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The Death of Growth: Old & rich vs young & poor in 2030 & beyond (Part 2)

The world’s birth rate is changing. Clint Laurent from Global Demographics shares surprising discoveries that he believes will happen in the next 10 years and how this will shape the world?

 

This is the second part of this discussion. Go here for part one.

 

Clint started Global Demographics in 1996 and cover 117 countries throughout the world and China. They do that right down to county level of 2,248 counties. Clint believes that demographics are better than financial data from the point of view of forecasting  because they tend to be stable trends.

 

Global Demographics is able to come up with reliable forecasts at least 15 years out. After 15 years, reliability goes down and they are typically never more plus or minus 5% error in our long-term forecast. Their clients are mainly consumer goods companies, infrastructure backbones and things like that.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Subscribe to our Youtube Channel.

💌 Subscribe to CI Newsletter and gain AI-driven intelligence.

📊 Forward-looking companies become more profitable with Complete Intelligence. The only fully automated and globally integrated AI platform for smarter cost and revenue planning. Book a demo here.

📈 Check out the CI Futures platform to forecast currencies, commodities, and equity indices

 

This QuickHit episode was recorded on June 17, 2021.

 

The views and opinions expressed in this QuickHit Clint Demographics Part 2 QuickHit episode are those of the guest and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any contents provided by our guest are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

 

Show Notes

 

TN: So Indonesia, India, Brazil and so on, so capital formation, capital investment is the real weakness there and it seems to me that’s a function of largely education. Is that fair to say?

 

CL: That’s exactly what it is. I mean, they you know, as they get the education right and, you know, they’re working on it, most of these countries that have been quite responsible in that area. And as they get that right, so the investment comes in, so the consumer gets more affluent and becomes a virtuous circle.

 

TN: OK, well, what timescale are we talking about for that consumption to come in a really notable way, for example, to take the place of, say, the under 40 Chinese consumption or the under 40, say, Western Europe or American consumption?

 

CL: Well, that’s the bad news. I mean, when you take India at least 15 years to get there. Because the education is only just coming right. And again to pick on India. India’s urbanization, 10 years ago, it was 30% of the population. Today, it’s 33% of the population.

 

TN: OK. So it’s not happening nearly fast enough.

 

CL: No. When you’re an uneducated girl in a village, why would you go to a slum somewhere of a big city? Your lifestyle would be actually worse, not better. And so they hadn’t been able to get that China effect of moving people from the low productivity agriculture into high productivity urban type of work.

 

TN: Yeah, but I think a lot of the, particularly the Westerners who are watching this would say, yeah, but I’ve been to Gurgaon and I’ve, you know, I’ve been to that kind of tech hubs in India. And I see, you know, a lot of women coming up in those hubs or have come up in those hubs over the last 10 or 20 years. But is not just such a small percentage that it matters, but it’s not making a huge difference?

 

CL: Exactly. It’s a small percentage. I mean, remember India is just behind China in terms of total population now. And by 2045, there’s 1.5 billion people. Because they’ve got the birthrate right under control as well. It’s dropping. But again, they’ve got an inertia of more women of childbearing age coming through. So total births keep going up. So they’ve got this problem of just too many people looking for jobs, which keeps the wage rates down. And that. And that’s what’s frustrating the education system, too, is they have to keep growing the number of school places to stand still, let alone expand. But they’re getting that right. So I don’t want to sound negative about that. All these countries are doing quite nicely on that, some positive.

 

And so but one important point to make is the demographic dividend hasn’t been collected. There’s was a lot of talk about India having a demographic dividend because there are always young people entering working age. But the trouble is they weren’t well enough educated, so they didn’t find jobs. In 2010, the propensity of a working age person to be in work was 58%. It’s now 50%. In other words, they couldn’t find the jobs for these people, so the dividend never paid off.

 

TN: OK, so jobs lead to consumption, of course.

 

CL: That’s right.

 

TN: But I guess. So it’s going to take these countries 10 to 15 years or more to get the quality of jobs that are needed.

 

CL: Yeah.

 

TN: So, you know, that growth that we’ve lazily relied on, say, China for the last 10 or 20 or 20 to 30 years, is there a gap between now and 10 to 15 years from now in terms of the rate of growth for, say, consumer goods and say, economic kind of new market entry, that sort of thing?

 

CL: Yeah, well, this is the crisis that’s coming. Because if we take, again, the kind of what I call the family stage countries, India, Brazil, etc, they actually need around about 250 million extra jobs in the next 25 years to get, to maintain their existing level of employment. Not lift it. Just maintain it. And that gives them a reasonable level of income. Not great, but hopefully with education situation, the earnings go up.

 

But let me put another layer on the cake, so to speak. This is fourth group of countries, which I call young and poor. I call them young because the median age of all of the countries in this group is 20 and some of them have a median age of 14. Mali and Niger, they both have a median age of 14.

 

That means half the population in those countries is under the age of 14 today. Yeah, and their birth rates are high. The average birth rate, an unweighted across these countries is 130 per thousand women. Most countries are at 40 elsewhere in the world. And the number of women of childbearing age, of course, are going up dramatically because of that as well. So even though the birthrate is starting to come down, it goes up dramatically. And it has a seismic effect.

 

First of all, is roughly a billion people in this part of the world at the moment. In 25 years time, there’s two billion of these people. In other words, in twenty five years, they add a billion people to their populations. And if I can just go on and to take Nigeria, for example, at the moment, has 45 million school age children, irrespective whether they are going to school, most of them are not. 45 million. It’s 90 million in 25 years time. Just to stand still on education, they have to double their education budget. And so, little own issues need improving.

 

TN: OK, so governments take, need tax revenue to grow their budgets. So will there will there be the incomes to allow them to grow those budgets just to keep up with where they are? And further, will they be able to accelerate the job growth to make sure they have those incomes, to keep their education, to improve their education like, say, India or Indonesia is doing well?

 

CL: Well, this is the crisis that’s coming because the answer simply is no. And it’s no for the simple reason that up until now, this is really what I was saying we were at a cusp. Up until now, the growth in consumption by the older affluent or the older countries generally, which includes China, has been such that it’s kept relatively full employment throughout the world.

 

There’s been enough jobs for those who are looking for jobs. And that doesn’t sound a bit. But even the young, poor countries have been trotting along at about 55% of working age people employed, which seems to work out quite well. But suddenly that whole relationship changes. As I said, the countries that account for, well, the old affluent account for 63% of global consumption. The other old add another 14% say up to 77% or 80%, chuck in a bit of India, 80%, which is also flattening out. So the countries account for 80% of the money that’s spent by households now flatten out in growth in their demand.

 

Layer on top of that, there’s a continuous increase in productivity per worker. The amount of number of workers needed to meet the new additional demand over the next 25 years is 300 million. And as I told you earlier, this 740 million people that are going to be looking for an extra job.

 

It’s going to be roughly 400 million people, mainly in the poor countries, are in a little bit in need, family stage countries, who are at working age, would like to have a job, but can’t get a job. That’s 400 million.

 

TN: That’s astounding. OK, so that’s as big as, say, the EU, right?

 

CL: Yeah, well, bigger.

 

TN: So if everyone in the EU didn’t have a job but they wanted a job. Man, woman and child couldn’t get a job.

 

CL: That’s right.

 

TN: So that’s terrible. So what do you think those people will do? What do you think some of the effects will be of this? First of all, where is this, kind of generally, geographically? Is this the kind of Bangladesh, Nigeria, kind of those types of countries?

 

CL: It’s based of the African continent and what we call South India, but not including India or Sri Lanka, which will be in Tibet, out there.

 

TN: So Bangladesh, Pakistan, Central Asia generally.

 

CL: And there’s a few small countries, obviously, in South America or Central America that are falling into this category as well. So it’s reasonably concentrated geographically. And it’s a real worry. And I think of myself. If I was turning, well, let’s say 20 and I cannot get a job. I’m scrambling for food. I’m scrambling for water, in some places in the world. What do I do? I’ve got nothing to lose. And that’s what something dramatic, I would rot and just die miserable, which is terrible.

 

So I think the world has a fairly major migration problem coming. These people are going to walk north. I would. So I don’t blame them. But it’s a desperate situation. So much so that in my own mind, it’s all very well to donate money to buy mosquito nets and things like that. I actually think would be better to donate money for a TV and an Internet connection so we could educate the kids. Because we could deliver education quite cheaply using modern technology. And if you could educate them, then they could do more productive things and then and so on and so on. You get the part of that. But there’s no easy solution to this one.

 

These people are largely alive today, will be alive in the next 10 years. And the consumption trends, well, they’re there too. The people with the money are getting older and saving. So the drawbridges are coming up. So this is.

 

TN: So migration. The migration issues we’ve seen over the last, say, 5 to 10 years sounds to me that they only intensify over the next, say, 15 to 20 years.

 

CL: Oh, incredibly so.

 

TN: And Europe is really the focal point. Yes. The US has some issues and maybe India, China have some issues. But it really seems to me that Europe is the major focal point there.

 

CL: But it’s the easy one to get to.

 

TN: Sure. Yeah.

 

CL: But there’s some other dimensions of migration, too, which is starting to come under stress. And I mean, for example, let’s take the U.K. It has one nurse for every 440 people in the population. So if you get sick, your access to a nurse is pretty good. But the UK hires nurses who have been trained and educated in the Philippines where there’s one nurse for every 4000 people in the population. Is that morally correct? Should affluent countries take skilled workers, from developing countries?

 

TN: But can you blame that worker for wanting to go to UK?

 

CL: Not at all. If I was the nurse, I’d be on the plane. I mean, basically, you’ve got the individual motivation and you’ve got the moral issue, and you’ve got the need. And then even if you take a country like Greece, which everyone says, oh, that’s nice and comfortable.

 

Greece’s population has dropped by one million people in the last 10 years. And that one million that are gone are skilled workers who got on a train and went north to Germany because under the EU, they can move.

 

TN: What percentage of the population is that? One?

 

CL: About 10%.

 

TN: 10% of the population?

 

CL: Well, you know, it’s a big drop. And again, you don’t blame the skilled plumber or electrician or whatever because he or she can earn 2 to 3 times as much going to Germany or getting across to Britain, which they could do perfectly legally. And then in 5 years time, the wife is with them, the kids are going to school, that kids speak German now, they never go back.

 

TN: So does this change, does this, you know, let’s say the education deficit issues and the jobs deficit issues in Africa, does it change immigration policy in Europe, for example, in the way Australia has the checklist of skills and those sorts of things to to migrate?

 

Does Europe come more to that type of migration policy to where they incentivize people, let’s say, in parts of Africa before coming, meaning get educated, you know, these sorts of things. And you can definitely come in. I mean, it certainly sounds like something that would be really helpful for places like Greece.

 

CL: Yeah, but not too helpful for places like Nigeria.

 

TN: Right.

 

CL: They’re losing the skilled worker. And the ability to lift the Nigerian economy is going to be a function of having skilled people. And if Greece takes them, that’s actually not that great. Right. So, yeah, you sort of resolve the great problem, but you don’t resolve the core problem, which is the change so to speak. Yeah. So it’s interesting because Greece, with its drop in population, its household values are dropping because the number of households is going down. And that’s the core asset of many households. So it’s trying to create some economic problems as well because the asset they could borrow against is going down in value, not going up in value. But that’s not just Greece. It’s Italy, Spain. It’s Romania, it’s Poland. And that being, you know, some of the talents are being sucked out. And that’s not good.

 

TN: So in sum, let me try to sum this up, because this has been a great conversation and it’s really opened up a lot of things I haven’t really thought about before. So so global consumption generally for, let’s say, the next 10 years or so is relatively stable.

 

We won’t see the rapid expansion that we saw in places like China over the last 10 or 20 years. So let’s say the pull on commodities right now, the inflation we’re seeing, the, you know, this sort of thing, that stuff really tamps down pretty quickly and really stabilizes for maybe a decade or so.

 

CL: Exactly.

 

TN: Once that stabilizes, then we see real disparities as these kind of young, poor countries explode in population. But the wealthy countries are pretty stable and continue to be pretty rich. Right. So we kind of have a status quo for the next decade or so. But then after that, there’s a real danger that emerges from global disparity.

 

CL: That’s right. You start to have a major, what I’d call a population crisis.

 

TN: Wow. OK. It’s a little bit dire. But this is great. Before we go, can you talk about, I know you have a couple of books coming out. Can you tell us what they’re about? I know they’re a little bit from coming to press, but I think it would be really helpful for people to understand what you’re writing about.

 

CL: Right. Well, one of the two books is basically called 2045: The Growing Demographic Crisis. And it’s pretty much along the lines that I’ve just discussed, the difference is, all the data is there. And you’ve got the data, if you like, at the segment level, which also go to by country level. And you can see how the numbers play out. It’s not something that we’re making these numbers up. They’re actually there. They’re pretty solid. And the core source, of course, is the World Bank and the United Nations that you can’t really argue with that. And it’s all old numbers behind what I’ve just discussed.

 

And the second book coming out is called China: 2040. Similar sort of theme. And what I have done that is China is going through a lot of changes that I’ve explained and China will continue to be important economically and politically for the next 10 years at least, if not longer. We know that.

 

So it’s actually quite important that people have a better understanding of what China is like demographically. And it’s not one country, it’s at least thirty one countries. The differences in consumption within that, it’s quite diversified.

 

This book is, if you like, the primer for someone that’s either doing business, thinking of doing business, investing in, whatever, into China. If you haven’t read it and you don’t know China, then you’d be dealing somewhat riskilly. If you read this, it’ll help you focus where the opportunities potentially are. Thanks for the opportunity to mention.

 

TN: Of course. Thank you so much for your time. You’ve been very generous and I think we’ve taken it a lot. I think of it to watch this two or three times before I kind of fully take it in. So I really appreciate it.

 

Further watching, please. We’d really appreciate if you’d like the video. We’d love it if you’d subscribe to our YouTube channel. And we’ll see you next time. Thank. Thanks very much.

 

CL: Thank you.

Categories
QuickHit

The Death of Growth: Old & rich vs young & poor in 2030 & beyond (Part 1)

Our guest is Clint Laurent from Global Demographics, an amazing demographer, businessman and observer of global trends long before they really take hold. He shares surprising observations that he believes will happen in the next 5 to 10 years.

 

This is the first of a two-part discussion. Watch the second part here.

 

Clint started Global Demographics in 1996 and cover 117 countries throughout the world and China. They do that right down to county level of 2,248 counties. Clint believes that demographics are better than financial data from the point of view of forecasting  because they tend to be stable trends.

 

Global Demographics is able to come up with reliable forecasts at least 15 years out. After 15 years, reliability goes down and they are typically never more plus or minus 5% error in our long-term forecast. Their clients are mainly consumer goods companies, infrastructure backbones and things like that.

 

💌 Subscribe to CI Newsletter and gain AI-driven intelligence.

📺 Subscribe to our Youtube Channel.

📊 Forward-looking companies become more profitable with Complete Intelligence. The only fully automated and globally integrated AI platform for smarter cost and revenue planning. Book a demo here.

📈 Check out the CI Futures platform to forecast currencies, commodities, and equity indices

 

This QuickHit episode was recorded on June 17, 2021.

 

The views and opinions expressed in this QuickHit Clint Demographics QuickHit episode are those of the guest and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any contents provided by our guest are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

 

Show Notes

 

TN: Over the last year or so, we’ve seen the pandemic. We’re now having this bullwhip effect with inflation and other things. But I guess this capping off in the last 20 years where we’ve seen China as the global growth market and the marginal consumer for almost everything. And it’s really forced me to think what’s next. You and I published a piece about a year and a half ago around China’s population topping out around 2023, 2024. And so I’m really curious, what do you see happening in the next 5 to 10 years that will really come as a surprise to people? What are some of your observations over the next decade?

 

CL: The world is actually as bizarrely almost on a bit of a cusp at the moment. The pandemic is almost irrelevant to what was going to happen. I mean, I know the pandemic caused a lot of economic disturbance, obviously affected some people’s lives quite significantly. But really, there was a lot of change that was about to start to happen anyhow, irrespective of whether or not the pandemic came along.

 

From a demographic point of view, the pandemic is not really very relevant. I’m currently based in the UK and the people who have unfortunately died from it, most of them would have died in the next two years anyhow because they had severe underlying health situations. And so, its effect on death rates has actually been very, very marginal.

 

Secondly, most deaths being over the age of 60, that means it doesn’t affect the labor force, it doesn’t affect the propensity to have children. So really, it will be a horrible little blip in the history of mankind. And hopefully we move on from it and the vaccines keep working. And so a little bit of hope there. But that aside, it was going to be a big change.

 

And if I can explain the change in the following ways.

 

Up to now, the world has perhaps been a little bit lucky in the sense to be, first of all, had what I call the Older-Affluent countries, and that’s Western Europe, North America and what I call affluent Asia — Japan, Taiwan, Australia. All of those countries, which are actually only 14% of the world’s population, account for a very significant proportion of the global consumption. As you know, it grew quite rapidly, which was really quite good. And that is really the first big change is going to  come into effect.

 

What’s already started to happen is people. The only growth in these countries is people over the age of 40. Every age group below that is in absolute decline. So even if they’re going up in affluence, the young affluent market is no longer a growth market. It’s more or less stable. Even if you add in increased incomes, which still occur, but at a slower rate. So you’re now looking at a 40+ age group, and in some countries, obviously, Japan is one, it’s 60+ that are the age group that’s growing.

 

So all of those societies, to some extent, are in a lot of trouble. They’re flattening out. They’ve moved from a pyramid population to a square, and that’s actually very good.

 

A lot of people say you should have a pyramid population with young people coming through and looking after the old. That’s actually the poverty trap. Because if young people come through, the dependance, first of all, will keep driving the society down. With a square, then the same number of people need education each year, the same number of people need health care each year. The capacity is there and it’s an improvement of quality rather than an increase of quantity.

 

TN: So you’re saying with these wealthy developed nations, Japan is an extreme example, consumption isn’t really the worry. It’s the growth that’s falling off. So the consumption is stable. It’s just not growing.

 

CL: Exactly. There’s one other big change to appreciate is what people say because they’re getting old, they’re going to run out of labor force. And here’s a statistic for you: In Japan, 25% of males, 70 to 74 are still in full-time employment. And you’re saying, “yeah, well, that’s Japan. It’s different everywhere else in the world.” You know, it’s exactly the same statistic in the United States.

 

The aged worker is a new phenomenon. In fact, the age worker is the fastest growing demographic. So these countries actually are not running out of workers. And the assumption that we all go decrepit and work after age 64 is just wrong. I am over 65, as you can probably guess. I don’t have a single friend who’s not in full-time employment at this point in time, enjoying it. It raises lots of issues.

 

So the labor force keeps going in these countries as well. So they don’t even need migrant workers to sustain these countries. So they are nice, comfortable niche. Growing steadily, not phenomenally. You’re talking about 1%, less than 1% growth in total consumer spending. Households are getting a little more affluent. Number of households is flattened out, which would have implications for the housing market. But it’s not going down, so it’s actually not too bad.

 

TN: So you say GDP is pretty stable, but what’s happening to GDP per capita in those countries? Does it continue to grow?

 

CL: It does, but just at a much slower rate. You’re talking 1% or even less than 1%, but it’s positive. And do remember, 1% of a hundred thousand US dollars is more money than the total income of households at the other end of the spectrum. Much of their spending power is quite significant. But a really important point to keep in your mind right now is that consumption expenditure will start to level out. It won’t hit that high growth rate anymore. It drops back to about 1% or even slightly lower.

 

Then the other big change you’ve got is what I call the next group of countries, which is older but not so affluent. And that obviously includes China. Now, let’s just put China to one side for the moment and look at the other countries in that group. You’re talking about Russia and the Eastern European countries. All of which have huge potential because like the previous group that I just talked about, they score really well on education.

 

And countries that score well on education, with the right capital investment, can lift the productivity. The countries that have weak education, it doesn’t matter how much capital you throw into them, they don’t lift their productivity. And there’s plenty of statistics to prove that. So these countries actually have a resource. I mean, Latvia, Romania. It doesn’t really matter. And that actually got the one thing that’s really hard to do. Good education.

 

Why is it hard to do? India has been really bad on education up to now. It finally has universal education. Every kid, 5 to 12 is now supposed to be in school. But it takes another 10 years before some of those kids come out of school and get into work. And it takes another 10 years before the workforce has become sufficiently skilled that the capital investment comes and lifts the productivity.

 

So these Eastern European countries and Russia are actually interesting from the QuickHit point of view. They start getting the fixed capital investment right, got the education right. They could actually be the next growth area. Only warning to you is they also are relatively old. So it’s a growth area of 40 pluses and 60 pluses. That is going to happen because they’re under earning at the moment. They can lift their incomes, obviously, buy bit of car, bit of clothing, all of those sort of things. But it’s a growth area of an older population, not a young population.

 

TN: And it’s something that nobody’s watching, Clint. Like, I don’t think anybody is really looking for that even as a possibility. A lot of people have written Russia off, see it as a petro state or whatever, and central and Eastern Europe is kind of just kind of a no man’s land in many cases. So some manufacturing there. There’s some services there in terms of globalization. But I don’t think there’s a lot of expectation to see rapid growth there and high productivity there. So I think that’s a really interesting question mark that most people aren’t even thinking about.

 

CL: That’s right. And if you go into these countries physically, you start to see some of the big brands starting to look at them. And you come across someone from XYZ Corporation there. We just have a little look. So some people are starting to see that it’s there. It’s just as you say, it’s not visible yet.

 

Let’s switch to China briefly. China slightly different and also very similar. First of all, remember 1989, China introduced the one child policy. That came under a huge amount of criticism. But ignoring how you feel about that, is one very simple thing it achieved. It levelled off the number of young kids needed to be educated. And subsequently started, it was 1979, they introduced. Such that by 1984, when they introduced compulsory education for all six to 12 year olds, they were talking of a relatively stable number of kids. So they could focus on the quality of education. And so every kid’s been going to school in such when you go to the year 2000, you’ve got this population still living in the rural areas. But who could read, write and do sums and all of those sort of things. Could get on their bike, go into town and get a job in a factory or an office or whatever.

And the differential between an urban worker and rural worker in China is 3.6. And that’s actually how China drove its growth and its productivity per worker and its influence. What it did is, it said, take all these people who are nice people, but not well-educated, not earning very much money, educate them, put them into job, let them earn lots of money, and have a good lifestyle. And that drove up the productivity and the whole success story of China.

 

 

TN: So urbanization and wage arbitrage, productivity gain for China. But is that running out in the next ten years or does that continue over that period?

 

CL: We’ve got it going through actually. It’s 20 million a year at the moment, which is a phenomenal number. That’s Australia, every year. It’s 20 million at the moment. We have it dropping down to about 11 million by 2040 because it’s still a lot of people moving there.

 

Now, this is the other big trick. Because some people have been saying, China’s population’s leveling out. And, you know, we thought it was 2023, where even the Chinese government agrees with us. Now, it’s 2023, and it’s leveling out. The working age population is starting to shrink. Oh, dear. That can have a decline in the workforce. No. They’re having a decline in the rural workforce. The rural workforce have in the next 20 years.

 

The urban workforce keeps growing for the next 10 years to 2030. The number of people working in urban jobs, which are highly productive, keeps going up. So for the next 10 years, China’s GDP growth still chugs along reasonably well. After 2030, the growth rate drops away and we have it down to about 1.3% by 2045, because it just isn’t the extra workers to keep growing the total GDP. So that’s the story there.

 

But again, coming back to the consumption side, China in the last 10 years in the urban area had this huge group of people, 220 million of them urban, aged 40 to 64 years of age, educated, earning quite good money by turning a stand and spending money on holidays and trips and things like that. And between 2010 and 2020, that went up to 100 million people. Think about it, a 100 million extra people with disposable income. It was no surprise that the retail side of China took off and tourism and all of that. It was those people. They’ve got a house. They’ve got a fridge, they’ve got a refrigerator. Let’s have some fun. That’s really what’s happening right now.

 

Now, the bad news is that now it flattens out. Every age group under 40 in China is already declining and will continue to decline in size. So don’t go after the kid market in China except on the wealthy and those sort of areas for education. The 40 to 64 age, what I call the working age optimist, it grows for a little bit, and then it flattens out. And it’s named the 65 plus, which in China is not like the other countries. The 65 plus at the moment doesn’t have great health, doesn’t have a great life expectancy. You get some extension of the workforce, but not a lot.

 

So China’s consumption is healthy as well. It’ll chugging along quite nicely. And to digress slightly, but I think we need to recover quickly here. The one child policy, it’s moved to three now. That’s totally and absolutely irrelevant.

 

TN: Yeah, it doesn’t seem like it’s going to do much. They’re too rich to want to have more kids, right?

 

CL: Exactly. And actually, it’s the birth rate that’s not the important point. It’s the number of women of childbearing age. And that goes down by a third. It drops 330 million now to about 220 million in 20 years time. And the birth rate can’t give up fast enough to compensate there. So births in 2019 are 14 million. It dropped to 10 million last year because of the pandemic, waiting to come back up a bit about to 14. It’ll be down to 11 million by 2030. And they can’t change that even with the three child policy. That won’t change.

 

TN: It’s not the three child policy, it’s the fact that there are not enough women to have babies. And those women are wealthy enough that they don’t want to have three kids.

 

CL: That’s really basically it. Just look at Singapore. They tried everything to get the birth rate up.

 

TN: I was there. They were paying people to have babies and it still didn’t work.

 

CL: Even send them on cruises. I mean, I volunteered.

 

And then you have, so that’s the second group. And the key point by the first group is nice and stable now, chugging along nicely, but no longer super growth in consumption. Nice growth in consumption is how I call it.

 

The third group, what we call the family stage. And that’s obviously dominated by India, Brazil, Indonesia all there. The bulk of populations is in that 25 through to 39, having children, at work, that sort of stage. So the working age population is still growing a bit, but not a lot. Education’s improving. It varies quite a lot across this group. India is at the weaker end. Indonesia is probably one of the better ends.

 

So, you’ve got a bit of a dichotomy there. But they’re generally in a position to be able to attract capital and generally in a position to be lifting their total consumption, but not dramatically. We’re still talking of relatively low incomes under 10 thousand USD for the average family per annum. So the growth is there.

 

TN: So Indonesia, India, Brazil and so on, the capital formation, capital investment is the real weakness there. And it seems to me that’s a function of, largely, education. Is that fair to say?

 

CL: That’s exactly what it is. As they get the education right and they’re working on it, most of these countries have been quite responsible in that area. And as they get that right, so the investment comes in, so the consumer gets more affluent and becomes a virtuous circle.

 

TN: And what time scale are we talking about for that consumption to come in a really notable way to take the place of the under 40 Chinese consumption or the under 40 Western Europe or American consumption?

 

CL: Well, that’s the bad news.

Categories
News Articles

Time To Rotate

Tony Nash joins BFM 89.9 The Business Station for another look at the global markets particularly discussing the “Japanese equity market”. Is it the time to rotate into value or maybe it is a sign that the broader economy is recovering?

 

This podcast first appeared and originally published at https://www.bfm.my/podcast/morning-run/market-watch/time-to-rotate on August 26, 2020.


BFM Description

 

With technology stocks hitting all time highs, there has been some inflow into the finance and utilities sectors. We ask Tony Nash, CEO of Complete Intelligence if it is time to rotate into these names. We also ask his views on the Japanese equity market and if there is still money to be made with the change in leadership.

 

Produced by: Mike Gong

 

Presented by: Khoo Hsu Chuang, Wong Shou Ning

 

Show Notes

 

WSN: So far, deeper dive in global markets today. Joining us is Tony Nash, CEO of Complete Intelligence. Good morning, Tony. Now, last night, U.S. tech stocks will slump relatively while laggards like finance and utilities saw some inflows. So do you think this is the time to rotate into value and maybe a sign that the broader economy is recovering?

 

TN: I think it’s certainly a time to to that that that rotation is starting. I don’t necessarily think it’s in full swing yet, but but we’ve received signals for the past week or so that that rotation would start sort of seeing some of the techs off.

 

Today is not really all that surprising, given especially some of the Fed and Treasury statements over the past couple of weeks.

 

KHC: Yeah. So in terms of cyclical stocks, Tony, what is your point of view in terms of which sectors might benefit?

 

TN: Well, I think, you know, we’ve seen tech with companies like Nvidia, Tesla, and these guys have just had amazing gains over the past, say, four months. I think, you know, the rotation into some of the finance stocks, into some other more mainstream, broader market equities is likely. I think the indices are assuming that tech stays at elevated values. That rotation will only help the indices if tech comes off. Given the concentration of waiting within those stocks, it could really hurt some of the overall indices.

 

WSN: And, Tony, let’s focus on one of these, you know, super winners in the last few months. And it’s Tesla, right? They have a decision to sell five billion worth of shares. Is that smart or overly ambitious? Move now. And what more what kind of growth can we expect from this company?

 

TN: Well, the I think the the growth in the stock price is very different from the growth of the company, so Tesla’s trading at a PE ratio of almost 1200.

 

OK, the stock’s more than doubled since March. So, you know, the company itself isn’t doubling. You know, I think it has. I think what the management is doing is making a very smart decision to sell equity while they know the price is very high. So from a management perspective, I think that was a very smart decision. In terms of a buyers perspective, I’m not so sure it’s possible that Tesla stays at these elevated level. People have been trying to short Tesla for years and it just hasn’t worked.

 

So it’s possible there’s growth there and it’s possible they stay at these elevated levels.

 

WSN: So, Tony, are you a big fan of Tesla? This level…

 

TN: It’s hard not to be whether I’m a buyer, personally or not, I would hesitate here. But, gosh, you know, I think there are other places to look that are better value.

 

But it really, you know, part of it really all depends where the stimulus is going. So since the Treasury and Fed are intervening in markets, if they’re targeting specific equities or specific sectors, then you kind of have to follow that money.

 

And so it’s it all depends on how much further these things are going to run and where that stimulus is targeted.

 

KHC: OK, based on PMI data, most of Asia remains contractionary. But for China, of course. You know, Tony, in your opinion, why is recovery not yet forthcoming? And is there a main catalyst needed for manufacturing to take off?

 

TN: Yeah, I mean, look, in terms of manufacturing PMI, as you have Indonesia, Thailand, South Korea, Taiwan, you know, they’re all growing, which is great. Myanmar is actually growing faster than China.

 

But what we don’t have really is the demand pull. And that’s been a real problem. And, you know, we’ve been talking about that since February and we’ve been really worried about deflation. And, you know, what we see even in Southeast Asia is government intervention in markets is really what, propping up a lot of the activity. And I think, you know, the big question I have is, will we see steam come out of recovery in Asia in the same way we’ve started to see steam come out of recovery in the U.S.?

 

I think the answer is unfortunately, probably yes. And I think until the demand from both consumers and companies comes back and the fear of covid wanes, I think we’ve got some some volatility ahead.

 

We’re expecting some real trouble in September. I think it’s great that markets are doing well today, but we’re starting to see the the momentum really slow this month.

And without additional help from the Fed or PEOC or other folks, it really slows down. The problem is the efficacy of that support really deteriorates the more you add to the system.

 

WSN: And Tony, look at Japan, right?

 

I mean, are trading the equities. They are trading at a steep discount to their historical premiums. Do you see any value in yen based assets? After all, Warren Buffett himself just dipped his toes into it by six billion dollars worth of trading companies did. What do you think?

 

TN: Well, that’s the answer. I mean, it’s hard to it’s hard to bet against Buffett. He’s obviously seeing real value there. And I think the Japanese trading companies are really, really interesting because they’re you know, they’re a very good play right now. So is there a value? Sure. I think there’s value there. I think with Japan, a lot of the story is around productivity and automation. If if Japan can continue to raise its productivity through automation, I think it will be a very good play.

 

If that productivity and if the level of automation slows down, then it becomes questionable because everyone knows about the demographic story in Japan, but the economy continues to grow, which is really amazing.

 

WSN: So it seems like you’re quite a believer in that this can overcome some of the structural issues. But what about the fact that Abe has resigned for health reasons? Does it change at all the economic and monetary policies in Japan that might change your decision?

 

TN: Yeah, I think when someone like Abe steps down,  there’s always momentum. So it last for several months. The real question is, how long should the next leadership last? And is there enough structural stability to continue the momentum in Japan, meaning it’s not growing leaps and bounds, but it’s stable growth and it’s healthy growth. So I like Japan a lot. We have had reform under Abe. We have had structural reform under Abe. I think it’s much more healthy today than it was in 2011 or 2010. A lot’s been done.

 

Japan has the capability to continue to improve, but it all really depends. There are regional dynamics and there are domestic dynamics. But again, I think if demand regionally and globally doesn’t return, which is likely COVID induced, then I think Japan, like everywhere else, will have issues.

 

WSN: All right. Thank you for your time. That was Tony Nash of Complete Intelligence, speaking to us from Houston, Texas.