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EM Meltdown: China, Turkey & Russia (Part 2)

In this second part, emerging markets expert Michael Nicoletos discussed Turkey and Russia. What are the major issues that Turkey is facing, specially around its FX reserves? They have an energy problem as well, and will soon need to choose between the US and Russia. And how about Russia’s love-hate relationship with Europe? How does Nicoletos see it will end up?

 

Please watch Part 1 first, if you have not already. Michael talked about China’s household debt and how much is that? Can they ever recover from the Evergrande disaster? And how they got into it in the first place? Is CNY still valuable? How do the Chinese get dollars now with their very limited FX reserve? Should you use the digital Yuan? How much is China spending right now to up its GDP?

 

Michael Nicoletos have spent most of his life around markets, and I used to run a hedge fund for more than 10 years on emerging markets. He shut it down in 2019 to take a sabbatical and Covid 19 hit the world. Now, he is doing a lot of research on emerging markets and trying to see what the next steps will be in terms of the investment world. But in the meantime, he is also advising a few firms on their investment.

 

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This QuickHit episode was recorded on October 20, 2021.

 

The views and opinions expressed in this EM Meltdown: China, Turkey and Russia (Part 1) Quickhit episode are those of the guest and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any contents provided by our guest are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

Show Notes

 

TN: Talking about EMs, and we talked about reserves, and you mentioned Turkey. Let’s talk about Turkey for a minute because you’ve made some really interesting statements about Turkey, and I’d like to really understand your perspective.

 

MN: Turkey faces some other issues. Turkey faces high inflation. More than 20% rates are around 19% of negative yields. The Lira has fallen more than 50% in the past few years. So you might see nominal GDP in Turkish Lira going up. But if you put it in dollar terms, it’s actually flat for the last ten years. It’s not flat, it’s flat-ish. So in Turkish Lira, the last ten years, the Turkish GDP has gone up 350%, which is a wow. But if you put it in dollars, it’s not flat, but it’s not something meaningful.

 

Turkey GDP in Lira and USD

Now, if you look at Turkey and the devaluation, the President of Turkey, Tayyip Erdoğan, has tried to stop the Lira from falling. Right now, it’s I think at its all-time lows around 920 versus a dollar. But if you look at the FX reserve, which is very tricky and this is very interesting for Turkey, you’ll see that, okay, the number is ambiguous because depending on what source you see, you’re going to see another number. But let’s say it’s around $18 billion. Now, this is the gross number. If we deduct gold and all the other stuff and we also deduct the swap lines, and I will explain what the swap line is, this number falls around to $20 billion. And this could be negative according to some sources because the dollars are not there.

 

What has Turkey done? Instead of using its dollars to protect the Lira from falling, I’m not an advocate that you should do that, but that’s what they’ve been doing. They went to the banks and did swap lines with the banks. And the banks are using depositors dollars to buy back the Lira. So depositors right now don’t actually have those dollars in their account.

 

Turkey FX Reserves

 

MN: Because the Turkish banks have made agreements with the central bank with swap lines, which okay, when your central bank gives you a swap line, it’s a guarantee if you’re a bank. And instead of, if you go and you see the headline number of the Turkey central bank, you won’t see it falling. But if you understand that they’ve been using depositors’ dollars to cover for it, you need to subtract that. So the number could be close to 20, maybe there are some allegations that it could even be negative. So if it’s negative, imagine. FX reserves in Turkey are pretty horrible.

 

You have, let’s say, $18 billion of gross FX reserve, and you have $130 billion of short term liabilities, within the next twelve months, Turkey has 130 billion of foreign claims. So again, this metric is not really good. Now, Turkey is estimated to grow around 8 or 9% this year. Again in Turkish Lira.

 

MN: If we take the Lira is down 25% this year. So this is an issue. Another issue is in Turkey, 60% of its current account is energy. They don’t have domestic energy, so they need to import energy and we know what’s been going on with the energy crisis and natural gas and oil going higher. So all these are main problems for Turkey right now, which I think will be forced to find a drastic way to… They don’t want to go to the IMF or the World Bank, but I think at some point they’ll have to go. And again here geopolitics come to play why they say geopolitics is because Turkey is in NATO. It’s the second biggest force in NATO. The US wants to keep it in NATO because wherever US doesn’t send military, Turkey does. Not many NATO allies send military forces wherever they go.

 

So Turkey is trying to play both sides right now. Trying to be the good guy with Russia, good guy with NATO. Trying to get the most out of both sides. But I think time is ticking and they will be forced to take some form of decision on what they want to do in the future because they’re running out of time in terms of their FX reserves.

 

TN: Yeah, it sounds like it’s pretty short time. Wow. Okay. So looking at the energy issues, not just what Turkey faces, but that Europe faces, I want to spend a little bit of time talking about the Russia-Europe relationship and what you’re seeing there. Will Russia provide sufficient gas to Europe this winter? And, from a financial perspective, how much will Russia benefit from that? Just generally.

 

MN: Yeah. Okay. But the thing is here the following: Europe trying to transition to a more green related economy. The planning was pretty horrible. I would say they wanted to do it fast and they wanted to say “blackmail” corporations to go to more green energy. What did they do then? They created the CO2 emissions credits. So if you were polluting above a level, you were forced to buy CO2 credits in order to cover for that. And that was like an indirect tax, making it less efficient for corporations to use that form of energy so they would be forced to go to other forms of energy.

 

Now, from going to coal to, let’s say, totally green. It takes some time to create the wind turbines and the sun. And actually Germany shut down all its nuclear reactors because of Fukushima.

 

TN: They have a lot of low-end Taiwanese fabs transition to photovoltaics with all of the incentives they were providing. I mean, for a long time, low-end fabs across Asia were just doing a very quick transition to a PV, and it was just a kind of back up the truck moment where they were just taking all the dollars they earned or Euros or whatever currency they could because Germany and all these other places were incentivizing them to do it. And they were low-end PVs. They weren’t high-end. They were just bog standard photovoltaics.

 

MN: No, no. Okay, but besides that, what did the European Commission do? There are auctions every now and then of CO2 credits. But the auctions are arbitrary. So the Commission, whenever it wanted the prices to go up, they did not do the auctions. So then the supply of credits was less and less. CO2 credit emissions went through the roof. So suddenly, if you use natural gas as an energy, it went even higher. And this created the viscious loop, creating the natural gas prices to go even higher.

 

In the meantime, Europe was negotiating with Russia about Nordstream, too. So Russia, which is a pretty good strategic and geopolitical player, realized that Europe was going back as being back in the corner and said, unless you sign whatever I want, let me put it in layman’s terms. I’m not going to pump anymore natural gas. Europe says, no, we have to sit down. We have to discuss. Okay, I’m not pumping. So one brings to another. And every time that Europe trying to play hardball, Russia says, okay, there’s no such a problem. I’m not going to be pumping and prices go higher and higher.

 

So I guess that at some point Europe will need to sign anything Russia wants at this moment. And will try to negotiate some form of an agreement which will be obviously not, it won’t be good. But it will be much better than the current prices that we’re seeing now. And because of the energy prices going higher, Russia is benefiting on a macro level, benefiting on a geopolitical level, and it’s gaining a lot of strength in the region.

 

TN: Hugely. Yeah. Hugely.

 

MN: So the two are interconnected. It’s not one or the other. So the energy crisis has helped Russia, and Russia has exploited Europe’s inability to act smoothly and fast.

 

TN: It’s very interesting. Okay. Just to close this out because I know we’ve been going on for a while. I’m just curious about Russia’s position with Europe, say, over the medium term. Do you see Russia and Europe growing closer? Do you see that relationship becoming tighter, or do you see that eventually becoming an antagonistic relationship? Are there substitutional energy sources that Europe can utilize and that eventually becomes an antagonistic relationship again? Just in general terms. I don’t necessarily political specifics. But how do you think that plays out?

 

MN: Well, I’ll use Henry Kissinger’s famous quote that was back, like 40 years ago. He said, “When I called Europe, who do I call?” So right now, you have, in Germany you just had elections. They haven’t formed the government. It might take months before they form a government.

 

In France, there are elections in April. It seems that the right could be a threat to Macron. And we don’t know what the “right’ means in France. It could be Le Pen or it could be someone else, but it could be anything right now. So right now, I don’t see a leader. If Macron wins, he could be the next leader of Europe. But right now, there’s a leadership problem within Europe.

 

So as long as there’s a leadership problem within Europe, in my view, there’s a vacuum. And I think Russia will exploit it to gate as much influence as it can. And I cannot foresee the future. But in the next six to eight months, I think Russia will try and get as much influence as it can and try to exploit that vacuum.

 

TN: I think you’re right. They’re very smart. They’re very smart political players.

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Podcasts

Blame the Hot Money

US markets continue their bullish trend. BFM 89.9 asks Tony Nash if this is due to better than expected corporate earnings in the coming quarters or the Fed monetary policy. Also discussed are the OPEC+ oil production and how oil will be affected by hurricane Ida, and what’s the status of supply chain specially around semiconductors?

 

This podcast first appeared and originally published at https://www.bfm.my/podcast/morning-run/market-watch/blame-the-hot-money on September 2, 2021.

 

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Show Notes

 

WSN: We speak to Tony Nash, CEO of Complete Intelligence. Now, US markets, I think it’s a bit of a choppy day, but still, nonetheless, the trend is bullish one. And what is that based on, though, is it expectations of stronger corporate earnings this quarter or just driven by ample liquidity flooding financial markets?

 

TN: I think more the latter than the former. We saw really good corporate earnings in the previous quarter, but in the current quarter, we’re hearing more rumblings of trouble with earnings. And that’s part of the base effect in the previous quarters, in 2020, companies had cut a lot of costs late in the year, so they’re reaping the benefits now. We’re starting to see the base effects come in where they had already cut a lot of those expenses in Q3 of 2020. So now we’ll see that going forward, we won’t see as much kind of profitability.

 

So what’s the baked into the market right now? It’s the Fed, it’s stimulus. It’s an expectation of a $3 trillion fiscal stimulus bill. So if we start to hear that this $3 trillion fiscal infrastructure bill won’t happen, we’ll see some disappointment if we see the jobs numbers on Friday come in disappointing, we’ll see some dampened momentum. And if we hear any more talk about tapering, which I don’t think we will for at least six months. But if we do, we’ll see some downward pressure in the market.

 

So all of those things are possible. But in the meantime, the Fed is injecting $120 billion into the market every month to keep everyone happy. And markets seem to be taking it well.

 

WSN: And I want to stay on corporate earnings, because I just wonder whether the recent inflationary pressures on the economy will be reflected in perhaps lower margins for corporate’s incoming quarters.

 

TN: Sure, companies are feeling pressure not just with raw materials and input factors, but also with salaries. Wage inflation in the US is pretty high right now. Companies are feeling it from all sides. So I think those margins are much thinner, both on those base effects I mentioned earlier. Also inflationary effects, both in terms of input goods and wages.

 

PS: And you say you paint a bit more cloudy picture for the US, but if you compare the US economy and financial markets versus Europe and China, they really have outperformed global peer strike. Could you explain it disparities there?

 

TN: When you look at China, I think it really has a lot to do with stimulus. China is really late to the game in terms of providing stimulus. They spent quite a long time in 2020 and 2021 deleveraging their economy. So getting rid of debt. Very procyclical. China was shrinking and they were delivering, which is maybe healthy for the balance sheet, but not necessarily the best thing to do to grow the economy.

 

In Europe, the ECB is really nervous with inflation. And so they may take more aggressive action against inflation instead of continuing to loosen to accelerate the economy. So the US is outperformed because nobody thinks the Fed is going to take aggressive action year, certainly. And probably not at least until Q two of 2022.

 

WSN: And how do you think the US dollar will react against the Euro and the yen in light of all these recent FED announcements on the timing of the tapering and also the rate hikes?

 

TN: We have the dollar continuing to weaken through, say, November. And we’re starting to see some expectations of dollar strength, not a lot of strength, but marginal dollar strength starting in, say, November. And that could be on, say, ECB deciding to continue to loosen. It could be on China. Adding stimulus. Currency is a relative game. As central banks get more active globally relative to the US, it could really help weaken their currencies on a relative basis.

 

PS: And let’s talk about oil because I want to get your views on yesterday’s OPEC+ meeting. They are sticking to next month’s  oil production increases. What impact will that have on prices in view? There also Hurricane Ida has also hit US or production?

 

TN: Yeah. Well, he can. It has fit some under sea production, but it’s really hit more refining capacity than really production. So the bigger issue in the US is around gasoline prices and refining, than it is around kind of supply of oil with OPEC+, it’s kind of a status quo. Let’s move ahead as we had expected, which is a really good sign. Look, oil is trading between what, 67 and $75 generally, and that’s kind of their happy. So as long as it stays in that zone, OPEC will continue to move ahead and stay within the agreement. If it goes higher, then they may accelerate the production. If it goes lower, they may pull back a little bit.

 

WSN: And let’s stay on supply side disruptions. Right. We talked about that just a few minutes ago. But do you think that there are still concerns over this, especially for things like semiconductors and certain commodities?

 

TN: Oh, yeah. Absolutely. So the supply chain issues, we hear a lot about Chinese ports and backups to Chinese ports and these sorts of things. But the Port in Long Beach in the US is backed up, hugely backed up. So the supply chain shocks are not only in China. US ports have their own issues. So when I hear, say, American companies complain about supply chain issues in China, that’s not the only factor. It’s US ports catching up. It’s US ports that are delayed and so on and so forth.

 

So I don’t think we’re done with this. In fact, it may get a little bit worse because the holiday season is coming up in a few months. And if we think supply chains are backed up now, they may get even worse going into, say, October and November, especially to import into the US.

 

PS: I mean, some are even saying that this could even go on to, quarter 1, ’22 or even the likes of semi cons.

 

TN: Oh, absolutely. Semiconductor supply chains are incredibly complex. So for them to get out of these issues, there are multiple layers of issues that have to be reconciled, and it could easily be Q1 ’22 by the time we’re out of this.

 

WSN: All right. Thank you for your time. There was Tony Nash. CEO of Complete Intelligence, giving us his views on where world markets are hitting. And I think the interesting point is that, look, the bullish trend is here to stay as long as the Feds just keep rates where they are. Plus, of course, there are expectations with regards to the US stimulus plan on the infrastructure bill. Right. Which I think is now going through the House. And apparently there’s something like 700 amendments that the Republicans want this document through the Max.

 

PS: I know, but I think they are optimistic. I hope to prove this call in October, but Tony does point relatively bleak picture for the short term. September. October is also seasonally weak in the US and also the stimulus packages or end or swim September. Very interesting. What he’s saying about the Fed is not likely to say much about tapering for the next six months as well.

 

WSN: Yeah.

I mean, if you look at where markets are right. The S&P 500 is up 20%. The Nasdaq are almost close to 19%. The Dow Jones is 16%. If I was a fund manager, I would do nothing. In fact, I might be tempted to lock in my games. Right. Because the year is almost coming to a close. Do I want to take on more risk for the potential return of two? 3%, maybe not. So we might be heading into quieter months for at least one or two, maybe towards year end, and then we might see some book closing.

 

But till now, maybe everyone’s just taking a bit of a breather. Look at markets, at what kind of corporate earnings will be coming out, and let’s see where the politicians are up to.

 

PS: And I wonder whether there’s an opportunity to reallocate to other markets in Europe where you see some value and even Southeast Asia as well in the midterm long term as well, for sure.

 

WSN: I’m sure Financiers already considering the Strategic allocation for 2022 Actually and rotating into markets that perhaps did not do as well this year. Stay tuned. BFM 89.9.

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QuickHit

QuickHit: What China is thinking right now?

China expert Chris Balding joins us this week for #QuickHit to discuss “What China is thinking right now?” What is the state of the Chinese economy? Are they really doing well in Covid? How about the deleveraging process, is that even real? And what’s happening to CNY? Also talked about are the politics around China especially how it relates to Afghanistan.

 

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This QuickHit episode was recorded on August 24, 2021.

 

The views and opinions expressed in this Sentiment has soured: How will governments and companies respond? (Part 1) QuickHit episode are those of the guest and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any contents provided by our guest are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

Show Notes

 

TN: Hi, everyone. Thanks for joining us for another QuickHit. My name is Tony Nash with Complete Intelligence. Today we’re talking with Christopher Balding about what is China thinking now.

 

Chris, thanks for joining us. Can you let us know a few things about yourself? Give us a little background?

 

CB: Sure. I was a professor at Peking University in China for nine years and then two years in Vietnam at the Fulbright University Vietnam. And today I am a super genius in the United States.

 

TN: Yes, you are. Thanks for taking the time, Chris. You’re one of the very few people I know who’ve actually had on the ground experience in China with a Chinese government organization.

 

So I think it’s really important to go to people like you, who had experience like you to understand what kind of China or the Chinese government is thinking now. Of course, it’s not monolithic. There are a lot of different opinions, but it’s good to have that insider’s view.

 

So I want to start off as we look at where we are in COVID, we’re a year and a half into it, depending on the school of thought, maybe it did or didn’t start in China, but we hear that Chinese economy is doing great and they’ve come out of COVID really well, all these other things. I’m really curious your view on the state of the Chinese economy right now. And what are Chinese economic planners thinking right now as they kind of potentially go into year two of Covid.

 

CB: So I think there is a couple of highlights out of the Chinese economy. First of all is that they’ve resorted to the pretty similar playbook that they go back to every year, which is pump credit, pump construction and infrastructure type spending.

 

In the early part of this year, we saw a significant amounts of credit growth. That’s softened as we’ve moved into summertime. That’s primarily due to because there’s a very clear summer and fall building season that allows builders in China to do things because the weather becomes inclement in significant parts of the year. And then if you add in the Corona backlog, that kind of is essentially almost trying to put two years of expected growth into one year.

 

We actually saw a lot of that. And that front loaded a lot of the credit and demand for things like commodities. This is why you’ve seen such demand for things like coal and steel, which were quite high. We’ve seen that soften as firms built their inventory and really ramped up during the summer building season as the demand for credit has softened and some of the building has actually been undertaken. You’ve seen a softening of that which has caused you’ve already seen talk of maybe there’s going to be unleashing or the economy is a little bit softer than the planners would like. So there’s talk of unleashing some additional credit growth trying to stimulate different parts of the economy. We’ll have to wait and see if that happens.

This chart of ICE Rotterdam Coal is generated from CI Futures, an app forecasting nearly a thousand assets across currencies, commodities, market indices, and economics using artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies. Curious how it can you and your business? Book a time with our expert and get free trial.

 

 

 

This chart of Steel is generated from CI Futures, an app forecasting nearly a thousand assets across currencies, commodities, market indices, and economics using artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies. Curious how it can you and your business? Book a time with our expert and get free trial.

 

 

 

Generally speaking, the rule is, if there’s a debate about whether or not they’re going to unleash credit growth, I would definitely take the over.

 

TN: By about three times. Right. So one of the interesting things you mentioned is that you said that they expended credit in the early part of this year. But what I read from investment banks and what I’ve read from other people who look at China is that China just underwent this big deleveraging process. Is that real? I’m just not sure, because I see on one side that there’s this talk about deleveraging, but my gut tells me it may not necessarily be happening. Is it happening, or is it something that’s just happening on paper or what’s your view?

 

CB: It’s tough to understand the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics and PBOC’s math as to how they arrived at that, because if you’re just running more generalized numbers, it’s very clear that debt at all levels has continued to outpace GDP. So it’s very difficult to understand how they’re estimating a leveraging. And it’s important to note that we did not see, let’s say, the rapid, rapid expansion of economic growth that you saw, for instance, in the United States.

This chart of China GDP is generated from CI Futures, an app forecasting nearly a thousand assets across currencies, commodities, market indices, and economics using artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies. Curious how it can you and your business? Book a time with our expert and get free trial.

 

 

 

And what I mean by that is, whereas any United States, maybe growth went from two or three to 5% relative, almost doubling, you know. You probably saw Chinese growth go for maybe like 5% last year to seven or 8% with the Corona boost where you have that base effect. And so you didn’t see it go to, like, 10, 12, 15% that you might have seen if it had really in relative terms, they doubled from the previous year.

 

And so it’s very difficult to understand how they arrive at those deleveraging numbers. And as we all know, China is famous for fudging their numbers. So it’s very difficult to understand how they’re arriving at those numbers.

 

TN: Right. No, I agree. I haven’t believed it when I’ve heard it, but I kind of nod along as if it’s real. But I think, you know, the Chinese economic data a lot more intimately than I do, but I just don’t see where it’s happening, where it’s actually materializing instead of just being debt transfers.

 

Okay. So earlier you said that Chinese economy is slowing. Now, from my perspective, that’s worrisome partly because you’re going into a big export season, and we’ve got some ports that are stopped up. We’ve also got an election next year with Xi Jinping being reelected, whether that’s in square quotes or not, but Xi Jinping being reelected next year.

 

In terms of the resources put towards stimulus this time around, do you expect that to be more intensive than normal?

 

CB: Typically, what you see. And you saw this the first time Xi was elected, you saw this second time Xi was elected. What you typically see is a pretty significant boost to fiscal outlays. And so I think if history is any guide, I think you’re probably going to see going in the fall and the first of year, it’s very, very likely you’re going to see some type of significant boost to fiscal outlays. And this pattern goes back many, many years well before Xi that when there are these elections. And I’m not sure if it’s a scare quotes or air quotes, but both seem to…

 

TN: Yeah.

 

CB: So I think it is very, very likely that you’re likely to see that. And one of the things I think that a lot of people have missed out on is yes, there were absolutely corporate, let’s say, bailouts or corporate funds for Corona. But one of the things is that in the United States, there were the large amounts of transfers directly to households. China has not enjoyed those transfers directly to households.

 

And so actually, consumer spending in China is actually pretty soft. And those are buying inflated data standards. And so I think that is something that is very important to note when we’re talking about the health of the Chinese consumer.

 

TN: Yep. That’s great. Okay. So I also want to talk about the supply chain issues. And I was just reading a story today about how Pudong Airport has been shut down. Cargo on Pudong Airport is going to be much slower for a period of time because of anothe Covid outbreak. This sort of thing. Do you see ongoing port capacity issues related to COVID? Is that something that you’re kind of concerned about?

 

CB: I think that is something that you’re going to be seeing for definitely the foreseeable future. And I should say it’s not just China. You’re seeing a lot of this in other parts of the world that I know, specifically Vietnam, the Middle East. I’ve heard of similar things in Europe where they are just straining at capacity. Sometimes it’s due to COVID shut down. Sometimes it’s due to other issues. But absolutely, these are issues that I think are not going away anytime soon.

 

And it is, I mean one of the debates in the United States right now is transitory or structural inflation. And I think, not to be capping out on the issue, but I do think it is kind of a mix of both. And I think the supply chain issues don’t be surprised if we’re looking at very likely two years before all these issues are really worked through, because when people went to, let’s say, just in time or contract manufacturing, what that did is that gave you less wiggle room. So you did not just have a massive warehouse of supply that you inventory, and then you could draw down as necessary where it would give you three months to make a mistake. Now people were essentially saying, I got one week of inventory, and if that one week gets shot, I’m in deep trouble.

 

So the chips are, there’s chips, there’s car, there’s Corona shutdowns, there’s capacity issues at some ports. And so it’s going to take a couple of years, probably to work through all these issues to return to what we think of as some degree of normalcy.

 

TN: Right. What’s interesting to me about that is the previous administration of the US tried to bring manufacturing businesses back to the US.

 

Now, with COVID because of the global supply chain issues and the intermittent supply issues, there’s more of a move to bring things back, at least to North America. I know lots going into Mexico right now. Some’s going into the US to minimize the disruption of things, especially in electronic supply chain.

 

So it seems like regardless of the kind of official policy, whether it’s trade policy or just say public health policy, it looks like more of this regionalization is happening. Does that make sense to you?

 

CB: Yeah, absolutely. I mean, look, nobody is going to announce that they’re leaving China for many reasons. But nobody’s going to announce that they’re leaving China. But you do absolutely see a spread of manufacturing capabilities.

 

Whether that is because they want to have multiple manufacturing bases, they want to be more diversified, whether it’s because of IT issues, whether it’s because of Corona risks, tariffs, all of these issues, there is absolutely increasing diversification of manufacturing capabilities, whether it’s Mexico, India, Malaysia, all of these different places. You’ve even seen Africa doing relatively well in certain areas. So it has absolutely happened.

 

TN: Okay. One last question on the economy then we’ll move to kind of politics and China’s place in the world. What’s the thought behind the elevated CNY? We’re trading much higher than we have for a long time, and it stayed there, right? It’s pegged right around 6.4 something, and it’s been there since Q1, I think. Why the persistent strength in CNY?

 

CB: Well, I mean, I think first of all, they have been running during Corona pretty significant surpluses. The United States has exports to China and other parts of the world have declined, not insignificantly or remained flat as we’re importing a lot more. That’s number one.

 

I think also the dollar has gone into a specific range. And the way that I think of the CNY is it’s basically just a reverse USB tracker, which I think explains most of what we’re seeing. I think what they’re trying to do and the reason that China has been buying some dollars, not in major amounts, but I think they kind of have, like, ICBC and CCB, those types of banks acting as dollar cushions for lack of a better term, is that they don’t want it to appreciate too much for a number of reasons, because they know they’ve become more expensive and that would just make it that much more expensive. So in a way, I think they’re trying to manage that, manage that flow. But I think it’s still generally within a range where it’s like you can say they’re within spitting distance of what their index say they should be. Okay, that’s fair.

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TN: Okay. Now let’s move on to politics. Let’s move on to kind of China’s big, long term, multi hundred year plan to rule the world, which I think is not real.

 

So let’s talk about Afghanistan. This just happened over the last couple of weeks, and there’s a few that China is going to be the master winner of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. I think there are multiple perspectives on that, but the consensus view seems to be that the US really did had to job on the withdrawal. And the ultimate winner of this is China. Can you kind of walk me through some of your views on that? What are some of the possibilities there with China and Afghanistan?

 

CB: Sure. So I think it is very fair to say that the United States has pretty badly bungled the withdrawal. You know, why, you know, we should have waited until we’d already evacuated all the army to say we’re going to start evacuating US citizens and Afghani translators and people like that.

 

One of the things I do think is absolutely happening. And this is not just China. And you’ve heard this from country after country. Taiwan, Germany, UK on down is they are saying we need to go back to the drawing board and re evaluate everything we think we know.

 

Okay. And somebody that I was talking to, I think, expressed it very well is the United States still has credibility because we can move large amounts of assets, whether it’s military, governmental, other private sector, we can bring significant assets and influence to the table. What, this has really changed in a lot of people’s minds is confidence.

 

TN: Yes. That’s fair.

 

CB: That has changed a lot of people’s mind. So you have a lot of people going back to the drawing board. One of the things I’m going to be a little bit hesitant to do is start pronouncing winners, losers, and this is what XYZ country is going to do in ABC country is going to do. And the reason I say that is it’s very, very plausible to construct a scenario where the Taliban and the CCP become BFFs. Okay?

 

TN: Sure.

 

CB: I mean, if China is shipping large amounts of fentanyl out of northeast China, it’s not a crazy scenario to say they partner with the Taliban to start shipping large amounts of opium into the United States at the same time.

 

TN: Sure.

 

CB: Not a crazy scenario. It’s also not a crazy scenario for the Taliban to start bombing China within a year or two. Okay. You could very easily construct those types of scenarios that lead to that. Okay. So it’s very, very difficult to construct those types of scenarios with any what I would consider a degree of certainty. Okay?

 

TN: Sure. So what about the, the China-Pakistan relationship? $46 billion of investment, supposedly, supposedly a tight relationship there. That’s arguable. Do you think that pays dividends in Afghanistan, or is that kind of something that’s a little bit, I wouldn’t say irrelevant, but a little bit less directly connected.

 

CB: So I think Pakistan is actually very pretty directly involved in all of this. But again, it’s very difficult to say with a high degree of certainty what’s happening there because Pakistan has very direct connections into both the Taliban, Al Qaeda. Some would even say that they were a Pakistani security service creation. At the same time, it’s well known that there are blood feuds between groups within each of those organizations.

 

So it’s very difficult to get to say exactly who the winner, loser there. With regards to China and Pakistan, one of the things that you’ve seen very clearly is that pretty much the Pakistani government and the Pakistani elites are effectively compromised by China. They will say nothing about wingers and other issues.

 

At the same time, everything, I think indicative on the ground and of the mass population is that there is maybe not extreme, but I would say broad discontent with the Pakistani relationship with China for many reasons.

 

TN: From who and Pakistan? Is it from the armed forces? Is it from other parts of the government, from regular folks who isn’t happy with that relationship?

 

CB: I think a lot of folks broadly. The business community. I think there’s a growing sense that they are effectively a Chinese colony. One Pakistani I know who described it as such. So I think there is very broad discontent. And as we all know, Pakistan has quite the lengthy history of governmental instability.

 

So similar to what you’ve seen in other countries in the region, it’s very easy to paint a picture, a scenario where the current government remains compromised and under the thumb of the CCP for years to come. I think it’s also plausible that a new government or some type of political instability happens in Pakistan. And all of a sudden, there’s an about face on how to manage relationships with China.

 

Generally speaking, though, I think there is going to be very tight coordination between Beijing, Islamabad and Kabul because those… Pakistan, I mean, almost anything that happens in Afghanistan is going to be maybe not controlled by Pakistan. I think that overstate it. But there’s going to be large amounts of information flows and influence back and forth happens over what happens in Afghanistan.

 

TN: Yeah. Okay. That’s all really interesting. I think we could spend a long time talking about China, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Russia, kind of where all those countries come together, Central Asia. But I want to end on this.

 

We’ve seen, a lot really changed with US standing in the world over the past couple of weeks over Afghanistan. We’ve seen a lot change in the US China relationship over the past year with the new administration. And so let’s talk for a minute about the overall US China relationship. What’s your thought there? Are they getting along? Is there a constructive dialogue? How do issues like Taiwan fit within that discussion? Can you just help me think about some of your thoughts there?

 

CB: So I was talking to someone, and I think they put succinctly the way that I would characterize the Biden administration’s record on China. You can’t criticize them for what they’ve done on China because they really haven’t done anything at all. Okay. Other than adding a couple of names to the Sanctiosn books, there really has not anything taken place.

 

They promised that they were going to get out their China strategy plan in June. Then there were rumblings that might happen in July, where now at almost rapidly approaching September 1. And now there’s not even talk of when it might be released. So really, nothing has been happened except for the Alaska meeting, which apparently went over like a lead balloon.

 

Everything right now just seems to be a stalemate. And the Biden administration is worrying, and that China is still moving forward, and the Biden administration is basically doing nothing.

 

The most telling point to me about the by administration approach, and I think this is something I think you should fault in. In fairness, Trump for is look, we can talk about values and do the right thing and all this kind of good stuff. But the United States, at some point has to actually put resources into this effort.

 

And the Trump administration, other than political capital with allies or other countries, never put any real hard resources or assets into these issues. And the point I would make is the Biden administration has made a point of spending literally trillions of dollars. And to the best of my knowledge, there has been almost zero spending passed that has really anything to do with China. Okay.

 

We cannot continue to talk to countries like Vietnam, Malaysia, South Korea, Japan. You cannot talk about the threat China poses and never spend any money on the issue.

 

TN: Sure.

 

CB: Okay. And look, this doesn’t have to mean we go out and increase military spending by 20%. This could simply mean we’re going to go into Vietnam and say, we want to have a development program and, you know, help solve issues. This can mean capitalizing the Development Finance Corporation to help countries like India and Malaysia and say, look, there is a real opportunity that does not involve the Belt and Road, where there’s going to be green standards or these non-corrupt standards and things like this to make sure that this money is really helping your country. You know, and it was probably something that was negotiated could be all the way back to the Obama administration.

 

There was some type of military center opened in, I believe, Jakarta with the Indonesian government that was supposed to have other governments. It’s a small center. Even those types of things. There’s simply not the resources being dedicated. And I think that’s indicative of where this ranks within the Biden administration priorities.

 

TN: I’ll be honest, Chris, it sounds like a mess. It sounds pretty bleak to me.

 

So great. I really appreciate this. I think if anybody knows has an idea of what China is thinking, I think you’re the guy. And I really, really appreciate your time.

 

Everyone watching. Please please subscribe to our YouTube channel. The more we have, the more we can bring to you as a part of our videos. And, Chris, thank you so much. And thanks to everyone. We’ll see you on the next interview. Thanks.

Categories
QuickHit

The Death of Growth: Old & rich vs young & poor in 2030 & beyond (Part 1)

Our guest is Clint Laurent from Global Demographics, an amazing demographer, businessman and observer of global trends long before they really take hold. He shares surprising observations that he believes will happen in the next 5 to 10 years.

 

This is the first of a two-part discussion. Watch the second part here.

 

Clint started Global Demographics in 1996 and cover 117 countries throughout the world and China. They do that right down to county level of 2,248 counties. Clint believes that demographics are better than financial data from the point of view of forecasting  because they tend to be stable trends.

 

Global Demographics is able to come up with reliable forecasts at least 15 years out. After 15 years, reliability goes down and they are typically never more plus or minus 5% error in our long-term forecast. Their clients are mainly consumer goods companies, infrastructure backbones and things like that.

 

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This QuickHit episode was recorded on June 17, 2021.

 

The views and opinions expressed in this QuickHit Clint Demographics QuickHit episode are those of the guest and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any contents provided by our guest are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

 

Show Notes

 

TN: Over the last year or so, we’ve seen the pandemic. We’re now having this bullwhip effect with inflation and other things. But I guess this capping off in the last 20 years where we’ve seen China as the global growth market and the marginal consumer for almost everything. And it’s really forced me to think what’s next. You and I published a piece about a year and a half ago around China’s population topping out around 2023, 2024. And so I’m really curious, what do you see happening in the next 5 to 10 years that will really come as a surprise to people? What are some of your observations over the next decade?

 

CL: The world is actually as bizarrely almost on a bit of a cusp at the moment. The pandemic is almost irrelevant to what was going to happen. I mean, I know the pandemic caused a lot of economic disturbance, obviously affected some people’s lives quite significantly. But really, there was a lot of change that was about to start to happen anyhow, irrespective of whether or not the pandemic came along.

 

From a demographic point of view, the pandemic is not really very relevant. I’m currently based in the UK and the people who have unfortunately died from it, most of them would have died in the next two years anyhow because they had severe underlying health situations. And so, its effect on death rates has actually been very, very marginal.

 

Secondly, most deaths being over the age of 60, that means it doesn’t affect the labor force, it doesn’t affect the propensity to have children. So really, it will be a horrible little blip in the history of mankind. And hopefully we move on from it and the vaccines keep working. And so a little bit of hope there. But that aside, it was going to be a big change.

 

And if I can explain the change in the following ways.

 

Up to now, the world has perhaps been a little bit lucky in the sense to be, first of all, had what I call the Older-Affluent countries, and that’s Western Europe, North America and what I call affluent Asia — Japan, Taiwan, Australia. All of those countries, which are actually only 14% of the world’s population, account for a very significant proportion of the global consumption. As you know, it grew quite rapidly, which was really quite good. And that is really the first big change is going to  come into effect.

 

What’s already started to happen is people. The only growth in these countries is people over the age of 40. Every age group below that is in absolute decline. So even if they’re going up in affluence, the young affluent market is no longer a growth market. It’s more or less stable. Even if you add in increased incomes, which still occur, but at a slower rate. So you’re now looking at a 40+ age group, and in some countries, obviously, Japan is one, it’s 60+ that are the age group that’s growing.

 

So all of those societies, to some extent, are in a lot of trouble. They’re flattening out. They’ve moved from a pyramid population to a square, and that’s actually very good.

 

A lot of people say you should have a pyramid population with young people coming through and looking after the old. That’s actually the poverty trap. Because if young people come through, the dependance, first of all, will keep driving the society down. With a square, then the same number of people need education each year, the same number of people need health care each year. The capacity is there and it’s an improvement of quality rather than an increase of quantity.

 

TN: So you’re saying with these wealthy developed nations, Japan is an extreme example, consumption isn’t really the worry. It’s the growth that’s falling off. So the consumption is stable. It’s just not growing.

 

CL: Exactly. There’s one other big change to appreciate is what people say because they’re getting old, they’re going to run out of labor force. And here’s a statistic for you: In Japan, 25% of males, 70 to 74 are still in full-time employment. And you’re saying, “yeah, well, that’s Japan. It’s different everywhere else in the world.” You know, it’s exactly the same statistic in the United States.

 

The aged worker is a new phenomenon. In fact, the age worker is the fastest growing demographic. So these countries actually are not running out of workers. And the assumption that we all go decrepit and work after age 64 is just wrong. I am over 65, as you can probably guess. I don’t have a single friend who’s not in full-time employment at this point in time, enjoying it. It raises lots of issues.

 

So the labor force keeps going in these countries as well. So they don’t even need migrant workers to sustain these countries. So they are nice, comfortable niche. Growing steadily, not phenomenally. You’re talking about 1%, less than 1% growth in total consumer spending. Households are getting a little more affluent. Number of households is flattened out, which would have implications for the housing market. But it’s not going down, so it’s actually not too bad.

 

TN: So you say GDP is pretty stable, but what’s happening to GDP per capita in those countries? Does it continue to grow?

 

CL: It does, but just at a much slower rate. You’re talking 1% or even less than 1%, but it’s positive. And do remember, 1% of a hundred thousand US dollars is more money than the total income of households at the other end of the spectrum. Much of their spending power is quite significant. But a really important point to keep in your mind right now is that consumption expenditure will start to level out. It won’t hit that high growth rate anymore. It drops back to about 1% or even slightly lower.

 

Then the other big change you’ve got is what I call the next group of countries, which is older but not so affluent. And that obviously includes China. Now, let’s just put China to one side for the moment and look at the other countries in that group. You’re talking about Russia and the Eastern European countries. All of which have huge potential because like the previous group that I just talked about, they score really well on education.

 

And countries that score well on education, with the right capital investment, can lift the productivity. The countries that have weak education, it doesn’t matter how much capital you throw into them, they don’t lift their productivity. And there’s plenty of statistics to prove that. So these countries actually have a resource. I mean, Latvia, Romania. It doesn’t really matter. And that actually got the one thing that’s really hard to do. Good education.

 

Why is it hard to do? India has been really bad on education up to now. It finally has universal education. Every kid, 5 to 12 is now supposed to be in school. But it takes another 10 years before some of those kids come out of school and get into work. And it takes another 10 years before the workforce has become sufficiently skilled that the capital investment comes and lifts the productivity.

 

So these Eastern European countries and Russia are actually interesting from the QuickHit point of view. They start getting the fixed capital investment right, got the education right. They could actually be the next growth area. Only warning to you is they also are relatively old. So it’s a growth area of 40 pluses and 60 pluses. That is going to happen because they’re under earning at the moment. They can lift their incomes, obviously, buy bit of car, bit of clothing, all of those sort of things. But it’s a growth area of an older population, not a young population.

 

TN: And it’s something that nobody’s watching, Clint. Like, I don’t think anybody is really looking for that even as a possibility. A lot of people have written Russia off, see it as a petro state or whatever, and central and Eastern Europe is kind of just kind of a no man’s land in many cases. So some manufacturing there. There’s some services there in terms of globalization. But I don’t think there’s a lot of expectation to see rapid growth there and high productivity there. So I think that’s a really interesting question mark that most people aren’t even thinking about.

 

CL: That’s right. And if you go into these countries physically, you start to see some of the big brands starting to look at them. And you come across someone from XYZ Corporation there. We just have a little look. So some people are starting to see that it’s there. It’s just as you say, it’s not visible yet.

 

Let’s switch to China briefly. China slightly different and also very similar. First of all, remember 1989, China introduced the one child policy. That came under a huge amount of criticism. But ignoring how you feel about that, is one very simple thing it achieved. It levelled off the number of young kids needed to be educated. And subsequently started, it was 1979, they introduced. Such that by 1984, when they introduced compulsory education for all six to 12 year olds, they were talking of a relatively stable number of kids. So they could focus on the quality of education. And so every kid’s been going to school in such when you go to the year 2000, you’ve got this population still living in the rural areas. But who could read, write and do sums and all of those sort of things. Could get on their bike, go into town and get a job in a factory or an office or whatever.

And the differential between an urban worker and rural worker in China is 3.6. And that’s actually how China drove its growth and its productivity per worker and its influence. What it did is, it said, take all these people who are nice people, but not well-educated, not earning very much money, educate them, put them into job, let them earn lots of money, and have a good lifestyle. And that drove up the productivity and the whole success story of China.

 

 

TN: So urbanization and wage arbitrage, productivity gain for China. But is that running out in the next ten years or does that continue over that period?

 

CL: We’ve got it going through actually. It’s 20 million a year at the moment, which is a phenomenal number. That’s Australia, every year. It’s 20 million at the moment. We have it dropping down to about 11 million by 2040 because it’s still a lot of people moving there.

 

Now, this is the other big trick. Because some people have been saying, China’s population’s leveling out. And, you know, we thought it was 2023, where even the Chinese government agrees with us. Now, it’s 2023, and it’s leveling out. The working age population is starting to shrink. Oh, dear. That can have a decline in the workforce. No. They’re having a decline in the rural workforce. The rural workforce have in the next 20 years.

 

The urban workforce keeps growing for the next 10 years to 2030. The number of people working in urban jobs, which are highly productive, keeps going up. So for the next 10 years, China’s GDP growth still chugs along reasonably well. After 2030, the growth rate drops away and we have it down to about 1.3% by 2045, because it just isn’t the extra workers to keep growing the total GDP. So that’s the story there.

 

But again, coming back to the consumption side, China in the last 10 years in the urban area had this huge group of people, 220 million of them urban, aged 40 to 64 years of age, educated, earning quite good money by turning a stand and spending money on holidays and trips and things like that. And between 2010 and 2020, that went up to 100 million people. Think about it, a 100 million extra people with disposable income. It was no surprise that the retail side of China took off and tourism and all of that. It was those people. They’ve got a house. They’ve got a fridge, they’ve got a refrigerator. Let’s have some fun. That’s really what’s happening right now.

 

Now, the bad news is that now it flattens out. Every age group under 40 in China is already declining and will continue to decline in size. So don’t go after the kid market in China except on the wealthy and those sort of areas for education. The 40 to 64 age, what I call the working age optimist, it grows for a little bit, and then it flattens out. And it’s named the 65 plus, which in China is not like the other countries. The 65 plus at the moment doesn’t have great health, doesn’t have a great life expectancy. You get some extension of the workforce, but not a lot.

 

So China’s consumption is healthy as well. It’ll chugging along quite nicely. And to digress slightly, but I think we need to recover quickly here. The one child policy, it’s moved to three now. That’s totally and absolutely irrelevant.

 

TN: Yeah, it doesn’t seem like it’s going to do much. They’re too rich to want to have more kids, right?

 

CL: Exactly. And actually, it’s the birth rate that’s not the important point. It’s the number of women of childbearing age. And that goes down by a third. It drops 330 million now to about 220 million in 20 years time. And the birth rate can’t give up fast enough to compensate there. So births in 2019 are 14 million. It dropped to 10 million last year because of the pandemic, waiting to come back up a bit about to 14. It’ll be down to 11 million by 2030. And they can’t change that even with the three child policy. That won’t change.

 

TN: It’s not the three child policy, it’s the fact that there are not enough women to have babies. And those women are wealthy enough that they don’t want to have three kids.

 

CL: That’s really basically it. Just look at Singapore. They tried everything to get the birth rate up.

 

TN: I was there. They were paying people to have babies and it still didn’t work.

 

CL: Even send them on cruises. I mean, I volunteered.

 

And then you have, so that’s the second group. And the key point by the first group is nice and stable now, chugging along nicely, but no longer super growth in consumption. Nice growth in consumption is how I call it.

 

The third group, what we call the family stage. And that’s obviously dominated by India, Brazil, Indonesia all there. The bulk of populations is in that 25 through to 39, having children, at work, that sort of stage. So the working age population is still growing a bit, but not a lot. Education’s improving. It varies quite a lot across this group. India is at the weaker end. Indonesia is probably one of the better ends.

 

So, you’ve got a bit of a dichotomy there. But they’re generally in a position to be able to attract capital and generally in a position to be lifting their total consumption, but not dramatically. We’re still talking of relatively low incomes under 10 thousand USD for the average family per annum. So the growth is there.

 

TN: So Indonesia, India, Brazil and so on, the capital formation, capital investment is the real weakness there. And it seems to me that’s a function of, largely, education. Is that fair to say?

 

CL: That’s exactly what it is. As they get the education right and they’re working on it, most of these countries have been quite responsible in that area. And as they get that right, so the investment comes in, so the consumer gets more affluent and becomes a virtuous circle.

 

TN: And what time scale are we talking about for that consumption to come in a really notable way to take the place of the under 40 Chinese consumption or the under 40 Western Europe or American consumption?

 

CL: Well, that’s the bad news.

Categories
Podcasts

Could This Be The Tail End Of The Bull Run?

In this BFM The Morning Run episode, Tony Nash explains what’s happening in the US markets, particularly the tail end of the bull run. Will value stocks improve now as compared to the growth stocks? How about stay-at-home stocks VS cyclicals? Also discussed are currencies, USD against the Japanese Yen and Chinese Yuan, and the labor market.

 

This podcast first appeared and originally published at https://www.bfm.my/podcast/morning-run/market-watch/could-this-be-the-tail-end-of-the-bull-run on April 1, 2021.

 

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Show Notes

 

WSN: Good morning, Tony. Now, is it likely that the U.S. indices will run out of steam for the moment? I mean, pausing to take stock of the earnings, are equity markets gravitating to what’s stay at home stocks or cyclicals?

 

TN: The problem with where we are now is that all value was stretched. Monetary policy and stimulus have really pushed money into equity markets as the remaining stimulus checks are distributed, meaning a lot of those stimulus checks are in the mail right now in the post going to homes in the US. So there’s a lot of investment expected and pushing against maybe the downdraft in equity markets. So I don’t think it’s really a question of stay at home versus cyclicals. It’s really a question of where is that value?

 

I don’t think it’s a sector question. It’s really an individual stock picking question. And that’s the problem. It’s not a sector market. It’s not a market wide phenomenon. We really have to understand where there is value because we’re in the very tail end of a bull market.

 

PS: Previously, it was the long and now five year Treasury treasuries are inching up. What impact will an upward shift of the whole yield curve have on equities?

 

TN: I think we’re seeing equities try to climb higher, but we’re not quite getting. The five year is up over five percent today on an incremental basis was up five point six percent. The 10 year is up two point three percent today. So, you know, there are a lot of risks out there. Ongoing Covid risk. France just closed down again today. There are geopolitical risks with the US and China and other geopolitical risks, of course, Syria and so on.

 

Iran, business supply chain risks. So, you know, with yields rising and the pressure on equity markets to rise as well, we believe that there’s going to come a point where equity markets break and we’re going to start to see see a decline in equity markets. So yields will rise in the U.S. and equity markets will inevitably decline, and that will likely bring some other global markets with it.

 

WSN: OK, Tony, let’s shift the conversation to currencies, because the U.S. dollar has really made some strident gains against both the Chinese yen and the Japanese yen. I just want to know, why are these two currencies taking such a beating in particular?

 

TN: Well, both currencies strengthened quite a bit in Q3 of twenty twenty and stayed strong until recently. CNY had been below seven and a bit well actually just above seven and it climbed to almost six point four versus the US dollar. So there’s been a lot of strength in both, as you say, Chinese and Japanese currencies. What’s happened while we’ve had those depreciated currencies is an accumulation of inventories of commodities like industrial metals. We’ve seen the copper price rise dramatically, for example.

 

And so as we see treasuries rise in the US, and that brings dollar strength, we’re seeing those manufacturers and those guys who’ve been building their commodity inventories in East Asia really slow down on those purchases and their future commitments. So we’ll likely see a lot of those currencies stabilize and weaken a bit more we don’t expect. A dramatic weakening from here, we don’t expect the US dollar to appreciate dramatically more, say, for the next few months. So we’re kind of in a range, we believe, for both.

 

We do see the CNY, for example, devaluing to say six point six to six point seven. And then, you know, we’ll kind of stabilize in that range unless there’s a dramatic impact.

 

PS: So a correction is in inventory levels readjust. Can I just shift your attention to oil? Because oil prices are at levels near the break even point for US shale producers. Are you expecting to see a resumption of shale activity this year?

 

TN: Well, yeah, we you know, living in Texas, we see a lot of shale activity here. So we do expect it to start slowly. But that business runs in a way where if we’re chasing price, more of those shale firms will come online pretty quickly, actually. So, you know, with the ability for shale to turn off and turn on so quickly, we believe that the prices will be range bound if there’s upward price pressure, you know, all things held equal.

 

If there’s you know, if there isn’t a major geopolitical issue in the Middle East or isn’t a major geopolitical issue in Asia or something, we think that will be fairly wrage range bound as those as those guys come back online. The shale producers.

 

WSN: Meanwhile, Tony, U.S. numbers, job numbers excuse me, are out on Friday. Are they expected to show a robust recovery in labor markets, in your opinion? Like what sectors grew the fastest in terms of employment?

 

TN: Well, you know, we’re starting to see quite a lot more capacity in airlines, although we don’t expect a lot of hiring there. The services around, say, travel and hospitality, they were devastated in twenty twenty. And we expect some of those jobs to come back online. We expect to see some restaurant jobs, some of those services jobs to come back online. That’s where we typically see these things come back first, relatively kind of lower wage, but more flexible workforces.

 

And so we’ll see activity there first. Tourism in the US obviously still isn’t up to what it was, but we have started to see some impact back in tourism. So I would expect to see some some interesting numbers there.

 

WSN: OK, thank you for your time. That was Tony Nash, CEO of Complete Intelligence, sadly reminding us that this is maybe the tail end of the bull run that we had been enjoying.

 

It was a very short one, is that it honestly, in March 2020 when markets collapsed and then because of the concerted, synchronized monetary policies that we saw around the world, central banks really pushing rates to ultra low equity markets rallied and rallied till now.

 

So he thinks we’re in the tail end and we should stop beginning to look at value stocks as opposed to growth stocks.

 

PS: And I think specific sector specific stocks, in fact, actually.

 

WSN: Yeah.

 

PS: It’s kind of very good.

 

Go for the jugular on specific things.

 

WSN: Yeah. I think you really do need to take a very bottom up approach as opposed from the top down approach. If you’re talking about the tail end of a bull cycle, what is also worrying is that he does say that with increasing yields in the U.S. and even on the shotted to bonds, which is the five year bonds, lightly equity markets, those are going to face another round of correction. And it’s not just going to be the U.S. it’s going to be other global markets as a result, because let’s face it, we take the cue from the U.S., right?

 

PS: Yeah.

 

WSN: If there is a shock there, there’s a shock around the world.

 

But what does it mean for Malaysia markets? Because yesterday we had a really terrible, terrible day.

 

And when I look at Bloomberg now and I’m trying to understand what caused the decline, it was really very much glove driven. Topcliffe hoteling, super Max, all coming under selling pressure as a result, took the index along with it, saying it was also the case for the telco sector. Zaatar was also down. Maxi’s was also down. There was actually no stock among the IBM, Kilsyth, the three component stocks, none were in the green. So clearly bad day.

 

We were down two point to two percent. And on original, on a year to day basis, we are actually down more than three percent.

 

PS: It’s incredible. I think also the conversation about currency is going to play. So we were talking to Tony about Japan and China. You heard and we saw disconsolately in Turkish I now emerging market currencies are going to all kind of a fall out in the short term.

 

WSN: Is there going to be a question of, you know, shift from emerging markets into developed markets? That’s the big question. But in about a few minutes, in light of April Fool’s Day, we’ll be speaking to resolve. Then Gizzle, comedian and the co-founder of Crack House Comedy Club. Stay tuned for that BFM eighty nine point nine.

Categories
QuickHit

Future of the US Dollar: Weaker or Stronger?

Commodities expert Tracy Shuchart graced our QuickHit this week with interesting and fresh insights about USD, CNY, oil, and metals. Will USD continue on the uptrend with Yellen on board? What is the near-term direction of CNY? Will metals like copper, aluminum, etc. continue to rise, or will they correct? Will crude continue the rally or is it time for a pause? Watch as Tracy explains her analysis on the markets in the latest QuickHit episode.

 

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This QuickHit episode was recorded on March 12, 2021.

The views and opinions expressed in this How robust is the global financial system in the wake of Covid? QuickHit episode are those of the guests and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any content provided by our guests are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

 

Show Notes

 

TN: I’ve been focused for the past few weeks on the Dollar and Chinese Yuan and on industrial metals. Can you talk to me a little bit about your view on the Dollar? What’s happening with the Treasury and Fed and some of their views of the Dollar and how is that spreading out to markets?

 

TS: Right now, we have a little bit of mixed messaging, right? So, we have the Fed that wants a weaker Dollar. But then, we have Yellen who’s come in and she wants a strong Dollar policy. So, I think that markets are confused right now. Do we want a weaker Dollar or do we want a stronger Dollar? And so, we’re seeing a lot of volatility in the markets because of that sentiment.

 

TN: So who do you think’s gonna win?

 

TS: I think that Yellen’s going to win. I think we’re probably going to get a little bit of a stronger Dollar. I don’t think we’re going to see a hundred anytime soon again. We’ve seen stronger Dollar when she was at the Fed. She’s come in right now and said that she wants a stronger Dollar. We would probably have at least a little bit more elevated than the low that we just had, like 89.

 

TN: I think things are so stretched right now that even a slightly marginally stronger Dollar, let’s say to 95 or something like that would really impact markets in a big way.

 

I’ve been watching CNY. I watch it really closely and, you know, we bottomed out, or let’s say it appreciated a lot over the last six months. It feels like we bottomed out and it’s weakening again. What does that mean to you? What is the impact of that?

 

TS: The impact obviously will have a lot to do with manufacturing, with exports, and things of that nature. So if their currency starts depreciating, and they’re going to export that deflation to the rest of the world, it’s just starting to bounce over the last week or so. Unless we have another trade war, I don’t think we’re probably gonna see like seven, seven plus. I remember last time we were talking about it, we were talking about it’s going to be 7.20 and you nailed that. It’s definitely something to keep an eye on obviously, because they’re such a big purchaser and because they’re such a big exporter.

 

TN: We’re expecting 6.6 this month, and continue to weaken, but not dramatically. We’re expecting a pretty managed weakening of CNY barring some event.

This China discussion is from our Telegram Channel. Join us here: https://t.me/completeintelligence

 

This chart was generated using the CI Futures app. For more information about it, go to https://www.completeintel.com/ci-futures/

What I’ve been observing as we’ve had a very strong CNY over the past six months is hoarding of industrial metals and we’ve seen that in things like the copper price. Have you seen that yourself? And with a weaker CNY, what does that do to some of those industrial metals prices in terms of magnitude, not necessarily specific levels, but what do you think that does to industrial metals prices?

 

TS: We’ve been seeing that across all industrial metals, right. It hasn’t just been copper. It’s been iron ore. It’s been aluminum. It’s been nickel. We’ve seen that across all of those. China likes to hoard. So when everything was very cheap like last summer, when everything kind of bottomed out, they started purchasing a lot. Then we also had problems with supply because of Covid. So prices really accelerated and then suddenly we just had China’s currency pretty much strengthened. We’ll probably see a pullback in those prices. It’ll be partly because of their currency. If they allow that to depreciate a little bit. And then also, as extended supply comes back on the market.

 

But it’s even getting to the point now where if you look at oil, oil prices are getting really high too. We’ll likely see China scale back on purchases, probably a little bit going forward just because prices are so high. Or we will see them, which we’re seeing now, is buy more from Iran, because they need the money. They get it at a great discount. It’s cheap. If they start buying more from Iran, that takes it away from Saudi Arabia and Russia, who are the two largest oil producers.

 

TN: When I look at Chinese consumption, at least over the past 15 months, there’s been almost an adverse relationship of CNY to USD and say industrial metals prices. It looks like a mirror. Crude oil doesn’t look that way. It’s really interesting how the crude price in CNY there really isn’t that type of relationship.

 

One would expect that if CNY devalues, they’ll necessarily cut back on purchases. I would argue and I could be wrong here, that it’s not necessarily the currency that would cause them to cut back on purchases. They’ve hoarded and stored so much that they don’t necessarily need to keep purchasing what they have been. Is that fair to say?

 

TS: They still like to hoard a lot. Between January and February, they were still up 6% year over year, where January was very high, February was lower because they have holiday during February. Oil, that is different. It’s not really related so much to their currency because you have outside factors such as OPEC, which has really taken eight percent off the market and they’ve held that over again for another month. And the fundamentals are improving with oil. I’ve been seeing a lot of strength in the market over the last eight months.

 

US is the world’s largest consumer. Whereas you look at something like industrial metals, they are the world’s largest consumer. When we were talking about crude oil, because that’s spread out so much, they don’t really have that much pull on the market per se that they would in metals markets.

 

TS: And I’ll remind you. I’m sure you remember this. When we spoke in Q2 of 2020, you said it would be Q2 of ’21 before we even started to return to normal consumption patterns for crude and downstream products. I think you hit that spot on. And it’s pretty amazing to see. I had hoped that it would return sooner, but of course it didn’t.

Categories
Visual (Videos)

Dollar Doldrums Before the Surge

This is an original publication by Real Vision and was posted on Youtube at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AHq0n_Bm7YA

 

This week Real Vision use Refinitiv’s best-in-class data to discuss the outlook for the US dollar and commodities with Tony Nash, CEO and Founder of Complete Intelligence, a forecasting company across currencies, commodities and equity indexes. Whilst many investors are expecting fireworks, Tony expects asset prices to remain subdued for now, before exploding back into life after the US election.

 

See the full series and access expert data-driven insights and news from Refinitiv: https://refini.tv/2Tq42o2

 

Show Notes

 

RV: Many of us make sweeping statements about the direction that markets will take, but accurate forecasting across a wide range of assets is a rare entity and has been made particularly difficult today by the distortions of central bank activity. That’s a financial forecasting challenge. Forecasting company Complete Intelligence has joined forces with Refinitiv to provide companies and investors with an outlook on assets such as currencies and commodities. In this week’s Big Conversation, I talk to founder and CEO Tony Nash about the prospects for the US dollar, commodities and also trade relations between the US and China.

Tony, great to see you.

 

TN: Thank you.

 

RV: Thanks very much for coming on The Big Conversation. And today we got to talk about a lot of things. We’re gonna talk about the dollar, currencies in general and a bit of commodities. But before we get into that, for those who do know you, could you give me a little bit about your background, what you’ve been doing and what you’re currently doing?

 

TN: I’ve been in research for couple of decades, actually, and in the past I led global research for a UK based firm called The Economist, I led Asia Consulting for a firm called IHS Market, and I jumped out to start Complete Intelligence about four or five years ago. Initially we were based in Singapore and now we’re based in Houston, Texas.

 

So Complete Intelligence is an artificial intelligence platform or a globally integrated AI platform. We help companies make better cost purchasing and revenue decisions. As a part of that, of course we work with raw materials, currencies, futures, commodities and even equity indices. All of this works in a layered environment so that we understand the interdependencies of supply chains and revenues and sales.

 

We go live on Refinitiv this month in July, and Refinitiv is a very positive partner for us. They’re great to work with. Our forecasts will be distributed on the Refinitv platform for purchase by Refinitiv clients.

 

RV: A lot of these forecasts are completely wrong, but your forecasts have been relatively accurate. They are pretty accurate, which is why I wanted this discussion. Your views on these commodities and currencies will be quite interesting. So how do you do that? What is it? What are the main inputs into your product?

 

TN: We started Complete Intelligence because my clients in my previous firms told me they can’t get good forecasting, whether it’s internal to their own firms or external from off the shelf information services firms. It’s definitely a financial forecasting challenge. What we found is generally external forecasters, whether they’re economists or banks or industry experts, typically have double-digit error rates on an absolute percentage error basis. Our average error rate is about 4.6 percent on a MAPE basis. We do much better generally than either internal forecasters or say industry experts, consensus forecasts.

 

What we do is we use what’s called an ensemble approach. We have a number of core methodologies that we use that build and learn scenarios for every iteration of our forecasts that we do. We do our forecast twice a month on the first of the month and mid-month. So we’re looking at thousands of methodological configurations for every line item that we forecast. So for example the dollar, we’ll look at between five and ten thousand configurations of methodologies to forecast the dollar. So that’s millions of calculations just for the dollar. And we do that for every line item foot.

 

Off the shelf, we have about 800 different assets that we forecast across currencies, commodities, equities. We also do economics and trade. So together it’s about 1.3 million line items that we forecast every month.

 

Obviously there are charts, so you can see the directional change in the lines. But we disclose the top relationships, six months ago, three months ago and this month. So you can see how those things change over time as well. That’s really a key part of understanding the market changing. If you see those relationships changing dramatically, then that’s a real indication. So if we look at last December, we saw things change dramatically and we saw that sometime ahead of that forecast. So we expected that dramatic change. When we expect, say, a mild change in October or a dramatic change in Jan/Feb, those relationships really do start to iterate because the market starts to restructure with every change.

 

RV: Tony you mentioned the dollar, ultimately. I always think of it as the apex predator of the financial market. You get the dollar right, you’re probably going to get a vast amount of the rest of your portfolio correct. Recently, the dollar had a lot of volatility very early on, but it’s actually been in a fairly kind of narrow range for a long period of time. At the moment, it’s testing the bottom of that range.

 

Let’s talk about the maybe the dollar index, the DXY, which is 57% Euro. Let’s talk about that first. Where do you see that going over the rest of the year and what do you see as the big drivers and the reasons for your view on the dollar?

 

TN: We see the dollar weakness continuing until about September. After September, we see a bit of strength coming back. And then in Q1, we start to see more dollar strength coming back.  So obviously, monetary policy, economic questions, these sorts of things in the US are behind that, but also economic questions around other parts of the world. The dollar is doesn’t operate in a vacuum. So there are a number of inputs there, and we’re really worried about a lot. Big monetary policies in the US have been made and they’re working themselves out. But we’re worried about other parts of the world, specifically Europe and China. But we do see the dollar continue to weaken until about September, late August and September, after which we see a slight return to strength. And then once we hit Q1 of 2021, we start to see that as well.

 

RV: What are those key drivers? Because in some ways, people have been, I wouldn’t say caught offside, but actually the dollar has been weakening as the Fed’s been tightening its balance sheet. So as it’s been reducing a little bit of liquidity and the other central banks is still going for it. Which of the drivers is it? Is it liquidity driving? It is perception? Is it interest rate differentials? Is it real, real yields and real difference? What are the key drivers that mean that you think it’s going lower?

 

TN: I don’t know that there’s necessarily trust in the fact that the Fed is actually reducing its balance sheet. Is that temporary? I think there’s a belief that the Fed will do anything to keep markets up.

 

We all see this cynicism in the market every day, and so I’m not sure that there is a lot of trust right now of the Fed’s true intentions. We’re in a position where both the Fed and the Treasury will do anything to grow the U.S. economy through COVID. And once we get through COVID, different rules apply. But for now, they’ll do anything to get us through. That’s until we see some proof points about a policy that isn’t just kind of throw everything at it. We’ll start to see that in October. But for now, we’re still in that very skeptical position where the U.S. institutions, finance and monetary, isn’t really questioned at the moment because we’re in the middle of this unprecedented period.

 

RV: When people are looking at currencies, people say, OK, I can see all these negatives for the US, but then you think, “well hang on a minute, Europe has a lot of negatives.” When we talk about the dollar, what are the alternatives? So with the Euro, do you see therefore that because a big part of the dollar index is the euro, do you see the Euro going sort of 1-17 from where it is today, or do you see the Euro being challanged as well, and over what timeframe or not perhaps?

 

TN: The euro is challenged once they get through these meetings now. The issues with the Euro are many and I think we’ll see probably four to five months of difficulties for the Euro. After which, let’s say, the end of Q1 2021, I think we’ll start to see more strength in the Euro. But we just don’t see the justification for Euro strength right now, even on a relative basis with the dollar. We find it really challenging to see a bull case for the Euro until early next year.

 

So what are the alternatives? Things like Aussie dollar or things like Japanese yen, those are also alternatives, but again, it’s the ugly sisters right there. It’s difficult to pin down a winner.

 

RV: So when you’re talking about that dollar weakness, what are you really thinking here? Is It’s probably dollar weakness that’s commensurate with volatility in currencies remaining relatively subdued. It sounds like the alternative to, if you’ve got dollar weakness through to September, maybe beyond, but you haven’t really got Euro strength and maybe the strength comes in Yen and Aussie dollar. But overall, we really talking about grinding currencies and low volatility currencies, is that you think is the next few weeks, months?

 

TN: That’s right. And I don’t know that anybody is really confident to say currency A is the currency I’m going to place the next three months of my bets on. It’s all speculative, vol related trades, or at least that’s what we see. And until we start to get some good direction, typically when we see good direction, we see dollar strength. We don’t really see good direction coming back to markets until maybe December or Q1 of 2021.

 

RV: And do you think in terms of people who are looking for signs of things, that change is there a sequencing that you were looking for, for instance? Well, what I think we really saw last year was those very challenged emerging market currencies, in places like Turkey obviously Argentina, they tended to move first. Then you saw things like the Aussie dollar moving, sort of commodity based, slightly EM style, and then eventually that was shifted through. Do you think that’s still going to be the way to look at this? That if we want to, an early warning that currencies are on the move, do you think it’s going to be in the challenged currencies again first like maybe Brazil moving slowly through? Or do you see a different sequencing now with slightly different paradigm post-COVID?

 

TN: I think until the end of COVID, I think we’re looking at the same patterns. And again, I think part of that is COVID, part of that is the US election, part of that is what’s really going on with Chinese data. There are a number of different considerations, macro considerations that until we have a good idea of what the data actually mean. And let’s say what you know, what is the future of U.S. politics? I don’t think we’re really going to settle. And if you don’t know the future of U.S. economic policies, you really don’t know the future of Chinese economic policies. And so you have the two biggest economies in the world that have a big question mark around them for the next four or five months.

 

RV: When it comes to commodities, as I think commodities has been the first item on the Refinitiv platform, currencies coming at the end of this month. So as a sort of segway between one and the other, the Aussie dollar is often considered to be a very important part of the multi complex, even though it’s not a commodity itself. Is that one of the ones you think will have a bit of strength VS the Dollar over the shorter term as in the next couple of months? How do you feel the Aussie dollar is going to play out and what are the key players behind that?

 

TN: We do see strength in the Aussie dollar. I mean Aussie dollar had this amazing trip over the past five months right? We do see strength coming in, say, through the next two to three months in the Aussie dollar. Then we see it returning to the normal levels, kind of around 70 cents. So part of that is COVID related, part of that is obviously China related, as Australia and China re-figure out what their relationship is, their trading relationship and their diplomatic relationship.

 

There is a bit of risk because obviously, Australia exports a lot of commodities to China. And if that relationship isn’t there, then the underlying driver of their economy is in question. And so we do have some questions about the Aussie dollar and the sustainability of some of those exports for some short to medium term. But some of that quite frankly, is just diplomatic positioning more than reality. There’s a bit of volatility until we figure out exactly what that looks like, but we don’t expect a return to say, of the Fed March position and the volatility we saw there.

 

RV: When you look at the Aussie dollar, are you looking at real economy assets like copper and like oil? Because obviously these have had, we’ve seen oil, WTI’s closed its gap from the trade war, the oil war earlier in the year, copper is now back at a big, i think it’s the 10 year resistance level. How do you see these real economy assets performing over the next two, three months because it feels like we’re recovering, but we’re recovering from such a low place that it looks v shaped, but we’re not recovering, we’re not going to return to where we were. Doesn’t that put pressure on some of these currencies like the Aussie dollar, which rely on the real economy to get back to where it was? I think we’re back to where we were beginning of year with the Aussie dollar, but should not really be capping it?

 

TN: Yeah, it’s been kind of a foreshock of recovery. It’s not really an aftershock. It’s never really recovered yet, but we’ve started we’ve seen markets recover. So we do see, say the Brent and WTI really having strength over the next, say, to three to four months. After that I think there’s some questions around the sustainability of that. Short of a supply, more controls on supply I think we hit some levels where we’re we’re not quite sure where things will go and we may see those kind of pare some of their gains that we’ve seen since, say, the lows in April. Going into early twenty one, we may very well see some downside, not serious downside, but gradual downside to crude oil. We do believe that WTI has more legs than Brent going into Q4, but not much.

 

When we look at things like copper, which is very, very important to the Australian economy, that’s really looking strong until, say, December, Jan, after which again, twenty one, I think people really take stock of where markets have gone and start to question whether the value is really there, whether, say, manufacturing and transportation have caught up with the prices that we’ve hit. And if we don’t see things like consumer goods and consumer electronics hit their previous pace, if we don’t see airlines starting to hit they’re approaching their previous pace, going back online, I think we’re going to start to see some questions around that value. And that’s kind of our base case right now, is we’re not necessarily expecting those things to start to approach their previous levels, and what we’ve faced from the beginning of this is a demand problem. The demand problem that came as a result of government’s pulling the plug on their economies.

 

So when will that demand return? Is the big question. We do see it coming back, but not necessarily at the pace that markets have expected for the past couple of months. But that won’t necessarily hit investors for another three to four months, actually.

 

RV: How much of that is dependent on the furlough support scheme we see in place? The US went first, it went hard, it went in size, and it took Europe’s only just caught up about a month ago. Japan’s never really stopped, and China’s may been more reticent, but let’s say we get into a scenario where we see the furlough schemes running off at the end of this month in the US, and what if the U.S. decides not to come back too aggressively? But other markets where the current countries do or other regions do? Is that is that going to change the view materially or is this kind of a global context and kind of everyone lives and falls together as it where?

 

TN: Well, I think everyone lives and falls together. Look, it’s an election year in the U.S. of course, they’re gonna put out more money. I mean, it’s you can’t I don’t think you can in an election year say, oh, we’re going to be fiscally responsible no. There’s just no election works that way at all. So the U.S. will definitely come out with more support. And because the US is doing it, every other Treasury and finance ministry and central bank will say, well, the U.S. is doing it, so we’re gonna do it. So exactly what you say kind of they’ll all rise or fall together. Once the US election is over, that tail will kind of taper off and then we’ll see things really starting to fall to Earth again. We’re not saying anything dramatic, but we’ll start to see some of the steam come off post-election in the US.

 

RV: We’ve been focusing on the currencies and a little bit on the commodities, but in some ways what people worry about is that we’ve gone from this liquidity issue at the beginning of the second quarter of the year to potentially a solvency issue. So a real, real economy growth issue. And do you think that that is going to come to fruition? Because those that will have a very, very key impact on bond yields, and if you look at these major bonds particularly in the U.S., they’ve been struggling, I mean, that would merely making new all time lows in the U.S. fight it? Where do you see bond yields going? Because in some ways, the bond yield is the one that will tell us the true growth, the equity market told us, how much liquidity, where do you see bond yields going?

 

TN: I don’t think there’s any choice but for bonds to continue to fall until we see more solvency to the economy, that’s really it. And we’ve seen so many SME’s go out of business, we’ve seen a complete section of the U.S. economy just give up. And we are now on to kind of the medium term players who are keeping it together but maybe can’t in for three to four to five to six months if they don’t have more support from the central government in the US. Until we see the baton passed from government support to market support, which again, probably won’t happen until sometime in twenty one, you know, we’re going to have this question around solvency. Once the market takes over again, then I think we’ll be in a very good place, we’ll have cleared out a lot of fairly weak companies, we’ll see consolidation in sectors that weren’t really healthy, and then as we go into twenty one and the market takes over again, I think the path has really cleared for companies to do extraordinarily well.

 

RV: Something that you talked about in depth last year, generally, you sort of you talked about was the the impact or the underestimation of the impact of the trade war and relationships like that. How important do you think that will be? Because obviously the politics today is kind of quite visceral in this, you know, in the last couple of months. Do you think that that is more bark than bite or do you think that we’re going to go back to the worst of what we saw with the trade wars, which was almost also reflecting the difficult position that the Chinese economy was in prior to all this if we went back a year, 12 to 18 months?

 

TN: One view that I’m kind of moving toward is that potentially a trade war is actually over. So with COVID, at least North American companies have taken an assessment of their supply chains and said, hold on a minute, we have a highly centralized supply chain sitting in China and other parts of Asia. COVID’s come along and we haven’t really been able to get access to our goods.

 

We need to diversify our supply chain. Now, before the financial crisis in 2008, there was a strategy that manufacturing companies were pursuing called the China plus one, China plus two, China plus three strategy, where they would have part of their supply chain in China and part elsewhere in Asia. I think what we’re at now because after the financial crisis, people just double and tripled down on their China-centric supply chains because it was convenient and in their in their eyes at the time, less risky.

 

I think we’re in a position now where especially North American companies have said it’s very risky for us to have our North American and our European manufacturing based in China. We need to disaggregate, we need to have regional supply chains. We look at, for example, the amount of electronics supply chain that’s moving to Mexico, when we look at companies like TSMC, Taiwan Semiconductor, moving to the US, these are major generational movements of supply chains. That to me is a signal that the trade war is almost over, meaning both sides have said enough, we’re not going to do this.

 

That’s a very bad signal for China, and you could potentially be looking at kind of a Russia post-World War Two scenario where all the foreign investors who went into Russia in the nineteen thirties from the UK and the US and other guys, they gave up with World War Two and really never went back. And so China could potentially be looking at that type of scenario.

 

The big question mark is around kind of Angela Merkel and a bunch of European investors in China, what will they or leaders in China, what will their investors do? Will they regionalize in Europe, which is what was happening in the 90s? Or will they continue to double and triple down on China? If they do, the problem that Europe has is that China has to export even more deflation than they were exporting two or three years ago because they have the additional capacity that is not going to the US now. That is a serious risk for the hollowing out of European industry and European unemployment.

 

RV: By the sounds of it, the next few months therefore, across pretty much every asset should be relatively low volatility, so maybe still working out all the support that’s come into the system as it still moves its way through the global framework. But it sounds like at the end of this year, particular into Q1 of next year there could be some inflection points. How do people use your product to spot those inflection points? Because its those inflection points where people are going to really win or lose?

 

TN: The inflection points are really where the risk comes in. So in our partnership with Refinitiv, you know, people can use our product to understand, as you say, when are those inflection points, what’s the degree of those inflection points? With all of our outlooks, we have high base, low scenarios. And so, those clients can understand where we see things going and the range where we see those things going. Whether it’s a currency, commodity and equity market. And so, as you say, we see a larger inflection coming kind of mid Q1, but in the in the near term, we see kind of a small calibration coming in September, October.

 

RV: Whilst most people want to hear about fireworks, where prices are either going to break down or break out, the reality is that for most of the time, they tend to grind through ranges. For corporate planners and investors, accurate forecasts help to prepare for the unexpected without getting bogged down by sensationalism.

 

Complete Intelligence currently forecasts the commodity and currency volatility will remain suppressed, with the dollar drifting lower, helping push oil and copper prices higher. The first market wobble should appear in September and October, but the big inflection point is expected after the US election. Markets in the first quarter of 2021 are forecast to be challenged by a stronger U.S. dollar as the real economy impact of the COVID crisis emerges from beneath the flood of government support.

 

About Refinitiv: For new insights on artificial intelligence (AI), digitalization, big data, risk management, compliance, fighting financial crime and the future of trading and investing, visit our insights hub – http://refinitiv.com/perspectives. Refinitiv is one of the world’s largest providers of financial markets data and infrastructure, serving over 40,000 institutions in approximately 190 countries. It provides leading data and insights, trading platforms, and open data and technology platforms that connect a thriving global financial markets community – driving performance in trading, investment, wealth management, regulatory compliance, market data management, enterprise risk and fighting financial crime. https://www.refinitiv.com

 

About Real Vision™: Real Vision™ is the destination for the world’s most successful investors to share their thoughts about what’s happening in today’s markets. (Think of it like TED Talks for Finance.). Understand the complex world of finance, business and the global economy with real in-depth analysis from real experts.

Categories
Podcasts

Worse GDPs, Market Expectations, Chinese Manufacturing, and the Rising US Dollar

BFM speaks to Tony about corporate earnings as worse GDPs, market expectations, and the Dow and S&P 500 extended losses after their worst quarter since 2008 as Trump warned of a “painful two weeks ahead”. They also get into Tony’s expectations for markets in April, the shortage of US Dollars globally and Chinese Manufacturing data.

 

Produced by: Michael Gong

Presented by: Roshan Kanesan, Noelle Lim, Khoo Hsu Chuang

 

Listen to the podcast at BFM: The Business Station

 

 

Podcast Notes

 

BFM: But right now. Let’s take a look at global markets, a deeper look at global markets and to do that, we speak to Tony Nash, CEO of complete intelligence. Tony, thank you for joining us on the line this morning. Now the Dow and the S&P 500 extended loss after their worse quarter since 2008, as Trump warned of a painful two weeks. I think, for the Dow, this was the worst quarter since 1987, if I’m not incorrect there. Now, how badly is this going to hit US corporate earnings across the board?

 

TN: It does really depend on the energy sector, but generally it’s hitting things pretty bad. I guess the good news is it’s only part of Q1. So the last few weeks of Q1, but I guess the big question mark and the reason markets are really saying negative is nobody is sure how long we need to endure?

 

It is another couple of weeks, is it another few months? And that’s why we’re seeing markets in the red because nobody really knows. And so I live in Houston, in Texas. So it’s the energy capital of the world. Malaysia’s feeling a similar pressure with the oil and gas and a lot of my neighbors, thousands of my neighbors have been laid off from their jobs. So it’s not just the stores being shut and things that are not happening. It’s actual incomes not coming in as well.

 

So that consumption part of the GDP calculation will be decimated for at least a single week. And this is why you’ve seen the big government intervention come in with the 2-terms plan, which allows government spending. That ‘G’ part of the GDP calculation, it allows that to replace some of the consumer spendings and that’s one component that’s been displaced over the last few weeks and will be displaced for the part of Q2. So, our view is it the last fiscal plan in the U.S.?

 

We expect at least one more, if not two, five to six trillion dollars of fiscal spending from the U.S. government. The real question is whether other governments can afford to match a similar proportion of their GDP. I’m skeptical that none of them can. So what matters right now to consumers is fiscal health, fiscal spending. For central banks do not matter as much. What matters is getting hands into the consumers.

 

BFM: U.S. right now has over 200 thousand COVID-19 cases and the situation does not look like it’s improving, and we might see even more lockdowns in the U.S. So do you expect markets will perform even more badly in April? And how might markets land in April?

 

TN: No, I think what’s affecting markets really is the uncertainty not necessarily the case count because, you know, not all tests are created equally. And what really matters in the case count is the denominator.

 

What we found is, yes US test is actually pretty accurate, unlike a number of other tests out there. And so the number of false positives and false negatives are a lot lower that’s my understanding of the US test. And the portion of population that’s been tested in the US is growing pretty rapidly. So although we see those cases counts growing, we see it as a fairly good example of the real picture in the US. Now, what we have seen on the ground here in the U.S. So the governor of Texas came out a few days ago and said that 99 percent of the bed space allocated for covered patients is empty. So we’re not seeing people in hospitals here. We are seeing things in other parts of the country. And of course, there are cases here. But what we’re doing again and again and again is that people will come in with other ailments that will be diagnosed as COVID. So COVID is a secondary or tertiary infection to something that is really, really ailing them.

 

So and that’s the question that people need to start peeling back is, “Is COVID the primary cause of that fatality or is was there already a number of other ailments in place and COVID was somewhat incidental?” Until we start asking these questions, you really won’t understand how deeply dire the problem is.

 

BFM: Tony, there’s a shortage of US dollars in the world today obviously as a safe haven. The Fed has introduced a new repo facility for foreign central banks to draw down on what you know about this facility and how effective has it been?

 

TN: Well, it’s been pretty effective. I mean, we see the trade weighted dollar down 99 with a 99 handle on it now it was up 103 or something, which makes it very difficult for people outside of the U.S. needing dollars. There’s a lot of U.S. dollars denominated debt. There’s a lot of trade conducted in U.S. dollars. So if the US dollar is expensive and if governments are having to buy medical equipment and other things in U.S. dollars, it makes it even harder for them to address some of these quality concerns. So the US government has been working very hard to help other countries by pushing the value of the U.S. dollar down. So these facilities and it’s easy for countries to put up pretty low quality assets in exchange for U.S. dollars. So that the U.S. can churn more U.S. dollars out into the global economy to grain that supply up and, of course, bring the value down. So I’m not really optimistic that they’ll be able to keep it down for long. I think the flight to kind of safe haven currencies is going to persist. So I think the dollar value is going to rise, continue to rise. But I think it’s really important for the Fed to focus on this and to take these efforts in the short term to help countries get the equipment they need and transact in dollars at a lower rate.

 

BFM: There’s a report forecasting a severe contraction for China this year, however, the latest PMI data beat market expectations. What is your current outlook on China’s economy?

 

TN: You know what’s interesting forecast, because the world’s economies can’t have a very downbeat China forecast without China’s permission. So, somebody is trying to get bad news out there, okay? So I think what we may be seeing, because we saw the PMIs came out a couple days ago that weren’t that bad. But we’ve also seen a lot of government spending to try to offset the lack of business and consumer activity. So there’s no doubt there’s going to be a bad reading in China this year. And I think the World Bank report is a way for the Chinese government to allow us to get out into the market first so they’re not seen as disappointing on their deliverable of 6 percent. So we’ve, you know, Complete Intelligence had believed that China’s been growing at 4 to 5 percent for the past couple of years. So with this, I believe it’s a 2.7 percent rate been said for continuous something, I can’t remember. But it allows China to deliver under 6 percent to deliver over whatever the World Bank forecast was so that they can start to notch down those expectations. So I think the World Bank report is probably credible. I don’t know that it’s necessarily that dire, but it might be, that I think it gives NBS and China an excuse to clock significantly under 6 layer.

 

BFM: Tony, how about your comments changed as the context of a couple of reports overnight suggesting a) that China has been doctoring the data on coronavirus the last couple of months and b) that a county in China, other reports suggesting that parts of the country is not under a new lockdown because of a further outbreak.

 

TN: Well, first, I don’t think it’s crazy that anybody that China’s been doctoring the data, but I don’t think China is unique. I think there are many, many countries out there that are doctoring the data. I think political leaders are afraid that corona would be seen as a political failure. And so I think many, many numbers. And China, usually have been singled out in this kind of data doctoring, which they’re guilty, but they’re not the only ones. So, you know, is there a resurgence of this? I don’t know if there’s a resurgence as much as maybe it didn’t pale off in the way the Chinese authorities said it did. So whether it’s a statistical resurgence, you know, maybe that’s the case. But these were you know, these were always there and they didn’t see the decline that was expected several weeks ago. I think that’s likelier than the fact that there’s just some crazy resurgence in COVID in China. But, you know, I don’t think anybody should be shocked. I don’t think China is angry or guilty than anybody else. They’re known for this. A lot of statistics ministries are known for its reporting and health agencies on this reporting. So it’s just the nature of reporting national level data that can be seen as politically sensitive.

 

BFM: Thank you so much for joining us on the line this morning. That was Tony Nash, CEO of Complete Intelligence.

 

Categories
Podcasts

Could COVID-19 Finally Kill the EU?

The fallout from COVID-19 might result in the disintegration of the European Union while the flight to safe havens like the USD is yet another headache for the financial markets to stomach, according to Tony Nash, CEO of Complete Intelligence.

Produced by: Michael Gong

Presented by: Roshan Kanesan, Noelle Lim, Khoo Hsu Chuang

 

Listen to the podcast in BFM: The Business Station

 

Show Notes:

 

BFM: So for more on global markets right now, we speak to Tony Nash, CEO of Complete Intelligence. Welcome to the show, Tony. Now U.S. markets closed down sharply again last night, erasing all gains from the time President Trump was elected. So what’s your outlook for markets? Is it still too early to buy?

 

TN: Gosh I don’t know. Actually, we don’t really know if it’s a really good time to buy. At this point, it’s really hard to catch that kind of falling knife. But what we don’t see is a V-shaped recovery. We think we’re in the zone where the fall may start slowing down. But we believe the equity markets will trade in a pretty low range for the next couple of months. And that’s because we’re not really sure of the economic impact of the slowdown in the West.

 

This COVID-19 is a government-driven recession that countries have lawfully gone into. So a lot of the recovery has been how quickly the fiscal stimulus is put into the hands of consumers and companies, and how quickly those individuals will get back to work.

 

 

BFM: Well, oil continues to fall last night to record lows with the Brent at $26 per barrel. What’s your view on oil? I know you are seeing the stock market. We do not know where the bottom is. But for oil, are we hitting the bottom yet?

 

TN: We may not be, but we’re pretty close. Our view is that crude will bounce once the Saudi-Russia price standoff is resolved. So we actually see crude moving back into the 40s in April.

 

But after that, we expect a gradual fall back into the low 40s to the high 30s in May. So, you know, we’ll see the next several months’ prices will be depressed. And we think it’s going to be quite a while before we see oil at 50 bucks again.

 

 

BFM: Yeah, Tony, you would have seen the stock futures point in green, obviously quite buoyed by the ECB’s whatever-it-takes policy. In Asia this week, four central banks are meeting. I’d like to go off a piece of possible talk about Australia, Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia. Our central banks are expected to meet this week. What do you expect them to do in terms of responding to the market turmoil?

 

TN: So it can’t just be central banks. I think central banks will do whatever it takes. But you really have to get finance ministries involved because, again, this is a government-induced recession.

 

Governments have demanded that people stay at home due to COVID-19. They’ve demanded that places of business close. And so until finance ministries and treasury departments get involved to get money in the hands of consumers and companies, we’re in a pretty rough place and there’s a lot of uncertainty.

 

So I think the central bank activity is fine. But I think getting a fiscal stimulus out there right now and not waiting is what they need to do. The US is talking about doing something in mid-April, that is just not good enough.

 

We have to get fiscal stimulus out right now because the governments have brought this on. The markets did not bring this on. The governments brought this recession on.

 

 

BFM: Yeah, Tony, obviously the helicopter money is going beyond the conceptual stage right now. But from a fiscal standpoint, how many central banks in Asia can afford, you know, the financial headroom to pay these helicopter money solutions?

 

TN: Well, whether they can afford it and whether they need to afford it are two different questions. And so I think we have real issues with a very expensive U.S. dollar right now.

 

Dollar strength continues to pound emerging market currencies. And emerging markets and middle-income markets may have to print money in order to get funds in the hands of consumers and companies.

 

So I think you have a dollar where appreciation continues to force the dollar strength. And you also have middle income and emerging market countries who may have to turn on printing presses to get money into the hands of consumers. So I think for middle income and emerging markets, it’s a really tough situation right now. The dollar, I think, is both a blessing and a curse for the U.S. But the U.S. Treasury and the Fed have to work very hard to produce the strength of the dollar.

 

There is a global shortage of dollars, partly because it’s a safety currency, partly because of the debt that’s been accumulated in U.S. dollars outside of the U.S.. And if those two things could be alleviated, it would weaken the dollar a bit. But the Treasury and the Fed are going to have to take some drastic measures to weaken the dollar.

 

 

BFM: Well, how much higher do you think the green buck can go?

 

TN: It can be pretty high. I mean, look, it depends on how panicked people get. And it depends on how drastic, I’d say, money supply creation is in other markets.

 

I think there are real questions in my mind about an environment like this and around the viability of the euro. The EU is in a very difficult place. I’m not convinced that they can control the outbreak. I think they have a very difficult demographic position. And I don’t think Europe within the EU, have the fiscal ability to stimulate like it is needed. The ECB cannot with monetary policy, wave a magic wand and stimulate Europe.

 

There has to be fiscal policy, and the individual finance ministries in every single EU country cannot coordinate to the point needed to get money into the hands of companies and individuals. So I think Europe and Japan, actually, have the most difficult times, but Europe has, the toughest hole to get out of economically.

 

 

BFM: It really sounds like Europe has its work cut out for it at this point. What do you think? What could we see coming out of Europe in terms of any fiscal policy? Or will this pressure the EU, put more pressure on the EU?

 

TN: ECB doesn’t really have the mandate for fiscal policy, so they would have to be granted special powers to develop fiscal policy solutions. It has to be national finance ministries in Europe that develops that.

 

So the ECB can backup as many dump trucks as it wants, but it just doesn’t have the power for fiscal policy. So, again, our view is that there is a possibility that the Euro and the EU actually break up in the wake of COVID-19.

 

This is not getting enough attention. But the institutional weakness in Europe and the weakness of the banking sector in Europe is a massive problem and nobody is really paying attention to it.

 

 

BFM: Do you think this has been a long time coming?

 

TN: Oh, yeah. I mean, look, we’re paying for the sins of the last 20 years right now. And for Asia, you know, Asian countries and Asian consumers and companies have taken on a huge amount of debt over the past 20 years to fund the quote unquote, “Asian Century.” And I think a lot of Asian governments and countries will be paying the price over the next six months. The same is true in Europe. But the institutions there are very, very weak.

 

The U.S., of course, has similar problems, not because the U.S. dollar is so dominant, the U.S. can paper over some of those sins, although those problems are coming from the U.S. as well.

 

So, again, what we need to think about is this: The people who are the most affected by COVID-19 are older people. Those people are no longer in the workforce generally, and they’re no longer large consumers, generally.

 

OK. So all of the workforce is being sidelined or has been sidelined in Asia, is being sidelined in the West now, and consumption is being delayed for a portion of the population that is no longer consuming and is no longer working.

 

And so getting the fiscal stimulus out is important because those people who are contributing to the economy can’t do anything, right?

 

So and this isn’t to say we’re not caring about the older populations. Of course, we all are. But it’s a little bit awkward that the beneficiaries of this economic displacement are largely people who are not contributing to economies anymore.

 

 

BFM: All right. Tony, thank you so much for joining us on the line this morning. That was Tony Nash, CEO of Complete Intelligence.

 

Listen to the podcast on COVID-19 in BFM: The Business Station