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The Week Ahead – 03 Aug 2022: Pelosi, China, & Taiwan

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There’s all this buzz around Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. What is she doing there? Why all the stress? Why is China upset?

Also, Yellen got China to stop the stimulus. If China starts the stimulus, will that be a really good thing for Chinese equities? And what does that do for the CNY?

We also discussed the likelihood now with Pelosi’s visit that China will start stimulating. And what does that mean for oil and gas imports and Europe?

Will China try to hurt US companies that are in China? Do you think they could push against ex-pats in China and make life difficult for them? What are possible aggressive moves that China could take? Like cyberattacks?

There have been some potential whispers of China taking over some of Taiwan’s small islands to make a statement. Is that possible? And will they take it on other countries like India? What is the likelihood of China and the US in direct warfare engagement in the next twelve months?

Listen to Spotify here:

This is the 28th episode of The Week Ahead, where experts talk about the week that just happened and what will most likely happen in the coming week.

Follow The Week Ahead panel on Twitter:

Tony: https://twitter.com/TonyNashNerd

Albert: https://twitter.com/amlivemon/

Chris: https://twitter.com/BaldingsWorld

Transcript

TN: Hi, everyone, and welcome to the Week Ahead. I’m Tony Nash, and we’ve got a special Week Ahead right now. We’re joined by Albert Marko and Dr. Christopher Balding to talk about the Taiwan-China issues around Nancy Pelosi’s visit. 

Before we get started, I want to let you know about a special we’re having for CI Futures. We’re doing CI Futures for $50 a month. With CI Futures, we forecast about 2000 economic variables every month and about 900 market variables (currencies, commodities, equities) every week. That $50 deal is for the next couple of weeks. And you don’t even have to take a year-long commitment. For the next couple of weeks, you do it a month at a time, and it’s $50 a month. 

So let’s get onto the show, guys. Thanks again for joining. I appreciate it. 

I want to get into there’s all this buzz around Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, and I want to take a step back and go, why all the stress? Why is China upset? Because I think there are a lot of loaded assumptions in the discussions that are happening. So can you guys talk us through a little bit, maybe? Chris, if you want to start, why is China so upset about this?

CB: So there’s the full history of the claim of Taiwan as Chinese territory. They refer to it as a Chinese province. That’s the general background. I’m going to assume that most of your listeners or watchers already know that.

However, if we jump ahead to this specific visit, to be honest, I’m a little bit mystified as to why this

specific visit has turned into this small crisis. Trump was sending a cabinet secretary and undersecretaries. There’s been a steady stream of Congresspeople to Taiwan. So why this specific visit? I think there’s very reasonable speculation we can go through those. But why this specific visit has turned into what it has, I think there are probably only a couple of people that could answer that question. 

TN: Okay, Albert?

AM: Well, to expand on that, I can understand why the Chinese have a little bit more drama involved in this visit simply because the economic situation in China at the moment is so dire for Xi that they need a little bit of a distraction just to get the headlines out of the way at the moment.

TN: Yeah, I think that’s a good point. And when I think about this, it’s, yes, you can go back into all the history and the UNC, the 1971 and all of this stuff, but I think my view is democrats need a distraction for the midterms. You have the Afghanistan anniversary coming up, all of these things coming up. A bill was just passed that either does or doesn’t raise taxes on a lot of the population. There’s a lot of discussion around that. 

Are we in a recession? Not a recession. I think this is a convenient foreign policy issue for Democrats to grab onto before the Midterms to raise some external issues that are a little bit more mysterious for people, a little more exciting. Will there be a war? That sort of thing. 

And I think, Albert, you’re exactly right. With the November meeting coming up in Beijing, where Xi is supposed to be this golden boy and a lot more power and all this stuff, the new Mao or whatever, I think China’s economy is in a horrific state. I think the provinces and cities are not falling in line with Beijing, and I think politics in China is terrible. So I think this helps galvanize people in China, it helps galvanize people in the US. And I think it’s more of a convenient event than anything.

AM: It is a convenient event. Other issues are going on within China with the actual US.

Fed and Yellen are Yellen got them to capitulate to stop stimulus to fight inflation. So from the Chinese perspective, they’re a little bit they feel a little bit betrayed here. Seeing Nancy Pelosi

nude sunbathing on Taiwanese beaches, it’s like, what are you doing?

TN: Yellen got them to capitulate, to stop safely. So you’re saying Yellen got China to stop stimulus? 

AM: Yeah. I don’t know if it was direct or indirect, but Xi warned them to don’t stimulate while we’re trying to combat inflation. Look what happened to the Russians. And from the Chinese elite perspective, looking at the oligarchs in Russia, being completely isolated from the rest of the world, that’s just something that a pill that they didn’t want to swallow, and they were glad to hold off stimulus up until this event. Now, I don’t know, after this event, the Chinese might renege on that gentleman’s deal, but we’ll see at this point.

TN: Okay, let me pursue that in a minute because that’s interesting. So if you’re saying that the Chinese were holding back stimulus because of a quiet bargain, and they reverse on that and they start, as I’ve been expecting them to do for the last six months, just dump truckloads of cash on the squares in Chinese cities, if they start doing that, that could potentially actually be a perfect thing for Chinese equities, right? 

AM: Well, of course, but it’s negative for the US inflation and the commodities will start ripping. It’s an asymmetric shot against the US. So it’s something that they have in their toolbox and they haven’t used yet, but they certainly could after this.

TN: Okay, and so what does that do for the CNY, guys? If China starts stimulus, if it’s fiscal that appreciates CNY, at least from a textbook perspective, right? 

AM: Yeah, from the textbook perspective, sure. They control whatever they want to set the CNY at, so, I mean, I can’t see them allowing it to shoot up too far just because they are an export-dependent economy. 

TN: Okay, Chris.

CB: I just wanted to circle back to what we were talking about before jumping back to the CNY issue because this has been a real puzzle about they’ve been pretty restrained, and there are all kinds of questions as to why that is. 

And again, I wish we could provide good, solid answers about that. I think a lot of the issues, like with Taiwan and stuff like that, I think there’s like, Tony, you mentioned the economy. I think that’s distinctly possible. I think it’s also one of those issues. If you go back right after the first of the year, they changed the language about reunification and how they were going to solve that problem for the new era. 

What’s the new era? It’s Xi getting the third term. So is it possible that the economy is, like, pushing this along, egging it forward, so to speak? Yeah, I think that’s possible. I also think there’s much more like Xi has staked his credibility on, I’m making China great again, come hell or high water, if I have to drive it off a cliff to do it. That’s part of what you’re seeing.

AM: Yeah, I agree with Balding on that one. The only caveat that I would throw in there is that would be exactly the case up until the Ukraine situation where Russia got their butts handed to them. 30,000 troops lost, flagship battleship gone, sunk.

From the PLA perspective, it’s like, hey, what happens if we lose? Because it’s not a 0% chance, right? What happens if we get decimated? Our military could be set back 50 years, 100 years. And I think that at this point, it’s too much of a cost for them to take an adventure in Taiwan.

CB: Yeah. I will say you and I disagreed on this previously. Like, what were the risks? Let’s assume Ukraine had never happened. I would say there’s probably a not immaterial chance of something

happening with China and Taiwan in the next, let’s say six to 18 months.

At this point, I definitely would push that back a little bit. If something’s going to happen, I think, within the next few years. But absolutely. I think they’re going back to the drawing board because they see what’s happening to Russia in Ukraine, and they’re like, there’s absolutely no way in hell this can happen to us. 

AM: Yeah, they saw Afghanistan as a point where they could probably take some territory away from the US sphere of influence. But then again, Ukraine happened, and that threw everything through, wrenching all the plans. 

TN: Okay, so let’s talk about that a little bit. The Russia-Ukraine angle is interesting. So when sanctions were put on Russia, Russia can do okay without sanctions, not thrive, but can survive. But China is so intermingled in global trade that if sanctions are put on China, it could be very difficult for them. Right. Or what am I missing? 

AM: It could, but they’re the world’s manufacturing base, so it’s like, you put sanctions on them, they’ll put sanctions, they’ll do something asymmetric, and it’ll hurt the West more than the West can hurt China, to be honest. I mean, The US can handle it. The Europeans can’t. They’re already in dire rates. 

CB: The other thing that I would add to that is people make the sanctions argument. I don’t buy the sanctions argument for two specific reasons. One is basically what they import. The bulk of what they import from the rest of the world is raw materials. And that’s not coming from Western Europe, Japan, or other places like that.

Then the high-tech products that they do import, let’s say very high-grade chips, are going into things like iPhones and then being re-exported right away. Okay, so they’re not on an import basis highly dependent on the rest of the world. 

They’ve made two bets with that in mind. Number one is that they can convince people not to block their exports, meaning Chinese exports to their country. Number one. And then also that other countries are so dependent upon them that they can’t. Okay?

What would happen to Walmart during the Christmas season if they couldn’t buy from China? Okay.

It’s a simple example, but it does throw a monkey wrench in there. 

AM: Caterpillar is another one. The Chinese have done a marvelous job of using US agricultural companies against the US political system. So they’ve got a noose around them. Buick also. GM, Buick, Caterpillar. I can name half a dozen companies. Yeah.

TN: My main focus in terms of sanctions was food. These other things, of course, they’re importing goods, really, largely to be transformed and re-exported. Food is the main issue that I would think would be damaging to China, potentially. 

AM: Yeah, that was always one of my main points of contention about a war starting with Taiwan is those ports being shut down in the eastern part of China, it would be devastating. They would have food and security problems. The Chinese middle class has been growing. They don’t want rice anymore. They want noodles and dumplings. So they have a persistent food issue that just gets worse and worse every year.

TN: Right. Okay, so let’s go into this. I saw Pelosi kind of pull up into that. I think it was the Grand Hyatt she’s staying at in Taipei. And really, what is she doing there? Like official, non Official. What do you think she’s doing there?

AM: That’s a pure distraction from the midterms in the economy in the US at the moment. It’s an easy distraction. They know China is not going to do anything outlandish. They’re a pretty pragmatic country when everything is said and done anyway. So it’s like, what negative is there for them, for Pelosi and the Democrats at the moment?

CB: Here’s the only reason I’m going to disagree with you, and you said something very similar earlier, Tony. Here’s. The only reason I’m going to disagree with you is that this assumes a level of evil genius out of the White House and maniacal thinking that I just don’t think they’re capable of, okay? Okay. Again, I could be wrong.

AM: I just don’t see these guys as the evil genius that says, hey, we need a distraction, what can we do?

I don’t think it’s an evil genius. I think that’s a little bit too strong. The game of scapegoating and distractions in the beltway is as old as time itself. The professionals at it. They can see what they want to do to pull people’s eyes away from one issue onto another and they have the media under their grips so they can do anything. They want to distract people. So the evil genius part comes in what are, steps 2, 3, 4, and 5 after this? Because now the Chinese can retaliate and I don’t think the US is prepared for that.

TN: In what ways? 

AM: Well, I mean if the Chinese decide to start simulating next week and commodities start ripping, inflation in, the US is going to have a ten print, 10% print on CPI come October, November, then what? You’re in the smack middle of the midterms looking at 10% inflation and you’re losing 50, 60 seats in the House and you’re losing the Senate and then you have the Republican take over and start throwing out hearings against Joe Biden every week like they did Trump. It’s chaotic. 

TN: Okay, so that’s an interesting scenario. Okay, I want to ask about that and then I want to ask another question about a potential reason for visiting. But you’ve mentioned that a couple of times. So what’s the likelihood, since they’ve said that they’ll undertake serious pushback, is there a likelihood that they’ll do that? Do you put that at a 50, 60, or 70% likelihood or do you think they’ll continue to hold?

AM: I think after this visit by Nancy Pelosi, it’s a greater than 50% chance that the Chinese start stimulating a little bit earlier than scheduled with commodities ripping.

TN: Okay, so that means more oil and gas imports, more pressure on gas prices, and diesel prices. All this would hurt Europe too? 

AM: Oh, of course. Europe has got massive energy issues going forward and they’re unsolvable within six months. 

TN: Okay, so so far I’m hearing potentially bullish Chinese equities and potentially bullish commodities, particularly energy, commodities, and industrial metals, right?

AM: Oh, absolutely, yeah. Full discretion, I’m going into KWEB. I have Baba at this low with this Pelosi landing. So for me, it’s just like Chinese equities have been battered with no stimulus. We’re down to the point. Yeah.

TN: Okay, so on tech, you mentioned tech. Is it possible that with the chips act just passing in the US, this is the one that supports semiconductor companies for putting operations in the US? Is it possible that there is a message being passed to TSMC or any of the strategic industry guys in Taiwan by Pelosi and her staff? Is that a possibility? And if so, what do you think it would be? 

CB: Absolutely. I would say that that’s one of the things I don’t know if you caught this statement from the chairman of TSMC, but he gave an interview just a day or two ago and he said, “China, if you invade, like all of our plants on the island are dust, they’re worthless. There’s nothing there.” Because I can guarantee you that. I’m sure that the US Air Force would have the coordinates for every TSMC plant that it’s like, hey, we’re going to make sure that China doesn’t get them. I’m sure that TSMC, at this point, their reputation is being a pretty well-run company, very attuned to security issues. And so I’m sure that they have multiple redundancy plans and multiple security plans to address that if China is locked in. So you have to think that TSMC, all the way down to all their key suppliers and things like that, are in some type of meeting here with Nancy.

AM: Yeah. I’m not very keen on this chip sack bill. I think it’s just fireworks and stringers and ticker tape raid. But there are EPA issues to deal with when chip-making also. So no matter what, whatever they want to throw out for legislation, as long as the EPA is hampering manufacturing in the United States, manufacturing is going nowhere, at least for the next five to ten years in the United States. So this chip act, although it gives a little bit of pressure, don’t think it’s going to be that big of a driver in the next five to ten years. 

TN: Okay. I want to talk to you guys a little bit about the pushback that China may give to US companies. So China already blocked a $5 billion battery investment from a Chinese company in the US. That was just announced today, and those batteries were supposed to support Tesla and Ford, I believe. Do you think China may try to hurt US companies that are in China? Could they directly take action against, say, Tesla or GM or Ford or GE or any of the American companies that are sitting in China? Do you think they could push against, say, ex-pats in China, and US ex-pats in China and make life difficult for them? 

Because if we look, for example, at what happened in Russia, we have a lot of Western companies that have abandoned their operations in Russia over the last eight months. Right? Is it possible that American companies get pushback from the Chinese government? 

Because if I think of what the Chinese government did to Japanese companies in 2012 if you remember that. It was very aggressive. They were instigating protests against Japanese companies, Japanese expatriates, and Japanese government officials. Could they instigate that against the US? Companies? And could they push us Companies to just give up their operations in China? 

CB: Well, the only way I would rephrase that is how would that differ from normal standard operating practice? Even within the past couple of years, there’s been a massive flood of not just Americans, but all foreigners out of China. And these are everything from journalists to just basic school teachers, English teachers. Okay? So it doesn’t even matter if you’re a sensitive national or in the sensitive industry or what China deems is sensitive. 

This goes for businesses as well. You heard stories about companies saying, oh, well, I have 10 million, $50 million of profits I can repatriate. I’m going to close down my China plant and go to Vietnam. And basically what they do is they just freeze everything and said, oh, you have an unpaid tax bill, coincidentally, the same amount of money that you were going to repatriate. And so they just have to walk away from everything or sell it for one dollar or something like that. 

So when you talk about that, I think that’s entirely fair. I think that’s going to happen. I think the only people that are going to effectively remain there till the end are the Shells of the world that didn’t get out of Russia until the bombs and the missiles started flying. I think it’s going to be the same with China.

TN: Are you saying that you think some US companies will in the next, let’s say, two to three years, abandon their China operations? Do you think that’s feasible? 

CB: Oh, yeah.

TN: Okay. 

CB: I think it’s already been happening. It’s not announced. You see a couple of announcements here and there. You hear about many more talking to people that are still there. But yeah. 

TN: Albert, what do you think about that? 

AM: Yes, they will. There’ll be certain companies that they go after depending on whatever political calculations they can throw at the US, for sure, without question. They’ve done this. I mean, Christopher said they’ve done this in the past. Nothing new. 

TN: Right. So how would that start? Would they try to push aggressively to localize leadership? I know a lot of that leadership is already localized, but would they almost make it mandatory for leadership of, say, US companies to be Chinese and then kind of cascade that through? Or what would the early phases of that look like?

AM: I think the early phases would be phantom tax violations or some kind of fines or fees that just pop up out of Chinese mountains. Who knows? Do you know what I mean? So I think that’s the first thing you’d want to look at if they start doing it.

CB: Yeah. And again, what you’re talking about, I think, is basically what’s been happening for the past couple of years is whether it’s the phantom tax bill, whether it’s all senior leadership has to be Chinese or party members or all those kinds of things. I mean, when you’re asking about that in the future, it is like, well, how would that differ from the past two to three years?

TN: Right. It feels like we’re on the precipice of that. And some of us have been talking about kind of the end of the Asian century for probably the last five to eight to ten years. And China is what seems slow, but very rapid decline in terms of its ability to grow. Not the fact that it’s not already huge, but its ability to continue to accelerate growth. That’s gone. Those days are gone. Right.

And when growth stalls out, the opportunity becomes a zero-sum game. And it’s about market share. It’s about getting your piece of the pie. Not a growing pie, but a stagnant pie. And that’s when things get very difficult in authoritarian countries. Right?

CB: Well, I think to add upon that, they were following the Asian growth model of build, in simple terms, run large trade surpluses, controlled currency, build apartments. It’s a pretty tried, true path. But one of the things that are very different is if Malaysia runs a large fiscal surplus, nobody cares. If Taiwan runs a significant trade surplus, some people care, but whatever. 

For every percentage point of GDP in trade surpluses that China runs at this point when you’re the second largest economy in the world, that is a massive, massive number, not just against your economy, but against the global economy. And that’s going to create massive, massive dislocations elsewhere. 

And then the other thing is that when your only source of growth is basically building apartments, and now they’ve got like 20% to 25% of these apartments all over the country, empty and household debt that is significantly above the OECD average. It doesn’t make any sense, and this is what they’re running up against. Okay.

AM: To take that a step further, it’s like if you have low growth and your economy starts in the waiver, how do you fund a growing military to combat the United States on a global level? The math doesn’t add up. Very difficult.

TN: Okay, I want to move next on to things like cyberattacks. Chris, I know that you’re very focused on kind of the IT side of what the Chinese government is doing. Can you talk us through some of the potential, maybe aggressive moves that China could take in the wake of this?

CB: Sure. So there are all kinds of things. And one of the things, you saw today where they were looking at, they shut down the Taiwanese Prime Minister’s website. But that’s, to be honest, small potatoes. 

The type of thing that you would look at, and you’ve seen this a little bit in Ukraine is where they went after things like nuclear reactors and other things like that. So if you’re looking at this, one of the types of things that you would be looking at would be, for instance, Taiwan being an island, there’s a handful of spots where cables come ashore. So what would you be looking at? Because if you wanted to make it hard on Taiwan, that might be something that you would go after. 

If you had the capability, and they are very likely due to some capacity, you would be looking at putting bugs in the TSMC type of production capacity. So those would be the types of things to narrow it to Taiwan. But generally speaking, if you aren’t being hacked by China, that basically just renders your place in the universe irrelevant, almost, because they’ve pretty much gone after everybody.

TN: Right. Albert, what do you think? 

AM: Yeah, I mean, the Chinese are prevalent in the cyber terrorism space. They’re out there stealing trade secrets and corporate secrets all over the place, especially in the United States. And I don’t foresee that slowing down at all. If anything ramping up, and they’re good at it, and we have lacked security in the United States, and it needs to be tightened up.

TN: Right. And we intentionally, for the viewers, did not record this on Zoom. That’s an indication of some of the thoughts around there. 

Now, guys, there are some islands between Taiwan and China, and there have been some potential whispers of China taking over, say, some islands, some of Taiwan’s small islands to make a statement. Do you think that’s possible?

AM: It’s possible. I don’t understand why they would try even risking that. What if they lose a few ships?

What if they lose 1000 or 2000 troops? It’s like all of a sudden you look weak and then you’re going to be forced into a position to do something bigger. It would make no sense from my perspective.

CB: The only reason I kind of disagrees is that there’s a handful of some of these very small islands, so I doubt that they have any military hardware there. And some of them are literally, I think, as close as like 10 miles off the Chinese mainland like that. They’re just that close. And so just as a symbolic act, something like that wouldn’t surprise me at all.

AM: It won’t surprise me at all. I’m just saying anything closer to the Taiwanese actual island, I would be wary of seeing the Chinese try to take them. 

TN: I spent a week on one of those islands in 2009 waiting out of typhoon, and it was an experience, but I think it’s feasible. It’s an island off of Taidong, which is no, that’s on the southwest side. They wouldn’t do that. They would do it on the I was on the southeast side. They would do it on the southwest side or the northwest side. But there are lots of islands, very small islands off of Taiwan.

Okay, good. What else I think do we need to be thinking about here? There has been talking of the Biden administration removing trade tariffs and this sort of thing on China. Do you think that could be something that the administration aggressively goes after to kind of compensate China? Or do you think this would maybe solidify those tariffs? 

AM: I don’t think so. Honestly, I would rather see what the rhetoric is around the oil market price cap that they’ve been talking about with G7 and the China terrorists might fall into that realm in negotiations. I would want to see what China’s reaction is to the oil cap at the moment.

CB: I’d be very skeptical at this moment of some type of tariff rollback because for them to… The White House has very badly managed this entire situation where they created a situation where if she went or if she didn’t go, they were losers. They’re not looking bad. And so if they were to roll back tariffs at this point, I think they would get they would get slaughtered, even among the Democrats at this point. So I think that’s very unlikely. 

But look, Jake Sullivan is the guy that a decade ago was proposing, what do you say we walk up to China and give them back Taiwan in exchange for peace in our time? So with these guys, anything is possible.

AM: This is the worst foreign policy cabinet I have ever seen in my life. No one’s even close second at the moment. And that kind of commentary by Jake Sullivan is just unbelievable.

TN: Yeah. Okay, guys, so let me ask you kind of one final question, and you have to answer it with one of these two answers you can’t equivocate in between. Okay. The likelihood of China and the US in some sort of direct warfare engagement in the next, say, twelve months, is it closer to, say, 20% likelihood, or is it closer to 70% likelihood?

AM: 20% in my opinion. 

CB: 20%. 

TN: Oh, good. Okay, so do you think it’s greater than 20% or less than 20%?

AM: I’d say less than 20%. Okay. I would again say less than 20%,

CB: and I would say if you were to draw that out, 24, 36 months, I see it going up, probably steeper as time goes on.

TN: Okay, so that’s fair. So there’s a risk all around, right? We’ve got economic suffering globally. We’ve got inflation globally. We have whatever’s happening post-COVID trying to be figured out globally. We’ve got political uncertainty globally. So we’ve got risk and uncertainty everywhere. Adding a conflict to that mix would not be positive for anybody. 

CB: And the one thing I would say is, even though I say less than 20%, that’s not like a firmly, deeply held conviction. Because if you’re talking about risk, I would have what I would call wide error bands in a lot of these situations. Look, we talk about, like, what is Xi going to do? Xi could say, hey, America is distracted by Ukraine. They got extra troops there. They’re shipping all kinds of weapons. Now’s the time to go to Taiwan. I don’t think people do that. That’s also not crazy to speculate. Yeah,

AM: I would have to agree with that because I never thought that Putin would try to take Kyiv with so few troops, but here we are, him making a vital mistake. And sometimes leaders make bad mistakes because they have a bunch of yes men around them. Yeah. Let me ask you one very quick question.

TN: Do you think there’s a possibility that China kind of takes it out on somebody else? Do they have a dust-up maybe with India to show strength at home while avoiding it with the US? Or something like that? Do they lash out to somebody else so that they can kind of flex muscles at home? 

AM: Yeah, they could, but I mean, honestly, the Indians are not people to be trifled with, to be honest. They are itching to take on China if they show any kind of aggression. So I don’t see who they can pressure to say they’re big, bad China at the moment. I don’t even think they should be doing that. They should be figuring out their economic situation more than anything else. 

TN: Xi Jinping’s role model is Mao. And Mao ultimately was a failure and a pariah in his own country by the time he died. Right. So I don’t think Xi has the sense to understand that Mao was a pariah by the time he died. And so that’s his role model who killed 60 million people through starvation and other things. So this is a problem. We have a guy in the office in China whose role model killed 60 million people directly.

AM: Yes, I understand that, Tony. The problem is the difference is that the CCP has wealthy families now that have almost equal footing as Xi in terms of power, and they can of them if they wanted to. 

TN: Well, and that’s the reality, right? And that’s what nobody talks about. And that may be the backstop for a lot of this stuff.

CB: I’ll tell you this. The rumor mill among Chinese ex-pats, dissidents, et cetera, et cetera, are in hyperdrive this year. Look, it’s hard to know what to believe. It’s very hard to know what to believe. Okay? So I’m not about to push any theories, but there’s a lot of that discussion going around.

TN: Guys, this has been great. Thank you so much for doing this on such short notice. For anyone watching, please put comments below. We’ll take a look at them and we’ll watch them through the next week. If you have any additional thoughts, please let us know, and look forward to seeing how the next thanks a lot.

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Show Notes

MG: The Lead Lag Report joining us for the hour here is Tony Nash of Complete Intelligence has found a lot of people that I respect following. Tony, I saw a few people saying they were excited to hear what Tony has to say. So hopefully we’ll have a good conversation here.

Tony for those who aren’t familiar with your background talk about who you are how’d you get involved in the data side of markets and forecasting in general. And what you’re doing with Complete Intelligence.

TN: Sure, Michael. First of all, thanks for having me. I have followed you for probably 10 or 15 years.

MG: I am very sorry for that I am very very sorry for that.

TN: But yeah so, I got involved in data way back in the late 90s when I was in Silicon Valley and I built a couple of research firms focused on technology businesses. I then took about probably eight years to become an operator. I did a turnaround in Asia of a telecom firm. I built a firm in Sri Lanka during the Civil War and then I started down the research front again. I was the Global Head of Research for the Economist and I was the Asia Head of Consulting for a company called IHS Markit which is now owned by S&P and then after that I started Complete Intelligence.

So, you know my background is really all about data but it’s also all about understanding the operational context of that data. And I think it’s very hard for people to really understand what data means without understanding how people use it.

MG: Okay. So that’s maybe a good direction to start with that point about context with data because I think part of that context is understanding what domains data is more appropriate for forecasting and others. Right? So, I always made this argument that there are certain domains in particular when it comes to, I would argue investing that have sort of a chaotic system element to them. Right? Where small changes can have ripple effects. So, it’s hard to necessarily to sort of make a direct link between a strong set of variables and the actual outcome because there’s always a degree of randomness. Whereas, something that’s more scientific right that doesn’t have that kind of chaos theory element is it’s clearer.

So, talk about that point about context when it comes to looking at data. And again, the kind of domains where data is more appropriate to really have more conviction in than others.

TN: Yeah. Okay. So, that’s a great place to start. So, the first thing I would say is take every macro variable that you know of and throw it out the window. It’s all garbage data 100 of it. Okay? I would never trade based on macro data.

We’ve tested macro data over the years and it’s just garbage. It doesn’t matter the country. You know we hear people saying that China makes up their data. Well, that may be true you can kind of fill in the blank on almost any country because I don’t know how much you guys understand about macro data. But it is not market clearing data. Okay? Like an equity price or a commodity price.

Macroeconomic data is purely academic made-up data that is a proxy for activity. It’s a second or third derivative of actual activity by the time you see, say, a CPI print which is coming out tomorrow. Right? And it’s late and it’s really all not all that meaningful. So, I wouldn’t really make a trade or put a strategy together based on macro data even historical macro data. Every OECD country revises their data by what four times or something.

So, you see, a print for CPI data tomorrow that’s a preliminary print and that’s revised several times before it’s put on quote-unquote actual. And so, you know, you really can’t make decisions using macroeconomic data beyond a directional decision. Okay? So, if you follow me on Twitter, you see I’m very critical macro data all the time. I’m very sarcastic about it.

I think the more specific you can get… You know if you have to look at say national data or macroeconomic data, I would look at very low-level data the more specific you can get the better. Things like household surveys or you know communist and socialist countries. Chinese data at the very specific level can be very interesting. Okay? Government data the high-level data in every country I consider it garbage data in every country. So, you’re looking at very low-level very specific government or multilateral data, that’s interesting.

The closer you get to market clearing data the better because that’s a real price. Right? A real price history on stuff is better and company data is the best. And of course, company data is revised at times but that really helps you understand what’s happening at the kind of firm level. And what’s happening at the transaction level. So, you know, those are the kind of hierarchies of data that I would look at.

MG: So, okay this is a great. That’s a great point you mentioned that it’s you said very these variables is macro variables they’re proxies for activity. Right? They’re really more proxies for narratives. Right? Because and that’s where I think… You mentioned sarcasm almost 99 of my tweets at this point are sarcasm because when Rome is burning, what else I’m not going to do except joke about it. Right? Because I can’t change anything. Right?

So, and to that point I share a lot of that cynicism around data that people will often reference in the financial media that sounds really interesting, sounds like it’s predictive but when you actually test it to your point, you throw it out because it doesn’t work. Right? There’s no real predictive element to it.

So, we’ll get into some of the predictive stuff that you talk about but I want to hit a little bit on this market clearing phrase you kept on using. Explain what you mean by market clearing.

TN: Data is where there is a buyer and a seller.

MG: To actual prices of some asset class or something like that.

TN: Yep. That’s right.

MG: Okay. So, that makes sense. Okay. Now again I go back to the certain domains that data is more clear in terms of cause and effect and getting a sense of probabilities the challenge with markets. As we know is that the probabilities change second by second because not only does that mean meaningless data change second by second but the market clearing data changes second by second. Right? Going back to that point.

So, with what you do with Complete Intelligence, talk us through a little bit. What are some of the variables that you tend to find have some predictive power? And how do you think about confidence when it comes to any kind of decision made based on those variables?

TN: Sure. Okay. So, before I do that let me get into why I started Complete Intelligence because if none of you have started a firm before don’t do it. It’s really really hard so…

MG: From the people in the back because I got to tell you I’m an entrepreneur, I’m going through. And all you got is people on Twitter kicking you when you’re down when it’s the small sample anyway.

TN: Absolutely. So, I was where I had worked for two very large research firms The Economist and IHS Markit. And I saw that both of them claimed to have very detailed and intricate models. Okay? Of the global economy industries, whatever. Okay? For all of the interior models. And I have never spoken with a global research firm a data firm that is different from this. And if I’m wrong then somebody please correct me. But at the end of that whole model pipeline is somebody who says “no that’s a little bit too high” or “a little bit too low” and they change the number. Okay? To whatever they wanted it to be in the first place. So, and I tell you 100% of research firms out there with forecasts today have a manual process at the end of their quote-unquote model. A 100% of them. Again, if there’s somebody else that doesn’t do that, I am happy to be corrected. Okay? But I had done that for a decade and I felt like a hypocrite when I would talk to clients.

So, I started Complete Intelligence because I wanted to build a 100% machine driven forecasts across economics, across market, across equities, across commodities, across currencies. Okay? And we’ve done that. So, we have a multi-phase, multi-layer machine learning process that takes in billions of data items. We’re running trillions of calculations every week when we reforecast our data. Right? Now the interval of our forecast is monthly interval forecast. So, if people looking at daily prices that’s not what we’re doing now. Okay? We will be launching daily interval forecasts. I would say probably before the end of the year to be conservative but we’re doing monthly interval forecasts now.

Why is everything I’ve said is meaningless unless we measure our error. Okay? So, for every forecast that we do. And if you log into our website, you can see whether it’s the gold price, the S&P 500, USD, JPY, molybdenum or whatever. We track our error for every month, for everything that we do. Okay? So, if you want to understand your risk associated with using our data it’s there right in front of you with the error calculations. Okay? It’s only fair, If I’m gonna say sell you a forecast, you should be able to understand how wrong we’ve been in the past, before you use that as a decision-making input.

MG: Well, maybe just add some framework on that because I think that’s interesting. So, what you call error I call luck. Right? Because luck is both good or bad. I always make that point that with any equation any set of variables you’re going to have that error is the luck component that you can’t control. And that doesn’t necessarily mean that the equation is wrong. Right? It’s just means that for whatever reason that error in that moment in time was higher or lower than you might otherwise want. Okay?

TN: There is no such thing as zero error. And anybody who tells you that they have zero error is obviously they’re an economist and they don’t understand how markets work. So, there is always error in every calculation.

So, the reason we track error is because that serves as a feedback loop into our machine learning process. Okay? And we have feedback loops every week as we and what we’re doing right now is every Friday end of day. We will download global data process over the weekend have a new forecast on Monday morning. Okay? And so all of that error whether it’s near-term error, short-term error or say medium-term error, we feed that all back in to help correct and understand what’s going on within our process. And we have like I said, we have a multi-phase process in our machine learning platform. So, error is simply understanding the risk associated with using with using our platform.

MG: Right, which is basically how apt is a thing that you’re forecasting to that error which is again luck good or bad. I’m trying to put in sort of a qualitative framework also because I think… Yeah, there’s errors in life obviously, too. Right? And so, when they’re good or bad. But you know those elements.

TN: Right. But here’s what I would and I don’t know, I don’t want to dispute this too much but I think there is. So, you use the word luck and that’s fine but I think luck has a bit to do with the human element of a decision. Okay? We’re using math and code there’s zero human interaction with the data and with the process. And so, I wouldn’t necessarily call it luck. I mean, it literally is error like our algorithms got it wrong. So, if you want to call luck that’s absolutely fine but I would say luck is more of a human say an outcome associated with a human decision. More than something that’s machine driven that’s iterating. Again, we’re doing trillions of calculations every week to get our forecasts out there.

MG: Yeah, no that’s fair and maybe for the audience, Tony. Explain what machine learning is now.

TN: Sure.

MG: I once developed an app called “How Edition”. I was having dinner with the head developer once and he said he just came back from a conference about machine learning and he was just basically well, having drinks with me laughing and joking saying everybody use this term machine learning but it’s really just regression analysis. Right? So, talk about machine learning what is actual machine learning? How important is recent data to changes in the regression? Because I assume that’s part of the sort of dynamic nature of what you do just kind of riff on that for a bit.

TN: Okay. So, when I first started Complete Intelligence, I was really cynical about AI. And I spoke to somebody in Silicon Valley and asked the same question: what is AI? And this person said “Well AI is everything from a basic I say, quadratic equation upward.” I’m not necessarily sure that I agree that something that simple would be considered artificial intelligence. What we’re really doing with machine learning is there are really three basic phases. Okay? You have a preprocess which is looking at your data to understand things like anomalies, missing data, weird behavior, these sorts of things. Okay? So, that’s the first phase that we look at to be honest that’s the hardest one to get right. Okay?

A lot of people want to talk about the forecasting methodologies and the forecasting algorithms. That’s great and that’s the sexy part of ML. But really the conditioning and the pre-process is the is the hardest part and it’s the most necessary part. Okay? When we then go into the forecasting aspect of it, we’re using what’s called an ensemble approach. So, we have a number of algorithms that we use and let’s say they’re 15 algorithms. Okay? That we use we’re looking at a potential combinatorial approach of any individual or combination of those algorithms based on the time horizon that we’re forecasting. Okay?

So, we’re not saying a simple regression is the way to go we’re saying there may be a neural network approach, there may be a neural network approach in combination with some sort of arima approach. We’re saying something like that. Right? And so, we test all of those permutations for every historical period that we’re looking at.

So, I think traditionally when I look back at kind of quote-unquote building models in excel, we would build a formula and that formula was fairly static. Okay? And every time you did say a crude oil forecast you had this static formula that you set your data against and a number came out. We don’t have static formulas at all.

To forecast crude oil every single week we start at obviously understanding what we did in the past but also re-testing and re-weighting every single algorithmic approach that we have and then recombining them based upon the activity that happened on a daily basis in that previous week. And in the history. Okay?

So, that’s phase two the forecasting approach and then phase three is the post process. Right? And so, the post process is understanding the forecast output. Is it a flat line? Right? If it’s a flat line then there’s something wrong. Is it a straight line up? Then that there’s something you know… those are to use some extremes. Right? But you know we have to test the output to understand if it’s reasonable. Right? So, it’s really an automated gut check on the reasonableness of the outcome and then we’ll go back and correct outliers potentially reforecast and then we’ll publish. Okay?

So, there are really three phases to what we do and I would think three phases to most machine learning approaches. And so, when we talk about machine learning that’s really what we’re talking about is that that really generally three-phase process and then the feedback loop that always goes back into that.

MG: Yeah. No that makes sense. Let’s get…

TN: That’s really boring after a while.

MG: No, no, no but I think that’s it’s part of what I want to do with these spaces is try to get people to understand you know beyond sort of just the headline or the thing that is thrown out there. As a term to what does that actually mean in practice you don’t have to know it fully in depth the way the that you do. But I think having that context is important.

TN: I would say on the idea generation side and on the risk management side right now. Okay? Now the other thing that I didn’t cover is obviously we’re doing markets but we also do… we use our platform to automate the budgeting process within enterprises. Okay? So, we work with very large organizations and the budget process within these large organizations can take anywhere from say four to six months. And they take hundreds of people. And so, we take that down to really interacting with one person in that organization and we do it in say less than 24 hours. And we build them a continuous budget every month.

Once accounting close happens we get their new data and then we send them a new say 18-month forward-looking forecast for them. So, their FPA team doesn’t have to dig around and beg people for information and all that stuff. So, some of this is on the firm event could be on the firm evaluation side, as well. Right? How will the firm perform? Nobody’s using us for that but the firms themselves are using that to help them automate their budgeting process. So, some of that could be on this a filtering side and the idea generation side, as well.

So, we do not force our own GL structure onto the clients. We integrate directly with their SAP or Oracle or other ERP database. We take on their GL structure at whatever levels they want. We have found that there is very little deterioration from say, the second or third level GL to say the sixth or seventh level GL, in terms of the accuracy of our forecast. And when we started doing this it really surprised me. We do a say a team level forecast for 10, 12 billion organizations, six layers down within their GL. And we see very little deterioration when we go down six levels than when we do it at say two levels. Which is you know it really to me it speaks to the robustness of our process but would we consider Anaplan a competitor not really, they’re not necessarily doing the kind of a budget automation that we’re doing at least, that I’m aware of. I know that there are guys like Hyperion who do what we’re doing but again their sophistication isn’t necessarily. What we’re doing and they do a great job and Hyperion is a great organization. I think Oracle gave them a new name now but they’re not necessarily using the same machine learning approaches that we’re using. And our clients have told us that they don’t get the same result with using that type of say ERP originated or ERP add-on budgeting process.

Yep. So, I would say we can’t we can do company-specific information for a customer if that’s what they want. Okay? We don’t necessarily have that on our platform today aside from say individual ticker symbols. Okay? But we’re not forecasting say the P&L of Apple or something like that or the balance sheet of Apple. Something we could do in a pretty straightforward manner but we do that on a customer-by-customer basis.

So, what we’re forecasting right now are currency pairs, commodities about 120 commodities and global equity indices. Okay? We are Beta testing individual equity tickers and we probably won’t introduce those fully on the platform until we have our daily interval forecast ready to go to market. But those are still we’re still working some kinks out of those and we’ll have those ready probably within a few months.

MG: Okay. So, let’s talk about commodities here for a bit tonight. Obviously, this is where a lot of people’s attention has gone to. What kind of variables and I know you said you have a whole bunch of variables that are being incorporated here but are there certain variables in particular when it comes to oil and other commodities that have a higher predictive power than others.

TN: There are I think one of the stories that I tell pretty often and this really shocks people is when we look at things like gold. Okay? I’m not trying to deflect from your oral question but just to you know we’ve spoken with the number of sugar traders over the years. Okay? And so, we tell them that say the gold price and the sugar price there may not necessarily be a say short term say correlation there but there is a lot of predictive capability there and we talk them through why. And I think the thing that we get out of the machine learning approach and we cast a wide net. We’re not forcing correlations is that we’ll find some unexpected say drivers. Although drivers implies a causal nature and we’re not trying to imply causality anywhere. Okay?

We’re looking at kind of co-movement in markets over time and understanding how things work in a lead lag basis with some sort of indirect causality as well as say a T0 or current state movement. So, with crude oil you know there are so many supply side factors that are impacting that price right now, that I can’t necessarily point to say another commodity that is having an impact on that. It really is a lot of the supply side and sentimental factors that are impacting those prices right now.

MG: That makes a lot of sense. And I’m curious how did you mention it’s I think the intervals once a month. Right? So, given the speed with which inflation has moved and yields have moved how does a machine learning process adapt to sudden spikes or massive deltas in in variable movement. Right? Because there’s always a degree of randomness going back to error. Right? And you can make an argument that the larger move is the that may actually be more error but I think that’s an interesting discussion.

TN: So, I’ll tell you where we were say two years ago when 2020 hit versus today. Okay? So, in March of 2020, April 2020 everything fell apart. I don’t think there were any models that caught what was going to happen. It was an exogenous event that hit markets and it happened very quickly. So, in June, I was talking with someone who is with one of the largest software companies in the world and they said “Hey has your AI caught up to markets yet because ours is still lost” And you guys would be shocked if I told you who this was because you would expect them to know exactly what’s going to happen before it happened. Okay? I’ll be honest I think it was all of them but the reality is you know Michael you where you were saying that ML is just regression analysis.

I think a lot of the large firms that are doing time series forecasting really are looking at regression and derivatives of regression as kind of their only approaches because it works a lot of the time. Right? So, we had about a two-month delay at that point and part of it was because… So, by June we had caught up to the market. And we had started in February to iterate twice a month, we were doing once a month; I hope you guys can understand with machine learning two factors are we’re always adjusting our algorithms. Okay? We’re always incorporating new algorithms. We’re always you know making sure that we can keep up with markets because you cannot be static in machine learning. Okay? The other thing is we’re always adding capacity why? Because we have to iterate again and again and again to make sure that we understand the changes in markets. Okay?

So, at that time we were only iterating twice a month and so it took us a while to catch up. Guys like this major technology firm and other major technology firms they just couldn’t figure it out. And I suspect that some of them probably manually intervened to ensure that their models caught up with markets. I don’t want to accuse any individual company but that temptation is always there. Especially, for people who don’t report their error. The temptation is always there for people to manually intervene in their forecast process. Okay?

So, now, today if we look for example at how are we catching changes in markets. Okay? So, if I look at the S&P 500 for April for example, our error rate for the S&P 500 for April I think was 0.6 percent. Okay? Now in May it changed it deteriorated a little bit to I think four or six percent, I’m sorry I don’t remember the exact number offhand but it deteriorated. Right? But you know when there are dramatic changes because we’re iterating at least once a week, if not twice a week we’re catching those inflections much much faster. And what we’re having to do, and this is a function of the liquidity adjustments, is where in the past you could have a trend and adjust for that trend and account for that trend. We’re really having to our algorithms are having to select more methodologies with recency bias because we’re seeing kind of micro volatility in markets. And so again…

MG: So, kind of like the difference between a simple moving average versus like an exponential moving average. Right? Where you’re waiting the more recent data sooner.

TN: It could be. Yeah.

MG: Right.

TN: Yeah. That’s a very very simple approach but yeah it would be something like that, that’s right. Yeah. What so when we work with enterprise customers that level of engagement is very tight because when we’re getting kind of the full set of financial data from a client obviously, they’re very vested in that process. So, that’s different from say a small portfolio manager subscribing to RCF futures product where we’re doing forecasts and they have their own risk process in place. And they can do whatever they want with it. Right? But again, with our enterprise clients we are measuring our error so they can see the result of our continuous budgeting process. Okay?

So, if we’re doing let’s say, we launch with a customer in May, they close their mate books in June get them over to us redo our forecast and send it over to them and let them know what our error rate was in May. Okay? So, they can decide how we’re doing by department, by team, by product, by whatever based upon the error rates that we’re giving at every line item. Okay? So, they can select and we’re not doing kind of capital projects budgets we’re doing business as usual budgets so they can decide what they want to take and what they don’t want to take. It’s really up to them but we do talk through that with them and then over time they just start to understand how we work and take it on within their own internal process.

MG: So, back a little bit Tony. So, you mentioned you do this machine learning forecasting work when it comes to broad economics, markets and currency; of those three which has the most variability and randomness in other words which tends to have a higher error? Whenever you do any kind of machine learning to try to forecast what comes next?

TN: I would say it depends on the equity market but probably equity markets when there are exogenous shocks. So, our error for April of 2020 again, we don’t hide this from anybody it was not good but it wasn’t good for anybody. Right? And so, but in general it depends on the equity market but some of the emerging equity markets, EM equity markets are pretty volatile.

We do have some commodities like say rhodium for example. Okay? Pretty illiquid market, pretty small base of people who trade it and highly volatile. So, something like rhodium over the years our air rates there have not necessarily been something that we’re telling people to use that as a basis to trade but obviously, it’s a hard problem. Right? And so, we’re iterating that through our ML process and looking at highly volatile commodities is something that we focus on and work to improve those error rates.

MG: Here, I hope you find this to be an interesting conversation because I think it’s a part of the of the way of looking at markets, which not too many people are themselves maybe using but is worth sort of considering. Because I always make a point that nobody can predict the future but we all have to take actions based on that unknowable future. So, to the extent that there might be some data or some conclusions that at least are looking at variables that historically have some degree of predictive power. It doesn’t guarantee that you’re going to necessarily be better off but at least you have something to hang your hat on. Right? I think that’s kind of an aspect to investing here.

Now, I want to go a little bit Tony to what you mentioned earlier you had lived abroad for a while in Europe. And when I was starting to record these spaces to put up on my YouTube channel the first one, I did that on was with Dan Arvis and the topic of that space was around this sort of new world order that seemed to be shaping up. I want you to just talk from a geopolitical perspective how you’re viewing perhaps changing alliances because of Russia, Ukraine. And maybe even dovetail that a little bit into the machine learning side because geopolitics is a variable. Which is probably quite vault in some periods.

TN: Yeah, absolutely. Okay. So, with the evolving geopolitical order I would say rather than kind of picking countries and saying it’s lining up against x country or lining up with x country or what country. I would say we’ve entered an era of opportunistic geopolitics. Okay? We had the cold war where we had a fairly static order where people were with either red team or blue team. That changed in the 90s of course, where you kind of had the kind of the superpower and that’s been changing over the last say 15 years with say, China allegedly becoming kind of stronger and so on and so forth. So, but we’ve entered a fairly chaotic era with say opportunistic macroeconomic relation or sorry, geopolitical relationships and I think one of the kinds of top relationships that is purely opportunistic today is the China-Russia relationship.

And so, there’s a lot of talk about China and Russia having this amazing new relationship and they’re deep. And they’re gonna go to war together or whatever. We’ve seen over the past say three, four months that’s just not the case. And I’ve been saying this for years just for a kind of people’s background. Actually, advised the Chinese government the NDRC which is the economic planning unit of the central government on a product or on an initiative called the belt and road initiative. Okay? I did that for two years. I was in and out of Beijing. I never took a dime for it. I never took expense reimbursement just to be clear, I’m not a CCP kind of pawn. But my view was, if the Chinese Government is spending a trillion dollars, I want to see if I can impact kind of good spend for that. So, I have seen the inside of the Chinese Government and how it works and I also in the 80s and 90s spoke Russian and studied a lot on the Russian Government and have a good idea about how totalitarian governments work.

So, I think in general if we thought America first was offensive in the last administration then you really don’t want to learn about Chinese politics and you really don’t want to learn about Russian politics because they make America first look like kindergarten. And so, whenever you have ultra-ultra-nationalistic politics, any diplomatic relationship is an opportunistic relationship. And I always ask people who claim to be China experts but say please tell me and name one Chinese ally. Give me one ally of China and you can’t, North Korea, Pakistan. I mean, who is an ally of China there isn’t an ally of China.  There is a transactional opportunistic relationship with China but there is not an ally with China.

And so, from a geopolitical perspective if you take that backdrop looking at what’s happening in the world today it makes a whole lot more sense. And a lot of the doomsayers out there saying China is going to fall and it’s going to have this catastrophic impact. And all this other stuff, the opportunism that we see at the nation-state level pervades into the bureaucracy. So, the bureaucracy we hear about Xi Jinping. And Xi Jinping is almost a fictional character. I hate to be that extreme on it but there is the aura of Xi Jinping and there is the reality of Xi Jinping, just a guy, he’s not Mao Zedong. He doesn’t have the power that supposed western Chinese experts claim that he has. He’s just a guy. Okay?

And so, the relationships within the Chinese bureaucracy are purely transactional and they are purely opportunistic. So again, if you take that perspective and you look at what’s happening in geopolitics, hopefully you can see things through a different lens.

MG: Now, I’m glad you’re framing that in those terms because I think it’s very hard for people to really understand some of these dynamics when it’s almost presented like a like the story for a movie. Right? For what could be a conflict to come by the media because and it’s almost overly simplified. Right? When you hear this type of talk. So again, I want to go back into how does that dovetail into actual data. Right? Maybe it doesn’t at all. When you have some of these dynamics and you talk about market clearing data, you’re going to probably see mark movement somewhat respond off of geopolitical changes. Talk about anything that you’ve kind of seen as far as that goes and how should investors consider geopolitical risk or maybe not consider geopolitical risk?

TN: Yeah, I think, well when you see geopolitical adjustments today all that really is… I don’t mean overly simplified but it’s a risk calibration. Right? So, you know Russia invades Ukraine, that’s really a risk calibration. How much risk do we want to accept and then what opportunities are there? Right?

So, when you hear about China, you have to look at what risk is China willing to accept for actions that it takes? Keeping in mind that China has a very complicated domestic political environment with COVID shutdown, lockdowns and all of this stuff. So, having worked with and known some really smart Chinese bureaucrats over the years, these guys are very concerned with the domestic environment. And I don’t although there are idiot you know generals and economists here and there who say really stupid stuff about China should take over TSMC and China should invade Taiwan, these sorts of things. My conversations over the years have been with very pragmatic and professional individuals within the bureaucracy.

So, do I agree with their policies? Not a lot of them but they are well thought out in general. So, I think just because we hear talk from some journalist in Beijing who lives a very sheltered life about some potential thing that may happen. I don’t think we necessarily need to calibrate our risk based on the day-to-day story flow. I think we need to look at like… so there’s a… I’m sure you all know who Leland Miller is in China beige book like?

MG: Yeah, he’s not too long ago.

TN: Yeah. He has a proxy of the Chinese economy and that’s a very interesting way to look at an interesting lens to look through China or through to look at China or whatever. But so, I think that the day-to-day headlines, if you follow those, you’re really just going to get a lot of volatility but if you try to understand what’s actually happening, you’ll get a clearer picture. It’s not necessarily a connection of a collection of names in China and the political musical chairs, it’s really asking questions about how does China serve China first. What will China do to serve China first and are some of these geopolitical radical things that are said do they fit within that context of China serving China first? So, that’s what I try to look at would I be freaked out if China invaded Taiwan? Absolutely. I think everybody would right but is that my main scenario? No, it’s not.

MG: In terms of the data inputs on the machine learning side how granular is the data meaning? Are you looking at where geographically demand might be picking up or is it simply this is what the price is and who cares the source? Because again with hindsight if you knew that the source of China and kind of had a rough sense of the history of Russia-Ukraine maybe that could have been an interesting tell that war was coming.

TN: Yes or No. To be honest it had more to do with the value of the CNY. Okay? And I’ll tell you a little bit about history with the CNY. We were as far as I know, the only ones who called the CNY hitting 6.7 in August of 2019 with a six-month lead time. And so, we have a very good track record with USD-CNY and I would argue that China’s buying early in 2022 had a lot more to do with them from a monetary policy perspective needing to devalue CNY. So, they were hoard buying before they could devalue the CNY and I think that had a lot more to do with their activity than Russia-Ukraine. Okay? And if you notice they’ve made many of their buys by mid-April and once that happened you saw CNY, go to 6.8. Right? It’s recovered a little bit since then but China has needed to devalue the CNY for probably at least nine months. So, it’s long overdue but they’ve been working very hard to keep it strong so that they could get the commodities they needed to last a period of time. Once they had those commodities, they just let the parachute go and they let it do value to 6.8 and actually slightly weaker than 6.8.

MG: The point of the devaluation is interesting. I feel if I had enough space but we were talking about the Yen and what’s happened there. And this observation that usually China will start to devalue when they see the end as itself going through its own devaluation.

How does some of those cross correlations play out with some of the work that on machine learning you’re doing? Because there’s a human element to the decision to devalue a currency. Right? So, the historical data may not be valid I would think because you might have kind of a more humanistic element that causes the data to look very different.

TN: Well, they’re both export lab economies. Right? And we’ve seen a number of other factors dollar strength and we’ve seen changing consumption patterns. And so, yes when Japan devalues you generally see China devalue as well but also, we’ve seen a lot of other activities in on the demand-pull side and on the currency side especially with the US dollar in… I would say over the last two quarters. So, yes, that I would say that the correlation there is probably pretty high but there are literally thousands of factors that contribute to the movement of those of those currencies.

MG: Is there anything recently Tony in the output that machine learning is spitting out that really surprises you? That you know… And again, I understand that there’s a subjective element which is our own views on the world and of course then the pure data. But I got to imagine it’s fascinating sometimes if you’re sitting there and seeing what’s being spit out if it’s surprising. Is there anything that’s been kind of an outlier in in the output versus what you would think would likely happen going forward?

TN: Yeah. You know, what was really surprising to me after we saw just to stick on CNY for a minute because it’s the first thing that comes to mind, when we saw CNY do value to 6.8. I was looking at our forecast for the next six months. And it showed that after we devalued pretty strong it would moderate and reappreciate just a bit. And that was not necessarily what I was hearing say in the chatter. It was kind of “okay, here we go we’re going to go to seven or whatever” but our data was telling us that that wasn’t necessarily going to happen that we were going to hit a certain point in May. And then we were going to moderate through the end of the year. So, you know we do see these bursty trends and then we see you know in some cases those bursty trends continue for say an integer period. But with CNY while I would have on my own expected them. I expected the machines to say they need to keep devaluing because they’ve been shut down and they need to do everything they can to generate CNY fun tickets. The machines were telling me that we would you know we’d see this peak and then we would we would moderate again and it would kind of re-appreciate again.

So, those are the kind of things that we’re seeing that when I talk about this it’s… Oh! the other thing is this: So, in early April we had a we have people come back to us on our forecast regularly who don’t agree with what we’re saying and they complain pretty loudly.

MG: So, what do you say I talk when I hear that because whenever somebody doesn’t agree with the forecast, they are themselves making a fork.

TN: Of course. Yeah. Exactly. Right? Yeah, and so this person was telling us in early April that we’re way wrong that the S&P was going to continue to rally and you know they wanted to cancel their subscription and they hated us and all this other stuff. And we said okay but the month’s not over yet so let’s see what happens this was probably a week and a half in April. And what happened by the end of April things came in line with our forecast and like I said earlier we were like 0.4 and 0.6 percent off for the month. And so that person had they listened to us at the beginning of the month they would have been in a much better position than they obviously ended up being in. Right? And so, these are the kind of things that we see on a… I mean, we’ve got hundreds of stories about this stuff but these are the kind of things that we see on a regular basis. And we mess up guys I’m not saying we’re perfect and but the thing that we when we do mess up, we’re very open about it. Everything that we do is posted on our on our website. Every call we make, every error we have is their wars and all. Okay? And so, we’re not hiding our performance because if you’re using our data to make a trade, we want you to understand the risk associated with using our data. That’s really what it comes down to.

MG: It reminds me of back in 2011 and in some other periods I’ve had similar situations, where I was writing and I was very adamant in saying the conditions favored a summer crash. Right? I was saying that for the summer and the market should be going up and people would say oh where’s your summer crash and I would say this summer hasn’t started. Like it’s amazing how people, I don’t know, what it is, I don’t know if it’s just short-termism or just this kind of culture of constantly reacting as opposed to thinking but it is it is remarkably frustrating.

Going back to your point at the very beginning being entrepreneur don’t do it, that you have to build a business with people and customers who in some cases are just flat out naïve.

TN: That’s all right though. That’s a part of the risk that we accept. Right?

MG: Yeah, the other thing right now that happens with every industry but from the entrepreneur’s standpoint. It’s what you’re doing the likely outcome of your product of your service. You’re trying to communicate that to end clients but then in the single role of the die the guy the end client who comes to you exactly for that simply because they disagree with you know the output, now says I want out.

TN: Oh! Yeah! Well, your where is your summer call from 2011 the analogy today is where is your recession call. Right? So, that’s become the how come you’re not one of us calls right now. So, it’s just one of those proof points and if you don’t agree with that then you’re stupid.

So, I would say you never finish with that there is always a consensus and a something you’re you absolutely, must believe in or you don’t know what you’re talking about.

MG: Yeah, well, thankfully. What you’re talking about so appreciate everybody joining this space Tony the first time you and I were talking. I enjoyed the conversation because I think it said on investing and I encourage you to take a look at Tony’s firm and follow him here on twitter. So, thank everybody. Thank you, Tony and enjoy.

Categories
QuickHit

What happens to markets if China invades Taiwan? (Part 1)

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In this QuickHit episode, we’re joined by Mike Green to talk about what will happen if China invades Taiwan? We’re not saying that China is going to invade Taiwan, but what if it is to happen? What will be the impact to markets?

Mike Green is the chief strategist and portfolio manager for an ETF firm called Simplify Asset Management. They specialize in derivative overlays and derivative structures that modify the traditional market exposures. Their flagship products are things like US equities with downside protection.

His background prior to Simplify, has been in hedge funds for about 15 years and have built an expertise or a degree of renowned for the work that he does in primarily the derivatives and volatility space and have managed traditionally in what’s referred to as a discretionary global macro style. The assets that he purchases or that he monitors exist around the world, including places like China, Taiwan, et cetera.

A lot of the discussions Tony and Mike have had around Taiwan are tied to some geopolitical observations and some dynamics that exist in which Mike played a role less under the Biden administration. But in the prior administration had an advisory capacity to some components of the Department of State and Department of Defense.

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This QuickHit episode was recorded on December 2, 2021.

The views and opinions expressed in this What happens to markets if China invades Taiwan? Quickhit episode are those of the guest and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any contents provided by our guest are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

 

Show Notes

TN: So today we hear or any day, pick a day. We hear that China is invading Taiwan. What are the first things that come to your mind as the news crosses the wires?

MG: Well, I think there’s a couple of things that are really important about the question of is China invading Taiwan, right. And so what we have seen very clearly, and this is fact, not speculation, is a dramatic escalation of China’s incursion on what would traditionally be thought of as Taiwan sovereignty or independence. Right.

We’ve seen a dramatic increase in boats transitioning across the international marine borders. We have seen a dramatic increase in incursion of both fighter jets and bombers into Taiwanese airspace. And in general, the strategy that you see China engaged in is what is typically thought of as a precursor to an invasion. They’re effectively forcing Taiwan to maintain alertness and readiness, which slowly degrades the quality of defenses.

If you have to constantly scramble jets, there’s only so many hours that you can actually have them in the air. There’s only so many hours you can have pilots operating before their capability deteriorates. That is very clearly what is in play here.

Now, it’s an unknown question whether they go to the next step, whether they take what is currently a largely psychological and relative resource advantage to degrade Taiwan’s capabilities, whether they turn that kinetic as compared to hoping for a psychological collapse where Taiwan effectively decides to sue for the best possible deal they can get is unclear.

And I think that’s really what we’re all debating. I mean, China has come out very clearly. Others have made this observation, and it’s not dissimilar to my former employer, Peter Thiel’s observation about Donald Trump, right. That everyone takes him literally, but not seriously. I would flip that on its head. And everyone say everyone takes Xi seriously, but not literally when he says we will reunify with Taiwan in one form or another within the next five years.

And that’s the core of the question. Are they going to do this in a peaceful fashion? Are they going to do it in a kinetic military fashion? What are the ramifications of each of those two strategies and what’s the state of gameplay that is in place right now, as each side including the allies of Taiwan in the form of Japan, the United States, et cetera, evaluates how they want to respond to it.

TN: Right. What is that? What are those initial responses that you think happen, setting aside battle plans, of course. Honestly, I don’t believe that Min Def or DoD know 100% of whether this will happen or not. I think everything is a potential.

What do you think those reactions are initially in terms of, say, markets, investments, even things like trade? Those are like, what do you think happens right away?

MG: Well, I think there’s a couple of things that are worth hitting on. Right. So the first is why does China want Taiwan or why does it matter? Right. So one component is just the psychological final victory over the Republic, the Taiwanese Republic, what is known as the Republic of China outside of the area.

When you think about that dynamic, this is a final victory that would allow Xi to place himself permanently on par with the founders of the Chinese Communist state. Right. The Mao’s, et cetera, of the world. So this is a huge accomplishment.

I think there’s a huge misunderstanding that the objective is to obtain the semiconductor resources, right. To me that feels, one, extremely unlikely to expect that they could do that successfully, and two, I’m not sure it’s actually entirely relevant. Right. But that does then speak to the indications that the game is being taken much more seriously.

And so one of the things that I would point to people is the dramatic expansion of capabilities and investment that Taiwan is making in Arizona, where they’ve effectively doubled on a nameplate capacity and potentially up to 5x the capacity of TSMC in Taiwan. Now, that’s a huge implication.

If we were to put ourselves back into the 17th century, it would be the akin of a European sovereign entity, a small Principality, taking the Crown jewels and shipping them for safekeeping somewhere further away when they were faced with a threat, taking the error apparent and shipping them abroad so that there’s a base of operations. If you think about TSMC’s investment in Arizona, that can be very easily thought of as a base of operations and a source of income for a government in exile. Right. So I don’t think Taiwan is planning on going away.

It also opens up kind of the interesting angle of how effective is China’s strategy, because I think that China broadly looks at it and says, we can wear them down and I would point to it and say, yeah, your best opportunity was actually probably a year ago to use the element of surprise. Now you’ve pretty well telegraphed it. Taiwan has made significant advances. The US Department of Defense, in particular, I would argue, would have been caught very much off guard a year to a year and a half ago. Today they’re pretty much on top of this, right.

The Pacific Theater has been opened pretty widely. You’re actively hearing expressions of support from South Korea, Japan, et cetera. So to me, it feels like the element of surprise has been lost, and now it just becomes a question of, is this ultimately going to happen? It seems extremely unlikely to me that it will be a long term successful component.

Then you have to ask yourself the last question, which is, why does China care beyond simply the moral victory or the desire for that? And that’s where you and I have been through these maps. And I don’t know if we’re doing this in a visual format, but I could share it if you wanted to.

The way the world looks at China is not the way China looks at itself. Right. So the traditional map that we think of with China when we look at it, we see this large access into the Philippines and in the Pacific Ocean. It looks like China has a coastline that is similar to the rest of the similar to the other great powers like the United States. The reality is that their entire access to the Pacific Ocean is framed and blocked by barrier Islands, Taiwan being the most prominent of those. Japan to the north, being another equally important one. The Philippines come into play. Okinawa comes into play there, et cetera. Right. What they’re really trying to do in terms of expressing a desire to take over Taiwan is to break into the Pacific Ocean and pick up that Deepwater Navy capability that is absolutely mandatory for an “Empire to express power.”

Map of China and countries surrounding it. Image from Google Maps.

So I think we’re at kind of a point of maximum uncertainty where it feels like they may have missed the best opportunity to do so. But as you and I have talked about, I’m not sure that China is actually as good at this game as everybody thinks.

TN: I’m with you on that. Yeah, I don’t think they are, either. And one of the things that I’m seeing more and more of two years ago, a year and a half ago, as you mentioned, China was winning diplomatically, not everything. But there was more of a positive bias toward China.

Today, they’re just annoying people. And so if they take an action like that, it seems like they start from a negative position, and it’s hard for them to get to a positive position out of that when Xi Jinping was going to the left to talk and all this other stuff, he had a lot of positive momentum behind him, and he actually could have done a lot of really terrible things, which, if you look at what’s happening in Xinjiang and other things, he did a lot of terrible things. He could have done more, actually. And I think the world would have turned the other way. But now I think it’s really hard for them to turn the other way. Does that make sense to you?

MG: No. I actually think that’s true. I think that they may have gained a degree of false confidence off of the failure to react to Hong Kong. But absolutely, with the exception of… Australia has clearly turned. The UK has recognized that it has to turn. Europe continues to enjoy the schadenfreude of the US’s relative standing having deteriorated. I think Europe is slowly waking up to the risks of their reliance on Russia, particularly for energy supplies.

And an interesting angle, and again, you and I have talked about this offline, would be the dynamic of a simultaneous move in both directions by Russia to expand into Ukraine and China, to expand into Taiwan and the immediate aftermath of the Chinese Olympics in Beijing this winter, which is February. From a purely mechanical standpoint, it’s almost impossible to mount any form of attack on Taiwan until May due to weather conditions, and an amphibious assault would make no sense, you could certainly see an airborne one.

I think there’s a very real chance that we see at least an increase in the drumbeats associated with that to test it out. But Europe will eventually turn, right. They have to understand at their core that they are an exposed peninsula on the Eurasian continent, and they really can’t allow China and Russia to become as dominant as they are expressing at least their interest of becoming.

TN: That’s right. Okay. So you bring up an interesting analog when you mentioned Hong Kong. Okay. So Hong Kong and Taiwan used to be this kind of holdouts from the mainland, and people looked at them as these democracies-ish, although Hong Kong, whether it was a democracy or not as questionable. But the takeover of Hong Kong is one that happened.

I was telling people in 2014 that it was already done. That this was going to happen. And for five years that I talked about it, people said, no, you’re crazy. It’s not going to happen. There’s too much money that goes through Hong Kong and so on and so forth. But it happened. And now in the wake of it, people just kind of shrug their shoulders like, okay, whatever it happened. Do you think that a takeover of Taiwan would be similar? Do you think people would just kind of shrug shoulders and say, “they invaded Taiwan. It was going to happen anyway, let’s just move on.?”

MG: No, I think it’s much harder for people to look at it in that context. Now, I would frame it, if we’re going to use a World War 2 analogy. And you always got to be careful with Godwin’s law about this, but it would be the analog to Nazi invasion or the German invasion, more accurate of the Sudettan land, which ostensibly was done in a manner very similar to Russia’s invasion of Crimea and the Dunbas region, were there to protect the Russian speakers.

We’re not actually there to have any form of substantive gain, and the world has broadly moved on from it. Right. Same thing I would argue with Hong Kong. Well, of course it was ours, right? You didn’t actually expect us to sit around 2047 and wait for this. There had to be a gradual progression in that direction.

Now, if this is the definition of gradual, I’d hate to see the definition of sudden. But again, the world has largely ignored it and moved on because for the most part, those outside the region have not experienced a significant shift. And again, if you were to look at foreigners in Berlin around the invasion of Sudetenland, they wouldn’t have seen anything different either. Right. Maybe they would have seen the riding on the wall and gotten out. But as we know, many didn’t.

There’s the risk that this is similar because the reality is if China were to decide to invade Taiwan, and now we can kind of get into the market impact, I don’t think the west can do anything about it. Right. Remember, this is 100 miles, give or take off the 100 km. I’m sorry. Off the coast of China. The US cannot Mount a credible defense and certainly not the ability to take back that region once China has taken it.

And I think that’s kind of the interesting feature associated with this is that like the actions of Germany and Sudetenland or the Blitzkrieg into Paris or any of these components, it’s going to be very hard to undo this. And so the minute it happens, it becomes a much longer protracted extended dynamic. And that’s the reason we care. It’s not so much that are we going to win or lose? Right. Almost any credible analysis of it says that China can indeed take Taiwan.

Taiwan is unique and in terms of its mountainous dynamics, et cetera. It’s uniquely suited in a lot of ways for guerrilla warfare. So my guess is they will be playing an Afghanistan type dynamic for decades if they take it. And the US would certainly be working in ways to resupply that and create harassment and everything else. But it is unrealistic to think that it can be stopped if they truly decide that they’re going to do that.

And that’s kind of the thing that, to me is more interesting is that how do the pieces start to fall together in a puzzle if they were to do that and what is properly priced under those scenarios? And I think, Ironically, people will point to US equity markets and say, oh, they’re going to fall or the dollar would be affected, et cetera.

I think there’s some truth to that certainly on a short term basis. But as you know, I don’t really think that the fundamentals matter all that much in the US equity markets right now. Are Americans going to lose their jobs and stop contributing to their 401k plans? And is the Federal Reserve suddenly going to step away from markets and stop engaging in supportive activity? To me, that seems very low probability. And so while there could very well be a correction, I’d be surprised if it moved in that direction. But I do think there’s other trades that are particularly interesting. Right.

So we mentioned Hong Kong. The Hong Kong dollar has been completely unaffected, both in terms of the absolute level of the dollar and its relationship with the US dollar. In other words, they continue to trade, basically a parody with very minor exception. But also the volatility associated with that. So taking bets against that relationship have retreated to near the lowest levels in years.

TN: Sure.

MG: If China were to make a play for Taiwan, it would be almost impossible for me to imagine a scenario in which that relationship didn’t fray violently. Same thing becomes true for Japan, right. Because Japan has two separate issues. One is they are a client state of the United States, and now they are directly in the face of a kinetic war that requires them to rapidly increase their government spending and to do so under somewhat existential risk. And at the same time, they have to write off, basically the minute they do that, they have to write off all of the collateral that most of their corporates have invested in China, which has become the single largest source of their external investment. Right.

So those to me, the area across Asia feels mispriced for this risk. Even if we’re just talking about a volatility spike, it feels that that area is much more mispriced than the US equity markets, for example.

TN: Interesting. So what you say about Japanese companies riding off their investments in China with the same go you think for, say, Korean companies as well?

MG: Oh, absolutely. You’re effectively placing them in a very difficult situation for sovereign reasons and for very obvious political reasons. Those are regions: South Korea, Philippines, Japan that really can’t get on board the China train. Right. Because it creates too powerful of an entity, and one that you point out is increasingly unliked. It places too powerful of an entity in their backyard.

TN: Okay. So something like 37, we all kind of know this 37% or something of global manufactured goods are made in northeast Asia. Right.

MG: Right.

TN: And if you look at electronics, it’s a lot more than that. I don’t know the number a lot more than that. So you have a manufacturing base, and especially in electronics, you have a manufacturing location where risk all of a sudden is amped up. Okay. What does that do? I know this is kind of an obvious question, but I want to get a little bit into details. What does that do to supply chains, especially around electronics?

MG: Yeah. Well, the quick answer is obviously it throws them into chaos. Right. And the most important point on the electronics that I would make is that while China holds a fraction of the world’s IP on electronics, again, the commentary around semiconductors, they are massive in the assembly process. Right. They’re basically the assembly line or the finishing stop. And so you have a ton of semiconductors that get shipped into China and then shipped out in the form of flat panel TVs, computers, iphones, et cetera.

That would unquestionably be disrupted. Right. And it creates an interesting, there’s an interesting game theory associated with it, which is you’re effectively talking about splitting the world in two at that point in a manner that is very similar to the breakdown of the alliance between the Soviet Union and the United States following World War II. Right.

TN: Right. This is what I’m not sure a lot of people, especially in the corporate world, understand, is how acute and how distinct that break could be if this happens.

MG: Yeah. I agree with you broadly. Now, the irony, of course, is part of the reason that they can’t embrace that is that redundancy costs money.

If I’m going to build a diversified supply chain, it places me at a disadvantage to competitors that do not do so in the interim. It potentially positions me for a knockout punch for a true winning of the game. But even there, you start to have to ask yourself questions. Would it be politically feasible given the likely response in terms of price controls and everything else that would kick in? Right.

I mean, I find it highly likely that a Biden administration or a Republican administration. Remember, the price controls were instituted by Nixon, not by Johnson. When you start talking about those types of dynamics, the game theory doesn’t really support the desire to fully diversify your resources. It places you at a disadvantage to your peers in the immediate future, and the potential rewards associated with it are somewhat in doubt as well because it becomes politically unacceptable to raise prices in response to that type of event.

TN: Right. Everyone else is going to be knocked out. I’ll be knocked out, too. So there’s no advantage or disadvantage to me to have a redundant supply chain.

MG: Correct. There’s a disadvantage if it doesn’t happen, right? You’re maintaining something more expensive.

So it’s hard to look at those who would be most impacted and say that they’re behaving in an irrational way. Right. Like the game theory is actually very much. Don’t do anything. Don’t do anything. Don’t do anything. Panic.

TN: Right. Okay. So we have a lot of risk in, say, Northeast Asian markets. We have a lot of risk to the electronic supply chain. I know this may seem like a secondary consideration, but maybe it’s not. What about Europe? Does Europe just kind of stand by and watch this happen, or are they any less, say risky than any place else? Are they insulated somehow?

Categories
QuickHit

QuickHit: Will China Invade Taiwan? (Part 2)

This is Part 2 of the QuickHit episode on “Will China invade Taiwan?” with Chris Balding and Albert Marko. In this second part, the guys discussed Hong Kong, the semiconductor industry, and possible actions by the Biden administration. Tony Nash is hosting this show where the two experts discuss likely possibilities for China, Taiwan and other countries that may be affected by the conflict between the two countries like the US, Japan, and South Korea.

 

In Part 1, we looked at the plausibility of China invading Taiwan and what that might look like. In Part 2, we look at is Hong Kong a precedent for China potentially taking over Taiwan? We also look at the global semiconductor industry and firms like TSMC. What kind of impact would Chinese action on Taiwan have toward TSMC and also how would we expect the US to react and what would the different reactions do to US credibility in East Asia?

 

You can watch the Part 1 here: https://www.completeintel.com/2021/01/27/quickhit-will-china-invade-taiwan-1/

 

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This QuickHit episode was recorded on January 26, 2021.

 

The views and opinions expressed in this Chinese invasion of Taiwan QuickHit episode are those of the guests and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any content provided by our guests are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

 

Show Notes

 

CB: What you’re saying about body bags makes perfect sense. Is Xi that directly rational? Because it would seem like there would be a better way to handle Hong Kong than what has taken place?

 

AM: Hong Kong was a little financial center with no military, no nothing. There’s just a bunch of woke millennials running around, thinking they can hold off the PLA. That doesn’t work like that in real life. You got to come at them with guns to earn your freedom. It was a circle by China. It was inevitable.

 

TN: Since ‘97, there hasn’t been a question as to whether Hong Kong is China. Hong Kong is China. And people have shrugged their shoulders since ‘97 and said look, it’s China. It’s a matter of time. It’s a special zone.

 

CB: Maybe my meaning was lost a little bit. The cost-benefit of what Xi has done in China or in Hong Kong, he clearly probably could have reaped more benefit by saying we’re gonna let Hong Kong continue to be Hong Kong for another 10 years or something. There wasn’t really a need for him to move. It’s probably going to create bigger problems internationally. There’s probably assets that are going to move out of Hong Kong and other places, Singapore. So what if we look at a strict cost-benefit, there wasn’t really a reason for Xi to do that.

 

TN: There was. The protests that would come, first every five years, then every two years, and so on, it was becoming increasingly embarrassing to Beijing. The official channel to as an inward or outbound investment lane through Hong Kong, it’s still there. But Beijing couldn’t take the embarrassment of this and what they didn’t want is to have some rogue police brigade kill a bunch of 25-year-olds on accident. I believe they had to pull the trigger and I think this has been planned and architected over years and it seems like something sudden that people are like “wait, what’s going on?” They’re rolling military and this has been planned for years.

 

CB: What you’re getting at is this was embarrassing domestically and he basically said to hell with the consequences internationally? If we apply that same basic line of thinking to Taiwan, the question would then become, well, they’re willing to deal with the international consequences. We know that in colossal range barriers. What other domestic issues are at play here about Taiwan?

 

TN: I think it’s backwards. It was more embarrassing internationally because the CCP plays international media like a fiddle. Xi Jinping goes into Davos or speaks at a WEF event. Everyone walks away, enlightened and they play international media like a fiddle. They were less worried about what international media would think and even less worried about what domestic populations would think over time.

 

They just needed to rip the band-aid off so that kind of righteous reporters in Hong Kong wouldn’t keep raising this story because it’s inconvenient. They knew that at some point, they were going to take over, and so they just did it and that it’s inevitable that’s going to happen. They just did it.

 

And global media? They’ve fallen in line over the last nine months. Nobody talks about Hong Kong anymore and the rights and being trampled upon and all that stuff. International media have fallen in line on this. They don’t care. They want to make China happy. Why? Because the CCP and their companies are going to buy supplements in their newspapers and in their online forums and they’re going to pay for their think tank pieces and all that stuff.

 

CB: There are specific media outlets that are decidedly less critical of China than they used to be as an editorial line.

 

AM: I agree and I love that analogy of like ripping the band-aid off because Hong Kong was ripping a band-aid off but Taiwan would be like ripping duct tape off a Greek guy’s chest. That’s the problem here, and that’s what we think we have to understand that not only is it economically damaging, it’s politically damaging internationally, militarily. The risks, just in my opinion, way outweigh the benefits of trying to take over Taiwan.

 

TN: Let’s say this happened. Let’s say six, nine months, something happens. What happens economically? I know there’s cross holdings with CCP princes and stuff but let’s look at say semiconductors, TSMC. The otherfoundries are disrupted for a period of time.

 

AM: I know where you’re going with this and this would actually make me flip my position if I was advising China. If they wanted to hit the West and create even a bigger semiconductor shortage, then you absolutely destroy Taiwan. This is where I’m going. You absolutely would do that.

 

TN: Right. So, does it make SMIC relevant and does it make the Chinese foundries relevant? What is in that gap? TSMC, all the execs are moving to Phoenix. What happens then?

 

CB: Taiwan and TSMC are in the very awkward space. At this point, they’re probably like THE manufacturing firm. The other places do the design and stuff like that. There’s a lot of firms that are in the mid and low end. But when it comes to your high-end stuff, it’s pretty much TSMC. I think you could make a case that Beijing says, “screw it!” Forget about Taiwan. If we can capture TSMC, we’ve got it all.

 

TN: We just invade Hsinchu, right?

 

AM: The Chinese, for all the negative things that I have to say about them, are really good asymmetrically combating the West especially the United States where they’ve weaponized Caterpillar, weaponized multiple American companies within China to hit the United States politically and economically. That would make perfect sense from the Chinese perspective to just cut off the semiconductors specifically because those semiconductors go to Apple, to the big three automobile sector, which is the only thing right now that’s going to be able to get unemployment back down to a decent level for the Biden administration.

 

TN: If that did happen, would that present an opportunity for Japanese, Korean firms to fill that void to circumvent Chinese control or has that ship sailed years ago and there’s no way they can recover that?

 

AM: I don’t think that they’d be able to recover especially in the near term. I think the chip shortage would be so, so damaging to the entire global economy that it would be pretty devastating for a while.

 

CB: And the people I talk to in chips basically say, when it comes to manufacturing of higher end chips, it’s basically TSMC. Not even Intel these days is manufacturing their own chips. So even if TSMC is Chinese tomorrow, it would probably take five years before Korean and Japanese firms at the earliest would be producing high-end chips that could compete with TSMC.

 

TN: If China threatens to invade Taiwan and the West is like “look, do whatever you want, we just want to make sure we have our chips.“ Is that really a plausible negotiating point?

 

AM: I don’t think the West could even trust China in that respect. Has the Chinese ever given us assurances and anything like that ever?

 

TN: Let’s act like this happens. Something happens in June, July whatever. What does the US Navy do? Will they protect Taiwan or will they distance and reevaluate?

 

AM: The US would probably let Taiwan defend itself for a certain period of time and float in a carrier strike group just to deter China at some point. They’d have to walk defense there. That’s not an easy solution. You’re talking about going up against China within proximity of their borders, which they would have an advantage of.

 

CB: They’re not going to do something like this just launching a couple volleys of low-grade missiles. This is moving all your chips to the center of the table. And so basically, the question that the US Navy would have to ask is are we going to move all our chips to the middle of the table otherwise, let China have it.

 

TN: If the US says, “fine, we’re not going gonna move our chip to the side of the table. Let China have it,” then does that destroy US credibility in East Asia because the obligation of the US to defend Japan, Korea and so on, those are gone then, because US has an obligation to defend Taiwan.

 

AM: The South Korea would be the biggest problem immediately after that.

 

CB: One of the first comments about by the administration foreign policy was the Japanese defense minister saying China is a real problem, you boys need to get your big boy pants on. That was a month ago or a couple weeks ago. That was pretty much the Japanese saying, “you know this isn’t 2008 boys. We’ve got to be ready.”

 

The other thing was, is over the past couple years, there’s been a shift in the US Military. Basically, all the US Military in Korea is now way far down the peninsula. And South Korea knows that. The US Military is in a position where if the North Korea decides to stream across the border, they can pretty much pack up their personnel and be gone in a couple of hours. If something happens, Tokyo and Seoul are absolutely going to be paranoid. Doesn’t stand right there and start firing back.