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Cause and Effect: Are you a deflationist or an inflationist?

Are you a deflationist or an inflationist?

This QuickHit episode is joined by central bank and monetary policy expert Brent Johnson. He talks about inflationists versus deflationists and what makes these camps different in a time of a pandemic. What’s monetary velocity? And why banks are failing at their job, and why they’re not lending anymore money? Also discussed China and when supply chain issues will be resolved.

 

Brent Johnson is the CEO and founder of Santiago Capital, a wealth management firm. He works with about a dozen different families and individuals customizing wealth management solutions for them. He does that through a combination of separately managed accounts and private funds, also invest in outside deals, private deals, venture capital funds, and others. Brent have a focus on macro and loves the big picture.

 

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This QuickHit episode was recorded on September 28, 2021.

 

The views and opinions expressed in this Cause and Effect: Are you a deflationist or an inflationist? QuickHit episode are those of the guest and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any contents provided by our guest are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

Show Notes

 

TN: Part of the reason we’re having this discussion. And is you posted something on Twitter a few weeks ago and I’m going to quote it and we’re going to put it up on screen. You said if you believe an additional QE is on the way, you are secretly a deflationist. If you believe in the taper, you are secretly in the inflation camp. Cause and effect. And I thought it was super interesting. Can you kind of talk through that with us and help us understand what you mean by that?

 

Inflation, deflation tweet

 

BJ: Sure. And before I get into that, I’m just going to take a step back because a lot of work I’ve done, a lot of the work I’ve done publicly and put out publicly over the last 10 to 12 years has really been about the design of the monetary system, how it works, how fund flows, you know, this currency versus that currency, what central banks do, etc. Etc.

 

And this is really a follow on from that and what I was, the point I was trying to get across in this particular tweet is that central banks are a reactive agency. They are not the cause. They are the effect. Now their policies can cause things to happen, but they are reacting to what they see in the market.

 

And so my point was if you think more QE is coming, then you believe they are going to be reacting to the deflationary forces that still exist in the economy. And so if they were to step back and do nothing, you would have massive deflation.

 

Now, the flip side of that is if you think that they’re going to taper and you think they’re going to pull away stimulus, then you’re actually an inflationist because you believe inflation is here, it’s going to remain. Prices are going to continue to rise. And the Fed is going to have to step back in reaction to those steadily higher prices.

 

And so I really get this across because I think there’s a huge battle between the people who believe deflation is next and the people who believe inflation is next. And I think it’s a fantastic debate because I’m not certain which one to come. I kind of get labeled into the deflationary camp, which I don’t mind for a few reasons. But I actually understand all the reasons that the inflationary arguments are being made. And I believe it was a few additional things happen. Then we could get into this sustained inflation. But until those things happen, I’m happy to be labeled into the deflationary camp. So I hope that makes sense.

 

TN: Yeah. So pull this apart for me. Inflation is ever and always a monetary function. Right. We hear that all the time. Of course, it’s hard to say something “always” is. But people love to quote that. And I think they misapply it in many cases. And I’ve seen that you’ve kind of pushed back on some people in some cases. So can you talk us through that and is this time different? Like, what are the considerations around inflation this time?

 

BJ: Yeah. So is this a perfect way to set this up because again, I understand the argument that those in the inflationary camp are making. And it would be hard to sit here and say we haven’t seen inflationary effects for the last twelve months. Prices have risen. Regardless of why or whatever prices have gone up. So I’m not going to sit here and deny that we’ve had inflationary pressures.

 

The question is what comes next. And I think what I would say with regard to the quote that you were just making, I think that was, I can’t remember who said it now, but it’s 50 or 60 years ago. And what I think was assumed in that quote was that monetary velocity is constant. And so you’ve seen these huge rises in the monetary base. But not just the United States, but Canada, Europe, South America, China and Japan.

 

And so the thought is that with that new money in the system, you’re naturally going to have inflation. But I think Lacy Hunt, who a fellow Texan of yours, does a fantastic job of showing, had the rate of monetary velocity stay the same. That is absolutely the case. But the reality is monetary velocity kind of took a nose dive starting about 20 years ago, and it just continued to lower and lower and lower.

 

TN: And it’s been negative, right, for the past couple years?

 

BJ: Yeah. It just continues to fall. And I think the rule is…

 

TN: Let me just stop you right there. “Negative velocity of money.” What does that mean?

 

BJ: What it essentially means is that new credit is not being created. And so the system is contracting. And this is really the key to it all. It’s the key to the way the monetary system is designed. It’s the key to the way it functions. And it’s the key to whether we’re going to have inflation or deflation next.

 

Because I do agree with the money, the inflation is always and everywhere, a monetary phenomenon, assuming that velocity is constant. But velocity isn’t constant. And it’s because of the way the monetary system is designed. And it’s because of the way that the Fed and other central banks have been providing stimulus.

 

Probably don’t have time to get into all the details of what a bank reserve is and whether it is or whether it isn’t money. But essentially what the central banks have been doing, especially the Fed, is re collateralizing the system. Now re collateralizing the system isn’t exactly the same thing as actually handing somebody else physical money. It sort of is, but it sort of isn’t. And it leads to this big debate on whether they’re actually printing money or not. It’s my argument that the Fed has been re collateralized the system and that has kept prices from continue to fall.

 

But in order to get this sustained inflation, I keep saying sustained inflation because I don’t want to deny, but we’ve had it. But to have it continue going higher, especially at the rate we’ve seen would require one of two things. Either the Congress has to come out and agree to spend another seven or $8 trillion, which this week is showing, it’s very hard to get them to agree to do that. They can’t even agree on 3.5 trillion and let alone another 6 to 7. Or the banks have to start lending. And the banks simply are not lending.

 

They lent last year because the loans that the banks made were guaranteed by the government. These were the PPP loans that everybody got.

 

TN: So. What you’re saying, it sounds to me, and correct me, what you’re essentially saying is that banks are failing as a transmission mechanism. So the government has had to become the transmission mechanism because banks aren’t doing what their job should be. Is that true?

 

BJ: That’s a very good way of putting it.

 

TN: Why? Why are banks not the transmission mechanism that they should be?

 

BJ: Well, they have the potential to be. And that’s what I say. The Fed has provided the banks all the kindling for lack of a better word, all the starter fuel to create this inflationary storm. But the banks haven’t done it. I would argue. Now there’s people to disagree with me. But I would argue that they don’t want to make a loan because believe it or not, banks don’t want to rely on getting bailed out, and they don’t want to make a loan where they are not going to get their money back.

 

Now, if you’re in an environment where businesses have been shut down either because of the pandemic or because of other laws or because of regulations that can’t afford all the regulations, whatever it is, you know, it’s hard to loan somebody a million dollars if you don’t know that their business is even going to be open the next day. Right.

 

So banks aren’t in the business of going out and making a loan and having and default on them. They want to get their money back. And I think that they would rather go out and buy a treasury bond that’s yielded one and a half percentage, than make a loan that pays them, three or four of them might go bad. Right.

 

TN: Okay.

 

BJ: So to me, that’s indicative of the deflationary forces that the banks who are closer to the money than anybody else, and typically the people that are close to money understand the money or benefit from the money the most, they are telling me from by their actions, maybe not their words, but their actions are telling me they don’t think this is a great investment.

 

TN: Yeah. I think we could talk about that point for, like, 20 minutes. So let’s switch to something else. So what you didn’t really mention is the supply side of the market in terms of inflation, meaning supply chain issues, these sorts of things. Right.

 

And so I want to focus a little bit on China. Now, there’s a lot happening in China, and I want to understand how that impacts your worldview.

 

In China, we’ve got the crypto regulation that’s come in. And the clampdown in crypto. We have a strong CNY, like an unusually strong CNY over the last six or nine months. We have the power supply issues. We have the supply chain issues. That’s a lot happening all at one time, at a time when a lot of people believe there’s kind of China has this clear path to ascendency, but I think they have a lot of headwinds, right. Of those kind of how are you thinking about those factors? The crypto factor, the supply chain factor, the power factor? How are you thinking about that stuff?

 

BJ: So I think about this a lot first of all. I mean, this is a probably, like it or not, for better force, the China-United States dynamic is probably one of the biggest macro drivers for the next ten or 20 years. It most likely will be. There’s nothing is guaranteed. But that’s probably a pretty safe bet that that’s going to be one of the main drivers. And so I think what you’re touching on as far as the supply chain, in my opinion, that is as big a driver as the “money printing” for the inflationary effects that we’ve seen for the last year.

 

You know, if you look at the efficiency with which the single global supply chain that Xi call it from 1990 to 2018 or 19, it’s pretty amazing, right. There’s one global supply chain, just in time inventory, you can predict with a very high level of certainty when you would get those things you ordered and at what price. But then with a combination of the US and Chinese antagonism and COVID, the supply chains are broke. And that makes it harder to get those supplies. And the timing of when you get them in the price, which you get to miss completely unknown or its delay, and the prices are higher.

 

And so I think that has led to a lot of the price pressure on commodities. Now, part of the reason that the decreasing supply push prices up was that demand stayed flat or went up it a little bit. And I think the reason it went up is a lot of people believe that the Fed would print enough money to cause demand to stay, solid and that China was growing and that they would continue. China has been the growth driver for the global economy for years and years. And I think a lot of people thought that China would continue to be that growth driver for these commodities and these other goods that were needed. And so if demand stays flat arise and supply gets cut, then price rises.

 

Now, I don’t think that China growing and ascending to economic hegemony or however you want to describe it is a given. I think they have more troubles internally than they would like to admit. And I think we’re starting to see that, with the Evergrande, real estate daisy chain of credit extension. You know, if you think that the US has a credit problem, take a look at China, they do as well. And it’s manifested itself nowhere more visibly than in the real estate market there and Evergrande.

 

Now, the problem is if they cannot send that credit contraction that is currently taking place in the Chinese market from a real estate perspective, then demand is not going to stay cloud. Demand is must start to fall, and demand starts to fall and some of those supply chain logistics start to get ironed out. Now, they’re not going to get fixed overnight. It’s not going to go back to the way it was 18 months ago. But if it even gets a little bit better and demand starts to fall, well, then you could have a move down in commodity prices and then move down in growth expectations.

 

And that is the way deflationary pressures could take whole. And as those prices start to come down, then you get more credit contraction. It becomes a vicious cycle both to the upside and to the downside. But based on the design of the monetary and I don’t need to keep harping on this. But based on the design of the monetary system, it is literally the stair step up in the elevator shut down. That’s just the way it’s designed. It’s an inherently inflationary system that it has to grow. Or if it doesn’t grow, then it crashes. And crash has always happened faster and steeper than the stairstep higher.

 

TN: They take longer, but steeper on the way up. Right.

 

BJ: That’s right. That’s right.

 

TN: Okay. So in terms of the supply chain issues, okay. I’m just curious, is this something that you think is going to resolve itself in three or six months? Do you think it’s something that’s with us for three years or what was I feeling out of this?

 

BJ: Some of it is gonna resolve itself in three or six months? And I think that will be a combination of just working out the kinks and demand falling. Right. I think that will help. But I don’t think it’s all going to get fixed in three to six months, and I think it might take three to six years to get the other part of it. And this is where I have to actually say that in the past, I’ve been somewhat critical of the people who called for stagflation because I kind of felt the top out, right? You couldn’t decide. So you just go down the middle.

 

But I actually think that that’s a very likely scenario. I think some things are going to inflate and some things are going to deflate and we’re going to have this kind of the stagflationary environment. I think the central banks are going to do everything they can to kind of offset those deflationary pressures. And in some cases, it will work. In some cases, they won’t. But the global debt, the amount of global debt and the global dollar… Is so big that deflationary scare, in my opinion, is always going to be there. And in my opinion, you can’t ignore it.

 

A lot of people just think, oh, don’t worry about it. Central banks, have you back. There’s a Fed put, don’t need to worry about it. I understand that argument, but I don’t think it’s correct. I think you do have to worry about it.

 

TN: Yes, I think that’s right. Brent, I would love to talk to you for another couple of hours. I think we could do it. And I’d love to revisit this in a few months. Thank you so much for your time for everyone watching. If you wouldn’t mind following us on YouTube and subscribing, we’d really appreciate that. That helps us get up to where we can promote more and other things. And, Brent, I really appreciate your time and really appreciate this conversation. Thank you very much.

Categories
QuickHit

How Bain uses alternative data and AI to solve business biggest problems

Here's how Bain uses alternative data and AI to solve business biggest problems

Richard Lichtenstein of Bain & Company joins us this week to talk about advanced analytics. What is it actually and how can companies and private equity firms use this to make better business decisions? He also shares some B2C and B2B examples and use cases. Also, what are some common barriers for companies to incorporate advanced analytics to their toolset?

 

Richard Lichtenstein is an expert partner at Bain & Company in New York. He has been at Bain for 17 years and he leads their efforts around advanced analytics and private equity. To get in touch with Richard, please email him at Richard.Lichtenstein@bain.com.

 

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This QuickHit episode was recorded on September 10, 2021.

 

The views and opinions expressed in this Here’s how Bain uses alternative data and AI to solve businesses’ biggest problems QuickHit episode are those of the guest and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any contents provided by our guest are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

 

Show Notes

 

TS: For people that might not be familiar with advanced analytics or what that entails, can you kind of give us an overview of what this encompasses?

 

RL: At Bain & Company, we have a team of over 50 people that thinks about just how can we use advanced analytics to serve private equity? And so what do all these people do?

 

Well, we’ve got a bunch of people scouring the world trying to find the latest and greatest and interesting data sources that we can use. And those could be B2B or B2C. And I can talk more about what those are. Right.

 

Then we have teams of data cleaners, because sometimes those data sources are really messy on credit card data, and they specialize in cleaning them and making them usable for analysis.

 

Then we have a group of data scientists who are building Python libraries that they can use to take that data and run fairly sophisticated analysis on these over and over again. So these might be looking at retention by cohort or customer lifetime value or understanding switching behavior and things of that nature.

 

Then we have a group that takes that output and builds ways to automatically turn that in slides or into tableau so that we can get that in front of clients quickly in a form that brings out the insights.

 

And then lastly, we have some people who just help other people at Bain figure out how to use all this stuff. We get about over a thousand requests a year from teams trying to figure out which tools should I use? Which data source should I use? Et cetera. And so we just have to help them figure out how to do it.

 

TS: Can you give us some of your use cases, maybe go into a little bit more detail?

 

RL: Yeah, of course. So in a way, it’s quite different for B2B and B2C, but both of them have a lot of good advanced analytics examples. If we start with B2C, in that environment, there’s a number of interesting alternative data sets that we leverage, things like credit card data, things like e-receipt data. These show us what people are buying online. Sometimes what people are buying in store, where they go. But it goes beyond some of the traditional data sources, like Nielsen and IRI, and actually shows you what customers are doing. What happens at the customer level. And that allows you to learn some really interesting things.

 

So, for example, we’ve done some work recently with a fast food restaurant chain. And they’re trying to figure out why are we losing share? We were able to see well among people who are going to your restaurant less often or stopped going, a lot of them were going to Chick-Fil-A. And this isn’t a restaurant that sells chicken. So they hadn’t really thought of them as a competitor. But they are. And that was news to them. Or we did similar work for a coffee chain, and they thought they were losing to McDonald’s on the low-end for coffee. But it turned out, actually, that Starbucks was also a threat to them on the high-end. That help them to figure out strategy. But for private equity investor in these companies, it tells them a lot about the business and where to go.

 

TS: You wrote a piece last year on like Wayfair and how they used advanced analytics to understand that it was like on the precipice of rapid growth. So what kind of other data or companies using to better understand their market?

 

RL: Yeah. The Wayfair analysis was really quite interesting. So it’s a great example here. So that’s. And in that case, it was understanding the customer behavior that we were seeing. This was early in COVID, right before the huge spike that we all know now happened. And we were just seeing people coming to Wayfair for the first time. We had never been there before, buying stuff. We were seeing people coming back with great retention. And we were able to observe these kinds of customer metrics at completely outside in.

 

And that gave our client confidence to make an investment there. One of the other ways we can use analytics there. So we’re working with, you know, another company that’s in a similar space. And so one of the things you can see with this data is because you can see what people are actually buying, you can see what they’re buying from the competition.

 

So, for example, you could see what are customers who like to shop on Wayfair buying at Overstock or buying a Target or IKEA. And then you could say, Well, if you’re Wayfairer, you then say, well, maybe we need to stock those products. Right. So maybe we should think of adding them. Or maybe we had a stock out on that product for a little bit. And that cost us a business. And so we need to think about our inventory.

 

And so you can quickly. You can quickly think about your customers differently. At the same time if you’re a brand, obviously, you can use this data to get much better analytics than you ever could about who’s buying your products. Because previously, if you’re a brand and you’re selling online, you don’t know anything about your customers. And now you can start to understand loyalty and things like that.

 

TS: Have you found any big issues for companies using advanced analytics like it’s hard to access data. It seems fairly sophisticated. So is there a barrier to understanding this kind of data and how it’s presented?

 

RL: Yeah. I mean, I would say it’s not really for the faint of heart in terms of diving into advanced analytics. If you’re an individual company or an individual private equity firm, it’s hard to really dive in to the degree that we have for a few reasons.

 

One is there’s a lot of data sources out there. If you go to one of these conferences, there are hundreds of these sources out there, and then there’s more even if you don’t even go to these conferences, right. There’s a lot of sources. It’s hard to figure out which ones are good, which ones really have sufficient sample size and data quality. And these sources also come and go.

 

Sometimes you might have a source that you really like, and sometimes they disappear or the quality degrades. And what have you. And so you need to maintain a rotating stable of sources. And you need to think a lot about sourcing them. And again, we have people whose job is just to figure that out, which is hard for an individual company to do. And then you also need armies of people to figure out how to use the data in productive ways.

 

Again, at Bain, we’ve set all that up, but there is a high fixed cost associated with it. And so I think it’s a little self-serving. But I think my view would be that if you’re a firm and you want to get your feet wet in this kind of data, you’re better off partnering with a company like us, like Bain & Company or someone else who’s already got all this figured out and see what insights are possible. What can I really learn doing this? How can this help me make smarter business or investing decisions?

 

And then once you’ve figured that out, then sort of and you got a narrower focus, then figure out how can you get that on a recurring date? Get a feed of that on a recurring basis versus trying to start from scratch.

 

TS: Right. That absolutely makes sense. Did you have anything else that you wanted to add to give us any broader scope of your company?

 

RL: Yeah. The one other thing I might mention, it’s easy to get. And I mean, I just fell into this trap. It’s easy to get sucked into the B2C examples because they’re so enticing and easy to under stand. But I do think there is a lot of exciting work and B2B that we see. And so just to give a couple of quick examples.

 

One, I think is around people analytics. So that’s an area that’s really come a long way in the last few years. And there’s a lot you can do outside and to understand at a company who works there, what those people do, what’s their turnover and how does that change? And that’s actually enabled a lot of interesting insights. Just to give an example that we did a recent diligence on a software company that served, did a complex sort of B2B type of software.

 

And the company we looked at was cloud native, and there was a legacy software provider in the space who had been there forever and was slowly developing cloud functionality.

 

And there was a big question of, well, how fast are they going to catch up? At the moment the cloud native company was ahead. But obviously, the question is could they maintain advantage forever? And so we just looked at the people data, and we saw that our target, the cloud company had a hundred people there and software engineers doing R&D, and the legacy company had 200 people doing it. And so I mean, you sort of figure, well, if one company’s got 200 people and one’s got 100, the 200 person, and it’s going to catch up at some point.

 

TS: Right.

 

RL: And I don’t know if it’s in a year or two years, but certainly within the holding period, you have to worry about them reaching parody. And that was not a super complicated insight, but one that had a big impact on thinking about the investment. And if you bought the company, what kind of investment in R&D is required? Just an example.

 

TS: I was actually I was looking at your site. What is the founder’s mentality?

 

RL: So that’s a great question. I mean, I will admit, I’m not the expert on founder’s mentality. That was a book that Jimmy Allen wrote. That’s a great book. And if you can get him on your show, he’s far more articulate on this than I am.

 

But the idea of the founder’s mentality is that, you know, founders can bring a certain sort of secret sauce to their companies and create a dynamic and innovative culture. And that once they leave, sometimes that dynamism can erode and things can become more bureaucratic and ossified. And it can be harder for companies to innovate.

 

And I think that that is actually, it’s interesting you mention that because this is actually something that’s come up in some of the work that I’ve been doing. One of the ways you can apply this data is in sourcing. So you can help a fund scan the ocean of companies out there and find, you know, of the millions and millions of companies, here’s a sector that’s interesting. And here’s a sub sector. And then within that here are companies that meet our specific thesis and so forth.

 

One type of thesis that we see sometimes is they’re interested in companies that are still led by the original founder or sometimes they’re interested in companies where the founders just left very recently. And there is an opportunity to think about the culture in a different way.

 

And we’ve actually built some tools that allow you to look at which companies have founders that have just recently left right. And that was something that at least the fund that we worked with on that, that was very exciting as they look for opportunities. So anyway, that’s the concept. And that’s at least how it fits into my world.

 

TS: I got it. It seems very interesting. And did you have anything else? We’re going to wrap this up here in a minute. So did you have anything else you wanted to add?

 

RL: No. I mean, I think we covered the main point. The main thing I would just say to people who are thinking about this is the world of alternative data is really exciting. And the insights that are possible today that just we’re not possible even a year ago.

 

So it’s really moving fast. We’re signing a new data source practically every month, at least. So it’s great. But it’s also very complicated and tricky and hard to navigate. And again, it sounds self serving. But we strongly recommend that if you’re waiting into this for the first time, you talk to people like us at Bain & Company to really understand specifically how this stuff can help, because often it’s hard to sort of just talk to a data provider. And then from that conversation, really figure out if they’re going to be the right fit. So anyway, we’re here to help, of course.

 

TS: If people want to contact you, how would they go about contacting you or.

 

RL: Sure. I mean, I’m happy to have someone reach out to me. I’m certainly here to talk to anyone who wants to think about this, how they can use alternative data. It’s Richard.Lichtenstein@bain.com is an easy way to get in touch with me. And I’m happy to talk to anyone again who wants to think about this stuff.

 

So thanks for the time, Tracy. Really appreciate it. And hope somebody out there who sees this gives me a call.

 

TS: Absolutely. Thanks again, Richard. We really appreciate everything you’ve shared with us today.

 

And for everyone watching, please don’t forget to subscribe to our YouTube channel, and we look forward to seeing you on the next QuickHit.

Categories
QuickHit

QuickHit: What China is thinking right now?

What China is thinking right now?

China expert Chris Balding joins us this week for #QuickHit to discuss “What China is thinking right now?” What is the state of the Chinese economy? Are they really doing well in Covid? How about the deleveraging process, is that even real? And what’s happening to CNY? Also talked about are the politics around China especially how it relates to Afghanistan.

 

Subscribe to our Youtube Channel.

💌 Subscribe to CI Newsletter and gain AI-driven intelligence.

📊 Forward-looking companies become more profitable with Complete Intelligence. The only fully automated and globally integrated AI platform for smarter cost and revenue planning. Book a demo here.

📈 Check out the CI Futures platform to forecast currencies, commodities, and equity indices

 

This QuickHit episode was recorded on August 24, 2021.

 

The views and opinions expressed in this Sentiment has soured: How will governments and companies respond? (Part 1) QuickHit episode are those of the guest and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any contents provided by our guest are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

Show Notes

 

TN: Hi, everyone. Thanks for joining us for another QuickHit. My name is Tony Nash with Complete Intelligence. Today we’re talking with Christopher Balding about what is China thinking now.

 

Chris, thanks for joining us. Can you let us know a few things about yourself? Give us a little background?

 

CB: Sure. I was a professor at Peking University in China for nine years and then two years in Vietnam at the Fulbright University Vietnam. And today I am a super genius in the United States.

 

TN: Yes, you are. Thanks for taking the time, Chris. You’re one of the very few people I know who’ve actually had on the ground experience in China with a Chinese government organization.

 

So I think it’s really important to go to people like you, who had experience like you to understand what kind of China or the Chinese government is thinking now. Of course, it’s not monolithic. There are a lot of different opinions, but it’s good to have that insider’s view.

 

So I want to start off as we look at where we are in COVID, we’re a year and a half into it, depending on the school of thought, maybe it did or didn’t start in China, but we hear that Chinese economy is doing great and they’ve come out of COVID really well, all these other things. I’m really curious your view on the state of the Chinese economy right now. And what are Chinese economic planners thinking right now as they kind of potentially go into year two of Covid.

 

CB: So I think there is a couple of highlights out of the Chinese economy. First of all is that they’ve resorted to the pretty similar playbook that they go back to every year, which is pump credit, pump construction and infrastructure type spending.

 

In the early part of this year, we saw a significant amounts of credit growth. That’s softened as we’ve moved into summertime. That’s primarily due to because there’s a very clear summer and fall building season that allows builders in China to do things because the weather becomes inclement in significant parts of the year. And then if you add in the Corona backlog, that kind of is essentially almost trying to put two years of expected growth into one year.

 

We actually saw a lot of that. And that front loaded a lot of the credit and demand for things like commodities. This is why you’ve seen such demand for things like coal and steel, which were quite high. We’ve seen that soften as firms built their inventory and really ramped up during the summer building season as the demand for credit has softened and some of the building has actually been undertaken. You’ve seen a softening of that which has caused you’ve already seen talk of maybe there’s going to be unleashing or the economy is a little bit softer than the planners would like. So there’s talk of unleashing some additional credit growth trying to stimulate different parts of the economy. We’ll have to wait and see if that happens.

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Generally speaking, the rule is, if there’s a debate about whether or not they’re going to unleash credit growth, I would definitely take the over.

 

TN: By about three times. Right. So one of the interesting things you mentioned is that you said that they expended credit in the early part of this year. But what I read from investment banks and what I’ve read from other people who look at China is that China just underwent this big deleveraging process. Is that real? I’m just not sure, because I see on one side that there’s this talk about deleveraging, but my gut tells me it may not necessarily be happening. Is it happening, or is it something that’s just happening on paper or what’s your view?

 

CB: It’s tough to understand the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics and PBOC’s math as to how they arrived at that, because if you’re just running more generalized numbers, it’s very clear that debt at all levels has continued to outpace GDP. So it’s very difficult to understand how they’re estimating a leveraging. And it’s important to note that we did not see, let’s say, the rapid, rapid expansion of economic growth that you saw, for instance, in the United States.

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And what I mean by that is, whereas any United States, maybe growth went from two or three to 5% relative, almost doubling, you know. You probably saw Chinese growth go for maybe like 5% last year to seven or 8% with the Corona boost where you have that base effect. And so you didn’t see it go to, like, 10, 12, 15% that you might have seen if it had really in relative terms, they doubled from the previous year.

 

And so it’s very difficult to understand how they arrive at those deleveraging numbers. And as we all know, China is famous for fudging their numbers. So it’s very difficult to understand how they’re arriving at those numbers.

 

TN: Right. No, I agree. I haven’t believed it when I’ve heard it, but I kind of nod along as if it’s real. But I think, you know, the Chinese economic data a lot more intimately than I do, but I just don’t see where it’s happening, where it’s actually materializing instead of just being debt transfers.

 

Okay. So earlier you said that Chinese economy is slowing. Now, from my perspective, that’s worrisome partly because you’re going into a big export season, and we’ve got some ports that are stopped up. We’ve also got an election next year with Xi Jinping being reelected, whether that’s in square quotes or not, but Xi Jinping being reelected next year.

 

In terms of the resources put towards stimulus this time around, do you expect that to be more intensive than normal?

 

CB: Typically, what you see. And you saw this the first time Xi was elected, you saw this second time Xi was elected. What you typically see is a pretty significant boost to fiscal outlays. And so I think if history is any guide, I think you’re probably going to see going in the fall and the first of year, it’s very, very likely you’re going to see some type of significant boost to fiscal outlays. And this pattern goes back many, many years well before Xi that when there are these elections. And I’m not sure if it’s a scare quotes or air quotes, but both seem to…

 

TN: Yeah.

 

CB: So I think it is very, very likely that you’re likely to see that. And one of the things I think that a lot of people have missed out on is yes, there were absolutely corporate, let’s say, bailouts or corporate funds for Corona. But one of the things is that in the United States, there were the large amounts of transfers directly to households. China has not enjoyed those transfers directly to households.

 

And so actually, consumer spending in China is actually pretty soft. And those are buying inflated data standards. And so I think that is something that is very important to note when we’re talking about the health of the Chinese consumer.

 

TN: Yep. That’s great. Okay. So I also want to talk about the supply chain issues. And I was just reading a story today about how Pudong Airport has been shut down. Cargo on Pudong Airport is going to be much slower for a period of time because of anothe Covid outbreak. This sort of thing. Do you see ongoing port capacity issues related to COVID? Is that something that you’re kind of concerned about?

 

CB: I think that is something that you’re going to be seeing for definitely the foreseeable future. And I should say it’s not just China. You’re seeing a lot of this in other parts of the world that I know, specifically Vietnam, the Middle East. I’ve heard of similar things in Europe where they are just straining at capacity. Sometimes it’s due to COVID shut down. Sometimes it’s due to other issues. But absolutely, these are issues that I think are not going away anytime soon.

 

And it is, I mean one of the debates in the United States right now is transitory or structural inflation. And I think, not to be capping out on the issue, but I do think it is kind of a mix of both. And I think the supply chain issues don’t be surprised if we’re looking at very likely two years before all these issues are really worked through, because when people went to, let’s say, just in time or contract manufacturing, what that did is that gave you less wiggle room. So you did not just have a massive warehouse of supply that you inventory, and then you could draw down as necessary where it would give you three months to make a mistake. Now people were essentially saying, I got one week of inventory, and if that one week gets shot, I’m in deep trouble.

 

So the chips are, there’s chips, there’s car, there’s Corona shutdowns, there’s capacity issues at some ports. And so it’s going to take a couple of years, probably to work through all these issues to return to what we think of as some degree of normalcy.

 

TN: Right. What’s interesting to me about that is the previous administration of the US tried to bring manufacturing businesses back to the US.

 

Now, with COVID because of the global supply chain issues and the intermittent supply issues, there’s more of a move to bring things back, at least to North America. I know lots going into Mexico right now. Some’s going into the US to minimize the disruption of things, especially in electronic supply chain.

 

So it seems like regardless of the kind of official policy, whether it’s trade policy or just say public health policy, it looks like more of this regionalization is happening. Does that make sense to you?

 

CB: Yeah, absolutely. I mean, look, nobody is going to announce that they’re leaving China for many reasons. But nobody’s going to announce that they’re leaving China. But you do absolutely see a spread of manufacturing capabilities.

 

Whether that is because they want to have multiple manufacturing bases, they want to be more diversified, whether it’s because of IT issues, whether it’s because of Corona risks, tariffs, all of these issues, there is absolutely increasing diversification of manufacturing capabilities, whether it’s Mexico, India, Malaysia, all of these different places. You’ve even seen Africa doing relatively well in certain areas. So it has absolutely happened.

 

TN: Okay. One last question on the economy then we’ll move to kind of politics and China’s place in the world. What’s the thought behind the elevated CNY? We’re trading much higher than we have for a long time, and it stayed there, right? It’s pegged right around 6.4 something, and it’s been there since Q1, I think. Why the persistent strength in CNY?

 

CB: Well, I mean, I think first of all, they have been running during Corona pretty significant surpluses. The United States has exports to China and other parts of the world have declined, not insignificantly or remained flat as we’re importing a lot more. That’s number one.

 

I think also the dollar has gone into a specific range. And the way that I think of the CNY is it’s basically just a reverse USB tracker, which I think explains most of what we’re seeing. I think what they’re trying to do and the reason that China has been buying some dollars, not in major amounts, but I think they kind of have, like, ICBC and CCB, those types of banks acting as dollar cushions for lack of a better term, is that they don’t want it to appreciate too much for a number of reasons, because they know they’ve become more expensive and that would just make it that much more expensive. So in a way, I think they’re trying to manage that, manage that flow. But I think it’s still generally within a range where it’s like you can say they’re within spitting distance of what their index say they should be. Okay, that’s fair.

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TN: Okay. Now let’s move on to politics. Let’s move on to kind of China’s big, long term, multi hundred year plan to rule the world, which I think is not real.

 

So let’s talk about Afghanistan. This just happened over the last couple of weeks, and there’s a few that China is going to be the master winner of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. I think there are multiple perspectives on that, but the consensus view seems to be that the US really did had to job on the withdrawal. And the ultimate winner of this is China. Can you kind of walk me through some of your views on that? What are some of the possibilities there with China and Afghanistan?

 

CB: Sure. So I think it is very fair to say that the United States has pretty badly bungled the withdrawal. You know, why, you know, we should have waited until we’d already evacuated all the army to say we’re going to start evacuating US citizens and Afghani translators and people like that.

 

One of the things I do think is absolutely happening. And this is not just China. And you’ve heard this from country after country. Taiwan, Germany, UK on down is they are saying we need to go back to the drawing board and re evaluate everything we think we know.

 

Okay. And somebody that I was talking to, I think, expressed it very well is the United States still has credibility because we can move large amounts of assets, whether it’s military, governmental, other private sector, we can bring significant assets and influence to the table. What, this has really changed in a lot of people’s minds is confidence.

 

TN: Yes. That’s fair.

 

CB: That has changed a lot of people’s mind. So you have a lot of people going back to the drawing board. One of the things I’m going to be a little bit hesitant to do is start pronouncing winners, losers, and this is what XYZ country is going to do in ABC country is going to do. And the reason I say that is it’s very, very plausible to construct a scenario where the Taliban and the CCP become BFFs. Okay?

 

TN: Sure.

 

CB: I mean, if China is shipping large amounts of fentanyl out of northeast China, it’s not a crazy scenario to say they partner with the Taliban to start shipping large amounts of opium into the United States at the same time.

 

TN: Sure.

 

CB: Not a crazy scenario. It’s also not a crazy scenario for the Taliban to start bombing China within a year or two. Okay. You could very easily construct those types of scenarios that lead to that. Okay. So it’s very, very difficult to construct those types of scenarios with any what I would consider a degree of certainty. Okay?

 

TN: Sure. So what about the, the China-Pakistan relationship? $46 billion of investment, supposedly, supposedly a tight relationship there. That’s arguable. Do you think that pays dividends in Afghanistan, or is that kind of something that’s a little bit, I wouldn’t say irrelevant, but a little bit less directly connected.

 

CB: So I think Pakistan is actually very pretty directly involved in all of this. But again, it’s very difficult to say with a high degree of certainty what’s happening there because Pakistan has very direct connections into both the Taliban, Al Qaeda. Some would even say that they were a Pakistani security service creation. At the same time, it’s well known that there are blood feuds between groups within each of those organizations.

 

So it’s very difficult to get to say exactly who the winner, loser there. With regards to China and Pakistan, one of the things that you’ve seen very clearly is that pretty much the Pakistani government and the Pakistani elites are effectively compromised by China. They will say nothing about wingers and other issues.

 

At the same time, everything, I think indicative on the ground and of the mass population is that there is maybe not extreme, but I would say broad discontent with the Pakistani relationship with China for many reasons.

 

TN: From who and Pakistan? Is it from the armed forces? Is it from other parts of the government, from regular folks who isn’t happy with that relationship?

 

CB: I think a lot of folks broadly. The business community. I think there’s a growing sense that they are effectively a Chinese colony. One Pakistani I know who described it as such. So I think there is very broad discontent. And as we all know, Pakistan has quite the lengthy history of governmental instability.

 

So similar to what you’ve seen in other countries in the region, it’s very easy to paint a picture, a scenario where the current government remains compromised and under the thumb of the CCP for years to come. I think it’s also plausible that a new government or some type of political instability happens in Pakistan. And all of a sudden, there’s an about face on how to manage relationships with China.

 

Generally speaking, though, I think there is going to be very tight coordination between Beijing, Islamabad and Kabul because those… Pakistan, I mean, almost anything that happens in Afghanistan is going to be maybe not controlled by Pakistan. I think that overstate it. But there’s going to be large amounts of information flows and influence back and forth happens over what happens in Afghanistan.

 

TN: Yeah. Okay. That’s all really interesting. I think we could spend a long time talking about China, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Russia, kind of where all those countries come together, Central Asia. But I want to end on this.

 

We’ve seen, a lot really changed with US standing in the world over the past couple of weeks over Afghanistan. We’ve seen a lot change in the US China relationship over the past year with the new administration. And so let’s talk for a minute about the overall US China relationship. What’s your thought there? Are they getting along? Is there a constructive dialogue? How do issues like Taiwan fit within that discussion? Can you just help me think about some of your thoughts there?

 

CB: So I was talking to someone, and I think they put succinctly the way that I would characterize the Biden administration’s record on China. You can’t criticize them for what they’ve done on China because they really haven’t done anything at all. Okay. Other than adding a couple of names to the Sanctiosn books, there really has not anything taken place.

 

They promised that they were going to get out their China strategy plan in June. Then there were rumblings that might happen in July, where now at almost rapidly approaching September 1. And now there’s not even talk of when it might be released. So really, nothing has been happened except for the Alaska meeting, which apparently went over like a lead balloon.

 

Everything right now just seems to be a stalemate. And the Biden administration is worrying, and that China is still moving forward, and the Biden administration is basically doing nothing.

 

The most telling point to me about the by administration approach, and I think this is something I think you should fault in. In fairness, Trump for is look, we can talk about values and do the right thing and all this kind of good stuff. But the United States, at some point has to actually put resources into this effort.

 

And the Trump administration, other than political capital with allies or other countries, never put any real hard resources or assets into these issues. And the point I would make is the Biden administration has made a point of spending literally trillions of dollars. And to the best of my knowledge, there has been almost zero spending passed that has really anything to do with China. Okay.

 

We cannot continue to talk to countries like Vietnam, Malaysia, South Korea, Japan. You cannot talk about the threat China poses and never spend any money on the issue.

 

TN: Sure.

 

CB: Okay. And look, this doesn’t have to mean we go out and increase military spending by 20%. This could simply mean we’re going to go into Vietnam and say, we want to have a development program and, you know, help solve issues. This can mean capitalizing the Development Finance Corporation to help countries like India and Malaysia and say, look, there is a real opportunity that does not involve the Belt and Road, where there’s going to be green standards or these non-corrupt standards and things like this to make sure that this money is really helping your country. You know, and it was probably something that was negotiated could be all the way back to the Obama administration.

 

There was some type of military center opened in, I believe, Jakarta with the Indonesian government that was supposed to have other governments. It’s a small center. Even those types of things. There’s simply not the resources being dedicated. And I think that’s indicative of where this ranks within the Biden administration priorities.

 

TN: I’ll be honest, Chris, it sounds like a mess. It sounds pretty bleak to me.

 

So great. I really appreciate this. I think if anybody knows has an idea of what China is thinking, I think you’re the guy. And I really, really appreciate your time.

 

Everyone watching. Please please subscribe to our YouTube channel. The more we have, the more we can bring to you as a part of our videos. And, Chris, thank you so much. And thanks to everyone. We’ll see you on the next interview. Thanks.

Categories
QuickHit

Sentiment has soured: How will governments and companies respond? (Part 2)

Sentiment has soured: How will governments and companies respond? (Part 2)

In this second part, Sam and Marko discussed possible tapering, what can the government do to help private companies, how the consumer sentiment is looking right now, what should you do with your investment in this Delta variant scare? Are vaccines really effective? And what is this thing that the Biden administration needs to do right or they’ll be dead?

 

Please go here for the first part. 

 

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This QuickHit episode was recorded on August 19, 2021.

 

The views and opinions expressed in this Sentiment has soured: How will governments and companies respond? (Part 1) QuickHit episode are those of the guest and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any contents provided by our guest are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

Show Notes

 

TN: Sounds like both of you agree that China is going to do more stimulus. I think they’re late. I think they should have started five or six months ago. But better now than never. Right. So it sounds to me like you believe that there will be the beginning of a taper, maybe a small beginning of a taper late this year. Is that fair to say?

 

SR: Yeah, I think it’s fair to say that there will be some form of taper. Okay. I don’t know, even if it’s just rhetoric, as we move into 2022, at least with what we know right now, I don’t think they should. But what I think they should do and what they’re likely to do are two wildly different things.

 

TN: So even if it say 10 billion a month, which is nothing compared to the entire kind of stimulus, monetary stimulus are doing right now, that would have a dramatic sentimental chain. Is that your view?

 

SR: Yes. So it’s all about that incremental change in Cinnamon. It’s not about the incremental change in the addition to the portfolio.

 

TN: Right. Marko, are you the same? Do you think there’s a change in the sentiment of the Fed and there’s going to be a move toward tapering late in the year?

 

MP: I mean, I think tapering happened in June at the FRC meeting. And so that’s… Because that’s when the Fed incrementally turned hawkish. The DXY dropped quite significantly after the meeting. So I think that the risk in your view is that a lot of the things that we’re talking about right now have been slowly priced in over a period of time. And while oil prices and S&P 500 haven’t really corrected to this view reality. You know, so S&P 500 is reaching a new high, except for the last two days. Oil prices have started to come down finally.

 

 

 

 

Brent Crude Oil
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Now the 10-year has actually been pretty stable through the last couple of weeks worth of volatility. And that tells me a couple of things. I think the bottom market price, a lot of the things we’re talking about already. The second issue is that fiscal policy is really tricky when we talk about it.

CBOT 10-year US Treasury Note
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And here’s what I mean. 1953 we had a fiscal cliff recession after the Korean War. But that’s because the fiscal cliff was very clean, very simple. We spend a lot of money on bullet casings and tanks and airplanes during the Korean War, and then that fiscal spend stayed on the Korean Peninsula. We couldn’t take it back with us in 1953. In other words, we got a fiscal cliff recession.

 

This time around, the 1.9 trillion, you know, fiscal stimulus we had earlier this year, that actually, in a curial mathematical terms, shows up as a huge fiscal cliff next year. But that actually lives on on household balance sheets. And so that’s where I would say that like, let’s see how the Delta variant issue resolves itself, because in one month, here’s what I know.

 

I know the savings rate in the United States, the personal savings rate is still elevated at 9.6%. I know that revolving credit is going through the roof, and the households are re-leveraging themselves in a way that they have it for ten years. The US consumer is acting in the ways they acted in the 90s and 2000s.

 

If you look at household debt, percent of GDP, you got this long period of deleveraging for the past ten years. And now it’s coming back up. And so to me, that’s where I think the fiscal cliff of next year is overstated. And the reason that even a ten year fiscal package matters is because you’re talking about a ten-year bond. If I’m going to hold a ten-year bond, that on the back end of that 10-year, there is Trump tax cut level of unnecessary fiscal stimulus.

 

Let me say that again, what this fiscal spend right now is going to produce a similar procyclical fiscal thrust that we had during the Trump administrations in the last two years, through doc cuts, this time through infrastructure spending. That’s going to create a modest fiscal thrust, positive fiscal thrust for the duration of the asset that you’re holding. And I think that the market will still have to respond to that, even though next year there’s no way to avoid mathematical fiscal flip.

 

TN: Interesting. So. All of these things together, just going back to the reason I initially contacted you guys. I was hearing companies telling me that their Q3 revenues were really, they were downgrading them, and they’re really worried about their performance in Q3. And I think we’ve seen that or I’ve seen it anecdotally.

 

We saw tourism not necessarily be what we thought it would be. We’ve seen a lot of things happen that we didn’t really think would happen over the summer or not happen that we thought would happen. So how are you seeing these policies or how do you expect these policies to manifest at the company level? And when do you expect them to help companies to move forward?

 

MP: Well, I don’t think any policies will help companies. I think what will help companies is once Covid cases go down, and people kind of stop being afraid of the Delta wave.

 

Right now, if you look at hotel stocks. Hotel stocks are back through, like November 20th level, like they’re back to pre-Pfizer result levels. And I think that that’s a great investment opportunity. I would be long COVID place right now because, you know, the data from Israel, the data from Iceland, the data from a lot of different places that are fully, almost fully vaccinated are pretty clear, which is that vaccinated people can absolutely get Covid, and very few of them have adverse effects. The efficiency is actually at very high levels. A lot of people misinterpret, a lot of people… Sorry, the media is misinterpreting the data. And once you account for age disparities and so on, the efficiency here is like in the 90s.

 

TN: So it’s amazing.

 

MP: Yeah. Look, it’s a simple fact. Now that’s going to take some time as Sam said, I think that’s going to be articulating the data for the next month. I think that you have a great entry point into the Covid place right now. And I don’t think that any of the policies we’re really talking about are going to have much of an effect on earnings over the next quarter.

 

TN: I’ll give you a data point that I was looking at earlier today. Texas right now has the same number of cases that it had in Feb of ’21. Okay. But the daily fatalities are 60% lower than they were in Feb. Okay. So the case counts are just as high, but the fatalities are dramatically lower. And that’s good news, right.

 

Texas Covid cases and fatalities

 

MP: Look, Tony, I would study really the case of Israel, because if you study the overall numbers in Israel, you come up with a figure. I think it’s 60% effectiveness for Pfizer, which is lower than advertising, but that’s actually a mathematical concept called a Sisyphus paradox.

 

And what’s happening is that we need to segregate the different age cohorts not just average them together.

 

TN: That’s right.

 

MP: You know, because the elderly tends to be more vaccinated. You have a larger pool of older people who tend to have received a vaccine. They also tend to go to a hospital more often with a respiratory disease, even though they’re vaccinated.

 

So you can’t just average everyone together. The actual vaccine efficacy is in the 90s for all cohorts. Except in the 80s for some of the much older, over 80. It’s, like, about 80% effective. And so, yeah, I think a lot of this is… You know where I want to compare Covid to? And I think Sam will appreciate this. I compared it to the Euro area crisis.

 

You could have made a call in 2010 that this thing was over. Like once Germany like bit the bullet and bailed out Greece the first time? Like it was over, guys. But every time a new country showed up, he was like, Whoa. Here goes Portugal. Oh, my God! The world’s gonna end! And it’s like, similarly COVID, like, we know where we’re headed. Like, every wave is gonna cause sentiment issues and so on. But I would just bet against those.

 

TN: That’s a good call. I like that. I like the optimism there, and I like the perspective there. I think that’s really interesting. Sam, what do you think?

 

SR: I think there’s a combination of two things. One, I think Marco is 100%, right? That this is an awful lot like the Euro area crisis. Every single time, like Greece was the first big bang. Then you had the ripple effect to Portugal. Then it was Spain. And everybody was wondering what the next set of fall was and had the correction of 2011. That was fun. You had these longer term kind of ripples.

 

I think there’s going to continue to be ripples this time around. And the question is in my mind, it’s really difficult to predict what people sentiment around those ripples are going to be. I think we can look through them for the next five to ten years and say it’s all going to be fine. This is the way it’s going to play out.

 

The real question is, how does the American consumer mindset, how does that actually grasp this ripple to move through it? And how does China react? How does Europe react? Right. There’s a number of factors that play in here, but I think the really difficult and maybe not as priced in as they should be. To Marco’s point. I think this is a really long term, very strange kind of predicament that we’re in where vaccines are really good. They work really, really well.

 

How do people’s minds begin to grasp it? And do they begin to look through? We get the higher vaccine rates? Do we really power through this in a meaningful way, very, very quickly, or does it continue to be highly volatile on the consumer sentiment front? Because if consumer sentiment continues to fall, it’s going to be a big problem for the back half of this year. And that I mean. It’s kind of…

 

TN: We’re right there at the back there in the back half of the year, right? That. This is a terrible time for consumer sentiment to fall because we’re at the precipice of kind of holiday season buying. Not quite there yet, but if it stays for two more months, it gets pretty bad.

 

SR: It does get pretty bad. But I think this is also one of those points that I think could really be a tailwind to Marko’s earlier comments about fiscal stimulus and fiscal stimulus being higher than anticipated. You continue to have consumer sentiment fall. You continue to have people fearful of Delta, you have a couple of bad job prints, and all of a sudden you’re going to have much higher fiscal spend. You’re going to have a very dovish Fed.

 

TN: Right.

 

SR: I think that’s the risk to call it “the market.” That’s the risk to kind of my side of Marko and I’s bet is if all of a sudden this fear actually really ingrains itself within individuals, it’s going to be a huge, huge issue as we move into the Christmas buying season for companies, Christmas buying season for consumers, and you’re going to get big checks written out of Washington, regardless of the geopolitical situation, regardless of whether or not people want to say Biden might be lame duck because of Afghanistan, etc.

 

All of a sudden you’re going to have a Fed that’s very concerned, thinking it was a ripping economy with incredible inflation that wasn’t going anywhere. You’re going to have them reverse very, very quickly. You’re going to have senators on both sides of the aisle very concerned that they just, they might get blamed for a recession.

 

It’s going to be a really interesting queue for.

 

TN: It is.

 

MP: That’s why it’s a dynamic environment. Right. And and what I would say is like, look, I have certainty on the Delta wave. Certainty. Every wave we’ve had has crested, other than in emerging markets because their testing is poor. So it’s actually a mega wave that we constantly think is over, but it isn’t.

 

In the US we know how the story plays up. We know it. It’s a four to six week wave. The challenge here Tony, is that we’re talking in the middle of this wave. We have probably another two to three weeks of upswing, and then we’re going to have a down swing in cases. And by the way, I know this with a science, like, a hundred percent certainty because we had waves collapse even before we had vaccines.

 

So this is a really important point, because if the Fed reacts to something that is extremely impermanent, something that’s over in three weeks, if the Fed at Jacksonhole and subsequently in September waivers, you know, I mean, that will just set, I think the market alight, in my view. I think that will collapse the dollar and they will sell the bond, because it will have been using this, you know, temporary blip in sentiments to justify a changing course.

 

The other thing I would say is, like, so Sam mention Afghanistan. I think he’s right to mention it. I think it’s really significant, and it’s significant because of this. I think… I’ve always expected that during the summer, the fiscal policy would get much more challenging. And now, because of the Republicans, I think moderate Democrats in the Senate versus progressive Democrats in the House were always going to try to eat each other alive.

 

But now, with this utter failure in Afghanistan, that looks really, really bad, they are going to circle the wagons on fiscal calls because the last remaining, the last remaining lever of the Biden administration is this fiscal package. If they don’t get it through, guys. Yeah. The Biden administration is done. And I mean, I’m not talking about midterms either. So they have to do something on fiscal. Right.

 

So this is why the stakes have now become much higher. They’re gonna pay Mansion. They’re gonna pay Cinema. They’re gonna get deep water ports in Arizona and West Virginia to get their compliant with a fiscal deal. You know what I mean? Like, there’s gonna be so much more. I wish I was living in West Virginia. I mean, they’re gonna have ice rinks in every little town. It’s gonna be amazing.

 

And so this is something to keep in mind, I think on that front, too. So I agree with Sam. I think it’s a really good point of how these things are very dynamic and they reinforce each other. And I just think that the political pack of lease resistance in every single issue we’re talking about here leads to more profligacy.

 

TN: Yeah, I think you’re right. I think at least for the near term, that’s the bias, is exactly in that direction.

 

Okay. Guys. Thank you so much. Again, I think we could go on for hours with this, and I love this discussion, but I really appreciate your time.

 

For everyone who’s watching. Please subscribe to our YouTube channel, where we need a few more subscribers to bring you a few more capabilities on our channel. If you don’t mind, please subscribe.

 

And Sam and Marko. Really appreciate your time. Thanks very much.

 

MP: Thank you. Thank you.

 

TN: Let’s do it again, and I want to come back in January and see who wins.

 

MP: Yeah, sure. We should definitely do that. We didn’t tell people when we been into, but it’s like a really nice steak dinner, I think was the… If the 10-year is at like between one point 49 and one point 51, I think we just…

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QuickHit

Sentiment has soured: How will governments and companies respond? (Part 1)

Sentiment has soured: How will governments and companies respond? (Part 1)

Companies are saying that the Q3 revenues will be down a bit. What’s really happening and how long will this last? Chief Economist for Avalon Advisors, Sam Rines, and a returning guest answers that with our first-time guest Marko Papic, the chief strategist for Clocktower Group.

 

In addition, both the Michigan Consumer Sentiment and the NY Manufacturing survey down as well. Watch what the experts are seeing and what they think might happen early in 2022.

 

Watch Part 2 here. 

 

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This QuickHit episode was recorded on August 19, 2021.

 

The views and opinions expressed in this Sentiment has soured: How will governments and companies respond? (Part 1) QuickHit episode are those of the guest and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any contents provided by our guest are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

Show Notes

 

TN: So I guess we’ve started to see some negative news come in with the Michigan Consumer Sentiment with the New York Manufacturing Survey and other things. Most recently, we had some of the housing sentiment information come in. And I’ve heard companies talk about their revenues for Q3 will be down a bit. And so I wanted to talk to you guys to say, are we at a turning point? What’s really happening and how long do you expect it to last? Marko, why don’t you let us know what your observation is, kind of what you’re seeing?

 

MP: Well, I think that, you know, the bull market has been telling us that we were going to have an intra cyclical blip, hiccup, interregnum, however you want to call it since really March. And there’s, like, really three reasons for this. One, the expectations of fiscal policy peaked in March. Since then, the market has been pricing it less and less expansion of fiscal deficits. Two Chinese have been engaged in deleveraging, really, since the end of Q4 last year, and that started showing up in the data also on March, April, May.

 

And then the final issue is that the big topic right now is something we’ve been focused on for a while, too, which is this handover from goods to services, which is really problematic for the economy. We had the surge of spending on goods, and now we all expected a YOLO summer where everybody got to YOLO. It really happened.

 

I mean, it kind of did. Things were okay but, that handoff from good services was always gonna be complicated, anyways. And so I’m going to stop there because then I can tell you where I stand and going forward. But I think that’s what’s happening now and what I would be worried about. And I really want to know what Sam thinks about this is that the bull market been telling you this since March. There’s some assets that were kind of front load. The one asset that hasn’t really is S&P 500, as kind of ignored these issues.

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TN: Right. Sam, what are you seeing and what do you think?

 

SR: Yeah, I’ll jump in on the third point that Marko made, which is that handoff from services or from goods to services. That did not go as smoothly as was planned or as thought by many. And I don’t think it’s going to get a whole lot better here. You have two things kind of smacking you in the face at the moment. That is University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment and the expectations. Neither of those came in fantastically. Today isn’t great. Tomorrow isn’t expected to be great.

 

Part of that is probably the Delta variant, depending on what part of the country you’re in, that is really beginning to become an issue. Not necessarily, I mean, it’s nowhere near as big of an issue as COVID was for death and mortality in call it 2020. But it’s a significant hit to the consumer’s mindset. Right?

 

And I think that’s the part, what really matters is how people are thinking about it. And if people are thinking about it in a fear mode, that is going to constrain their switch from goods to services and the switch from goods to services over time is necessary for the economy to begin growing again at a place that is both sustainable and is somewhat elevated. But at this point, it’s really difficult to see exactly where that catalyst is going to come come from, how it’s going to actually materialize in a way that we can get somewhat excited about and begin to actually become a driver of employment. We do need that hand off to services to drive employment numbers higher.

 

And what we really need is a combination of employment numbers going higher, GDP being sustainably elevated to get bond rates higher. So I think Marko’s point on what the treasury market is telling us should not be discounted in any way whatsoever.

 

The treasury market is telling us we’re not exactly going to a 4% growth rate with elevated inflation.

 

United States GDP Annual Growth Rate
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TN: Right.

 

SR: It’s telling us we’re going to something between Japan and Germany at this point.

 

TN: Yeah. That’s what I’m a bit worried about. And with the consumer sentiment especially, I’m a bit worried about sticky sentiment where we have this Delta variant or other expectations, and they remain on the downside, even if there are good things happening.

 

Do you guys share those worries, or do you think maybe the Michigan survey was a blip?

 

SR: Oh, I’ll just jump in for 1 minute. I don’t think it was a blip at all. I think what people should be very concerned about at this point is what the next reading is. That reading did not include the collapse of Afghanistan. It did not include any sort of significant geopolitical risk that is going to be significant for a number of Americans.

 

Again, it’s kind of like Covid. It might not affect the economy much. It’s going to affect the psyche of America significantly as we move forward. And if consumer sentiment were to pick up in the face of what we’ve seen over the last few days, I would be pretty shocked.

 

TN: It would be remarkable. Marko, what do you think about that?

 

MP: So I’m going to take the other side of this because I have a bet on with Sam, and the bet is, by the end of the year, I’m betting the 10-year is going to be closer to 2%. He’s betting it’s going to be closer to 1%. So he’s been winning for a long time, but we settled the bet January 1, 2022.

CBOT 10-year US Treasury Note
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Here’s why I think I would take the other side of a lot of the things, like when we think about where we’re headed. So first, I think there’s three things I’m looking at. There’s really four things. But the fourth is the Fed. And I’m going to like Sam talk about that because he knows a lot more than I do. The first three things I’m looking at is, as I said, there are reasons that the bond market has rallied. And I think a lot of these reasons were baked in the cake for the past six months, or at least since March.

 

The first and foremost is China. And China is no longer deleveraged. The July 30th Politburo meeting clearly had a policy shift, but I would argue that that been the case since April 30. They’ve been telling us they are going to step off the break. And, quite frankly, I don’t need them to search infrastructure spending a lot. I don’t need them to do a lot of LGFB. I just need them to stop the leverage. And so they’re doing that.

 

And the reason they’re doing that is fundamentally the same reason they crack down on tech. And it has to do with the fact that Xi Jinping has to win an election next year. Yeah. And an election. It’s not a clear cut deal. He’s going to extend his term for another five years. CCP, The Chinese Communist Party is a multi sort of variant entity, and he has to sell his peers in the communist party that the economy is going to be stable.

 

And so we expect there to be a significant policy shift in China. So one of the sort of bond bullish economic bearish variables is shifting. The second is fiscal policy. Remember I mentioned that in March, investors basically started, like the expectations of further deficit increases, basically whittle down. This was also expected.

 

The summer period was also going to be one during which the negotiations over the next fiscal package were going to get very difficult. I would use the analog of 2017. Throughout the summer of 2017, everybody lost faith in tax cuts by the Trump administration. And that’s because fundamentally, investors are very poor at forecasting fiscal policy. And I think it has to do with the fact that we’re overly focused on monetary policy. We’re very comfortable with the way that monetary policy uses forward guidance.

 

I mean, think about it. Central bankers bend over backwards to tell us what you’re going to do in 2023. Fiscal policy is a product of game theory, its product of backstabbing, its product of using the media to increase the cost of collaboration, of cooperation. And so I think that by the end of the year, we will get more physical spending. I think the net deficit contribution will be about $2 trillion, the net contribution to deficit, which is on the high end. If you look at Wall Street, most people think 500 billion to a trillion, I would take double of that.

 

And then the final issue is the Delta. Delta is going to be like any other wave that we’ve had is going to dissipate in a couple of weeks. And also on top of that, the data is very, very robust. If you’re vaccinated, you’re good. Now, I agree with everything Sam has said. Delta has been relevant. It has, you know, made it difficult to transition from goods to services, but it will dissipate. Vaccines work. People with just behavior. So.

 

TN: Let me go back to the first thing you mentioned, Marko, is you mentioned China will have a new policy environment. What does that look like to you?

 

MP: There’s going to be more monetary policy support, for sure. So they’ve already, the PBOC has basically already told us they’re going to do an interest rate cut and another RRR cut by the end of the year. Also, they are going to make it easier for infrastructure spending to happen. Only about 20-30% of all bonds, local government bonds have been issued relative to where we should be in the year. I don’t think we’re going to get to 100%. But they could very well double what they issued thus far in eight months over the next four months.

 

So does this mean that you should necessarily be like long copper? No, I don’t think so. They’re not going to stimulate like crazy. The analogy I’m using is that the Chinese policy makers have been pressing on a break, really, since the recovery of Covid in second half of 2020. They’ve been pressing on the breaks for a number of reasons, political, leverage reasons, blah, blah, blah. They’re not going to ease off of that break. That’s an important condition for global economy to stabilize.

 

Thus far, China has actually been a head wind to global growth. They’ve been benefiting from exports, you know, because we’ve been basically buying too many goods. They know the handoff from goods to services is going to happen. Goods consumption is going to go down. That’s going to hurt their exports. On top of that, they have this political catalyst where Xi Jinping wants to ease into next year with economy stable.

 

Plus, they’ve just cracked down on their tech sector. They’re doing regulatory policy. They have problems in the infrastructure and real estate sectors. And so we expect that they will stimulate the economy. Think about it that way. Much more actively than they have thus far.

 

TN: Great. Okay. That’s good news. It’s very good news. Sam?

 

SR: Yeah. So the only push back that I would give to Marko and it’s not really pushback, given his assessment, because I agree with 99% of what he’s saying. But the one place that I think is being overlooked is, one thing is the fiscal policy with 2 trillion is great, but that’s probably spread over five to ten years, and therefore it’s cool. But it’s not that big of a deal when it comes to the treasury market or to the economic growth rate on a one-year basis. It’s not going to move the needle as much as the middle of COVID.

 

TN: Let me ask. Sorry to interrupt you. But when you say that’s going to take five to ten years, when we think about things like the PPP program isn’t even fully utilized. A lot of this fiscal that’s been approved over the last year isn’t fully utilized. So when these things pass and you say it’s going to take five to ten years, there’s the sentiment of the bill passing. But then there’s the reality of the spend. Right. And so you just take a random infrastructure multiplier of 1.6 and apply it.

 

There’s an expectation that that three and a half trillion or whatever number happens, two trillion, whatever will materialize in the next year. But it’s not. It’s a partial of it over the next, say, at least half a decade. Is that fair to say?

 

SR: Correct? Yeah. Which is great. It’s better than nothing in terms of a catalyst to the economy. The key for me is it’s not being borrowed all at once. It’s not being spent all at once. Right.

 

If it was a $2 trillion infrastructure package to be spent in 2022, I would lose my bet to Marko in a heartbeat. It would be a huge lose for me, and I would just pay up. But I would caution to a certain degree, it’s $200 billion a year isn’t that big of a deal to the US economy, right. That’s a very de minimis. Sounds like a big number, but it’s rather de minimis to the overall scale of what the US economy is.

 

And you incorporate that on top of a Federal Reserve that’s likely to begin pulling back, or at least intimate heavily that they’re going to begin pulling back incremental stimulus or incremental stimulus by the end of 2021 and 2022. And all of a sudden you have a pretty hawkish kind of outlook for the US economy as we enter that 2022 phase. And it’s difficult for me, at least, to see the longer term, short term rates, I think, could move higher, particularly that call it one to three year frame. But the ten to 30-year frame, for me is very difficult to see those rates moving higher. With that type of hawkish policy in coming to fruition, it’s kind of a push and pull to me. So I’m not obviously, I don’t disagree with the view that China is going to stimulate and begin to actually accelerate growth there. I just don’t know how much that’s actually going to push back on America and begin to push rates higher here.

 

I think we’ve had max dovishness. And strictly Max dovishness is when you see max rates and when you begin to have incremental hawkishness on the monetary policy side and fiscal side. And 2 trillion would be slightly hawkish versus 2020 and early 2021. When you begin to have that pivot, that it’s hard for me to see longer term interest rates moving materially higher for longer than call it a month or two.

 

TN: Okay, so a couple of things that you said, it sounds like both you agree that China is going to do more stimulus. I think they’re late. I think they should have started five or six months ago, but better now than never. Right. So it sounds to me like you believe that there will be the beginning of a taper, maybe a small beginning of a taper late this year. Is that fair to say.

Categories
QuickHit

QuickHit Cage Match: Time to Taper?

QuickHit Cage Match: Time to Taper?

This is a special QuickHit Cage Match edition with returning guest Albert Marko, and joining us for the very first time Andreas Steno Larsen to talk about tapering. Will the Fed taper this year? If yes, when, how, and why? If no, why not? Also discussed are the housing market, China GDP, and corporate earnings.

 

Andreas is the chief global strategist at Nordea Bank, which is mostly a Nordic bank, but has a presence in large parts of Europe, but also in the US. He speaks on behalf of the bank on topics surrounding global markets and in particular bond markets.

 

Albert Marko is a consultant for financial firms and high net worth individuals trying to navigate Washington, DC and what the Fed and Congress are up to.

 


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This QuickHit episode was recorded on August 16, 2021.

 

The views and opinions expressed in this QuickHit Cage Match: Time to Taper? QuickHit episode are those of the guest and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any contents provided by our guest are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

 

Show Notes

 

TN: So Andreas, I noticed you guys, you and Albert kind of in a Twitter fight last week about tapering, and that’s what really drew me to this discussion. I wanted to give you guys a platform to talk through this. So help me understand, you know. So what is your position? Why do you think it’s going to happen? When do you think it’s going to happen?

 

ASL:  Well, I think tapering is right around the corner, and the basic reason is that I expect marked sequential improvements in the labor market in the US over the coming two or three quarters. If you look at it, very simply speaking, right now, there are more job openings than unemployed in the US. I know I disagree with Albert on this as well. But in the old world, that would at least have let the Fed to turn very, very hawkish when they can see such a rate between job openings and unemployed as we have right now.

 

I basically have a case that once these extraordinary benefits, they will end across the US during September. Then we will have an explosion in a positive sense in the US Labor market. And that is exactly what is needed to convince the Fed of tapering.

 

So my base case is a decision taken in September and then an implementation starting already in December this year. And I expect them to be done already during the first half of next year with the tapering process. So it’s fairly aggressive compared to the scenarios I’ve seen painted by by other analysts.

 

TN: That’s really interesting. I just want to clarify one thing. When you say explosion the labor market, you mean more people coming into the market?

 

ASL: Yeah. And they come into the market and fill these job openings right now, we have a low labor market mobility due to a lot of temporary factors. And once they’re gone, then we should expect employment to be almost running at full speed before New Years.

 

TN: Okay. Okay. Very interesting. Albert, take it away. Help me understand what you’re thinking.

 

AM: Well, I mean, I would agree with him in the old days. Right. But we are in a situation where these tapering assumptions are based on Fed rhetoric and the public comments that they’ve been making specifically addressing his unemployment, unemployment boost or surge.

 

You know, we still have COVID lockdown patchwork across the world happening at the moment. Australia, Japan, Taiwan, and most importantly, China, because no one’s looking right now in China, but China’s GDP looks like it’s not going to surpass two or 3% for the next four or five quarters. With that in mind, where the United States going to get inventory for the holiday season and have this boost in employment surge that we usually get on holiday season.

 

It’s just, to me, there’s so many negatives, so many variables with negative connotations towards it. I can’t see the Fed tapering and just absolutely obliterating the market right before mid term season coming up in 2022. It’s just for me, it’s just inconceivable for them to do such a thing like that.

 

TN: Okay. Understood. So, Andreas, what do you think? Let’s say it doesn’t happen in September. What is the Fed thinking through and what mechanisms do they have to use, say, instead of a taper? Are there other things they can do aside from taper that will basically bring about the same intended outcome?

 

ASL: Well, I want to first of all, address what Albert said on China. I perfectly agree with the view on China right now. China is slowing massively. But I actually find it very interesting that the Federal Reserve is now even more behind the curve when it comes to its reaction function compared to earlier cycles, given that they want to see realized progress in labor markets and not forecasted progress.

 

And we know that labor markets, they lack the actual economic development. So it’s almost a given in my view, that we have a surge in employment over the coming couple of quarters as a consequence of what happened during the first half of the year. So that’s one thing.

 

And the second thing is that what we see right now in China is another wave of restrictions that will lead to renewed supply chains disruptions across the globe. And again, we will have a wave of supply side inflation, which is the exact kind of inflation that we are faced with right now. And given how the Fed communicated just three months back, you have to be amazed by how scared they are of the supply side inflation, even though it’s not the kind of inflation that they like.

 

So I still think that they will react to this, even though it’s supply side driven. What they have in sort of the toolbox ahead of September is obviously that they could hint that the interest rate path further out could be hiked. But otherwise, I think the most obvious tool is to look at the purchases of mortgages. Since we currently have a situation where most US consumers, they are very worried or even scared of buying a house. Timing wise right now, as a consequence of the rapid rise we’ve seen in the house prices. And I guess that’s directly linked to what the Fed is done on mortgages.

 

TN: Yeah. I can tell you just from my observation here in Texas where we have a lot of people moving in. House prices have taken a pause for probably the last two or three months where things even two, three months ago wouldn’t stay on the market for, like, three days. We’ve started to see things on the market for longer.

 

And so, I’m seeing what you’re saying, Andreas, about the housing market. And the question is, can that stuff pick up again, and is it justified? Albert, what’s your response to Andreas statement?

 

AM: The best comparison that we have is the 2013 economy to today’s economy. No one can sit there and argue that today’s economy is stronger than 2013. And look what Tapering Tantrum did to 2013 market. It was an absolute debacle. Yellen was so put off by Bernanke’s Tapering that she refused to do it in 2015. And in 2017, when they even mentioned it again, the market took a leg down. So, with that, right? And especially with Andres mentioning the word inflation, which is an absolute bad word to talk about in DC, tapering would have to have the Fed admit wrongdoing on sticking inflation.

 

When have we ever seen the US Federal Reserve ever take blame for something that’s negative in the markets? They just simply don’t do that. In fact, what I think they’re going to end up doing is allowing a market correction late into the fall and then unleash another $3 trillion of QE with Yellen and Powell to support the markets. So which would be completely opposite of tapering.

 

TN: Yeah, that’s interesting. You have completely opposite views. And what’s your view on the possibility of QE? I mean, is it possible?

 

ASL: Well, I don’t think Albert and I disagree a whole lot on the structural view or outlook, since that QE is a permanent instrument and it’s needed to fund the debt load of the US Treasury. There is no doubt about it. The point being here that the Federal Reserve needs a positive excuse to start tapering. I agree with that as well. And that exact positive excuse will be another couple of very strong labor market reports.

 

That’s exactly what they’ve been telling us. That they want to see between 800K and 1 million jobs created a month would be enough for them to launch a Tapering decision in September. Whether they will succeed with the entire tapering process is whole different question, but I’m looking for that decision in September. And then I guess Albert and I will agree a lot on the market takeaways if they take such a decision.

 

AM: Let me ask you a question Andreas. What would happen if the United States Congress refuses to deal with the debt ceiling and have no fiscal at that point? What would happen then?

 

ASL: Well, in such case, there is a whole lot of issues that you need to take care of as a Fed Reserve. So first of all, I’m not too scared of that scenario. I consider very low probability. I’m interested if you have another opinion.

 

AM: I personally don’t think it happens until at the very earliest November.

 

ASL: Yeah, but, I mean, obviously, every time there’s a debt ceiling deadline, we know that the true deadline is not the suspension deadline, its the deadline when the US Treasury is not able to run on fuels any longer, right? And that would be sometime during late October, there about I agree with you on that. So we basically have a window right now without a whole lot of issuance due to the debt ceiling being in place. And I actually think that’s a decent window for the Federal Reserve to utilize if they want to start tapering, since there is a smaller issuance for the private sector to swallow in such case.

 

TN: Interesting. Okay. What are you guys seeing on the corporate side? Are you seeing strength on the corporate side? I know we just had earnings season and they were very strong, but are you seeing a justifiably strong corporate position to start to taper?

 

AM: Right now, I really don’t. I mean, the University of Michigan Consumer Confidence had collapse. I think today, New York’s Manufacturer Index came in at 18.3, which was an astounding collapses in itself. You know, I personally deal with a couple of hedge funds, and they have been well behind the curve in returns right now.

 

I think the best ones are sub 10% for the year, so they’re gonna have to move back into cyclicals, and they’re gonna have to move back into small caps to make up the difference before the year end. Simply just even discussing that option, it makes tapering, you know, even less of a likely outcome just because it would ruin the market.

 

ASL: Obviously, if you go long small caps right now into a tapering scenario, you will end up losing. I agree with that. That would be kind of the worst. Yeah, exactly. But otherwise, I have to agree that the corporate sector is more doubtful, I would say, than the US Treasury in terms of a tapering decision. I’m much more scared of the corporate debt load than I am of the US Treasury debt load.

 

The State’s currency issue is they can always get rid of such a scenario. But the corporate sector is bigger trouble than the US Treasury into this scenario that I depict.

 

AM: Yeah. I completely agree with that one.

 

TN: Wow. We end on agreement. Guys. Thank you so much for this. Thanks so much for your time. I really look forward to it. Andreas, I look forward to having you back. Albert, of course, we look forward to having you back. Have a great week ahead, guys. Thank you very much.

 

And for all you guys watching. Thanks for taking the time. Please subscribe to our channel. And we’ll see you next time. Thanks very much.

Categories
QuickHit

The Fed and ECB Playbooks: What are they thinking right now? (Part 2)

Fed & ECB Playbooks: What are they thinking right now? (Part 2)

Part 2 of the Fed and ECB Playbooks discussion is here with Albert Marko and Nick Glinsman. In this second part, the housing and rent market in the US, UK, Australia, etc. was tackled. Also, do we really need a market collapse or correction right now? And discover the “sweet spot” for the Fed to “ping pong” the market. When can we see 95 again? What is the Fed trying to do with the dollar? And what currencies in the world will run pretty well in a time like this?

 

Go here for Part 1 of the discussion.

 

 

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This QuickHit episode was recorded on July 29, 2021.

 

The views and opinions expressed in this The Fed & ECB Playbooks: What are they thinking right now? (Part 2) QuickHit episode are those of the guest and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any contents provided by our guest are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

 

Show Notes

 

TN: Now, with all of that in mind, Nick, you did a piece recently about the Fed and housing and some of the trade offs that they’re looking at with regard to the housing market.

 

Now, housing is an issue in Australia. It’s an issue in the UK. It’s an issue in the U.S. and other places. Can you walk us through a little bit of your kind of reasoning and what you’re thinking about with regard to the Fed and housing?

 

NG: Well, I actually think, it was, I was watching Bloomberg TV as they ask after the Fed comments from me, well, you know, maybe the Fed’s right because the lumber has collapsed. Right. Lumber’s in an illiquid market, takes one player and you can move that price 5 to 10 percent. But that was an irrelevance.

 

I think there’s a couple of things that lead the Fed in the wrong direction. First of all, the mortgage backed securities QE, that really isn’t necessary. That they could definitely tap and that would perhaps quell some of the criticism on you letting inflation on. Know this criticism, by the way, the Fed and the other central banks is all coming from some of the former highest members of those central banks. It seems that once you leave the central bank, you get back to a normal DNA to Mervyn King and the be governor of the Bank of England, hugely critical.

 

And you have that House of Lords touching on QE. Bill Dudley ran, said New York. That is the second most important position at the Fed. And in fact, my thought process there is the repo problems that we’ve had is because his two market lieutenants of many years experience were let go when Williams took over. Big mistake.

 

Anyway. So back to the federal housing. I think they focused on cost of new housing. My view is the slowdown that we will get on new homes is purely a function of supply of goods used to make homes, where essential supply. Then tell me is or if it’s not essential supply, it’s become incredibly expensive. Copper wire and so on and so forth. But my fear is that focused on this and the thing that’s going to come and hit them really hard at some point in the future, which is why I think inflation is not going to be transitory. It’s going to be persistent. Rent. Going one way is… I mean, New York rents have picked up dramatically. New York being an exceptional example, but.

 

TN: Remember a year ago you couldn’t give away an apartment in New York?

 

NG: So I think in that respect, everybody’s talking about mortgage backed securities and QE. Why are you doing it? Housing market doesn’t need it. Look at the price action. Fine. All valid points. I think the Fed should be more worried ultimately about rent. And the rent.

 

AM: Rent is a problem. You’re right, Nick. The other thing I want to point out is there’s a disconnect because it’s not just one housing market in the United States. Because of covid, the migration from north to southern states has really jumbled up some of the figures and how they’re going to tackle that is something that it’s above my pay grade right now, but it’s just something I wanted to point out.

 

NG: Albert’s absolutely right. People have been incentivized to be in real estate. People have been incentivized effectively to be in related markets to the collective real hard assets in this environment. Absolutely.

 

I mean, I would argue that part of Bitcoin’s rise is because, in fact, it’s a collectible. Limited supply. It’s such a collectible. It’s got no intrinsic value. But it’s a collectible. But I would, I think that’s. Albert’s right to point out the demographic moves in the US. I think there’s a huge pressure. One policy doesn’t fit every market. And I think the red pressure will be reflected in the similar fashion. It’s a huge problem.

 

TN: So what can the Fed do about it? Is there anything they can do about it?

 

NG: Become a commercial banker in terms of policy. You know, we’ve I mean, in the U.K., there was certain lending criteria for corporates that were imposed during the crisis that actually did help. But I think also the other thing that seems to be problematic for the commercial banks is Basel III. So, even if the Fed wants to help, how much can they help within that framework? Of course, the US Fed can just say thank you Basel.

 

TN: Doesn’t apply to us.

 

AM: They can also raise rates if they want to be cheeky.

 

TN: Yeah, but then it’s not just real estate that collapses. It’s everything, right?

 

AM: Maybe it needs to be collapsed, Tony. Maybe it needs to correct a little bit because, what are we buying here? We’re buying stuff, we’re buying equities that are 30, 40 percent above what they were pre-Covid.

 

It’s just silly at this point. I was talking to one of my clients and this is like we have to look through, we have to sift through US equities, which are probably going to go down to like twenty seven hundred of them right after this shenanigans ends and trying to find a gem in there to invest in. Whereas we can go overseas in emerging markets and look through thirty four thousand of them. Right. So you know, we need a correction.

 

TN: Famous last words.

 

The last thing we’d really like to talk about is currencies. So, you know, we’ve seen a lot of interesting things happening with the dollar, with the euro, with the Chinese yen. And so I’d really like to understand the interplay of how you see the Fed and the ECB with the value of the dollar and the euro. Albert, you said, you know, the ECB really has no control or very little control over the euro because of what the Fed does. So what is the Fed trying to do with the dollar?

 

AM: You know, Tony, Nick and I had wrote a two-page piece on the dollar’s range of ninety one to ninety three. And that seems to be the sweet spot for them, where they can ping pong the markets and drop the Russel a little bit, promote the Nasdaq and then vice versa and go back and forth like that. That is where they’ve been keeping this thing for… How long has that been, Nick? For like six months now, that we keep it in that range?

 

NG: We wrote eighty nine to ninety three, but really ninety one midpoint should start to be the, the solid support. That’s played out exactly.

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AM: They’re a bunch of comic jokesters where they go to ninety three point one and three point one five and then they scare people and then they come back down and drop it back to ninety two. I mean it almost with the ninety one today, I believe. You know, so it’s just we’re stuck in that range, Tony, until they want to correct the market after the market corrects, they’ll probably go to ninety five, ninety six.

 

NG: Our view on that is partly because that the dollar is the ultimate economic weapon of destruction. Not to the US. For other countries. First of foremost emerging markets, but because it’s included in emerging market indices and ETFs as a result, I include China there. And you know, to be honest with you, I not only the geopolitics suggestive and Albert and I tweeted on some of the things that we believe are going to happen. How can the US authorities allow China to wipe out investors the next day after an IPO?

 

The people forget, it astounds me. Not more is made of this and no more commentary. We’re dealing with a Stalinist bunch of communists led by Xi. They will do anything to retain power, and they certainly don’t care about American and international investors. We’ve just seen that. You seen that with DiDi. You seen that with the education companies that are created in the US. We’ve even seen Tencent down. Tencent is one of the worst performing stocks in the world. It’s a tech stock in China, and look at tech in the US.

 

AM: Yeah. Let’s not deviate too far into the Chinese thing because we can do a whole hour just on China. When it comes to the currencies, Tony, the dollar being at ninety one, ninety two. The only other currencies that I do love are the Canadian dollar and the Aussie dollar, simply for the fact that they’re a commodity rich nations. And in a time of inflation, there’s no better place to be right now.

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TN: Yeah, I think they’ll run pretty well.

 

NG: Yeah, I think as a macro trade in the next couple of years is commodities and it doesn’t necessitate economic reflation. You’ve got enough supply chain issues and supply issues and lack of capex and politics with regard to energy that restrict the supply. And the demand is there. Can you imagine, even if we don’t have a fully reflation story from the economy, if Jet Blue has a shortage of jet fuel in the in the US right now, imagine what happens to jet fuel when Europe starts to travel properly, which won’t happen this year, it will be next year.

 

In fact, the commodity minus the big ones? Have you seen their profits? Huge increase in dividends and share buybacks.

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QuickHit

The Fed & ECB Playbooks: What are they thinking right now? (Part 1)

Fed & ECB Playbooks: What are they thinking right now? (Part 2)

Geopolitics experts Albert Marko and Nick Glinsman are back on QuickHit for a discussion on the Federal Reserve, the ECB, and central banks. What are they thinking right now?

 

Albert Marko advises financial firms and some high net worth individuals on how politics works in D.C.. He worked with congressional members and their staff for the past 15 to 20 years. In his words, Albert basically is a tour guide for them to figure out how to invest their money.

 

Nick Glinsman is the co-founder and CIO of EVO Capital LLC. He does a lot of writing and some portfolio management. He was a macro portfolio manager in one of the big micro funds in London for quite a few years. Prior to that, Nick was with Salomon Brothers. Now, he concentrates on providing key intel, both economics and politics on a global level to finance managers and politicos.

 

You can go here for Part 2 of the discussion.

 

 

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This QuickHit episode was recorded on July 29, 2021.

 

The views and opinions expressed in this The Fed & ECB Playbooks: What are they thinking right now? (Part 1) QuickHit episode are those of the guest and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any contents provided by our guest are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

 

Show Notes

 

TN: Today we’re talking about central banks and given where we are in “the cycle”, whatever that means at this point, post or late Covid, we’ve had waves of support coming from finance ministries and treasuries and central banks around the world. Central banks seem to be in a very weird position right now. So I’d really love to understand your point of view particularly what the Fed and the ECB thinking about right now and what are some of the biggest dilemmas they have? Nick, if you want to go first and frame that out a little bit and then Albert, will obviously go to you.

 

NG: Well, given how long I’ve been doing this, I’m more of a traditional, black coated central bank watcher. And I would say a couple of key comments to make right now is I think they’ve lost their independence to a large extent. Harder for the ECB to lose its independence. But with the commission, you have that loss.

 

I also think that we are, defective monetary financing. And again, I’ll go back to the ECB, who literally for the last month, for everything that was issued in Europe and this reluctance by the Fed to, even they admit talking about talking about tapering, but this reluctance to even consider a pullback on the mortgage-backed securities. The jest, pretty much the same, and it’s very clear with a lot of the actions that I’m in, my interpretation is, one, they’re working in cahoots with the political arm.

 

So treasury in the US, commission in Europe. Bank of England is a slight exception about to happen, but we can cover that later. So that’s clearly going on. And I think now Albert might do a lot of work together and I think this Albert came out with a comment a while back saying Yellen wants six trillion dollars fiscal. And the excuse that was given, aside from the political bias, was the Treasury market needs it.

 

And interesting enough, we saw the change to the Repos yesterday. This was after criticism by a committee that was published in the F.T. yesterday. And even Bill Dudley’s commented on Today suggesting that a lot more work needs to be done to ensure that the normal functioning of the plumbing behind the form of safe assets.

 

So it’s clear to me that things are being worked on in a politically coordinated way that impacts monetary policy. Now, I think they’ve got themselves into an economic or policy black hole. I think the mind set, and it’s been like this since probably ’08, which is they’re not prepared to accept the economic cycle anymore.

 

So back to one of my previous appearances on on your pod, the Fed not doing anything? Yeah, it seems to me that that’s an acceptable process, regardless of inflation is way above their forecast. And forecasting that’s a whole ‘nother bad area for the… Fed’s forecasts are terribly wrong. The ECB’s forecasts have been wrong for, you know, since time immemorial.

 

The ECB is more dangerous because they have a bias that keeps them on their policy’s wreck.

 

TN: So first on forecasts, if any central bankers are watching, I can help you with that. Second, when you say they don’t believe in the business cycle anymore, do you mean the central banks or do you mean the political folks?

 

NG: The central banks and government. I mean, funnily enough, I’m reading a biography on Jim Baker right now. And when you look at Reagan, when he came in and Volcker, economic data was pretty bad back at the beginning of the 80s. That. No way, no politician is prepared to accept that anymore. To be honest, I think the central bankers are prepared to accept that anymore. Any of the people leading the central banks being political appointees, of course.

 

TN: So this is kind of beyond a Keynesian point of view, because even Keynesians believed in a business cycle, right?

 

NG: It’s a traditional Keynesian point of view. The modern day, neo Keynesian, yes, you’re right. Way beyond what they’re thinking.

 

TN: There’s a lot of detail in that, and I think we could spend an hour talking about every third thing you said there. So I really do appreciate that. Albert. Can you tell us both Fed and ECB, what are they thinking about right now? What are the trade offs? What are the fears they have?

 

AM: We’ll start with the ECB. The ECB is not even a junior player right now in the central bank world. I know people want to look at the EU and say, oh, it’s a massive trading bloc, so and so. But the fact is, that it’s completely insolvent. Besides the Germans and maybe the French in some sectors, there’s nothing else in Europe that’s even worth looking at at the moment.

 

As for the ECB’s standpoint, you know, they’re still powerless. I mean, the Federal Reserve makes all the policy. They first will talk to the Anglosphere banks that are on the dollar standard basically. I mean, the Pound and the Australian dollar and whatnot. They’re just Euro Dollar tentacles. But, for the ECB, they’re frustrated right now because they see that the Euro keeps going up and their export driving market is just taking a battering at the moment. But they can’t do anything because the Fed goes and buys Euros on the open market to drop the price of the Dollar to promote the equities in the United States. And that’s just happening right now.

 

When it comes to the Fed, we have to look at what is the Fed, right? Normally what everyone is taught in school is that they are an independent entity that looks over the market and so on and so forth. Right. But these guys are political appointees. These guys have money and donors. They play with both political parties. Right now, the Democrats have complete control of the Federal Reserve. And everyone wants to look at Jerome Powell as the Fed chair, but I’ve said this multiple times on Twitter, the real Fed chair is Larry Fink. He’s got Powell’s portfolio under management of BlackRock. He’s the one making all the moves on the market, with the market makers and coordinating things behind the scenes. He’s the guy to look at, not Jerome Powell.

 

I mean, have anyone even watched Jerome Powell’s speech yesterday? It was appalling. He was overly dovish. That’s the script that he was written. He’s not the smart guy in this playing field, in this battleground.

 

TN: He needs a media training, actually. I think.

 

AM: He’s being set up to be scapegoated for a crash. He’s just no one to show. He’s a Trump appointee. So next time there’s a crash, whether it’s one week from now or one month from now, it’s going to be pointed on him that, you know, he’s the Fed chair. Look at the Fed chair. Don’t look at everything else that the political guys have made and policies in the past four or five years that have absolutely just decimated the real economy.

 

TN: This time reminds me, and I’m not a huge historian of the Fed, but it really reminds me of the of the Nixon era Fed where Nixon and his Fed chair had differences and they were known, and then the Fed chair ended up capitulating to do whatever Nixon wanted to get back in his good graces. Does that sound about right?

 

AM: No, that’s a perfect example. I mean, this idea that’s floated around by economists that economics and politics are separate entities is absolute fantasy. And it just it doesn’t exist in the real world.

 

NG: Just to pop in on this one because actually there is a new book out which I started three days at Camp David. Because it’s coming up to 50 years since that decision of the gold standard. Now, it’s just interesting you brought it up, because if you think of one of the rationales for coming off the gold standard, there’s several, but one that struck me as I was reading actually the review, the back cover show Percy.

 

This enables the government to stop printing in terms of fiscal, fiscal, fiscal. That’s what it did in effect. First of all, that’s one of the biggest arguments against people who argue for a return to the gold standard because that would decimate things or cryptos being in a limited supply of crypto as the new reserve currency because the gain that would be pulling against the elastic and you wouldn’t get, the economy would just boom. Right.

 

So that’s where I think it’s just huge, you know. I’ve always said that actually what we have is what we’re going to ultimately see is exactly the same cost that came with Lyndon Johnson paying for the Vietnam War, Covid. And then the Great Society, which is Joe Biden’s what I call social infrastructure and green ghost plan. So. Going back to that, Nixon was paying part of the price for all of that. With Volcke right. So I actually sit there thinking, well. There are similarities right now, and we’re seeing effectively a central bank and the Treasury, wherever you want to look, untethered from what used to be, well before I started in this business, to be part of the discipline. But even when they came off the gold standard, there was discipline. As you referred earlier, to, traditional Keynesians believed in the economic cycle of boom, bust. You know, boom, you tap the brakes a little bit, take the punch all the way. That’s gone.

 

That is to me what’s gone on recently, I don’t know whether you would say since the 08 or more recently is the equivalent of that ’73 meeting where they came off the gold standard. People just said no more cycles. Tapping the brakes and now the central banks are in a hole and politicized, they’re not independent because there are no.

 

AM: Yeah, yeah, that that’s real quick, Tony. That’s exactly right. I mean, even like, you know, I was on Twitter saying we’re going to go to 4400. We’re going to go to 4400 and people are like “No way. We’re in a bear market. This thing’s going back down 37, whatever charts and whatever Bollinger bands they want to look at. But the fact is because of the politics has a necessity to pump the market and then crash it to pass more stimulus packages. The only way was to go up to 4400 plus, right.

 

TN: Right. OK, now, with all of that in mind, Nick, you did a piece recently about the Fed and housing and some of the trade offs that they’re looking out looking at with regard to the housing market. Now, housing is an issue in Australia. It’s an issue in the UK. It’s an issue in the US and other places. Can you walk us through a little bit of your kind of reasoning and what you were thinking about with regard to the Fed and housing?

Categories
QuickHit

OPEC+, JCPOA & Delta Variant: Strength or weakness for oil & gas prices?

Energy commodities experts Tracy Shuchart and Sam Madani joined forces in this special #QuickHit episode to talk about crude, OPEC+, JCPOA, and how lockdowns will affect the market this year. Most importantly, how investors should plan?

 

Tracy writes for a Hedge Fund Telemetry, where she is the energy and material strategist. She also manages an energy and materials portfolio for a family office. Meanwhile, Samir Madani is the co-founder of TankerTrackers.com. They’re an online service that keeps track of oil that’s being shipped around the world. His specialty is the tricky tankers, the ones that like to play according to the rules.

 

 

 

 

 

 

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This QuickHit episode was recorded on July 17, 2021.

 

The views and opinions expressed in this OPEC+, JCPOA & Delta Variant: Strength or weakness for oil & gas prices? QuickHit episode are those of the guest and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any contents provided by our guest are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

 

Show Notes

 

TN: We’ve seen kind of an uplifting crude prices. We’ve seen things like copper prices come down, natural gas prices really start to see some upward pressure recently. At the same time, we’re seeing talk about the JCPOA and some other Middle East type of changes with OPEC+ and UAE and Saudi. What’s your thoughts on the crude and natural gas markets? We can talk about commodities generally.I know that’s a big, wide open question. Tracy, do you want to give us generally your view and some of your positioning at the moment?

 

TS: Well, I’m very bullish on commodities, particularly industrial metals, base metals and minerals needed for this energy transition. So copper and things of that nature.

 

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We have seen a little bit of a pullback in a lot of commodities, which is not surprising. We had such a large move up. However, everybody’s looking at this as a group like the CRB index rate has pulled back. But if you look at individual commodities, you’re still seeing iron ore still at highs. So it’s not like a whole commodity collapse. You’re still seeing strength in a lot of different areas.

 

So my positioning is instead of index, I’m positioned in individual stocks and particularly on the minor side, because minors are going to have the same capex problem that oil is having.

 

TN: OK, that’s a great point. Sam, what’s your view like generally with with energy?

 

SM: I remain bullish when it comes to oil in particular, and I pat myself on the back for having gone long in at the end of March last year, when the the mutual funds were at the all time lowest in regards to oil. And that’s come up quite a lot since then.

 

I do believe that we will probably find a good footholding now in the 70s. And in order for that to remain, I think something drastic is going to have to happen on the upward probably scathe $100 and come back down so that the OPEC can look like the good guys in the mid 70s. So I think also because of the fact that there’s a capex shortage in the oil sector, they need this revenue to come in order to sustain production as well.

 

My original intended investment horizon was around three to four years. I’m going to be cutting that short until September of next year because the issue that we have now is that the lockdowns are still in effect in many areas, but also when it comes to Europe where I’m situated, most of the inoculations have only gone through the first phase. So we’re still waiting for the second shot and therefore this summer will be delayed. We’re not going to be traveling everywhere like we were in 2019. Instead, that will happen most likely next summer.

 

There’s still one big run up towards the three-digit oil price and that would be most likely to happen next year rather than now.

 

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TN: So you brought up OPEC. There’s been news this week around OPEC+ and a deal with Saudi and UAE and some other Middle East dynamics. What’s your view on that? How much downward pressure will that put on crude markets?

 

TS: Because of those factors in the Middle East, because I am of a belief we will see a deal and we will get some more barrels on the market, the market is actually very tight right now. But we’re also having lockdowns in some places in Asia. So right now, we already are seeing a pullback in crude. Until we get a little bit more certain that 65-75 range will probably hold us for a while, I see some consolidation there and after $115 move from the lows last year, it makes sense for oil to chill out, consolidate here a little bit.

 

TN: Sam, what’s your view on the kind of OPEC+, Saudi, UAE and other kind of OPEC countries wanting to tag along on the UAE?

 

SM: I think one issue that they themselves want to know is status of the JCPOA. They really want to know how much of an issue Iran would be if their balance come back to market. Now, that’s a big if.

 

But if we look at what happened during the Trump administration, the United States pulled out of the deal and that was not good optics for the U.S. side. But now what’s happened is that Iran is not complying with the deal. So the ball is now in their court instead. So the Biden administration is saying, yes, the United States wants to be part of the deal, even though it’s not a very popular deal in the US. I don’t see any popular support for it. It’s more of a let’s just get back in there so Iran can improve its compliance. But they’re not improving their compliance. Instead, what they’re doing is going the other direction and they’re increasing their enrichment. They’re becoming more brazen about how they move around the world with Navy vessels and so on.

 

And now, of course, there’s an Iranian president that’s going to take office in August. So I think the deal will play fall apart instead because of the fact that Iran is not complying.

 

TN: If the deal falls apart, does that chaos help oil prices, meaning rise or does it create the perception that there will be a dramatically larger supply in the market?

 

SM: I think the initial reaction will be that, “Oh, these barrels are not going to be reentering the market, therefore the price will go higher.” So that’s the first automated response. But then, you know, the dust will begin to settle after a while when there’s an understanding of what kind of barrels are not entering the market.

 

So in Iran’s case, they are shipping sour crude. Whether it’s light or heavy, it’s sour. In order for that oil to become sweet, which is more attractive, you have to de-sulfur the oil. And so Iran, what they do is they give you a discount if you want to buy light sweet oil, but then they’re buying like sour oil. Iran gives $10 discount, for instance, and then they just remove the sulfur at the refinery at their own expense. And that’s what’s causing, for instance, West Africa to lower their exports. So moving out a lot less oil now out of Africa than before on account of China buying more Iranian oil instead.

 

TS: I think what people forget, there’s already a lot of Iranian oil on the market. So even if they came back at production of 4 to 4.5 million, it’s not really a lot of extra added barrels that are not already on the market.

 

SM: Exactly. And it will be absorbed by the demand that’s coming of course.

 

TN: But it seems to me the kind of perception of legitimacy that would come through JCPOA may calm prices down a bit through the kind of perception of legitimacy of that supply?

 

TS: Yeah. I mean, if it came to fruition, which I don’t foresee it, I have to agree with Sam on this point. But yeah, the market would think, oh, OK, we have all these barrels coming on even though there isn’t, and that it would be a numbers game from there, then you’d have to see supply and demand numbers from the various agencies monthly reports.

 

SM: And the thing also does not happen overnight. So even if the process of JCPOA happens and Biden finally signs, for instance, initially a waiver, the whole process takes forever to reboot again. We saw it last time. Remember Tracy back in years ago, it took many months.

 

And also in the case of Iran, most of their domestic national fleet is tied up containing gas condensate. So they have around 70 million barrels of gas condensates floating. And that used up nearly all of the VLCC supertankers, the ones that can carry two million barrels. So what Iran has done is they put additional vessels, vintage VLCC. So now they have 200 vessels as opposed to 70. And those are the ones, the foreign flagged vessels that are moving the oil mostly to China.

 

TN: You both mentioned lockdowns earlier in the conversation. And I think the tone here is that we have a pretty strong basis for rising crude prices. But we’ve seen some moves over the last week in the Netherlands and California and other places for maybe not full lockdowns, but more severe compliance with masks and other things and that seems to be leading toward potentially some lockdowns. First of all, if there are lockdowns coming, what would be driving that? And we all know about the Delta variant and stuff. But are there political factors that would be driving that? Second of all, if there were, how would that impact the six to nine month view of crude markets for you guys?

 

TS: The United States is so big, I don’t believe that they’re going to lock down the whole country again. It just won’t happen. You would literally have riots on the streets in some places. So I don’t foresee that happening. I could see some of the states like California just reinstated their mask mandates. I’ve been watching those states that kind of had more severe lockdowns to begin with like Michigan. If they’d lockdown again in the fall, that would probably be more politically motivated, but we’ll have to see what the numbers are and whatnot.

 

As far as my crude view, I’m very bullish on crude. But that doesn’t mean like I’m expecting a $100 tomorrow. How I’m invested is longer term. So I’m invested for at least the next five years or so.

 

And I do believe that if we get through the fall and we don’t have lockdowns in the United States, Europe and Asia, then I definitely think six to nine months, we’re back in the swing of things, because that’ll put us right to basically next spring when oil demand really starts.

 

TN: Sam, what’s your view in Europe on lockdowns? Do you see that stuff coming back and how do you see that impacting consumption?

 

SM: I would think that it would be mostly in the countries with the high population density. Germany is obviously one of those countries and the UK is another. In other countries, not so much the case. I live here in Sweden. We never had lockdowns. So we had seniors living in retirement homes and so on. But then, we pretty much met the same statistic level as every other country — 10% population suffer through it, 1% or so perished as a result. But I don’t think that we’ll be seeing any big efforts on locking down countries again.

 

And what’s more interesting now is schools are coming up in a couple of months or at least a month and a half. Here in Sweden, life will pretty much continue as is. I have four kids and none of them missed more than a week of school, throughout the entire ordeal since 2020.

 

TN: So it sounds to me like you both see there may be some lockdowns at the edges, but it doesn’t sound like it’s something you expect to affect the mainstream. Maybe we see a slight dip in the rate of rise of demand. But it doesn’t sound like it’ll have a huge impact to the downside on energy prices generally, whether it’s crude or natgas or something like that. Is that fair to say?

 

SM: Yep.

 

TS: Absolutely.

 

TN: When it comes to natural gas, Tracy, I know you’ve been talking about that a lot lately. Can you tell us a little bit about your observations and your thesis and and what you’re seeing there?

 

TS: For natural gas, the reason I like it is it’s the great transition fuel especially for emerging markets, because it’s very inexpensive than to go straight into something like solar or wind just because the cost of those minerals and metals can make those are skyrocketing right now. So natural gas is abundant. It’s a great transition fuel. It’s cleaner burning than oil.

 

We just saw the EU green deal, they just stepped back and now are including that gas, whereas before there was no oil or gas, because I think they’re also realizing that it’s inexpensive, it’s a good transition fuel. If you look at Germany, there’s still a lot of coal going on in Germany. So for Europe, it’s not like fossil fuels are gone.

 

I think they realize also it’s an inexpensive transition fuel. In particular for the United States, what I like right now is we’re seeing European natgas ETF and JKM, which is the Asian natgas, are trading at significantly higher than the United States is right now. And so I think there is opportunity there because the US can export and still come in at a lower cost, even with the cost of transportation to Europe or to Asia.

 

TN: Interesting. Living in Texas, I have to say that I love that message. Sam, what about the tanker fleet? Is the global tanker fleet ready to to provide the capacity needed to power EMs with, say, American natgas or Middle Eastern natgas?

 

SM: So natgas, I haven’t checked too much. But tankers in general, the demand is not that great right now. When I say that, I mean that usually, they really step up to the plate whenever there’s a floating storage opportunity to talk about. So you had that case in Q2 of last year, and that really drove up the prices from the growing normal rate of 20,000 barrels a day to 500,000. That spike.

 

And it’s come down so much. Complete occupancy is far lower than what I normally see if I talk about the tonnage and it’s around under 40%, which is very little. We were looking at April of last year, it was around north of 55, close to 60%. So that’s a big swing. And that really crushed the prices for tanker rates. They’re even negative. Below zero. But when I look at the transfers of illicit oil, it’s around $38,000 a day. So there’s a lot lot of money to be made in those transfers, unfortunately. But for nat-G, I’m not entirely sure. So I can’t say for sure.

 

TN: OK, very good. Guys, thank you so much for your time. This has been really helpful. I’m really intrigued by kind of the long bull thesis for energy because we hope that we’re going to start recovering much quicker than we had been, which is fantastic. So thanks for your time. I really appreciate. Always, I really appreciate talking with you guys. Thanks very much.

Categories
QuickHit

The Death of Growth: Old & rich vs young & poor in 2030 & beyond (Part 2)

The world’s birth rate is changing. Clint Laurent from Global Demographics shares surprising discoveries that he believes will happen in the next 10 years and how this will shape the world?

 

This is the second part of this discussion. Go here for part one.

 

Clint started Global Demographics in 1996 and cover 117 countries throughout the world and China. They do that right down to county level of 2,248 counties. Clint believes that demographics are better than financial data from the point of view of forecasting  because they tend to be stable trends.

 

Global Demographics is able to come up with reliable forecasts at least 15 years out. After 15 years, reliability goes down and they are typically never more plus or minus 5% error in our long-term forecast. Their clients are mainly consumer goods companies, infrastructure backbones and things like that.

 

 

 

 

 

 

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This QuickHit episode was recorded on June 17, 2021.

 

The views and opinions expressed in this QuickHit Clint Demographics Part 2 QuickHit episode are those of the guest and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any contents provided by our guest are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

 

Show Notes

 

TN: So Indonesia, India, Brazil and so on, so capital formation, capital investment is the real weakness there and it seems to me that’s a function of largely education. Is that fair to say?

 

CL: That’s exactly what it is. I mean, they you know, as they get the education right and, you know, they’re working on it, most of these countries that have been quite responsible in that area. And as they get that right, so the investment comes in, so the consumer gets more affluent and becomes a virtuous circle.

 

TN: OK, well, what timescale are we talking about for that consumption to come in a really notable way, for example, to take the place of, say, the under 40 Chinese consumption or the under 40, say, Western Europe or American consumption?

 

CL: Well, that’s the bad news. I mean, when you take India at least 15 years to get there. Because the education is only just coming right. And again to pick on India. India’s urbanization, 10 years ago, it was 30% of the population. Today, it’s 33% of the population.

 

TN: OK. So it’s not happening nearly fast enough.

 

CL: No. When you’re an uneducated girl in a village, why would you go to a slum somewhere of a big city? Your lifestyle would be actually worse, not better. And so they hadn’t been able to get that China effect of moving people from the low productivity agriculture into high productivity urban type of work.

 

TN: Yeah, but I think a lot of the, particularly the Westerners who are watching this would say, yeah, but I’ve been to Gurgaon and I’ve, you know, I’ve been to that kind of tech hubs in India. And I see, you know, a lot of women coming up in those hubs or have come up in those hubs over the last 10 or 20 years. But is not just such a small percentage that it matters, but it’s not making a huge difference?

 

CL: Exactly. It’s a small percentage. I mean, remember India is just behind China in terms of total population now. And by 2045, there’s 1.5 billion people. Because they’ve got the birthrate right under control as well. It’s dropping. But again, they’ve got an inertia of more women of childbearing age coming through. So total births keep going up. So they’ve got this problem of just too many people looking for jobs, which keeps the wage rates down. And that. And that’s what’s frustrating the education system, too, is they have to keep growing the number of school places to stand still, let alone expand. But they’re getting that right. So I don’t want to sound negative about that. All these countries are doing quite nicely on that, some positive.

 

And so but one important point to make is the demographic dividend hasn’t been collected. There’s was a lot of talk about India having a demographic dividend because there are always young people entering working age. But the trouble is they weren’t well enough educated, so they didn’t find jobs. In 2010, the propensity of a working age person to be in work was 58%. It’s now 50%. In other words, they couldn’t find the jobs for these people, so the dividend never paid off.

 

TN: OK, so jobs lead to consumption, of course.

 

CL: That’s right.

 

TN: But I guess. So it’s going to take these countries 10 to 15 years or more to get the quality of jobs that are needed.

 

CL: Yeah.

 

TN: So, you know, that growth that we’ve lazily relied on, say, China for the last 10 or 20 or 20 to 30 years, is there a gap between now and 10 to 15 years from now in terms of the rate of growth for, say, consumer goods and say, economic kind of new market entry, that sort of thing?

 

CL: Yeah, well, this is the crisis that’s coming. Because if we take, again, the kind of what I call the family stage countries, India, Brazil, etc, they actually need around about 250 million extra jobs in the next 25 years to get, to maintain their existing level of employment. Not lift it. Just maintain it. And that gives them a reasonable level of income. Not great, but hopefully with education situation, the earnings go up.

 

But let me put another layer on the cake, so to speak. This is fourth group of countries, which I call young and poor. I call them young because the median age of all of the countries in this group is 20 and some of them have a median age of 14. Mali and Niger, they both have a median age of 14.

 

That means half the population in those countries is under the age of 14 today. Yeah, and their birth rates are high. The average birth rate, an unweighted across these countries is 130 per thousand women. Most countries are at 40 elsewhere in the world. And the number of women of childbearing age, of course, are going up dramatically because of that as well. So even though the birthrate is starting to come down, it goes up dramatically. And it has a seismic effect.

 

First of all, is roughly a billion people in this part of the world at the moment. In 25 years time, there’s two billion of these people. In other words, in twenty five years, they add a billion people to their populations. And if I can just go on and to take Nigeria, for example, at the moment, has 45 million school age children, irrespective whether they are going to school, most of them are not. 45 million. It’s 90 million in 25 years time. Just to stand still on education, they have to double their education budget. And so, little own issues need improving.

 

TN: OK, so governments take, need tax revenue to grow their budgets. So will there will there be the incomes to allow them to grow those budgets just to keep up with where they are? And further, will they be able to accelerate the job growth to make sure they have those incomes, to keep their education, to improve their education like, say, India or Indonesia is doing well?

 

CL: Well, this is the crisis that’s coming because the answer simply is no. And it’s no for the simple reason that up until now, this is really what I was saying we were at a cusp. Up until now, the growth in consumption by the older affluent or the older countries generally, which includes China, has been such that it’s kept relatively full employment throughout the world.

 

There’s been enough jobs for those who are looking for jobs. And that doesn’t sound a bit. But even the young, poor countries have been trotting along at about 55% of working age people employed, which seems to work out quite well. But suddenly that whole relationship changes. As I said, the countries that account for, well, the old affluent account for 63% of global consumption. The other old add another 14% say up to 77% or 80%, chuck in a bit of India, 80%, which is also flattening out. So the countries account for 80% of the money that’s spent by households now flatten out in growth in their demand.

 

Layer on top of that, there’s a continuous increase in productivity per worker. The amount of number of workers needed to meet the new additional demand over the next 25 years is 300 million. And as I told you earlier, this 740 million people that are going to be looking for an extra job.

 

It’s going to be roughly 400 million people, mainly in the poor countries, are in a little bit in need, family stage countries, who are at working age, would like to have a job, but can’t get a job. That’s 400 million.

 

TN: That’s astounding. OK, so that’s as big as, say, the EU, right?

 

CL: Yeah, well, bigger.

 

TN: So if everyone in the EU didn’t have a job but they wanted a job. Man, woman and child couldn’t get a job.

 

CL: That’s right.

 

TN: So that’s terrible. So what do you think those people will do? What do you think some of the effects will be of this? First of all, where is this, kind of generally, geographically? Is this the kind of Bangladesh, Nigeria, kind of those types of countries?

 

CL: It’s based of the African continent and what we call South India, but not including India or Sri Lanka, which will be in Tibet, out there.

 

TN: So Bangladesh, Pakistan, Central Asia generally.

 

CL: And there’s a few small countries, obviously, in South America or Central America that are falling into this category as well. So it’s reasonably concentrated geographically. And it’s a real worry. And I think of myself. If I was turning, well, let’s say 20 and I cannot get a job. I’m scrambling for food. I’m scrambling for water, in some places in the world. What do I do? I’ve got nothing to lose. And that’s what something dramatic, I would rot and just die miserable, which is terrible.

 

So I think the world has a fairly major migration problem coming. These people are going to walk north. I would. So I don’t blame them. But it’s a desperate situation. So much so that in my own mind, it’s all very well to donate money to buy mosquito nets and things like that. I actually think would be better to donate money for a TV and an Internet connection so we could educate the kids. Because we could deliver education quite cheaply using modern technology. And if you could educate them, then they could do more productive things and then and so on and so on. You get the part of that. But there’s no easy solution to this one.

 

These people are largely alive today, will be alive in the next 10 years. And the consumption trends, well, they’re there too. The people with the money are getting older and saving. So the drawbridges are coming up. So this is.

 

TN: So migration. The migration issues we’ve seen over the last, say, 5 to 10 years sounds to me that they only intensify over the next, say, 15 to 20 years.

 

CL: Oh, incredibly so.

 

TN: And Europe is really the focal point. Yes. The US has some issues and maybe India, China have some issues. But it really seems to me that Europe is the major focal point there.

 

CL: But it’s the easy one to get to.

 

TN: Sure. Yeah.

 

CL: But there’s some other dimensions of migration, too, which is starting to come under stress. And I mean, for example, let’s take the U.K. It has one nurse for every 440 people in the population. So if you get sick, your access to a nurse is pretty good. But the UK hires nurses who have been trained and educated in the Philippines where there’s one nurse for every 4000 people in the population. Is that morally correct? Should affluent countries take skilled workers, from developing countries?

 

TN: But can you blame that worker for wanting to go to UK?

 

CL: Not at all. If I was the nurse, I’d be on the plane. I mean, basically, you’ve got the individual motivation and you’ve got the moral issue, and you’ve got the need. And then even if you take a country like Greece, which everyone says, oh, that’s nice and comfortable.

 

Greece’s population has dropped by one million people in the last 10 years. And that one million that are gone are skilled workers who got on a train and went north to Germany because under the EU, they can move.

 

TN: What percentage of the population is that? One?

 

CL: About 10%.

 

TN: 10% of the population?

 

CL: Well, you know, it’s a big drop. And again, you don’t blame the skilled plumber or electrician or whatever because he or she can earn 2 to 3 times as much going to Germany or getting across to Britain, which they could do perfectly legally. And then in 5 years time, the wife is with them, the kids are going to school, that kids speak German now, they never go back.

 

TN: So does this change, does this, you know, let’s say the education deficit issues and the jobs deficit issues in Africa, does it change immigration policy in Europe, for example, in the way Australia has the checklist of skills and those sorts of things to to migrate?

 

Does Europe come more to that type of migration policy to where they incentivize people, let’s say, in parts of Africa before coming, meaning get educated, you know, these sorts of things. And you can definitely come in. I mean, it certainly sounds like something that would be really helpful for places like Greece.

 

CL: Yeah, but not too helpful for places like Nigeria.

 

TN: Right.

 

CL: They’re losing the skilled worker. And the ability to lift the Nigerian economy is going to be a function of having skilled people. And if Greece takes them, that’s actually not that great. Right. So, yeah, you sort of resolve the great problem, but you don’t resolve the core problem, which is the change so to speak. Yeah. So it’s interesting because Greece, with its drop in population, its household values are dropping because the number of households is going down. And that’s the core asset of many households. So it’s trying to create some economic problems as well because the asset they could borrow against is going down in value, not going up in value. But that’s not just Greece. It’s Italy, Spain. It’s Romania, it’s Poland. And that being, you know, some of the talents are being sucked out. And that’s not good.

 

TN: So in sum, let me try to sum this up, because this has been a great conversation and it’s really opened up a lot of things I haven’t really thought about before. So so global consumption generally for, let’s say, the next 10 years or so is relatively stable.

 

We won’t see the rapid expansion that we saw in places like China over the last 10 or 20 years. So let’s say the pull on commodities right now, the inflation we’re seeing, the, you know, this sort of thing, that stuff really tamps down pretty quickly and really stabilizes for maybe a decade or so.

 

CL: Exactly.

 

TN: Once that stabilizes, then we see real disparities as these kind of young, poor countries explode in population. But the wealthy countries are pretty stable and continue to be pretty rich. Right. So we kind of have a status quo for the next decade or so. But then after that, there’s a real danger that emerges from global disparity.

 

CL: That’s right. You start to have a major, what I’d call a population crisis.

 

TN: Wow. OK. It’s a little bit dire. But this is great. Before we go, can you talk about, I know you have a couple of books coming out. Can you tell us what they’re about? I know they’re a little bit from coming to press, but I think it would be really helpful for people to understand what you’re writing about.

 

CL: Right. Well, one of the two books is basically called 2045: The Growing Demographic Crisis. And it’s pretty much along the lines that I’ve just discussed, the difference is, all the data is there. And you’ve got the data, if you like, at the segment level, which also go to by country level. And you can see how the numbers play out. It’s not something that we’re making these numbers up. They’re actually there. They’re pretty solid. And the core source, of course, is the World Bank and the United Nations that you can’t really argue with that. And it’s all old numbers behind what I’ve just discussed.

 

And the second book coming out is called China: 2040. Similar sort of theme. And what I have done that is China is going through a lot of changes that I’ve explained and China will continue to be important economically and politically for the next 10 years at least, if not longer. We know that.

 

So it’s actually quite important that people have a better understanding of what China is like demographically. And it’s not one country, it’s at least thirty one countries. The differences in consumption within that, it’s quite diversified.

 

This book is, if you like, the primer for someone that’s either doing business, thinking of doing business, investing in, whatever, into China. If you haven’t read it and you don’t know China, then you’d be dealing somewhat riskilly. If you read this, it’ll help you focus where the opportunities potentially are. Thanks for the opportunity to mention.

 

TN: Of course. Thank you so much for your time. You’ve been very generous and I think we’ve taken it a lot. I think of it to watch this two or three times before I kind of fully take it in. So I really appreciate it.

 

Further watching, please. We’d really appreciate if you’d like the video. We’d love it if you’d subscribe to our YouTube channel. And we’ll see you next time. Thank. Thanks very much.

 

CL: Thank you.