Complete Intelligence

Login

Tag: Quick hit experts

Categories
QuickHit

Inflation: Buckle up, it may get worse (Part 2)

Nick Glinsman and Sam Rines are back in this QuickHit episode special Cage Match edition about inflation, part two, where we start looking into things like raw materials cost versus processing and manufacturing bottlenecks. Also discussed are the wage inflation and labor availability and how long these impacts will last. And finally, we start talking about central banks. What will the Fed do? Will it do anything? When will it do it?

 

For those who prefer to listen to a podcast, here’s the Spotify link for you: https://open.spotify.com/episode/3CK3SNwMK97oWLy1DMRQnD?si=uV1As8VsTxSVrQNE0iYuiA You can also find us in other podcast audio streaming services. Just search “QuickHit”. Thank you!

 

Part one covered a lot around specific commodity inflation and why it’s happening.

 

💌 Subscribe to CI Newsletter and gain AI-driven intelligence.

📺 Subscribe to our Youtube Channel.

📊 Forward-looking companies become more profitable with Complete Intelligence. The only fully automated and globally integrated AI platform for smarter cost and revenue planning. Book a demo here.

📈 Check out the CI Futures platform to forecast currencies, commodities, and equity indices

 

This QuickHit episode was recorded on April 28, 2021.

 

The views and opinions expressed in this nflation: Buckle up, it may get worse QuickHit episode are those of the guests and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any content provided by our guests are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

 

Show Notes

 

TN: What the people in the middle. So the manufacturers, what capacity do they have to absorb these price rises? What are you guys seeing when you talk to people when you read? Are you seeing that manufacturers can absorb the lumber prices, the copper prices and other things, or are they passing that directly along?

 

NG: Sorry, Sam. I’m jumping in here. The beauty of that question right now is there was a major headline, the Financial Times talking about margin compression of how US corporates are going to be increasing prices. It was today. You have the likes of Chipotle. We’ll go on to that. That’s a labor cost issue. But the other company, you know, J&J, various bare necessities manufacturers for nappies for kitchenware also they’re saying they’re going to have to put price pressure through to the consumer and as we were discussing just before we started, there’s the elasticity of price increases is very high.

 

The elasticity of price decreases is extremely low. And I would contend that this becomes a rolling, snowball effect as these prices get passed through to the consumer. There are other costs that will be passed through to which we can talk about later on labor side. But this clearly, one of the signals that our well worth watching, on the margins in the corporate reporting, and all of them are suggestive of higher prices to the consumer.

 

Then you look at the ISM prices paid. I have a chart, a model that looks at that versus the CPI. And if that sticks to what it’s done over the last couple of decades, it’s indicative of CPI, actually, the big figure having a getting up to somewhere around four, maybe even higher.

 

TN: Which was kind of a China 2011 scenario of four to six percent CPI.

 

NG: Correct. But also also the the process of decoupling, as long as it may be, that process has created a demand because of the supply shock.

 

There’s a supply shock in the system. The demand is adjusting there, too, so that work as additional demand to fill in the gaps, so if the decoupling replacement process is long standing, the demand is still there, it’s a matter and then catching up. There’s a price disparity caused by that.

 

TN: Yeah, we definitely have a mismatch, at least in the short term. And will those supply chains catch up? That’s a real question. Sam, what’s your view on that in terms of manufacturers being able to absorb these cost and margin pressures?

 

SR: So I’ll jump to the housing market as my example, which I think is one of the more interesting ones filtering, filtering through down into lumber.

 

A very close friend of mine in Houston is delaying the start of one hundred and ninety homes that were supposed to be going into, well… He has the pads laid. He won’t build those homes until lumber prices go down. It’s the largest backlog he’s ever had. And that got us talking and kind of working through the market. And when you look at the market for pine studs in the US, it’s an intriguing look into kind of where the cost pressures are coming through, where mills are making mills that make the two by fours are making an absolute fortune off of the disruption.

 

But if you own a pine stand of several thousand acres, the tree that you are cutting off of it is the exact same price that it was a year ago. You have seen none of the prices at all.

 

TN: So there’s not a supply, a raw materials supply issue. It’s a processed materials issue.

 

SR: Yes. Exactly. So it’s the supply chain breaking down. You didn’t have enough. You didn’t have the mills up and running for a couple of months. You had about 40 percent of the capacity offline. And that created a shock to the system that eventually will be sorted out at some point.

 

We didn’t destroy any capacity for two by fours. We’re building even at the current rate, we’re building one point seven million homes. That’s nowhere near what we were doing in 2005. And yet lumber is four times where it was. So, yeah.

 

NG: May I ask a question because you’re obviously in touch with that level on a micro basis? So one of the things that I’ve been told by several different sources is they don’t disagree with your number coming down eventually. The problem the homebuilders now have is labor shortage.

 

SR: That might be a problem in the northeast. That might be a problem in a kind of coastal problem in the US, where I have fewer contacts in construction. But in the south, there’s no labor shortage. Wages are still very strong. You have some projects that were delayed for large oil which created a supply of able bodied plumbers, electricians, where there’s a shortage elsewhere. So I would say that’s probably very true for parts of the country.

 

There’s anecdotally, Beth. Beth Iron Works? One of the major boat docks in the north, northeast is driving around an RV trying to recruit people to come, trying to recruit welders. That was a problem before Covid that was and will remain a problem. The trades will be a big issue. Common labor, particularly in the South, does not appear to be an issue. That is an issue in the north.

 

NG: I’ve heard it’s an issue in Florida, actually, which is back to you point about coasts. Sorry, I interrupt.

 

TN: We’re in Texas. It’s the Promised Land. I mean, I think you…

 

NG: Would agree with you on that one.

 

TN: OK, so we’ve gone long. I know these are very detailed issues, but I’m going to ask another question. I did ask for some questions over Twitter.

 

So one of them came in from Brent. This was around supply chain disruptions, which we’ve already talked about. There’s another from Jerrett Heath. He says, “Will it be velocity or magnitude that causes the Fed to react to inflationary pressures?”

 

So what do you guys think? Are we going to see kind of the magnitude inflation push the Fed to react or what’s going to push the Fed to react to start to taper a little bit, if they do at all?

 

NG: I would say both at the same time. My great fear is that there is, and this was actually covered by the Wall Street Journal, but I’ve written and spoken about this as well. I sit there looking at the Fed becoming reactive rather than proactive, and the punch bowl analogy is gone, and that worries me enormously because they have great confidence in something that they’re forecasting as transitory and we know what their forecast record is, and if you really want a bad forecast record, just go to Frankfurt and see what the ECB is all about.

 

Now, it’s interesting to me that the conventional wisdom, the consensus forecast is for tapering to the end of this year as opposed to next year. It seems like the more people talk about the inflation pressure, the greater it is. But I wonder whether we will get tapering. That’s what worries me about the Fed.

 

I’ve been really working hard on looking at what Claudia Sahm has written and said over the last couple of weeks. She wrote an op ed in The New York Times and Bloomberg. She’s said… She’s an ex-economist for the FOMC and the Board of Governors, actually. And you get the feeling that the priorities are unemployment with equity, racial equity as opposed to equality. Furthermore, you get the feeling that financial stability… Both of those more important than inflation.

 

Now, if that’s the case and we start to see any signs of a taper tantrum, I worry that this Fed is going to do a proactive. Either stop the idea of tapering or do a twist or something that eases this market. I think they’ve got themselves, we have a very political Fed that, if it’s reactive by nature, it could be procyclical by action. And that’s where I find I really worry about it.

 

Then, we’ve got Powells term expiry February. Well, Lail Brainard is one of Janet Yellen’s favorite people. And if she gets in, we’re going full MMT. So those are my concerns about the tapering, its focus on financial stability and the risk that reactive policy will be procyclical.

 

TN: Interesting. OK, that’s great. Thank you. Sam. Help me understand, what’s your point of view on this? What gets the Fed to react and how do they react?

 

SR: Yeah, so I would go with neither of those will get the Fed to react. It’s not a question of should they or, you know, what they think they should do. But it’s a question of will they. And they won’t react to inflation. They do not care about the magnitude. They do not care about the velocity. And they won’t care for at least another nine months because we know the combination that they’re going to look through, the combination of basic facts and supply chain disruptions, at least through the end of the third quarter. They do not care. And then they will start the clock on their four quarters of inflation above or at two percent, and they want full employment before they raise. That’s four percent at least on measured unemployment.

 

So I would say, it, whatever you want to look at for inflation numbers, they don’t care. And maybe they should, but they don’t.

 

TN: So they don’t care yet. Or they don’t care period?

 

SR: They don’t care, period, until it’s been until it’s been a year of around 2 percent in this summer and fall don’t matter to them.

 

NG: Let me add one or it’s too late.

 

SR: Yes.

 

NG: I’m with you. You and I seem to agree. I mean, that is exactly the impression I got from Claudia Sahm’s words. I mean it was just straight up. And that’s where I worry, you know, I have a huge respect for Lail Brainard. She is a very, very accomplished economist. But she’ll go full MMT is what Janet Yellen wants. It’s what the Democrats want and I really worry about that.

 

Plus, you combine this with here we go back to Larry Summers. You combine this with this fiscal effort and one thing that, so in American terminology, progressive policies typically have historically been inflationary. In English terminology, is what I am, these socialist policies have a history of inflation. More government intervention, more pushing against the string of inefficient allocation of resources. Labor restrictions, minimum wage, universal basic income. It all leads to in one direction.

 

So I agree with you, Sam. I think the Fed doesn’t care and I think, hence, the reactive. When they react, it’s going to be, in my view, potentially too late. It’s already started.

 

TN: So I just sent out on Twitter a chart that Sam published about three weeks ago from another source on the negative impact of fiscal stimulus, and as we end up ’21, like in Q3, Q4 of ’21, that fiscal stimulus starts to have a negative impact. And certainly in ’22, the US fiscal stimulus has a negative impact.

 

So, you know, there are a number of things to worry about, not just with inflation, but with the efficacy of some of this fiscal stimulus that’s going into the market.

 

So with that, I want to thank both of you guys. Honestly, we could talk about this for hours. I would love to have this discussion with you guys again, you know, even in a couple of weeks to talk about other issues. So let’s see where this goes. But thank you so much. Thank you very much for your time on this. I really appreciate it.

 

We’ll get this out as quickly as possible. Thanks to everyone who’s watching this. Thanks for everyone who submitted questions. For those who did submit questions, for the questions we used, we’ll give you guys a month of CI Futures and look forward to the next time. Thanks for joining us.

 

Categories
QuickHit

Inflation: Buckle up, it may get worse (Part 1)

Nick Glinsman and Sam Rines are back in this QuickHit episode special Cage Match edition about inflation. Where are we in the inflation and what is the horizon? Both guests have different views and they explain exactly why they have such views. And what about China’s manipulation of CNY through hoarding metals and commodities? Is that a valid way of looking at inflation?

 

Part 2 of this discussion can be found here: https://www.completeintel.com/2021/05/06/quickhit-inflation-part-2/

 

Want the audio version? Play this on Spotify or find us in other podcast players. You can also find us in other podcast audio streaming services. Just search “QuickHit”.

 

💌 Subscribe to CI Newsletter and gain AI-driven intelligence.

📺 Subscribe to our Youtube Channel.

📊 Forward-looking companies become more profitable with Complete Intelligence. The only fully automated and globally integrated AI platform for smarter cost and revenue planning. Book a demo here.

📈 Check out the CI Futures platform to forecast currencies, commodities, and equity indices

 

This QuickHit episode was recorded on April 28, 2021.

The views and opinions expressed in this nflation: Buckle up, it may get worse QuickHit episode are those of the guests and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any content provided by our guests are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

 

Show Notes

 

TN: Today we’re talking about inflation. It’s been on everyone’s mind for the last couple months and we’ve got two macro geniuses to talk to us about it today. We’ve got Nick Glinsman from EVO Capital and we’ve got Sam Rines from Avalon.

 

We look at copper. We look at a lot of these indicators of inflation and it’s been on everyone’s mind over the last few months. A year ago, people were worried about deflation. Now the worry is inflation. Obviously we’ve seen a lot of monetary and fiscal policy in the interim.

 

So, Nick, can you give us your view on where we are with inflation and what that looks like over what horizon? Is it months? Is it five years? Is it, you know, how does this play out?

 

NG: The horizon is a little bit tougher. But my my thesis is based on looking back at historical precedence and I focused on the LBJ Vietnam War spending, combined with his great society fiscal spend, which ultimately led in the early 70s Paul Volcker’s fame containing huge inflation there was at that period.

 

And I’m sitting here having spent the last year but actually building this thesis up for a couple of years thinking that the equivalent of the Vietnam expenditure is Covid and the relief spending that’s been has combined Trump and now Biden, and then the great society equivalent would be Biden’s green infrastructure spending which, I slightly tongue-in-cheek called the green ghost plan, which is enormous. Amazing.

 

When I find myself agreeing with Larry Summers on inflation. I think his odds of a third in terms of this creating inflation, I would suggest a higher. In terms of timeline, it took five to seven years for the inflation to really kick in during the 60’s leading to Volcker. I think this time around, it will be much quicker due to the differences, a lot of globalization and supply chain management.

 

TN: Sam, can you kind of give us your view of where we are in inflation and what’s the duration that you kind of expect this to play out?

 

SR: I have a very different view. If you look at the lumber market, copper, et cetera, these are things that tend to sort themselves out rather rapidly. Being in Houston, the best cure for high prices and energy is high prices. We will pump more if oil ever goes to 80. It’s very similar with lumber and copper. Most of the mills are becoming much more efficient in lumber, for instance.

 

So we will see that begin to roll over and that will roll over in a very meaningful way as we begin to work through these supply chain issues that we know are coming in the summer and we know are probably going to persist in the fall. But as we get into the fall and we get into early 2022, even if we have a couple trillion dollars infrastructure, it’s going to be spread over the better part of 10 years infrastructure.

 

It’s not a fast spend and it will not save us from the fiscal cliff. It will not save us from the lower employment numbers that we’ve been seeing on an overall basis. Yes, unemployment is moving lower, but employment is not keeping up with the employment figures.

 

Once the economy begins to have to stand on its own two legs, even if it has a touch of a tailwind from the government, it’s still going to be very difficult to continue to see consumption going through the roof, continue to see the types of disruptions that we’ll see for the next six to nine months in terms of supply chain that will have one-off price implications.

 

But that to me says we’re probably getting towards the peak of the sugar high as we get into the summer and the other side of the sugar high is going to be very painful in terms of going back to a one and a half to two and a half percent growth rate in the US inflation that will be very difficult to get higher simply because it’s difficult to have sustained disruptions in supply and demographics that aren’t changing anytime soon. So we will continue to have a number of those headwinds. And I think that’s what the US 10-years is telling you, US tenure at 1.5 is telling you that the market’s looking through this summer and saying the next decade doesn’t look as good as the last decade in a lot of ways.

 

It’s something to at least keep in the back of our minds that the Fed doesn’t have great control over the 10-year. The fed has great control over zero to two-year timeframe. But nothing beyond that.

 

TN: Okay, so let’s look at common areas. It seems to me that both of you see inflation continuing to rise maybe not in terms of the rate of rise but certainly continue to rise until, let’s say say Q3 Q4? Do we at least have comic around there?

 

SR: Yeah.

 

NG: Yes, absolutely.

 

TN: When we look at some of the the pressures in inflation, part of my assertion has been, and I’m sure you’re both going to tell me I’m wrong, but as we’ve seen the CNY strengthen, my hypothesis has been with a strong CNY, Chinese manufacturers are stocking up on industrial metals, food, other things because it’s in dollar terms. They can get it pretty cheaply and they’re waiting for CNY to devalue again when their buying power will decline.

 

What I’m hearing is that a lot of these things are really going to China to be hoarded and as a play on a potentially devaluing CNY. What do you think of that hypothesis aligned with a lot of the central bank easing? Is that a valid way of looking at inflation? Meaning this is stockpiling more than it is demand pull?

 

NG: My view on China is that, if you look at food firstly, there is a food shortage crisis. And we all know what the CCP are most scared of, which is society unrest. And we can take the examples of the Arab Spring, food is the key. But I also wonder whether the Chinese are stockpiling in anticipation of decoupling? I think of rare earths, of which they have a large control of the refining thereof being problematic. Semiconductors, there is an issue there.

 

So if I extrapolate further, my view is I think the supply chain issues are much longer standing now because of various geopolitical forces creating a decoupling with China for sure. And we have this Anglosphere grouping that’s clearly beginning to take shape, which now looks like that will include India because of the health crisis there.

 

If we look at that, then the question is what happens with Europe? Again, I think that’s part of the supply chain problem whilst they decide which site they go to. Is it china-centric or is it anglers-centric?

 

So I think the supply chain issue is much longer standing, hence I suspect that we’ve got China positioning, because nothing goes on which in China without the government knowing about it, quite frankly. In terms of anticipating a supply chain issue, because all the commodities they’re importing they’re short off.

 

TN: Okay, Sam, first of all, what do you think about my hypothesis and then Nick’s qualification around the supply chain issues being much longer term on the back of decoupling?

 

SR: I would take the argument that decoupling isn’t an action. It’s a process, and the process takes a very, very long time. And that creates in my mind a much longer time frame for the United States to build out its portion of the supply chain, for instance semiconductors, et cetera. So I would say I don’t disagree that there is a decoupling underway. In my opinion or my argument would be that it will take much longer than a few years to really get that process to move and it’ll be particularly under this administration a much more diplomatic and less blunt force tools than we’ve seen in the past being used. So I don’t disagree with the supply chain eventually being at least somewhat disentangled from China. I would just argue that it will take quite a while to really begin to become an issue unto itself.

 

On your point that China stockpiling, that does appear to be happening. It does appear to be a hedge against a weaker CNY to come including with lumber. One of the reasons that lumber prices are spiking is because China’s buying a lot of lumber in the US. That is a significant problem. And I would point to, when they stop stockpiling, that tends to have a significant effect on the price of commodities in the opposite direction. We’ve seen that with copper a couple of times during their infrastructure builds.

 

The interesting thing right now is you’ve actually seen a pullback from infrastructure spending. From the peak in China, they’ve begun to do their form of policy tightening on that front already. Suspected will continue at least on the margin and that will be a significant headwind for those commodities that have been stockpiled when less of them are being used on the margin as well. So that that does play into a 2022 disinflationary type environment versus 2021.

 

TN: Given that we have all these different pressures, whether it’s supply chains, whether it’s stockpiling, whatever it is, what the people in the middle, so that the manufacturers, what capacity do they have to absorb these price rises? What are you guys seeing when you talk to people, when you read? Are you seeing that manufacturers can absorb the lumber prices, the copper prices and other things? Or are they passing that directly along?

Categories
QuickHit Visual (Videos)

QuickHit: Europe is undergoing a ‘partial’ regionalization

In this QuickHit episode, we’re joined by Velina Tchakarova, the Head of the Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy, to talk about the Europe reconfigurations and regionalizations on global supply chains, manufacturing, digitalization, and other industries.

 

The Austrian Institute for European Security Policy is a think tank, which works very closely with Austrian and European institutions. They provide a macro perspective for geo economic to strategic, geopolitical perspective on current and future developments in the fields of security and defense.

 

***This video was recorded on July 27, 2020 CDT.

 

The views and opinions expressed in this QuickHit episode are those of the guests and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any content provided by our guests are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

 

Show Notes

 

TN: But it seems to me that you’re also seeing, observing ,and commenting a lot on things that are happening in China. And we’ve started to see a lot of structural change in western diplomatic and political and economic relationships with China as well as supply chains. What we’re seeing here in the States is a bit of a decoupling of supply chains from China and North America. So a little bit of re-shoring and I’ve been curious for a long time, is that same thing happening in Europe now? And what do you expect that to look like if that’s the case?

 

VT: I don’t have a ready answer but I can provide you with two main narratives that are right now relevant for the situation here in Europe.

 

On the one side, there are many, many statements coming from the highest ranking-level. One of them was the French President Macron or take the European Union Commissioner for Industry and they were namely sharing this view that globalization had went too far. Now, Europe has to take care of its own. They call it “strategic autonomy.” That means that in fields that are of strategic importance, specifically geo-economic fields, strategic sectors, strategic industries, that some of them have to go back to Europe. On the side of the so-called geopolitical commission, there is this clear statement that we want to introduce a green transition, a carbon-free economy by 2030, 2040. That means that dependencies on raw materials, on metals, and stuff like that is going to be cut and this is still in place because China has a huge market share.

 

Now on the other side, there is also the narrative coming from highest ranking politicians and representatives that the “strategic autonomy,” in terms of global supply chains is not possible. And that this kind of COVID 19 responses were crisis-related. Some part of the re-shoring was due to crisis response, to crisis management and once things start working again post COVID 19, we are going to go back to business.

 

We know that certain European member states have very strong economic interests in expanding relations with China and right now. I can name one of these countries that’s Germany. The German presidency of the European Council has began and there is no secret that the topic China was on the top of the agenda for the next six months. Now with the shift in terms of certain perceptions when it comes to dependencies on China, things are going to move slower. We’ll be slower. That means investment deals, negotiations that were planned are not going on according to the pre-COVID 19 plans.

 

Investment deals between Europe and China is a very important point. Investment screenings, buying up of companies in Europe that have declared defaults, all of these things are going to be on the agenda for the next six months. There is a debate on reconfigurations of global supply chains going back to Europe. But on the other side, there is an expectation to go back to business because the economies have been struck and have been hit very hard by COVID 19. And so we are right now somewhere in between.

 

TN: Five or eight years ago, there were a number of infrastructure pieces that were sold to Chinese SOEs — in the Puerto Peres, in Greece and the Portuguese electric utility. We had a number of things that were actually sold to Chinese SOEs that’s been slowed down quite a bit. In terms of supply chains, I was involved in that first generation of Eastern Europe build out of manufacturing in the mid to late 90s. And when China joined the WTO, we saw a lot of that manufacturing and the fixed asset investment associated with it moved to China in the first half of the 2000s and then accelerate.

 

Do you expect a scenario where we see reinvestment in Central and Eastern Europe for regional manufacturing? Do we expect a rebirth of that manufacturing or is that something that’s bygone era? We’re going to continue to see centralization of manufacturing in China or other parts of Asia and Central and Eastern Europe is kind of passe? It’s kind of very 20 years ago?

 

VT: We have to tell first and foremost the facts. And the facts are that two-thirds of the trade that takes place within the European Union is actually an inter-state trade. It’s taking place between the member states. So in that context, there will be no necessity for reconfigurations at all.

 

But what I am expecting to happen is that due to this decoupling between United States and China, and also due to the increasing awareness in the European capitals in terms of dependencies on China, there will be a reconfiguration to some extent.

 

So partial reconfiguration, which will be initiated, will be supported by the European institutions. The very fact that we have a European Commissioner now for industry points to the increasing realization of how important this. In that matter, there will be certainly a partial reconfiguration coming back to Europe. Not just manufacturing. We are talking also about digitalization, that it has to take place. We are still actually in the middle of the process of a fourth industrial revolution.

 

Six months ago, there was almost no discussion on 5G Huawei being initiated and supported by Huawei, by a Chinese company. Now with COVID 19, there are already strong signals and decisions in United Kingdom, in France. There will be some similar reaction in Germany that a 5G being introduced by Huawei will not be in the interest of European sectors. So this digital transition will certainly be also part of this reconfiguration of global supply chains. Partially, like I said. We should not expect too much. But there will be certain, certain expectations are already in place that this is going to happen.

 

TN: We’ve talked about from Complete Intelligence for the past couple years how our hypothesis has been that Europe would be the biggest loser of a US-China trade war. The reason we expect that is once China cannot export its deflation to the U.S., it will have to export that capacity to Europe because Japan has already, after the 2012 protest of Japanese factories, Japan’s already ramped down its imports from China. As the U.S. is gradually decoupling, it just seems that it’s likely that more deflationary goods will go to Europe and potentially hollow out European manufacturing even more. Is that something Europeans are thinking about? Or is that something that just seems a little too far out there?

 

VT: Right now, I have the feeling that our stakeholders and political decision makers are preoccupied with coping with the post COVID 19 social, economic repercussions. It’s all about how to revive the economies. So there is no serious debate right now on that matter.

 

But I think this is a very important issue that you’ve addressed. From a current perspective, I don’t see how Europe has a strong position, a strong card on that matter. On one side, there is the systemic decoupling taking place. On the other side, there is a trade surplus between the European Union and United States. And we all know that the U.S. President Trump is not in favor of institutions such as European Union. I am expecting pressure that he will probably impose on the European Union in order to provide a strong narrative prior to the US election.

 

The geo-economic relations between the United States and the European Union, that means the European member states are going to deteriorate. That’s my expectation. In terms of re-election, this is going to be further the case. Political decision makers in Europe would have to find other geo-economic allies. They will probably look for solidifying business interests. This narrative of going back to business with China is quite strong right now in European capitals without thinking of the long-term implications. I’m not saying that I personally agree with it. But I’m just outlining the reality the way it is.

 

You mentioned Japan. There are also other strong regional partners and regional players. Here, the European Union has on one side a regional card to play with the European Commission how to trade deals. This is something that they are going to push for. But on the other side, when it comes to the member states where the political narrative is being pushed and decided on in the capitals. Right now, it’s all about the French, German access because of the exit of the UK from the European Union.

 

I expect that there will be further push for solidifying business relations with China in order to have a sort of an exit plan in case that relations with the United States deteriorate. In the European capitals, everyone is hoping for Joe Biden to win the election in November because if that is not going to be the case, the expectation is that the relations specifically geoeconomics, they are going to deteriorate.

 

TN: A lot to think about. Velina, thank you so much for your time. I do hope we can reconnect in a few months just to see how this stuff kind of bears out over the next few months, and again thank you so much for your time this has been really, really helpful for us.

 

VT: Thank you for having me and stay safe and sound.