whether it’s because of IT issues, whether it’s because of Corona risks, tariffs, all of these issues, there is absolutely increasing diversification of manufacturing capabilities, whether it’s Mexico, India, Malaysia, all of these different places. You’ve even seen Africa doing relatively well in certain areas. So it has absolutely happened.

 

TN: Okay. One last question on the economy then we’ll move to kind of politics and China’s place in the world. What’s the thought behind the elevated CNY? We’re trading much higher than we have for a long time, and it stayed there, right? It’s pegged right around 6.4 something, and it’s been there since Q1, I think. Why the persistent strength in CNY?

 

CB: Well, I mean, I think first of all, they have been running during Corona pretty significant surpluses. The United States has exports to China and other parts of the world have declined, not insignificantly or remained flat as we’re importing a lot more. That’s number one.

 

I think also the dollar has gone into a specific range. And the way that I think of the CNY is it’s basically just a reverse USB tracker, which I think explains most of what we’re seeing. I think what they’re trying to do and the reason that China has been buying some dollars, not in major amounts, but I think they kind of have, like, ICBC and CCB, those types of banks acting as dollar cushions for lack of a better term, is that they don’t want it to appreciate too much for a number of reasons, because they know they’ve become more expensive and that would just make it that much more expensive. So in a way, I think they’re trying to manage that, manage that flow. But I think it’s still generally within a range where it’s like you can say they’re within spitting distance of what their index say they should be. Okay, that’s fair.

This chart of USD/CNY is generated from CI Futures, an app forecasting nearly a thousand assets across currencies, commodities, market indices, and economics using artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies. Curious how it can you and your business? Book a time with our expert and get free trial.

 

 

 

TN: Okay. Now let’s move on to politics. Let’s move on to kind of China’s big, long term, multi hundred year plan to rule the world, which I think is not real.

 

So let’s talk about Afghanistan. This just happened over the last couple of weeks, and there’s a few that China is going to be the master winner of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. I think there are multiple perspectives on that, but the consensus view seems to be that the US really did had to job on the withdrawal. And the ultimate winner of this is China. Can you kind of walk me through some of your views on that? What are some of the possibilities there with China and Afghanistan?

 

CB: Sure. So I think it is very fair to say that the United States has pretty badly bungled the withdrawal. You know, why, you know, we should have waited until we’d already evacuated all the army to say we’re going to start evacuating US citizens and Afghani translators and people like that.

 

One of the things I do think is absolutely happening. And this is not just China. And you’ve heard this from country after country. Taiwan, Germany, UK on down is they are saying we need to go back to the drawing board and re evaluate everything we think we know.

 

Okay. And somebody that I was talking to, I think, expressed it very well is the United States still has credibility because we can move large amounts of assets, whether it’s military, governmental, other private sector, we can bring significant assets and influence to the table. What, this has really changed in a lot of people’s minds is confidence.

 

TN: Yes. That’s fair.

 

CB: That has changed a lot of people’s mind. So you have a lot of people going back to the drawing board. One of the things I’m going to be a little bit hesitant to do is start pronouncing winners, losers, and this is what XYZ country is going to do in ABC country is going to do. And the reason I say that is it’s very, very plausible to construct a scenario where the Taliban and the CCP become BFFs. Okay?

 

TN: Sure.

 

CB: I mean, if China is shipping large amounts of fentanyl out of northeast China, it’s not a crazy scenario to say they partner with the Taliban to start shipping large amounts of opium into the United States at the same time.

 

TN: Sure.

 

CB: Not a crazy scenario. It’s also not a crazy scenario for the Taliban to start bombing China within a year or two. Okay. You could very easily construct those types of scenarios that lead to that. Okay. So it’s very, very difficult to construct those types of scenarios with any what I would consider a degree of certainty. Okay?

 

TN: Sure. So what about the, the China-Pakistan relationship? $46 billion of investment, supposedly, supposedly a tight relationship there. That’s arguable. Do you think that pays dividends in Afghanistan, or is that kind of something that’s a little bit, I wouldn’t say irrelevant, but a little bit less directly connected.

 

CB: So I think Pakistan is actually very pretty directly involved in all of this. But again, it’s very difficult to say with a high degree of certainty what’s happening there because Pakistan has very direct connections into both the Taliban, Al Qaeda. Some would even say that they were a Pakistani security service creation. At the same time, it’s well known that there are blood feuds between groups within each of those organizations.

 

So it’s very difficult to get to say exactly who the winner, loser there. With regards to China and Pakistan, one of the things that you’ve seen very clearly is that pretty much the Pakistani government and the Pakistani elites are effectively compromised by China. They will say nothing about wingers and other issues.

 

At the same time, everything, I think indicative on the ground and of the mass population is that there is maybe not extreme, but I would say broad discontent with the Pakistani relationship with China for many reasons.

 

TN: From who and Pakistan? Is it from the armed forces? Is it from other parts of the government, from regular folks who isn’t happy with that relationship?

 

CB: I think a lot of folks broadly. The business community. I think there’s a growing sense that they are effectively a Chinese colony. One Pakistani I know who described it as such. So I think there is very broad discontent. And as we all know, Pakistan has quite the lengthy history of governmental instability.

 

So similar to what you’ve seen in other countries in the region, it’s very easy to paint a picture, a scenario where the current government remains compromised and under the thumb of the CCP for years to come. I think it’s also plausible that a new government or some type of political instability happens in Pakistan. And all of a sudden, there’s an about face on how to manage relationships with China.

 

Generally speaking, though, I think there is going to be very tight coordination between Beijing, Islamabad and Kabul because those… Pakistan, I mean, almost anything that happens in Afghanistan is going to be maybe not controlled by Pakistan. I think that overstate it. But there’s going to be large amounts of information flows and influence back and forth happens over what happens in Afghanistan.

 

TN: Yeah. Okay. That’s all really interesting. I think we could spend a long time talking about China, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Russia, kind of where all those countries come together, Central Asia. But I want to end on this.

 

We’ve seen, a lot really changed with US standing in the world over the past couple of weeks over Afghanistan. We’ve seen a lot change in the US China relationship over the past year with the new administration. And so let’s talk for a minute about the overall US China relationship. What’s your thought there? Are they getting along? Is there a constructive dialogue? How do issues like Taiwan fit within that discussion? Can you just help me think about some of your thoughts there?

 

CB: So I was talking to someone, and I think they put succinctly the way that I would characterize the Biden administration’s record on China. You can’t criticize them for what they’ve done on China because they really haven’t done anything at all. Okay. Other than adding a couple of names to the Sanctiosn books, there really has not anything taken place.

 

They promised that they were going to get out their China strategy plan in June. Then there were rumblings that might happen in July, where now at almost rapidly approaching September 1. And now there’s not even talk of when it might be released. So really, nothing has been happened except for the Alaska meeting, which apparently went over like a lead balloon.

 

Everything right now just seems to be a stalemate. And the Biden administration is worrying, and that China is still moving forward, and the Biden administration is basically doing nothing.

 

The most telling point to me about the by administration approach, and I think this is something I think you should fault in. In fairness, Trump for is look, we can talk about values and do the right thing and all this kind of good stuff. But the United States, at some point has to actually put resources into this effort.

 

And the Trump administration, other than political capital with allies or other countries, never put any real hard resources or assets into these issues. And the point I would make is the Biden administration has made a point of spending literally trillions of dollars. And to the best of my knowledge, there has been almost zero spending passed that has really anything to do with China. Okay.

 

We cannot continue to talk to countries like Vietnam, Malaysia, South Korea, Japan. You cannot talk about the threat China poses and never spend any money on the issue.

 

TN: Sure.

 

CB: Okay. And look, this doesn’t have to mean we go out and increase military spending by 20%. This could simply mean we’re going to go into Vietnam and say, we want to have a development program and, you know, help solve issues. This can mean capitalizing the Development Finance Corporation to help countries like India and Malaysia and say, look, there is a real opportunity that does not involve the Belt and Road, where there’s going to be green standards or these non-corrupt standards and things like this to make sure that this money is really helping your country. You know, and it was probably something that was negotiated could be all the way back to the Obama administration.

 

There was some type of military center opened in, I believe, Jakarta with the Indonesian government that was supposed to have other governments. It’s a small center. Even those types of things. There’s simply not the resources being dedicated. And I think that’s indicative of where this ranks within the Biden administration priorities.

 

TN: I’ll be honest, Chris, it sounds like a mess. It sounds pretty bleak to me.

 

So great. I really appreciate this. I think if anybody knows has an idea of what China is thinking, I think you’re the guy. And I really, really appreciate your time.

 

Everyone watching. Please please subscribe to our YouTube channel. The more we have, the more we can bring to you as a part of our videos. And, Chris, thank you so much. And thanks to everyone. We’ll see you on the next interview. Thanks.

Categories
Visual (Videos)

Why legacy car brands, IT giants are rushing to make electric cars

This article originally published at http://www.arirang.co.kr/News/News_View.asp?nseq=274827 on April 1, 2021.


Can Hyundai, Kia, Volkswagen, GM make better electric cars than Tesla? Last year, sales of electric cars surged 44.6% despite the general downturn of car sales in the global market. In early 2021, a number of automobile giants announced plans to go fully electric within the next ten years. Can they beat the likes of Tesla and offer innovative rides for consumers?

 

Show Notes

 

SO: Last year sales of electric cars surged 44.6 despite the general downturn of car sales in the global market and that trend looks set to accelerate in early 2021. A number of automobile giants including Volkswagen, General Motors and Volvo announced plans to go fully electric within the next 10 years but can they beat the likes of Tesla and offer innovative rides for their customers?

 

For insights on this we turn to Tony Nash, CEO and founder of Complete Intelligence based in Houston, Texas and Jason Salvucci, national manager of the Overseas Military Sales Group based in Seoul but currently in Okinawa. Well, a very warm welcome to you both and well Tony good to see you again.

 

I think it’s our first time connecting this year but well we’ve seen we’ve heard some very exciting news coming from these automakers and the likes of Volkswagen and General Motors. They’re going all electric they’re really moving away from this at the main business that they’ve been building over the decades based on combustion engines.

 

What’s led them to take this risk and do you think it’s the right move?

 

TN: I think, it’s a move that they have to make. Whether or not it’s a move that they want to make. I don’t think there’s really a lot of debate there but I think their equity market valuation they have to catch up well.

 

I don’t know that they will but they’ll try to catch up with say Tesla or something within terms of the equity market valuation but the customer perception they’re actually making viable EVs that they want is really critically important especially with younger customers. But from a balancing perspective at least in the US for example there are emission standards and the more electric vehicles they produce that also allows them produced to produce other larger vehicles SUVs and other high polluting vehicles. So as long as on an average basis they keep it down to the emission standards.

 

They can produce EVs to allow them to produce say the SUVs that other say consumers want. So, it’s both perception and equity market valuation as well as balancing out the regulatory aspects.

 

SO: So, they’re wearing the different sort of costs and risks here. Well, Jason, what’s your thoughts on this? I mean the world’s biggest legacy automakers scrapping their combustion engines. Do you think they’re making the right move?

 

JS: You know, I kind of got to agree with Tony that this is electric is the future. I mean, they have no choice. It’s not just the standards. Electric cars are easier to maintain. They’re quieter. They’re cleaner. They’re more efficient. I mean, the power is better it’s the way everything’s going. I mean, we don’t really have much choice in the matter. While it may not be 100 electric tomorrow. We’re getting there.

 

The big manufacturers if they want to, they want to play with you know companies like Tesla, they have no choice. That’s where the future is.

 

SO: And the force Tony, Tesla is without a doubt the world’s most iconic electric car company but do you think it’s leading the global market is going to last with all these other competitors now coming into the market these giant auto businesses? And are these car makers catching up quickly enough in terms of battery technology and other key technologies?

 

TN: Well obviously, they have a lead but will they be able to keep it as the real question. I think they may be able to keep it for a few years but I’m not sure that they can keep it say over the medium to long term.

 

So, Tesla has a lead but that gap is closing. And with technology they can use external, say sources to either acquire or develop the battery technology that they need to compete with Tesla. So, I think really at the end of the day it comes down to: can you produce a quality vehicle? Can it perform like consumers want and does it drive like consumers want?

 

So, the novelty of an EV is wearing off. And as it goes broad-based that first user advantage or first user interest wears off. And the broad market really just wants a functional car that is electric. And so, you have the segmentation and other things but I think Tesla is going to have a tougher job going forward to keep the lead that it’s got.

 

SO: Well, Jason is it as straightforward as one might think for these giant automakers to transition into all EV?

 

I mean, what are the major differences that traditional car makers are going to have to adapt to and really face as they transition into all electric?

 

JS: Well, the manufacturing process for one, you know, the number of components in a combustion engine vehicle, compared to an electric car, it’s night and day. I mean it goes beyond the manufacture of the vehicle. It’s the maintenance of the vehicle it’s really everything.

 

The shell may look the same but when you transition to, you know even a mild hybrid to a all-electric vehicle. It’s completely different. Not only will the way the cars are sold have to change but also because how the customers buy the cars. How they maintain. How they operate the cars everything changes. It’s not as simple as just shifting from one to the other.

 

So, I think that the manufacturers have quite a task ahead of them. They are really playing catch up, if they want to grow in this and be industry leaders as they have been for years like Volkswagen, Toyota, Ford. They were industry leaders for years and they’ve surrendered that position to a startup company like Tesla.

 

SO: Right and there was some news this week that Volkswagen might be changing its name in the US to Voltswagen. So, really goes to show. It’s not as easy or straightforward as simply changing the name and probably…

 

JS: That’s an April fool’s joke by the way. Yeah, it was April fool’s joke. I fell for it too. Voltswagen is their April fool’s joke.

 

SO: It was a bit too early for April fool’s day but well thankfully yes, they’re retaining the Volkswagen brand. And well Tony, internet companies like Apple and Google and apparently Xiaomi now and Huawei. They’re working on electric vehicles as well and it’s clearly not going to be such an easy ride. So, what’s really in it for them? And what kind of innovations do you think they’re going to bring to the market as tech companies?

 

TN: Well, that’s a great question. Jason brought up a great point about the business models and as you move into the more software-based business models that EVs are you move into a different ability. In a different way for consumers to pay for things. And you know, I think it’s possible for kind of that big expense of a car that a consumer would buy instead of it being financed. It could be a service fee that’s put over a period of time. I don’t really know what that model looks like but these software companies are companies that really balance out especially Apple. A hard asset like a phone plus monthly recurring software fees.

 

And so, these guys will come into the market. Understanding the risk associated with making hardware and balancing that out with software fees. Whereas automakers traditional automakers at least are accustomed to one big transaction that gets financed by a third party. So, it’s a fundamental change in the business model.

 

SO: And Jason, now South Korean car makers, Hyundai and Kia. They currently set fourth place in the global EV markets and of course Kia having unveiled its EB6 this week. And Honda continuing to expand this EB lineup, of course.

 

So, how competitive are these South Korean car makers products? And do you think they’re really going to have to step up the game? Now as market leaders global market leaders Volkswagen GM they’re going out all electric?

 

JS: I’ve been in South Korea 20 years and the way cars have improved in the last 20 years is phenomenal. When I first got to South Korea. Korean cars were far behind but now the fit, the finish, the quality is amazing.

 

I think the larger auto manufacturers are going to get a run for their money by the likes of Hyundai and Kia when it comes to electric vehicles. I really do.

 

SO: So, what kind of… I suppose, what kind of advantages or what kind of features do you think they offer Jason that might really help them really engage in the competition especially as all these car makers go electric?

 

JS: It seems to me the… not just the quality but the design of the Korean cars is a little more exciting than some of the other manufacturers. That’s what I’ve noticed over the last couple of years, is that they’re good-looking cars and they’re reliable. And the price points are, well, I mean they’ve significantly come up in cost in the last 20 years, that’s for sure but they’re nice. And I see a future of like a subscription type of service for electric cars because you know the United States every three years to 39 months. Americans are trading their vehicle up trading in one car for another car. And we have a traditional dealer manufacturer, dealer model that we have to require our customers to go through a subscription service in the future.

 

It is definitely, in the makes for electric cars because you’ll trade out of them much more frequently.

 

SO: So, it’s not just the hardware but also the software that’s going to bring about a lot of changes in how we consume electric vehicles, as well. And of course, everyone cares about the design too. And well Tony, it seems that EVs really are the future but it looks like for now the stock market is quite confused about the prospects they’ve been fluctuating. They’ve been declining over the last few weeks. And of course there was a boost on Wednesday after the Biden administration announced its plans to really ramp up green vehicles and infrastructure but what do you make of these market fluctuations? And how does Complete Intelligence really project the demand or market for electric vehicles in the near future?

 

TN: Sure, obviously there’s a healthy market ahead. I think the equity market fluctuations over the last few weeks are really just, that its markets searching for the right price. And there are so many different variables with bond prices. And currencies. And equity markets that are going into the calculations around the stock market prices for these companies but I do think that those companies that will not only crack the battery technology. And the value proposition for the market but also the business model, as Jason mentioned. Those companies are the ones that the equity analysts. And the investors will really want to follow.

 

So, Tesla is a high visibility leader, early leader in electric cars. And I think they’ll remain a leader but the volume of cars that they produce compared to say a Volkswagen on an annual basis is tiny. And so, the scale that a Volkswagen or a Hyundai or somebody can bring to this market can overwhelm almost an artisan car maker like a Tesla.

 

That’s I don’t mean that as an insult to Tesla at all they’ve done some amazing groundbreaking work but they just don’t have the scale that a Volkswagen or Hyundai has.

 

SO: Well, the likes of Volkswagen and Volvo. They’re going all electric Jason but Hyundai seems to be putting its eggs in multiple baskets. It’s been betting on hydrogen cars as well. Which right now are considered a bit less economical. And there’s also a lack of supportive infrastructure in most parts of the world.

 

Do you think this investment is going to pay off for the company?

 

JS: I think the future is multi-faceted. I don’t necessarily see the entire replacement of the combustion engine, anytime soon. I mean, they’ll definitely be hybrid vehicles, will be mild hybrid plug-in hybrids. There’ll be some hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. I think that there’s multiple avenues that manufacturers will have in the future.

 

So, that we can kind of have something for everybody. I don’t know that the investment in the infrastructure for hydrogen pays off because right now extracting the hydrogen requires fossil fuels. That’s a bit of a problem until they can crack the hydrogen extraction of via solar or something like. That it’s a bit of an… it’s not there yet. I don’t think.

 

SO: And Tony, before we go now there’s a massive EV market in China. And recently, Huawei technologies. They’ve come out and said they’re going to invest billions into that market.

 

How do you see the prospects and do you see China sort of leading the global market in terms of EVs just with the massive number of consumers they have?

 

TN: Sure, I think, Yes. I think China’s challenge is moving their vehicles beyond China and beyond Asia. There’s so much intense competition from Korea, Japan, the US, Germany and so on and so forth, that I think their challenge will be taking an electric domestic, electric vehicle market that will be massive. And moving that into other countries whether it’s safety standards or features or business models.

 

I think, there is something especially with technology that is specific to China that is very difficult to move beyond Asia. And so, if there is a Chinese EV maker, who can move beyond China and beyond Asia. I think they’ll do very very well.

 

SO: See, well, this is all we have time for today but that was Tony Nash, CEO and founder of Complete Intelligence and Jason Salvici, national manager of the Overseas Military Sales Group.

 

Thank you both so much for your insights today. And to our viewers, as always, thank you for watching.

 

Categories
QuickHit

QuickHit: Will China Invade Taiwan? (Part 2)

This is Part 2 of the QuickHit episode on “Will China invade Taiwan?” with Chris Balding and Albert Marko. In this second part, the guys discussed Hong Kong, the semiconductor industry, and possible actions by the Biden administration. Tony Nash is hosting this show where the two experts discuss likely possibilities for China, Taiwan and other countries that may be affected by the conflict between the two countries like the US, Japan, and South Korea.

 

In Part 1, we looked at the plausibility of China invading Taiwan and what that might look like. In Part 2, we look at is Hong Kong a precedent for China potentially taking over Taiwan? We also look at the global semiconductor industry and firms like TSMC. What kind of impact would Chinese action on Taiwan have toward TSMC and also how would we expect the US to react and what would the different reactions do to US credibility in East Asia?

 

You can watch the Part 1 here: https://www.completeintel.com/2021/01/27/quickhit-will-china-invade-taiwan-1/

 

💌 Subscribe to CI Newsletter and gain AI-driven intelligence.

📺 Subscribe to our Youtube Channel.

📊 Forward-looking companies become more profitable with Complete Intelligence. The only fully automated and globally integrated AI platform for smarter cost and revenue planning. Book a demo here.

📈 Check out the CI Futures platform to forecast currencies, commodities, and equity indices

 

This QuickHit episode was recorded on January 26, 2021.

 

The views and opinions expressed in this Chinese invasion of Taiwan QuickHit episode are those of the guests and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any content provided by our guests are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

 

Show Notes

 

CB: What you’re saying about body bags makes perfect sense. Is Xi that directly rational? Because it would seem like there would be a better way to handle Hong Kong than what has taken place?

 

AM: Hong Kong was a little financial center with no military, no nothing. There’s just a bunch of woke millennials running around, thinking they can hold off the PLA. That doesn’t work like that in real life. You got to come at them with guns to earn your freedom. It was a circle by China. It was inevitable.

 

TN: Since ‘97, there hasn’t been a question as to whether Hong Kong is China. Hong Kong is China. And people have shrugged their shoulders since ‘97 and said look, it’s China. It’s a matter of time. It’s a special zone.

 

CB: Maybe my meaning was lost a little bit. The cost-benefit of what Xi has done in China or in Hong Kong, he clearly probably could have reaped more benefit by saying we’re gonna let Hong Kong continue to be Hong Kong for another 10 years or something. There wasn’t really a need for him to move. It’s probably going to create bigger problems internationally. There’s probably assets that are going to move out of Hong Kong and other places, Singapore. So what if we look at a strict cost-benefit, there wasn’t really a reason for Xi to do that.

 

TN: There was. The protests that would come, first every five years, then every two years, and so on, it was becoming increasingly embarrassing to Beijing. The official channel to as an inward or outbound investment lane through Hong Kong, it’s still there. But Beijing couldn’t take the embarrassment of this and what they didn’t want is to have some rogue police brigade kill a bunch of 25-year-olds on accident. I believe they had to pull the trigger and I think this has been planned and architected over years and it seems like something sudden that people are like “wait, what’s going on?” They’re rolling military and this has been planned for years.

 

CB: What you’re getting at is this was embarrassing domestically and he basically said to hell with the consequences internationally? If we apply that same basic line of thinking to Taiwan, the question would then become, well, they’re willing to deal with the international consequences. We know that in colossal range barriers. What other domestic issues are at play here about Taiwan?

 

TN: I think it’s backwards. It was more embarrassing internationally because the CCP plays international media like a fiddle. Xi Jinping goes into Davos or speaks at a WEF event. Everyone walks away, enlightened and they play international media like a fiddle. They were less worried about what international media would think and even less worried about what domestic populations would think over time.

 

They just needed to rip the band-aid off so that kind of righteous reporters in Hong Kong wouldn’t keep raising this story because it’s inconvenient. They knew that at some point, they were going to take over, and so they just did it and that it’s inevitable that’s going to happen. They just did it.

 

And global media? They’ve fallen in line over the last nine months. Nobody talks about Hong Kong anymore and the rights and being trampled upon and all that stuff. International media have fallen in line on this. They don’t care. They want to make China happy. Why? Because the CCP and their companies are going to buy supplements in their newspapers and in their online forums and they’re going to pay for their think tank pieces and all that stuff.

 

CB: There are specific media outlets that are decidedly less critical of China than they used to be as an editorial line.

 

AM: I agree and I love that analogy of like ripping the band-aid off because Hong Kong was ripping a band-aid off but Taiwan would be like ripping duct tape off a Greek guy’s chest. That’s the problem here, and that’s what we think we have to understand that not only is it economically damaging, it’s politically damaging internationally, militarily. The risks, just in my opinion, way outweigh the benefits of trying to take over Taiwan.

 

TN: Let’s say this happened. Let’s say six, nine months, something happens. What happens economically? I know there’s cross holdings with CCP princes and stuff but let’s look at say semiconductors, TSMC. The otherfoundries are disrupted for a period of time.

 

AM: I know where you’re going with this and this would actually make me flip my position if I was advising China. If they wanted to hit the West and create even a bigger semiconductor shortage, then you absolutely destroy Taiwan. This is where I’m going. You absolutely would do that.

 

TN: Right. So, does it make SMIC relevant and does it make the Chinese foundries relevant? What is in that gap? TSMC, all the execs are moving to Phoenix. What happens then?

 

CB: Taiwan and TSMC are in the very awkward space. At this point, they’re probably like THE manufacturing firm. The other places do the design and stuff like that. There’s a lot of firms that are in the mid and low end. But when it comes to your high-end stuff, it’s pretty much TSMC. I think you could make a case that Beijing says, “screw it!” Forget about Taiwan. If we can capture TSMC, we’ve got it all.

 

TN: We just invade Hsinchu, right?

 

AM: The Chinese, for all the negative things that I have to say about them, are really good asymmetrically combating the West especially the United States where they’ve weaponized Caterpillar, weaponized multiple American companies within China to hit the United States politically and economically. That would make perfect sense from the Chinese perspective to just cut off the semiconductors specifically because those semiconductors go to Apple, to the big three automobile sector, which is the only thing right now that’s going to be able to get unemployment back down to a decent level for the Biden administration.

 

TN: If that did happen, would that present an opportunity for Japanese, Korean firms to fill that void to circumvent Chinese control or has that ship sailed years ago and there’s no way they can recover that?

 

AM: I don’t think that they’d be able to recover especially in the near term. I think the chip shortage would be so, so damaging to the entire global economy that it would be pretty devastating for a while.

 

CB: And the people I talk to in chips basically say, when it comes to manufacturing of higher end chips, it’s basically TSMC. Not even Intel these days is manufacturing their own chips. So even if TSMC is Chinese tomorrow, it would probably take five years before Korean and Japanese firms at the earliest would be producing high-end chips that could compete with TSMC.

 

TN: If China threatens to invade Taiwan and the West is like “look, do whatever you want, we just want to make sure we have our chips.“ Is that really a plausible negotiating point?

 

AM: I don’t think the West could even trust China in that respect. Has the Chinese ever given us assurances and anything like that ever?

 

TN: Let’s act like this happens. Something happens in June, July whatever. What does the US Navy do? Will they protect Taiwan or will they distance and reevaluate?

 

AM: The US would probably let Taiwan defend itself for a certain period of time and float in a carrier strike group just to deter China at some point. They’d have to walk defense there. That’s not an easy solution. You’re talking about going up against China within proximity of their borders, which they would have an advantage of.

 

CB: They’re not going to do something like this just launching a couple volleys of low-grade missiles. This is moving all your chips to the center of the table. And so basically, the question that the US Navy would have to ask is are we going to move all our chips to the middle of the table otherwise, let China have it.

 

TN: If the US says, “fine, we’re not going gonna move our chip to the side of the table. Let China have it,” then does that destroy US credibility in East Asia because the obligation of the US to defend Japan, Korea and so on, those are gone then, because US has an obligation to defend Taiwan.

 

AM: The South Korea would be the biggest problem immediately after that.

 

CB: One of the first comments about by the administration foreign policy was the Japanese defense minister saying China is a real problem, you boys need to get your big boy pants on. That was a month ago or a couple weeks ago. That was pretty much the Japanese saying, “you know this isn’t 2008 boys. We’ve got to be ready.”

 

The other thing was, is over the past couple years, there’s been a shift in the US Military. Basically, all the US Military in Korea is now way far down the peninsula. And South Korea knows that. The US Military is in a position where if the North Korea decides to stream across the border, they can pretty much pack up their personnel and be gone in a couple of hours. If something happens, Tokyo and Seoul are absolutely going to be paranoid. Doesn’t stand right there and start firing back.

Categories
Visual (Videos)

CNA Asia First: How the US Foreign Trade Policies will Change after the US Election

Founder and CEO of Complete Intelligence, Tony Nash joins CNA Asia First to give insights around the 2020 US Elections and how the possible turnout will affect US’s foreign policies, economy, and trade. Was the delay in stimulus affected the voters’ decisions? Can oil companies be greener without causing a lot of disruptions? And did Trump’s trade strategies yield results?

 

This video segment was published on November 5, 2020 and is originally from Channel News Asia’s videos on demand, which can be found at https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/video-on-demand/asia-first

 

Show Notes

 

CNA: Now for more on the markets, the US elections, and economy including trade policy from whoever takes place in the White House going forward, Tony Nash founder and CEO at Complete Intelligence joins us from Houston, Texas.

 

So Tony, it’s been a very divisive election and I don’t know at this point is it worth looking back at how there was gridlock and was difficult for congress to push forward any form of stimulus leaving a lot of Americans out in the cold. I don’t know if there’s weight on the minds of voters that maybe the whole of congress was complicit in this issue. But where do you think paving the way forward for the American economy needs to start.

 

TN: It really depends on where in America you are. There are parts of America that just can’t wait to get out and work and there are restrictions. There are other parts of America where people want to stay in under restrictions and generally that’s the red-blue divide in the US.

 

What we’ve seen is more people wanting to push out demonstrations and say California and other places where people just want to get out. The stimulus issues with congress, there were a number of windows where stimulus could have come out. But it didn’t. And that was a lever that was pulled largely by the house of representatives before the election. They wanted to hold off from it. Especially business owners, very frustrated by that. People who have been laid off, very frustrated by that. Certainly, some of this has been a part of the voting consideration.

 

CNA: Both sides red and blue are blaming each other on why stimulus was difficult and not being pushed forward before the election. But I want to get to the issue of the backbone of some of the sectors of the economy in this election. Climate change featured very heavily. You come from an oil state. The bigger question now going forward is because of this increasing climate consciousness, can these sectors actually pivot away from oil without causing huge disruption, political and economic?

 

TN: That’s fine in terms of climate change. The US actually performed very well in terms of emissions and efficiency. The bigger issue for these oil companies is actually the inefficiencies of their organizations and we’ve seen a lot of oil companies come out to say that they’d be laying off 16 percent of their global workforce. They’re realizing that with oil prices where they are and gas prices where they are,
they just can’t sustain the bloated workforces that they’ve had to date.

 

So, yes climate change is an issue and that’s a consideration. But with the fossil fuel companies, they’ve had bloated workforces that they’re having to contend with now that oil prices are lower.

 

CNA: As we look back at what the Trump administration set out to achieve with its very aggressive trade policy based on the metrics of leveling or gaining leverage to negotiate better terms for trade deals, do you think it has achieved this?

 

TN: What the current administration has been doing is a long game. It’s not something that is a short-term plan. To get factories to move, to get capital investment, to get say supply chains to move, that’s a three to five to ten-year process and can be even longer for industries that have super heavy capital investment. It’s making progress. If you look at investments say in electronic supply chains going into Mexico, I think both the aggressive nature toward China and the USMCA have really helped.

 

The electronics industry come back to Mexico and to the US. Those are some of the faster moving industries where we’re starting to see some real traction. But it is a long game. It’s something that if that’s dialed back now, you won’t necessarily see that continue or you may not see that continue.

 

CNA: The way that the Trump administration up and NAFTA, it does seem that it antagonizes some of its closest security partners including Canada. Is that counterproductive trying to form an alliance to counter the rise of China?

 

TN: There are two things with the USMCA, the kind of NAFTA part two. There was an agreement among the partners that it was a much better agreement. Getting them to the negotiating table was the first hurdle. But once they realized what the US wanted to do, what I understand is all sides were very happy especially Mexico. But in terms of getting a coalition against China together, I don’t think the US has necessarily tried to do that. The US has understood that where there are multilateral organizations or multilateral relationships countering China, that China will peel off one or two or three to create division. And so the US has taken China on one on one. This was a strategy from the very beginning and it’s yielded some of the results. But again, it’s a longer term strategy that they’ve tried to undertake.

Categories
News Articles

Time To Rotate

Tony Nash joins BFM 89.9 The Business Station for another look at the global markets particularly discussing the “Japanese equity market”. Is it the time to rotate into value or maybe it is a sign that the broader economy is recovering?

 

This podcast first appeared and originally published at https://www.bfm.my/podcast/morning-run/market-watch/time-to-rotate on August 26, 2020.


BFM Description

 

With technology stocks hitting all time highs, there has been some inflow into the finance and utilities sectors. We ask Tony Nash, CEO of Complete Intelligence if it is time to rotate into these names. We also ask his views on the Japanese equity market and if there is still money to be made with the change in leadership.

 

Produced by: Mike Gong

 

Presented by: Khoo Hsu Chuang, Wong Shou Ning

 

Show Notes

 

WSN: So far, deeper dive in global markets today. Joining us is Tony Nash, CEO of Complete Intelligence. Good morning, Tony. Now, last night, U.S. tech stocks will slump relatively while laggards like finance and utilities saw some inflows. So do you think this is the time to rotate into value and maybe a sign that the broader economy is recovering?

 

TN: I think it’s certainly a time to to that that that rotation is starting. I don’t necessarily think it’s in full swing yet, but but we’ve received signals for the past week or so that that rotation would start sort of seeing some of the techs off.

 

Today is not really all that surprising, given especially some of the Fed and Treasury statements over the past couple of weeks.

 

KHC: Yeah. So in terms of cyclical stocks, Tony, what is your point of view in terms of which sectors might benefit?

 

TN: Well, I think, you know, we’ve seen tech with companies like Nvidia, Tesla, and these guys have just had amazing gains over the past, say, four months. I think, you know, the rotation into some of the finance stocks, into some other more mainstream, broader market equities is likely. I think the indices are assuming that tech stays at elevated values. That rotation will only help the indices if tech comes off. Given the concentration of waiting within those stocks, it could really hurt some of the overall indices.

 

WSN: And, Tony, let’s focus on one of these, you know, super winners in the last few months. And it’s Tesla, right? They have a decision to sell five billion worth of shares. Is that smart or overly ambitious? Move now. And what more what kind of growth can we expect from this company?

 

TN: Well, the I think the the growth in the stock price is very different from the growth of the company, so Tesla’s trading at a PE ratio of almost 1200.

 

OK, the stock’s more than doubled since March. So, you know, the company itself isn’t doubling. You know, I think it has. I think what the management is doing is making a very smart decision to sell equity while they know the price is very high. So from a management perspective, I think that was a very smart decision. In terms of a buyers perspective, I’m not so sure it’s possible that Tesla stays at these elevated level. People have been trying to short Tesla for years and it just hasn’t worked.

 

So it’s possible there’s growth there and it’s possible they stay at these elevated levels.

 

WSN: So, Tony, are you a big fan of Tesla? This level…

 

TN: It’s hard not to be whether I’m a buyer, personally or not, I would hesitate here. But, gosh, you know, I think there are other places to look that are better value.

 

But it really, you know, part of it really all depends where the stimulus is going. So since the Treasury and Fed are intervening in markets, if they’re targeting specific equities or specific sectors, then you kind of have to follow that money.

 

And so it’s it all depends on how much further these things are going to run and where that stimulus is targeted.

 

KHC: OK, based on PMI data, most of Asia remains contractionary. But for China, of course. You know, Tony, in your opinion, why is recovery not yet forthcoming? And is there a main catalyst needed for manufacturing to take off?

 

TN: Yeah, I mean, look, in terms of manufacturing PMI, as you have Indonesia, Thailand, South Korea, Taiwan, you know, they’re all growing, which is great. Myanmar is actually growing faster than China.

 

But what we don’t have really is the demand pull. And that’s been a real problem. And, you know, we’ve been talking about that since February and we’ve been really worried about deflation. And, you know, what we see even in Southeast Asia is government intervention in markets is really what, propping up a lot of the activity. And I think, you know, the big question I have is, will we see steam come out of recovery in Asia in the same way we’ve started to see steam come out of recovery in the U.S.?

 

I think the answer is unfortunately, probably yes. And I think until the demand from both consumers and companies comes back and the fear of covid wanes, I think we’ve got some some volatility ahead.

 

We’re expecting some real trouble in September. I think it’s great that markets are doing well today, but we’re starting to see the the momentum really slow this month.

And without additional help from the Fed or PEOC or other folks, it really slows down. The problem is the efficacy of that support really deteriorates the more you add to the system.

 

WSN: And Tony, look at Japan, right?

 

I mean, are trading the equities. They are trading at a steep discount to their historical premiums. Do you see any value in yen based assets? After all, Warren Buffett himself just dipped his toes into it by six billion dollars worth of trading companies did. What do you think?

 

TN: Well, that’s the answer. I mean, it’s hard to it’s hard to bet against Buffett. He’s obviously seeing real value there. And I think the Japanese trading companies are really, really interesting because they’re you know, they’re a very good play right now. So is there a value? Sure. I think there’s value there. I think with Japan, a lot of the story is around productivity and automation. If if Japan can continue to raise its productivity through automation, I think it will be a very good play.

 

If that productivity and if the level of automation slows down, then it becomes questionable because everyone knows about the demographic story in Japan, but the economy continues to grow, which is really amazing.

 

WSN: So it seems like you’re quite a believer in that this can overcome some of the structural issues. But what about the fact that Abe has resigned for health reasons? Does it change at all the economic and monetary policies in Japan that might change your decision?

 

TN: Yeah, I think when someone like Abe steps down,  there’s always momentum. So it last for several months. The real question is, how long should the next leadership last? And is there enough structural stability to continue the momentum in Japan, meaning it’s not growing leaps and bounds, but it’s stable growth and it’s healthy growth. So I like Japan a lot. We have had reform under Abe. We have had structural reform under Abe. I think it’s much more healthy today than it was in 2011 or 2010. A lot’s been done.

 

Japan has the capability to continue to improve, but it all really depends. There are regional dynamics and there are domestic dynamics. But again, I think if demand regionally and globally doesn’t return, which is likely COVID induced, then I think Japan, like everywhere else, will have issues.

 

WSN: All right. Thank you for your time. That was Tony Nash of Complete Intelligence, speaking to us from Houston, Texas.

Categories
Podcasts

Policy Action Kicks In As Bull Market Officially Ends

Various central banks are implementing emergency rate cuts to respond to the coronavirus and as the bull market ends. Meanwhile, it remains to be seen whether peak infections in China and South Korea are a light at the end of the tunnel.

 

Presented by: Wong Shou Ning, Lyn Mak, Julian Ng

 

 

The UK has launched a stimulus plan. Do you think the ECB will be pressured to do the same?

 

I’m sure they will. I don’t think they have that much power into interest rate cutting area – the rates are already right around zero. What they’ll most likely do: buy more government bonds, ease up on the reserve ratio, loan incentives, etc.

 

Europe is in a pretty bad position partly because COVID really attacks older people more aggressively than younger people, and the demographic profile of Europe is pretty terrible. So the ECB has to do something to help the economy. What they’re trying to do is to make sure the consumers don’t totally close their wallets and the banks don’t totally close lending. They’re really trying to stimulate banks to keep money moving.

 

 

In China and South Korea, there are indications that the infections have peaked. Pres. Xi visited Wuhan. Is this the light at the end of the tunnel?

 

I think it’s a natural progression and it’s quite possible that things are dissipating in China and things are improving. We see road traffic congestion gradually building back. That’s good for everybody. 2/3 recovered. We’re getting there. There may still be quite a lot of bounce back in March. Hopefully, in Q2, we’re back to an almost normal level.

 

 

Japan’s economy seems to be bordering on the recession. Do you think even the Bank of Japan has assisted on the current downward cycle? Have they got any more policy options left?

 

Central banks can do for the ending bull market. The BOJ really has been focused since 2012 on Abenomics to try to raise the inflation rate to 2%. They never achieved that. But they have helped some other things to stimulate the economy.

 

Japan’s in a very tough place because it’s tied to the Northeast Asian supply chain and it has the same demographic problem that Europe has. They really need to start circulating money. They can use these tools on reserve rates and loans, but how much further can they push it?

 

 

The fall in crude prices has also negatively affected shale oil producers. What’s your near and long-term outlook for the industry?

 

Shale for the US is energy security. Americans are tired of the political issues that they face in the Middle East to secure their energy supply chain. The current administration help the shale producers to survive including backing up their loans, working with banks to extend the payback period, etc. Shale is seen as a national asset by the current administration as they work very hard to make sure that those companies continue to be competitive and have the resources.

 

 

Listen to this podcast on the bull market at BFM: The Business Station.

Categories
News Articles

Asian shares lacklustre despite a positive US lead

This article is originally published at https://www.bbc.com/news/business-33105365

 

Asian shares were lacklustre in early trade on Friday, despite US stocks closing higher on strong retail sales data.

 

Japan’s Nikkei 225 closed up just 0.12% at 20,407.08.

 

But on Thursday, the benchmark index marked its biggest percentage gain in four months.

 

“It’s interesting to see that US retail sales are up,” economist Tony Nash told the BBC, “as we’ve seen Asian exports down for the past several months.”

 

“The real question for Asia is whether the US up-tick is a trend and if that will flow upstream to exports in Asia any time soon,” said Mr Nash, managing partner of Complete Intelligence.

 

In Australia, the S&P/ASX 200 closed down 0.21% at 5,545.30, while South Korea’s benchmark Kospi index closed down 0.22% at 2,052.17.

 

South Korean shares ended a four-day losing streak on Thursday after the country’s central bank cut interest rates to a record low, citing a deadly outbreak of Mers as a concern for the economy.

 

Mixed trading

In China, markets were setting a more positive trend, with Hong Kong’s Hang Seng index up 0.5% at 27,043.43 in afternoon trade and the Shanghai Composite up 0.72% at 5,158.40.

 

Chinese markets experienced mixed trading on Thursday following data that showed both retail sales and industrial production rose in May from a year earlier, in line with expectations.

 

But fixed asset investment grew more slowly than forecast in the first five months of the year compared to a year ago.

 

Earlier this week, China’s National Development and Reform Commission said that it had given approval for seven big new projects, including an airport expansion on Hainan – an island destination that is growing in popularity with holidaymakers.

 

Mr Nash said he expected fixed asset investment in China to see stronger growth in early 2016 in light of the Commission’s announcement.