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The Week Ahead – 06 Jun 2022: Is India a geopolitical trend setter?

This past week, we had a flat S&P 500. Nasdaq was up slightly. Bond yields were up slightly. It was a summer stall this week. Not a lot happening from the beginning to the end of the week. In this episode, we’re going to focus on geopolitics.

Key themes:

  1. Is India a geopolitical trendsetter?
  2. China, MBS & Biden – BFFs?
  3. What does Turkey get out of halting NATO expansion?
  4. What’s ahead for next week?

This is the 21st episode of The Week Ahead, where experts talk about the week that just happened and what will most likely happen in the coming week.

Follow The Week Ahead experts on Twitter:

Tony: https://twitter.com/TonyNashNerd
Sam: https://twitter.com/SamuelRines
Albert: https://twitter.com/amlivemon
Tracy: https://twitter.com/chigrl

Time Stamps

0:00 Start
1:36 India as a geopolitical trendsetter now?
3:55 US is frustrated with India? What’s going?
7:35 Is India being ridiculously nationalistic?
8:00 China, MBS, and Biden as BFFs?
10:08 How does MBS look at Biden with China opening up?
11:31 Awkward and Desperate: Is the US-Saudi a short-term diplomatic issue?
14:45 Is there any place they can go for energy supply?
16:00 What does Turkey get out of halting the NATA expansion?
20:20 What impacts on some countries by opening the Bosphorus.
21:22 What is DC thinking and do out of the gun discussions?
24:24 What to expect for the week ahead?

Listen to the podcast version on Spotify here:

Transcript

TN: Hi, and welcome to The Week Ahead. I’m Tony Nash. And as always, we’re joined by Sam, Albert, and Tracy. Before we get started, could you please like and subscribe? It’s very important. But here’s what’s more important today. If you could comment on the episode, we would appreciate it. We check that stuff every week. If you disagree with us, if you think we’re full of it, let us know and let us know why. Okay.

So this week, this past week, we had a flat S&P 500. Nasdaq was up slightly. Bond yields were up slightly. Kind of a summer stall this week. Not a lot happening from beginning to end of the week. So we’re going to focus on geopolitics this week.

We’re looking at a few things. Is India a geopolitical trendsetter now? That’ll be a really interesting discussion. Second, we have China, MBS, and Biden as BFFs. So let’s see what’s there. What does Turkey get out of halting NATO expansion? Really, Turkey becoming a real geopolitical linchpin. And then we’ll have a quick chat on what we expect for the week ahead.

So first is India as a geopolitical trendsetter. India recently has halted some commodity exports. They’ve done some deals with Russia for energy, and they’ve been really independent. And India’s typically independent with foreign policy. But I’m curious if we can look at, say, the energy deals first, Tracy, can you help us understand a little bit about that, and what is India doing there?

TS: Well, I mean, absolutely. First of all, India has been complaining about oil price and saying that it’s unsustainable for them for months now, right. As we’ve been over $100. And so when they were typically not really buying anything from Russia.

However, after the Ukraine invasion, then we had that discount. The Euro to Brent discount fell to almost $40 at one point. So India started buying a lot of oil from Russia, obviously, because it’s less expensive. And they said outright energy security is more important to us right now than anything else because they are also having issues with coal. And whatnot really that’s their focus right now.

And so what we think is that likely they’ll probably become a semi permanent customer of them and probably will take in about 500,000 barrels per day going forward. So what is coming off of the European market is actually going to India and China.

TN: A lot of Westerners don’t understand that India and Russia or the former Soviet Union have had a long political ties, longtime political ties, and those long term political ties tend to come up when people need friends. There is a connection between India and Russia that a lot of Westerners don’t understand.

Albert. I guess the US tends to do this very binary. You’re with us or against us. And I would imagine that the White House and State Department, if we actually have a State Department, that they’re a little bit frustrated with India. What’s going through the US’s mind with the India relationship right now?

AM: Well, this is basically goes back to Obama, actually, with his animosity towards Modi. But the Biden, State Department and the DoD just have this naive idea of how things work in the world. India, like you said, the Russian ties with India are long standing because they use them as a counterbalance against the Chinese aggression. Right.

If you look at a map, because I always say this on Twitter, look at a map before you start talking about geopolitics. India’s surrounded by Pakistan, China, all these other proxies to China and Russia. So they can’t afford they can’t afford to sit there and poke the Hornets nest in the region because it’ll just come back at them. I mean, Pakistanika starts things in Kashmir.

The Chinese have been building mountaintop air bases to stress India over the watershed in the Himalayas. There’s so many issues that the Indians have to deal with and balance that with their Western counterparts, animosity with the dealings with Russia. It’s not that complex if you sit there and talk about it for 15 minutes. But for some reason, our State Department just can’t come to grips with that. And it’s actually causing quite the damage of the state relations of United States and India right now.

And you can talk about the Chinese component and how they stress India because they’re a major competitor in the manufacturing sector.

TN: Right.

SR: And not to mention that India has always been a very large importer of energy. And it’s a critical part of their development going forward. And they’re a 1.1 billion population. If you begin to have significant problems with energy prices and food prices, that’s a big problem for a democracy in that part of the world.

And not to mention, I think it’s somewhat hypocritical for the US government to be so mad about them buying 500,000 barrels a day when you still have Europe buying oil and gas every single day and being like, well, maybe we’ll be done by the end of the year.

TN: Right.

SR: The number of hypocrites that just keep coming out. Is India really our friend? It’s like, well, it’s Germany, it’s France, Italy.

TN: Those are valid questions.

SR: I mean, to me, it’s a little bit insincere for us to continuously be pounding on India for trying to survive as a democracy. It doesn’t make a lot of sense.

TN: Well, you conveniently overlook the fact that India regularly imports energy from Iran. Korea places like Korea regularly import energy from Iran. The State Department and White House regularly just overlook things conveniently because they want to. Right. But when it comes to Russia, for some reason, it’s a major issue.

So one quick thing I want to talk about with regard to India, and this has happened with some other Asian countries where India stopped exporting sugar and a few other commodities. We saw Indonesia stopped exporting, say, palm oil and a few other things. So this has been kind of painted as some sort of nationalistic action.

My contention has been, look, a nation state has the kind of obligation to look after their own people first. What do you guys think about that? Is India being ridiculously nationalistic by not exporting sugar and a few other things?

AM: Absolutely not. I mean, this is a case of survival, not just for India, but for multiple countries. Egypt recently, Morocco and all the other North African countries are following suit. I mean, they got to feed their own people. You can’t have your own citizens miss meals because pitchforks and torches start coming out.

TN: Yes, I think that’s a perfect way to say it. Okay, let’s move on to kind of a little bit of a crazily, delicately balanced series of relationships with China, MBS in Saudi Arabia, and Joe Biden. There’s been talk of a trip of a Biden trip to Saudi Arabia, which is a little bit awkward given the fact that MBS wouldn’t take his phone call last month. And then we’ve got China as energy importer. There are a number of levers there.

So, Sam, actually, Tracy, can you take us down that path a little bit on the energy side of what happens there and why that is so important?

TS: Well, I mean, I think it’s a thing. Relations have already been strained. Right. So I think it’s too little, too late. And second of all, to go ahead and think that Saudi Arabia or OPEC, for that matter, can lower oil prices in the US or lower gasoline prices in the US is completely misguided. We should be focusing domestically on what we can be doing here instead of banking other countries.

TN: Let me stop you right there and ask the refinery capacity is like the highest it’s been in 20 years or something, right? 92.4% or something.

TS: Yeah, it was 92.7% this week. The prior week was we were at 93.4%. So we’re pretty much at we’re cranking it out. We definitely need more refining capacity going forward. We haven’t had a major refinery built since 1977. Brownfield projects, but not real Greenfield projects.

TN: Okay. Going back to the Biden-Saudi visit, Sam, what are your thoughts on that? And if you can throw a little bit of China analysis, if China is actually opening up. How does MBS look at Biden with the potential of China opening up more aggressively?

SR: I think he looks at it as a little bit desperate. Right. And probably wants quite a bit out of doing anything. And to begin with, Sunny doesn’t have that much fair capacity. There’s not a whole lot they can do very quickly, maybe release some stocks, et cetera, but there’s not a whole lot they can do to get oil on the market quickly. And there’s a lot less that they can do to magically make diesel.

We don’t have the amount of diesel out there that we need. And we are building a refinery, and a refinery takes three to five years to build. So good luck with that. So I think it’s going to smack is a little bit desperate to MBS, and I think there’s going to be a pretty good bargaining spot for him to be in, given that China has largely shut down for a month and a half to two months, maybe reopening, and that’s going to be another tailwind to oil consumption.

And if you all of a sudden have higher oil consumption coming out of China, that’s going to be a problem for oil prices, even from $1.20, $1.15 where we’re sitting right now. That’s a tailwind that I think MBS kind of has a little bit of a grin on his face saying, hey, nothing I can do here.

TN: Right? And tell me a little bit more about the political dynamics there. Does the US and Saudi Arabia, is this kind of a short-term, say, diplomatic issue, or is it something longer term?

AM: Well, you and Sam said two key words, “awkward” and “desperate.” At the moment, Biden going to Saudi Arabia to meet with the King, which was rejected, so they’re actually pushing them off to MBS is such a black eye to the United States foreign policy. Unbelievable. I mean, at this point, you’re going to have Joe Biden go meet with MBS, who Biden’s cabinet brought up Khashoggi not too long ago, which prompted the phone call to be not even taken by the Saudi, leader of a US President. I can’t even remember when last time US President was ignored by the Saudi Arabians. I mean, it’s a disaster in the making that will probably take a good ten to 15 years to rectify.

The Saudis, what are they really going to do? A couple of hundred thousand barrels extra in a pump just to make Joe Biden happy? It’s not going to do anything. I mean, swallowed up by demand almost instantly. But when it comes to the political stuff, you have a realignment between Saudi Arabia, Russia and China happening right under our noses. And it seems to be just completely missed by the State Department of Biden administration.

SR: And to Albert’s point here, and I think it’s an extremely, extremely important point. Saudi doesn’t need the US anymore. Saudi needed the US for a while. We were their biggest customer. We are not their largest customer by a mile, and we’re unlikely to be their largest customer ever again.

So their pivot towards Asia and away from the US makes strategic sense for them. And that, to me, is an understated long term fundamental issue facing the US-Saudi relationship.

AM: That’s exactly right, Sam. And the only other component that actually contradicts that is because of the security situation between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the Saudis need US armaments, they need the relationship with Israel, and they need to re-mend relationships with Turkey. But if Russia at this point, if they’re not poking the Iranians to mess with the Saudis, there’s really no real desperate need by the Saudis for the US defense umbrella at the moment and they can just be free to sell to the Chinese, the Asians and whoever else. And remember that Biden attempted to go to Venezuela to try to get them to pump more, but then realized that while their refinery is broken down and can’t really produce anything at the moment.

SR: So the Arabians went to fix it.

TN: Yeah.

AM: There’s a lot of hypocrisy and a lot of awkward things that’s coming out of the Biden administration right now for geopolitical issues concerning the Saudis.

TN: It’s amateur hour, guys. Lincoln is a joke, often as a joke. I can’t believe it’s embarrassing where we are right now. Tracy, is there any place else they can go for supply right now?

TS: If you look at OPEC, OPEC can’t even produce what their current quote is, right? Because you have too many, too many laggards. So it doesn’t really matter. I mean, they’re 2 million barrels plus below quota last month. So it doesn’t matter if they keep raising or not. They just don’t have the spare capacity. And a lot of the smaller countries are having problems with production.

There’s nowhere else to go. Right. Especially if you’re trying to push Russia out, which is, depending on the month, the second or third largest producer. Right.

TN: Okay. And I think we can all agree that if we just buy electric cars, that would solve everything.

TS: Oh, absolutely. With the announcement that we’re going to have rolling blackouts in the Midwest this summer, I’m sure that rush right out and get EVs should help us.

TN: Right? Exactly. Okay. Let’s move on to Turkey and get really interested in the power dynamics with Turkey right now and their veto power over NATO expansion and some of their control of energy going through the Bosphorus. Turkey has really emerged as a real regional power.

I remember reading about this with George what’s his name’s book the next 100 years, reading that Turkey would be really powerful. This was a 20 year old book. Right. George Freedman. Right. And so it hasn’t happened exactly as he thought. But at the time I thought, “no, Turkey can’t reemerge.” And it’s happening right now. Right.

Albert, can you talk us through what does Turkey get out of halting NATO expansion?

AM: Well, a few things actually, quite. They really want to stop the Kurdish money system support system coming out of the Scandinavian countries because that’s where a lot of the money and support groups based themselves out of Stockholm and parts of the Baltic area. So they really want to stop that. Right. But that’s not really what they’re after because the Scandinavians put a block on their sales of arms. Right. So the Turks obviously want to sell their drones.

They want to sell some military equipment to the EU and to other players in the region. The Turks, they have a big economic problem. Right. And so they’re using every point of leverage they possibly can use. They’re trying to press the EU to give more loans, trying to stress the refugee situation, trying to stress the energy situation, trying to stress the food situation through the Bosphors. And I’ll let Sam and Tracy touch on that.

But for them right now, if you look at it like I said, with India, look at a map. Turkey right now is arguably the most geostrategic position in the entire world right now with concerns to wheat, gas, oil, refugee status. You can just pick a topic and Turkey is pretty much top five.

TN: Okay. Sam talked us through kind of from a macro perspective. What does that mean? What opportunities does that bring up?

SR: I mean, it brings leverage, right? It brings incredible amount of leverage, particularly as you begin to have Sri Lankan type issues. Go to North Africa. The easiest way for North Africa to solve its problems is for Turkey to solve the problems very quickly by opening the Bosphorus or doing something along those lines. So I think from a macro perspective, it’s really about leverage and what type of leverage they want. Right.

They actually manufacture really good, fairly cheap drones. That’s a pretty easy thing for NATO, the EU, to kind of give them a pound on the back and say, okay, yeah, go. Right. That’s something that they can actually do. And quite frankly, if you’re Sweden and Finland, guess what? You don’t really have a choice.

Turkey is going to be selling drones. Turkey is going to have some leverage on what they get to do, and you’re not going to be able to veto it or you’re going to be sitting there like a sitting duck for the next time that Putin decides he wants a little extra territory.

TN: Right. Okay.

AM: And to expand on that, Tony, the Turks, in sort of cooperation with the Iranians and the Russians, have been moving into Africa using old Ottoman trading post colonies, I mean, through West Africa, North Africa, Horn of Africa, everywhere. And there’s been absolutely no talk about it, no counteraction against it. They’re acting as if they were a major superpower with no one really putting them in their place.

TN: Well, this potentially could turn into I don’t know how much you guys know about Ottoman history 1860s, 18870s, debt load that the Turks had and the refinancing that the British and French came in to do it. And I wonder if that’s where we’ll be in five or ten years. It’s really interesting to see how that Ottoman history played through and see if that happens again with Turkey. I hope it doesn’t, because that ended up leading to World War One. But this could be really interesting.

Tracy, they opened the Bosphorus. What impact does that have on some of these countries, like Egypt and North African countries and say, Lebanon and some of these other countries that are really desperately waiting for some things out of Russia and Ukraine?

TS: Yeah. I mean, obviously that’s going to help. We’re going to get some wheat out. It looks like that is going to happen and that we are starting to see shipments flow that’s obviously going to ease tensions. Hungry people tend to revolt. So something needed to be done, in other words. And so it looks like that’s starting to happen, which is obviously a good thing.

TN: Great. Okay. I want to spring a kind of a surprise topic on you guys just really quickly. It’s a big debate in the US since we’re talking geopolitics. Guns on top of everyone’s mind. Some shootings in the States over the past few weeks.

Albert, I know, you know, DC probably better than all of us. So can you walk us through really quickly? Excuse me, what is DC thinking? What will likely happen in DC out of all of the gun discussions?

AM: Well, because it’s an election year, probably nothing. And I’ll tell you what. In politics, you cannot take a singular issue, isolate it and solve the problem. It doesn’t work like that. So, for instance, and this is something I always stress about. When you look at guns, you have to look at it as what voters intentions are and feelings are with the guns because they’re electing their members. Right.

When you have guns, they’re typically rural Americans that are religious, that have views on abortion and are farmers. Right. What’s under farmlands? Oil. So not only do you have to tackle the religious voter, the anti abortion voter, the rural farm voter, but then also big oil that actually funds all these people. So you can’t take guns alone and say, I’m going to solve it without agitating another 40 million Americans and Senate races are completely dependent on rural voters, not so much urban because that tends to go Democratic anyways. But there is actually swing cities and swing areas on top of the conservative areas that there’s a political calculation and numbers game that has to be played.

So for this year, I don’t see anything happening with guns at all. Maybe something extremely minor, but nothing that would actually be effective.

TN: For people who are non Americans, what do people outside of America not understand about the gun discussion in the US?

AM: It’s a cultural thing. The United States prides itself on being a system of checks and balances. Right. And for guns, Americans tend to think we are not going to let our government intrude and overtake us. That’s our checks and balances to dictatorships. Right. Authoritarian systems.

As other issues come up from the left and come up from the right, just everyone’s going to get more pulverized on this. There’s never going to be 100% solution. The Europeans are definitely not going to understand why Americans love their guns. But it’s just…

TN: Europeans, Australians, Asians, they don’t actually some in Asia get it.

AM: Some in Asia get it. The Swiss hilariously get it. They’re mandatory. They have Pentagon, everyone’s. And it’s unfair for the rest of the world to compare a small country of like, say, 10 million people statistically to the United States that has 350,000,000 plus people out there, the giant system.

TN: Yeah.

AM: We’re doing our best and nothing is a perfect system and we’re getting towards it. But it’ll take decades.

TN: Yes. Okay, good. I just wanted to cover that off since it’s been such a big topic lately. Okay, guys, the week ahead. We had a kind of a lackluster week this week. Tracy, what do you see happening in the week ahead? Crude actually had a fantastic week. What do you see going on next week in, say, energy and commodities?

TS: I’m still bullish energy and commodities. From a technical standpoint, we broke out of a technical pattern. Right. I don’t see anything changing, in other words, in the physical landscape, I mean, markets are tight. We have a structural deficit. The whole complex is in bacridation. So I expect energy prices to stay high. Really? I don’t think Biden’s meeting is going to do anything.

TN: Right. Okay. Very good. Shannon, what are you looking for?

SR: More chop. A lot more chop. I think the jobs report on Friday, there was a quote that it was goldilocks-ish it was not goldilocks-ish if you’re the Fed. The Fed saw a lot of jobs created. It’s a participation tick up and it’s average hourly earnings still sitting at 5.5% for everyone on a year over year basis. Those are three things that they don’t really want to see sitting that high.

TN: Right.

SR: It’s that simple. They would be much happier with 100,000 jobs created or lower. I think they want a couple of negative prints. An average hourly earnings that’s closer to 2% year over year. That means that the wage price spiral isn’t happening. And they really want an awful lot of call it pain in the inflation space. So you’re not really seeing anything to knock the Fed off of its current path. And if anything, you probably gave it a little bit of a tailwind to some more hawkish rhetoric.

Brainard being a Hawk? That should scare everyone. Because when Brainard comes out as a Hawk, that’s a signal.

TN: That’s weird.

SR: That’s a signal that they’re going and they’re going hard.

TN: Yeah, that’s upside down world weird. And then was it May said out yesterday saying they could do another fifty in September?

SR: Yeah. After the print on Friday, guess what, this is the best part about the Brainard statement is she said in order to have a better balance in the labor market, they need to see job openings decline.

This is critical, though. Job openings are reported a month lagged to everything else. Right. So in September, they’re going to be looking at maybe August.

TN: Let me ask you this. Elon Musk was out this week saying, hey, if you’re not going to come back to the office, we’re going to consider that you resigned. Are we going to see more CEOs do that? And could that potentially have an impact on the jobs numbers?

SR: Not really. One, Musk, then he said we’re over staffed by 10% across salaried workers. So the statement for Musk was probably more to get some natural attrition. So we didn’t have to actually lay off people because it’s a lot cheaper when people quit than it is when people get laid off. And Musk needs a couple of headlines because his Twitter deal was a really dumb idea.

TN: Yeah. And also I kind of preempted Musk by two years. I told my staff in June of 2020, but if you don’t show up, you could resign. So I was early on that boat. So Albert, what do you expect in the week ahead.

AM: Everyone saw Yellen come out and say I missed the inflation and how bad it’s going to be. That’s her getting ahead of the CPI print. It’s going to be a bad one. I think it actually could get close to 9% which would be not good for the markets.

On top of that Opex Fed minute coming up, I think we’re going to be like Sam said, I think there’s going to be some chop. They’re doing their best to keep this thing above 4200. So I think we’re going to be looking at probably push 4250 which is a bull bear line this week until CPI print comes in and then Armageddon.

TN: That’s what you said last week.

AM: That’s a 4200 on that Monday on futures.

TN: Okay.

AM: They tried but they sold it. Everyone’s just selling.

TN: Okay. So we have another chance this week.

AM: Yes.

TN: Great guys. Thank you very much. This has been a great discussion. Thanks so much and I really appreciate this. Have a great week ahead.

AM, SR, TS: Thank you. Bye.

Categories
Week Ahead

The Week Ahead – 28 Feb 2022

Last week’s big news is Ukraine and Russia. So in this episode, we want to talk you through some context and what this means for markets in the near term. First, the guys talked about the most surprising thing that happened and then we moved on to answer a few viewer questions like what’s the implication of Russia being disconnected from SWIFT? Will anything change between Europe and China? Will the Russia-Ukraine inspire China to actually invade Taiwan? How disrupted the energy markets will be? And finally, what happens to the world economy – Fed, QE, QT, consumers, etc.?

Listen to this episode on Spotify

https://open.spotify.com/episode/6ynTFaOtWF6rl1xNKX1Cnq?si=439f4977cb3743fd

Follow The Week Ahead experts on Twitter:

Tony: https://twitter.com/TonyNashNerd
Sam: https://twitter.com/SamuelRines
Albert: https://twitter.com/amlivemon
Tracy: https://twitter.com/chigrl

Transcript

TN: Hello. Welcome to The Week Ahead. I’m Tony Nash. And I’m joined by Tracy Shuchart, Albert Marko, and Sam Rines. Before we get started, I’d like to ask you to subscribe to our YouTube channel. And like this video. It helps us with visibility and you get reminded when a new episode is out. So thanks for doing that right now.

We had a lot on this week, especially around Ukraine. So today we’re really focused on Ukraine. We want you to understand the context around Ukraine. We want you to understand what it means for markets. And we’re going to take a lot of your questions that we’ve been gathering off of Twitter.

So just a quick recap of what we said last week. Coming out of last week’s episode, we said it’s not a time to make big decisions. We said to keep risk tight and be careful of volatility. And we said that crude markets would move sideways. So we did kind of come into this assuming risk would be there this week. And obviously, we saw that.

So first, guys, can you walk us through some of your observations of the past week? What are you seeing directly in and around Ukraine or Ukraine, and how is that affecting markets? And as each one of you talk, Albert, I want to start with you, but name something that surprised you most in the past week in markets. Okay. Can you give us a quick overview? I know you’ve got deep networks in that region. So can you talk to us a little bit about what you’re hearing and seeing there?

AM: Well, I mean, concerning Ukraine and the markets. What I was most surprised and a little bit taken aback by was the amount of mainstream media just decorations of World War Three and whatnot then how much it affected the markets? So much so that you have to look at the markets and say what is going on?

Because this is just not normal behavior for markets to respond to a situation in the Ukraine that’s really kind of not really attached to the United States market at the moment. I mean, it isn’t commodities and that’s something Tracy will get into. But it was an overabundance of bad news, just an overdrive. And that’s what actually really took me aback.

TN: Good opportunities out there.

AM: There is absolutely good opportunities. But the problem is the volatility goes way up higher. The VIX exploded. You can’t get into options because they’re just far too expensive. You’re going to get burned doing that. And what do you do? Maybe sitting on your hands is the proper thing to do until things stabilize. But yes, there were actually great opportunities.

TN: What are you hearing on the ground, Albert? I know you’re really close to that part of the world. So what are you hearing on the ground?

AM: Well, the situation is really fluid and really tense at the moment. I think the Russians were taken aback. I know that the Russians were taken aback about the actual veracity of defense by the Ukrainians. Their main objective is to take Mariupol and then take Odessa. That is their number one and number two objective. Their next objective is to take not really to take you because I don’t think they can actually do it unless they want to do some kind of redo of the Chech and guerrilla warfare and just start massacring people. They’re not in that business at the moment. The world’s eyes are on it.

So I think political change, maybe snap elections is what they’re probably going for in Kiev just to surround it, stress the city, stress the residents, force a change where Western governments can’t get a bigger say in the matter on a nation that’s right on the doorstep.

TN: Okay, so I’m seeing on say on social media like TikTok videos of burned out Russian tanks and all these things, and I think it seems to me that Russia is losing the PR war right now and that’s really important in the early days and with different demographics even within Russia. Do you think Russia or Putin kind of underappreciated the impact that social media would have, at least on the early days of this?

AM: Of course, Russia has a vast network globally of PR campaigns in the west. So for him, it’s definitely a concern where you have negative images of Russia, Russia’s military trying to enact power projection. It’s a little bit daunting for him at the moment.

However, from a military strategic point of view, we don’t know exactly what their exact strategy is. Whereas they’re just trying to expand Ukrainian defenses, trying to get the best of their defenses out already. So they have a shortage of supply later on. That’s what most professionals would say is happening.

So we really have to see over the weekend to see what kind of resources have been expended by the Russians trying to take back Mariupol and Odessa.

TN: Do you think the Ukrainians can get stuff resupplied? Do you think they would have any difficulty getting stuff resupplied from the west?

AM: It’s totally up to the west and what they’re going to supply them and how they’re going to supply them. I’m sure that the west have Special Forces sprinkled without inside of Kiev assisting as advisers to the defense forces there. So it just depends on the will of the Europeans at the moment.

TN: Okay, Sam, what have you seen this week in markets that’s kind of gotten your attention or surprise you?

SR: I would say what really caught my attention were two things. One, how quickly Wheat went up and how far it went up and then how quickly Wheat went down and how far it went down.

There were two days where Wheat was just skyrocketing. I think it was 5.5% day followed by negative. I forget where it closed, but a significant negative day in the six to range at a minimum. That really caught my attention.

Ukraine is incredibly important on the wheat front. That’s a pretty important one. And then I would say how quickly and how far gold went. Right. Gold was almost $2,000, and now it’s below where it was prior to the invasion, and it did that all in a day. I mean, that was an incredible move in my book and somewhat shocking. And I think it was kind of interesting when people caught on that if you cut off Russia from being able to really sell, call it dollars, Euros, et cetera, on the market openly, it’s going to potentially have to sell gold if this thing drags out.

So you have an overhang of gold in a war scenario. Not necessarily, I call it a tailwind. I thought that was a really interesting call it knee jerk reaction up in gold, and then kind of a realization of, oh, crap, this might not be the thing to own here.

And then the final thing and I’ll make this one quick is crypto and how war was supposed to be great for crypto. And as the war started, you saw crypto sell off pretty hard. I think it’s interesting on two fronts. One, there’s a significant amount of crypto activity in Ukraine and Russia.

Russia is the second largest country when it comes to providing hash rate to the market for Bitcoin. And if there’s any sort of disruption there, all of a sudden the US could become 50% of the hash rate awfully quickly, which could become an interesting scenario there.

TN: How does the hash rate for people who aren’t crypto experts? How does the hash rate equate to say, the crypto price?

SR: It makes it, call it’s basically an efficiency mechanism where you can either do transactions more quickly, more efficiently, and somewhat of a lower cost. That’s basically what you do.

So if you lower the hash rate, you increase the cost of doing transactions and slow the general system down.

TN: Okay, great.

AM: This is interesting, Tony, because this actually leads into a lot of my arguments against crypto being decentralized, saying, hey, when push comes to shove, governments have control of the networks and the financial system. You can’t get away from that.

TN: Yeah. And if you cut off the electricity supply, it becomes even more difficult.

AM: Nearly impossible. Puerto Rico.

TS: And if you’re Russia that has control of the entire Internet, you can cut off whatever sites that you want. Right?

TN: Right.

SR: Yeah, that’s right. Yeah. It was interesting. There was something floating around yesterday where it appeared that Russia was at least partially geofencing their country from the rest of the world. And if it does that, that could become problematic if it does it in a meaningful way for crypto.

TN: Sure. And taking down the RT site doesn’t help their paranoia there. Right. Tracy, what happened for you over the week? What’s one of your observations that really kind of surprised you?

TS: Well, I mean, to be honest, because I’m focused on the commodity side of everything, pretty much how I saw the markets going or how I pretty much thought how the markets were going to go. Right. I posted a bunch of stuff on Twitter.

TN: You saw all this coming?

TS: No. Well, I didn’t do this. I don’t want to sound like arrogant. I focus on energy, metals, materials, agriculture. And because Ukraine and Russia are such large hubs for all of these commodities, wasn’t really surprising to me that we saw a jump in all of these.

TN: Yeah. Were you surprised the magnitude of the jump?

TS: Yes. And in some respects, I actually expected Palladium to have a bigger jump than it did because Rush is 43% of that global markets and wheat went far beyond bonkers that I thought it was going to go.

Was I surprised about oil? No. On the upside and on the downside today.

TN: Great. Okay, very good. Let’s jump into some of these viewer questions. You guys know that we saw a lot of viewer questions at the start of this.

So the first one I’m going to read out is from Keith Snyder. It’s @snyderkr0822. He says, what would the implications be of disconnecting Russia from SWIFT?

I’ve inspired your knowledge and have to be informed. So there’s been a lot of talk about SWIFT over the past few days. Sam, do you have some insight there on what would happen if Russia was taken out of the SWIFT network?

SR: It would be less bad than it would have been call it three years ago. Russia has somewhat insulated themselves from SWIFT, but not entirely by no means. Right. The SWIFT system can cut you off from dollar denominated, at least dollar denominated transactions.

That’s a pretty important thing, particularly when you’re selling a lot of things that are denominated in dollars. Right. Oil, et cetera. That becomes somewhat problematic. I would say that would be a very significant hit to Russia.

And it would also be a significant hit. And by significant hit, I mean that’s putting you on par with Iran and Cuba. Right. That’s basically putting you at Code E country without saying it. That’s Iran, your Cuba, see you later, bye.

I think that what I would be paying very close attention to is the reaction of European banks. That’s $330 billion worth of Russian liabilities assets on their books. So you’ve got to figure something out there pretty quickly because those books are going to get smacked if you can’t actually get on the SWIFT system.

TN: Okay. And Tracy, if they were taken off a SWIFT on Friday, Germany said that they would be okay with imposing that sanction, how would Germany pay for its electricity?

TS: I mean, Germany said that with a caveat, let’s say, because they did say we’re going to look at this, but we need to look at the implications of this. So obviously the problem there in lies that if you take a Rush off SWIFT, then Europe is screwed energy wise. Right? Unless they choose to scramble and make long term contracts with, say, the United States.

They could go through the United States. They could go through Azerbaijan on the Tap pipeline. They could go through Israel and Egypt if they wanted to, through the Southern gas quarter. I mean, there are options for them.

The problem is that they should have been looking at long term contracts this summer when we already knew that Nordstream Two was going to be delayed.

TN: Four, three, four years ago. I mean, they’ve had this optionality on the table for a long time.

TS: But those options are still on the table for them. But by delaying SWIFT, if you cut Rush off SWIFT, the big problem Europe has to decide is do we cut off SWIFT and hurt ourselves or do we hurt Russia more? And I could argue that both ways. Anybody could argue that both ways. But that’s a big decision that they have to make.

TN: Well, everybody hurts, right? That would not be a sanction that would be pain free for anybody.

TS: Right. Except maybe the US.

AM: Well, Tony, despite the rogue status of Russia, it’s still well attached to the Western financial system. It’s not seen as able or even as aggressive as the Chinese are and detach it from the financial system.

There would be a lot of problems if they were banned from SWIFT. But it’s certainly a valid deterrent if the west wants to actually use it. They keep a lot of their bank and central bank money in the Euro dollar market. So no SWIFT would mean no more Treasuries, but they’d just move into the Euro dollars itself.

Maybe that’s why they were buying gold because of this tension that they saw coming. It’s a risk to their global market.

TN: Sure. Okay, let’s move to China now. We’ve got a few questions on China. We’ve got one from @NathanDallon. He says, does anything in Europe change the situation with China?

There’s another one from Ritesh @chorSipahi, he says question for Samuel Rines and Albert, Ritesh. I’m not taking offense at this. What is the deterrence for China not to invade Taiwan or now to invade Taiwan?

And then we’ve got another one from Rich @rm_ua09. How could China benefit the most out of the Russia Ukraine situation? A, supporting Ukraine in some manner, B, remaining neutral, or C, taking measures to whether Putin.

So there’s a broad spectrum of questions there, guys.

TS: Take the first one, I think, Tony.

TN: Okay, let’s go for it. What happens in Europe?

AM: Well, Europe. I think that the Europeans are going to be actually more dependent on China trade after this because they’re seeing a problem with the Russians politically.

You can’t sit there and tell me that they’re going to be able to support the Russians like they were in trade, whether it’s commodities or whatnot on steel. I mean, name your commodity. Name your.

TN: Chinese already own like 70% of the global steel market. So is it going to make that much of a difference?

AM: It’s, well, I mean, they still diversify. They’re still going to have to play ball in the global trade. So I think at this point, politically, Russia’s poisonous, and then you’re going to have to steer even more towards China.

TN: Right. So, yeah, it seems to me that China could actually use this as an opportunity to distance itself from Russia. Right. If it goes bad, China is very silent right now. And if it goes bad, they could distance themselves from Russia and make some really tight allies in Europe at Russia’s expense. Does that make sense to you guys?

AM: It does to me.

SR: 100%. I think that would be the spare play from China in a lot of ways, because you get two things. You’re going to get tighter ties to Europe, which diversifies you somewhat away from the US even more. It gives you call it a barrier to the United States and whatever the US wants to do, and it also, to a certain extent, raises your profile on the international stage. Right.

TN: That’s key. China really wants to be seen as a credible diplomatic player and I think there’s still a bit of a chip on their shoulder about not being seen as an equal with a lot of the larger Western Nations. So I think your last point is really important.

There seems to be a view that Russia invading Ukraine somehow enables China to invade Taiwan. What are your thoughts on that?

AM: I absolutely disagree with that wholeheartedly. I think the two situations are nothing alike at the moment. I mean, Ukraine is in Russia’s eyes, it’s own territory. Same as is China views Taiwan.

However, Taiwan has a much more active defense military force and more of a backing from not only the US, but Australia, Japan, India. That’s a problem for the Chinese, too. So I think the two. I don’t like to draw a comparison between the two. I don’t think there is anything related to it.

TN: Sam?

SR: I have almost nothing to add beyond that. And I think the one country that’s really interesting in there is India, because India did not step up on the Ukrainian front and India would step up on the Taiwan front.

AM: Yeah. And on top of that, on top of that, let’s just be realistic here. We know that the Chinese probably have military observers inside of Ukraine watching and taking notes.

TN: Sure. How to conduct right now. If you’re a Chinese PLA officer and you’re looking at what’s happening in Russia versus what the United States did in Iraq, what would be your assessment? Russia gives us nothing against the United States.

The United States is a juggernaut. That’s what I think nobody’s even talking about.

TN: Yeah. If Russia didn’t just roll into Ukraine and take it over in 24 hours, what kind of model are they for China?

AM: And that’s on their border, Tony, that’s on their border.

TN: Exactly. No, exactly. So logistically, Russia’s logistic supply chain for their military, it seems like it’s pretty horrific. Their intelligence, like everything. It just seems like a mishmash of let’s just go get them.

AM: They are a professional military force. They have budget problems. That’s what. If they really wanted to go into Ukraine and just smash the place, they could. But the problem is you’d have to kill many civilians in the meantime, which they can’t do that.

So the Chinese are sitting there probably looking at like, what do we do here? Who is this military partner that we’re actually partnering up against the United States? It’s not sufficient.

TN: Yeah. It seems to me that on some level, going back to the social media comment I made, Russia is kind of embarrassing itself. China doesn’t want to be seen allied with someone who’s embarrassing themselves. Right. They’re happy to.

TS: That’s why they’ve been so quiet. They haven’t said nothing.

TN: Yes. And I think China is always looking also looking at how unified is the world’s response against Ukraine. Right. So if they were to go after Taiwan, how unified would the response be?

So going back to what I said earlier, I think China has a real opportunity here to distance itself from Russia, to play nice on Taiwan and really benefit from trade and finance and diplomatic relationships.

AM: 100%.

TN: Tracy, do you have anything else on that on China? Any other thoughts?

TS: No. I think you guys…

TN: Awesome. Okay, very good. Let’s go to the next ones. Okay. Tracy, these are all energy related. So primarily, if we look at this @DaveRubin15, he says, what are the energy implications if Ukraine has no choice but to make this a war of attrition rather than surrender, bleeding Russia out from exposure and can this catalyze an energy super cycle? Okay.

And then we’ve got another one from Giovanni Ponzetto asking, assuming that gas from Russia is kept flowing at the same rate of the past couple of months, will the EU be able to restock gas reserve? So, Tracy, you’re the expert here. Take it away.

TS: All right. So for the first one, there are two extreme scenarios that could happen. Either somebody blows up a pipeline by accident or somebody blows it up on purpose and blames the other side. And if you look at the chart that’s on the screen right now, you can see the choke points where this could easily happen to really hurt gas flows into Europe.

That said, if we look at the role of Ukraine in the gas markets, they’re much smaller today than they were in the 1990s. Right. There was a time when 90% of gas that came from Russia to Europe went through Ukraine. And now it’s about less than a quarter percent.

The other extreme is that Russia just cuts off gas flows entirely. Right. And that hurts EU way more than it hurts Russia because they don’t really actually make that much money selling gas. They make way more money selling oil. They have $640 billion in reserves. They could live without the gas for a few months. And that’s kind of why the US has had problems getting the Europeans on board with sanctions against existing flows from Europe.

In addition, Europe also has other options. They can go again to the United States, Azerbaijan or Israel and Europe.

Now there are about 2.9 million barrels at risk of oil exports that are exported from Russia to the United States and Europe, which is about 30% of their exports. And that would be much more catastrophic than, say, natural gas in the oil markets. But as far as oil flows through Ukraine, it’s very limited. Again, you can see the map.

TN: Okay.

TS: The second question.

AM: Sorry about that. I had a related question for you. How possible is it or how necessary do you think it would be for the Italians to take the initiative and become Europe’s energy hub?

TS: Actually, they really could with Greece. Right. And I’ve been talking about the Southern gas border for a very long time, which branches off, you could go Cypress into Greece and then you could go straight into Italy from the Southern gas corridor.

I think that region is really something you really want to keep an eye on right now. And I’ve kind of been talking about this for a couple of years right now because there’s just so much supply. And although people say that region is geopolitically unstable, so is everywhere. But that’s never really stopped oil and gas flows.

Personally, I think as an investor, I would be looking at that particular area of the world because they really have a lot of gas supply. And now we have pipelines built, and I think it’s more stable than, say, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, that have had a lot.

AM: You know what’s funny, though, Tracy, is every time the Libyans or Egyptians or whoever try to export gas and oil and whatnot, the Russian Wagner conveniently shows up.

TS: Conveniently shows up. Right. Exactly.

AM: Here we are, guys.

TS: Exactly. For the second question, as far as, I think that you were asking about gas flows, if Europe could restock. Absolutely. They can restock because of the things that, because of the alternative sources that I mentioned before, and we’re headed into a season that we don’t need as much. So I think that as we head into summer, it will not be as dire as the dead of winter.

TN: Very good. Okay. Thanks for that.

Sam, let’s look at some economic questions now. We’re looking at from @_0001337 probability of rate hikes and tightening now. We just let inflation run amok. When we see price controls. That’s one question. There’s another one, wondering how North America will go about continuing to grow consumerism, things like cuts on gas taxes, that sort of thing.

And there was another question about gold, which you covered a little bit at first from @Mercerandgrand looking at gold prices. So if you don’t mind, let’s talk a little bit about kind of Fed options now. Are we still expecting given the volatility, are still expecting the Fed to act in March? Are they going to continue to are they going to stop QE? Will they hike? Is QT still on the table for June?

SR: Yes, 25 is going to happen. They will end QE, and QT is still on the table, at least a runoff, not a sale. They’re not going to go over their skis here and start selling mortgage backs or do anything along those lines.

TN: Okay.

SR: But they will continue with their tightening path. I think the broader question here is just how far they actually can go this year. I do think that the limiting factor of highly volatile energy prices at the pump, which is something that monetary policy just can’t solve. Right.

Tightening 5100 basis points isn’t going to push the cost of oil down unless you somehow spark a recession or something. So I think it’s going to be interesting to see how their language evolves around future hikes. I think we kind of know that it’s 25 basis points. 50 is simply not priced in enough for them to do that.

And how we see and how they see monetary policy evolving, call it in the September and onward is going to be really important with the midterms coming up, et cetera. So I think that’s important.

On the consumer front, maybe you see call it a gas tax holiday or something along those lines to lower gas prices at the pump. That could happen. But generally the consumer is not in horrible shape. The consumer is not great, but it’s not in horrible shape. So I don’t really think they have to do much there. And I don’t see any point in buying gold here with the type of move you’ve seen over the past week. I think that if you had narratives that went from invasion of Ukraine to World War Three and you only got it to $2,000 and you couldn’t hold, I think that’s a little bit of a problem for the gold narrative.

TN: Sure. Okay, great. So let’s wrap it up and let’s start looking at the week ahead. What do you guys expect to see the week ahead? Albert, I guess we’ll start with you. Part of it is what do you expect to see on the ground in the week ahead in Ukraine? I expect that to impact markets.

AM: I think that we’re going to get a little bit more bloody, a little bit more daunting headlines. It’s going to affect the markets. I think we probably start shooting a little bit lower depending on how low we go. I think that’s going to make a big impact of what the fed does. I agree with Sam. I think it’s going to be 25 basis points. If the news is okay out of Ukraine, I think they even go 50 basis points.

TN: Wow. Okay. Tracy, what do you expect to see in the week ahead?

TS: I’m looking at the equity markets in particular. So just came out and global flows despite the fact that equities are coming off globally, we’re still seeing people pile into equities, right. We’re still seeing flows into equity markets.

So that to me says that the current situation with Ukraine in Russia is likely to be temporary and that perhaps the big funds and managers are thinking that we’re going to see less of a rate hike in March than most anticipate because they’re still selling bonds and they’re still buying equities.

TN: Okay. Interesting. Sam?

SR: I think you’re looking at a lot of chop here as we transition from as pointed out a moment ago, as you transition from Ukraine grabbing all the headlines to the Fed getting back in the headlines that’s going to be a choppy hand off. When the fed was in the headlines. It wasn’t exactly great for markets and a little bit of a relief rally here off of world war three going into.

TS: Sorry to interrupt. I think that’s a bit of a little bit of end of month rebalancing too, right? What we’re seeing right now.

TN: It could be. Yes, that’s right.

SR: Yeah. Definitely. But I think the hand off from Ukraine headlines back to the Fed headlines creates a lot of chop and probably some downside bias across asset classes or at least we’re assessing.

TN: Sounds like a very interesting week ahead, guys. Thank you. You so much. I really appreciate this. Have a great week ahead. Thank you.

SR, AM, TS: Thank you.

Categories
Podcasts

Bottlenecks To Ease With Xmas Coming?

Tony Nash gave the BFM 89.9: The Morning Run his thoughts on how the sooner-than-expected Fed rate hikes could affect global markets. Will inflation derail hastening of the tapering talk? How does crude oil look like in the next few months? As the Christmas season is coming, how much of a concern supply chains will be for the consumers and the economy? When the Fed begins normalizing rates, which currencies will be vulnerable if or when this happens?

 

This podcast first appeared and originally published at https://www.bfm.my/podcast/morning-run/market-watch/bottlenecks-to-ease-with-xmas-coming on November 25, 2021.

 

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Show Notes

 

SM: BFM 89.9 good morning. You are listening to the Morning Run. I’m Shazana Mokhtar together with Khoo Hsu Chuang and Philip See. It’s 9:07 in the morning. Thursday, the 25 November. If we look at how the US markets closed yesterday, the Dow was down marginally by 0.3%. The S&P 500 was up 0.2%. Nasdaq was also up 0.4%. So for some thoughts on where international markets are headed, we have with us on the line Tony Nash, CEO of Complete Intelligence. Good morning, Tony. So the Fed minutes revealed that the pace of tapering may be hastened, while macro data points from personal spending to job data suggest that the US economy is in quite the sweet spot, but will inflation derail this?

 

TN: Yeah. There was a statement from one of the Fed governors today talking about that inflation is not transitory in their mind or could potentially not be transitory in their mind. That’s a real danger to people who are thinking that we’re really in a sweet spot right now because it could mean Fed intervention, meaning tightening sooner than many people had counted on. So I think people had counted on some sort of intervention, maybe in Q2, but it may be happening sooner. That would have a real impact on the dollar. The dollar would strengthen, and that would have a real impact on emerging markets all around Asia, all around Africa. People would feel it in a big way where there is US dollar debt.

 

KHC: We are seeing that strengthening US dollar in our currency now. But I just want to get your perspective on crude oil because various countries from the US to China are now tapping into their strategic crude reserves to alleviate the present energy crisis. But if you look at crude now, it’s not really being responsive, right to these actions?

 

TN: Right? That’s right. So what the US agreed to release is about two and a half days of consumption. Not much. The releases agreed in the UK and India, for example, were really token releases. They weren’t really major portions of their consumption. So these countries are kind of giving a nod to the Biden administration, but they’re not really alleviating the supply concerns that are spiking prices. So it really has been a dud for the White House. It’s been kind of an embarrassment because crude prices haven’t fallen, really. They fell initially, but they really came back after the release announcement was absorbed.

 

PS: Yeah. Tony, that trickling in oil supply releases from the US government hasn’t done much to alleviate the supply concerns. Gas prices in America have been on a massive uptrend as well, just in terms of inflation and not being as transitory as people expected, as we enter Christmas season, how much of a concern is it for consumers as well as the economy?

 

TN: It’s a real concern. I have to tell you, I’ve driven halfway across the US for our Thanksgiving holiday, which is tomorrow morning. It’s Thursday here, and we’ve seen a lot of trucks with cargoes on US roads, and I make this drive pretty regularly. So it seems like a lot more on roads than I normally see. So that’s good in terms of the domestic supply chain.

 

I think it’s the international supply chain that is really concerning, and we still have those backups in the Port of Long Beach. That is the real main constraint for supply chains in the US. So I don’t think we’re going to see major disruptions outside of other ports. But through Long Beach, we definitely see issues.

 

The semiconductor supply chain is the main impact for, say, electronics and automobiles in the US. We did see semi manufacturers start to produce more auto related semiconductors, say mid-Q3 and into Q4. We should start to see those automotive supply chains, the semiconductor dependent issues and automotive supply chains alleviate, probably in Q1. So that will help.

 

But for the Christmas season, I’m not sure that there’s a whole lot that’s going to help with electronics and say automobiles.

 

PS: Yeah, Tony with JPowell still back and still in the fair chair in terms of his reappointment. And he does hike rates earlier than expected to address inflationary concerns. How much of a dangerous is to slowing down the economy in America and as  the rest of the world.

 

TN: Sure, it is a risk in America. I think it’s really hard to hire people in the US right now. There’s a lot of job switching happening and people haven’t come back into the workforce. We lost about 5 million people in the workforce in the US through the Covid period. So that’s a real issue. Anything that raises the cost of doing business is problematic for the US and will inhibit growth. The main problem in the US is that the environment right now, it continues to crush small companies. It’s very difficult for small companies. And while it may seem that small companies don’t matter that much, they are the main employer in the US and the main growth engine in the US. And the Biden administration hasn’t helped this with a lot of their policies. Their policies have been very favorable toward big companies. If the Fed pushes inflation, it will make borrowing a little bit harder. I’m sorry if the Fed pushes the interest rate, it’ll make borrowing a little bit harder. But the collapsing, say, the tapering of the Fed balance sheet will have a bigger impact on liquidity in the US.

 

SM: And if I could just touch on large US dollar debt and what happens to emerging markets when the Fed begins normalizing rates, which currencies do you see as going to be particularly vulnerable if or when this happens?

 

TN: Well, I think one that I’m really keeping an eye on is the Chinese Yuan because it’s a highly appreciated currency right now. And the Chinese government has kept the CNY strong so they can continue to import commodities and energy for the winter. And they’ll likely keep it strong through Chinese New Year. We expect CNY to really start to weaken, say, after Chinese New Year to help Chinese exporters. So winter we mostly pass. They want to help kind of push a Chinese export, so they’ll start to really devalue, seeing why probably end of Q1 early Q2.

We do see pressure, the Euro, as you’ve seen over the last three weeks, there’s been real pressure on the Euro as well. Other Asian currencies. We do think that there will be pressure on other Asian currencies. Sing Dollar will likely continue to stay pretty consistent. But we’ll see some pressure on other Asian currencies simply because of the US dollar pressure. The US dollar is something like 88% of transnational transactions. So the US dollar as a share of transnational transactions actually come up over the past two to three years. So there’s much more pressure with an appreciated dollar and it’s coming.

 

KHC: Just like the one. Tony, India Indian equities record high. Have you reached to speak considering PTM’s IPO failure?

 

TN: Yeah. I think there’s been a lot of excitement there, and I think it’s at least for now. I think it has I don’t think you can ever really claim that an equity market has hit its peak, but I think for now, a lot of the excitement is dissipated. It may come back in a month, it may come back in six months. But I think that momentum is really important. And as you see, failed IPOs, I think it’s really hard for equity investors to kind of get their mojo back.

 

SM: Tony, thank you so much as always for speaking to us and happy Thanksgiving to you and your family. That was Tony Nash, CEO of Complete Intelligence, giving us his thoughts on how the sooner-than-expected Fed rate hikes could affect global markets.

Categories
Podcasts

BBC Business Matters: Vaccine mandates announced

Biden just announced that all Federal employees are required to be vaccinated. What does this mean to the US and especially the private sector? Tony Nash joins the BBC Business Matters for a discussion on this. Also discussed are the BRICS and how they are catching up to the world’s major economies and will the environment be a big priority in the next US election?

 

This podcast was published on September 10, 2021 and the original source can be found at https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/w172xvqj8vfxhr5.

 

BBC Business Matters Description:

US President, Joe Biden, has announced that all federal workers have to be vaccinated against Covid-19. He’s also instructing the Department of Labor to draft a rule mandating that all businesses with 100 or more employees require their workers to get vaccinated or face weekly testing. And as the BRICS leaders meet, is the loose alliance of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa working? We hear from Professor Miles Kahler, a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington DC. Facebook has been accused of breaking UK equality law in the way it handles job adverts. The campaign group Global Witness said the social network failed to prevent discriminatory targeting of ads, and its algorithm was biased in choosing who would see them, as Naomi Hirst from the organisation explains. Also in the programme, we find out why the issue of climate change has become such a dominant theme in the upcoming German federal elections. And the American car giant, Ford will stop production in India; we get analysis from Nikhil Chawla, a business journalist and proud Ford owner based in Delhi. We’re joined throughout the programme by Jyoti Malhotra, National & Strategic Affairs Editor at The Print; she’s with us from New Delhi. And Tony Nash, co-founder and Chief Economist at Complete Intelligence, is with us from Houston, Texas. (Photo of President Joe Biden by Kevin Dietsch/Getty Images).

 

Show Notes

 

FW: It’s good to hear you, Tony. Back last summer, when the vaccine was a fantasy, we didn’t know how far they were getting and how fast they were working. I remember an astute commentator on this show saying it answers the question, should the federal government get involved in forcing people to have it, if and when it becomes available said, “no way, no way, because it’ll polarize opinion. Leave it to business.” Is the President going too far with this?

 

TN: I do think he is. I think forcing this through the private sector as an enforcement vehicle is polarizing, will say that much. I think this will drive a political wedge, like very few other things, and I think it’s somewhat intentional. I’ll say I don’t necessarily believe that public health is the guideline. I’m looking right now at COVID figures for Texas, and the fatality rate is something like 40% lower than it was during the cycle we had in Q1 in February.

 

So I think people are looking at the data we’re accustomed to COVID, and we’re accustomed to these data, and I think he sounded quite a lot like he was lecturing and talking down to people. And the folks that have not been vaccinated wouldn’t really appreciate that. So it’s politically polarizing. There will be more States rights issues that come out of this than I think he had intended.

 

FW: Okay, that’s an interesting thing that we’ll be watching. Is it not the case or there are those who may disbelieve the figures, the assertion being that 97% or so of those in hospital with COVID have not been vaccinated, and that would suggest that the president’s got the message exactly right. These 80 million, whatever their reasons, they are the most vulnerable.

 

TN: So, I haven’t seen those data divided at the state level, and those data differ dramatically from what we see out of Israel, which is one of the only governments that’s got very transparent data on who is vaccinated, at what stage they’re vaccinated and so on. So the data from Israel tell us very differently than 97%. So whether I’m vaccinated or not isn’t necessarily a part of this discussion. I think what really matters is we have to look at data, and the American system is one where if you look at American health care, if you look at American public health, for the most part in our history, individuals have been able to decide on the course of their own treatment and what has happened with American government that’s happened under Trump. This is happening under Biden. This has happened at some state levels where governments are telling people how they have to manage health care, and it’s not left up to them. So, again, this is translated by a number of Americans, not as a public health policy. iIt’s translated as an individual and States rights policy. So we’ve already had a number of governors, Oklahoma, Georgia, Missouri, other places, Florida and Texas will come out soon, basically saying this will not be enforced in my state and this is a state rights issue.

 

FW: Very interesting. Let’s go a very quick one if you would have both of you about the corporate side. Seems to me we discussed this a bit on the show, Tony, that in America, a company has immense power to tell its employees and fire them. We talked to one instance about CNN firing three employees who haven’t had the jab. Is that something that the President can count on?

 

TN: Can you count on companies to do that? Yeah. I think you’ll have plenty of companies who will not do it. So it will likely come the Federal through OSHA, which is a health and safety Department in the US government, and they’ll issue mandates. The question is around enforcement mechanisms. I think the main problem with this is the forcing it on smaller companies. The expectation is that it would be on bigger companies, but it’s companies down to 100 staff. And you’ve got a lot of very independent, very willful heads of smaller companies who will outright refuse to do this. I think larger kind of corporate America folks, no problem. They’ll get it done

 

FW.  From a US perspective. Tony, thanks, Joy. From a US perspective, is this a kind disaster for Ford, or is he just a really hard nose business decision that has been made by Jim Farley and 2 billion for Ford? It’s affordable. Yeah.

 

TN: I think it’s just a business decision. I think Americans obviously want to expand overseas, but in markets where the difficult people understand. So I just think it’s seen as a business decision.

 

FW: And that moved to China. That Jose said that is the business decision.

 

TN: It is. Yeah. And for got some catching up to do with General Motors there as well. So I think that’s the bigger priority.

 

FW: Tony, react to that if you would, because there’s a suggestion and I might be taking this too far from what Jody was saying. But when we had the professor talking about these constant ideas of reforming the multilateral system and redefining a multipolar world, it sounds what Jet is suggesting is actually this is all a bit hypocritical because it’s going to be mono, polo or unipolar. It’s just going to be China, that’s all.

 

TN: Well, I think that’s possible. But I also think that if we look at the three most active participants in BRICS, Russia, India, China, they’re strategic competitors. Yes, they’re rising fast, but their strategic competitors and they’re neighbors. So I think BRICS is a really interesting organization, kind of to ensure that they don’t become competitors or aggressive competitors too quickly to be able to cooperate in finance, cooperate and kind of cross border things. Other social programs, investment, that sort of thing. I think I remember when BRICS was announced, and I think it was kind of a neat thing to have, but there wasn’t an understanding of how important these economies would actually be. Now that they’re there, of course, as Jose mentioned, Brazil in South Africa just haven’t kept up in terms of relevance and importance. But the Russia, India, China part of BRICS really has, it really has. And I think it’s necessary to keep the kind of temperature low between those countries. I think there’s a lot of friction between the or potential friction between those countries.

 

FW: So just to pick up on that. From a DC perspective, does the State Department watch a BRIC summit and think the three primarily, China, Russia, India, these are countries need to be following closely in what they do in their internal relationship because we have to watch them all for different reasons.

 

TN: Will the State Department watch the brick summit. I think they would. I am not sure what they would do with it, because I think the US has opportunities to apply diplomatic carrots and sticks in different ways outside of multilateral, because it’s one of the leading economies and one of the leading powers. It has opportunities outside of multilateral environments to do that. So what we have with BRICS is some countries that were, I guess, economically considered kind of small countries 15 years ago when it was formed. Now they’re actually big countries, and so they needed the multilateral environment in those days to get things done.

 

Now, they don’t necessarily need the multilateral environment as much. They can do more on their own. I would argue that any one of those top three BRICS countries potentially has more diplomatic ability than many countries in Europe. Whereas 1520 years ago, you couldn’t say that. So it’s really the countries themselves are a lot more powerful than they were. So I think it could potentially be an important organization to keep them somewhat aligned.

 

FW: Equipped Tony to you. Cop 26, just coming up in November. I guess that’s a full year ahead of the next midterms in the US. Would the environment play at all in the campaign?

 

TN: I think it will. I think it will be marginal. I think things like COVID and some social issues and the business cycle, to be honest, will be bigger issues than the environment. But of course, it’ll hit certain cities and certain demographics, but I don’t think it will be a major issue.

 

FW: Well, thank you both. It’s great having you with us. We’re off for now. Bye bye.

Categories
QuickHit

QuickHit: What China is thinking right now?

China expert Chris Balding joins us this week for #QuickHit to discuss “What China is thinking right now?” What is the state of the Chinese economy? Are they really doing well in Covid? How about the deleveraging process, is that even real? And what’s happening to CNY? Also talked about are the politics around China especially how it relates to Afghanistan.

 

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This QuickHit episode was recorded on August 24, 2021.

 

The views and opinions expressed in this Sentiment has soured: How will governments and companies respond? (Part 1) QuickHit episode are those of the guest and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any contents provided by our guest are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

Show Notes

 

TN: Hi, everyone. Thanks for joining us for another QuickHit. My name is Tony Nash with Complete Intelligence. Today we’re talking with Christopher Balding about what is China thinking now.

 

Chris, thanks for joining us. Can you let us know a few things about yourself? Give us a little background?

 

CB: Sure. I was a professor at Peking University in China for nine years and then two years in Vietnam at the Fulbright University Vietnam. And today I am a super genius in the United States.

 

TN: Yes, you are. Thanks for taking the time, Chris. You’re one of the very few people I know who’ve actually had on the ground experience in China with a Chinese government organization.

 

So I think it’s really important to go to people like you, who had experience like you to understand what kind of China or the Chinese government is thinking now. Of course, it’s not monolithic. There are a lot of different opinions, but it’s good to have that insider’s view.

 

So I want to start off as we look at where we are in COVID, we’re a year and a half into it, depending on the school of thought, maybe it did or didn’t start in China, but we hear that Chinese economy is doing great and they’ve come out of COVID really well, all these other things. I’m really curious your view on the state of the Chinese economy right now. And what are Chinese economic planners thinking right now as they kind of potentially go into year two of Covid.

 

CB: So I think there is a couple of highlights out of the Chinese economy. First of all is that they’ve resorted to the pretty similar playbook that they go back to every year, which is pump credit, pump construction and infrastructure type spending.

 

In the early part of this year, we saw a significant amounts of credit growth. That’s softened as we’ve moved into summertime. That’s primarily due to because there’s a very clear summer and fall building season that allows builders in China to do things because the weather becomes inclement in significant parts of the year. And then if you add in the Corona backlog, that kind of is essentially almost trying to put two years of expected growth into one year.

 

We actually saw a lot of that. And that front loaded a lot of the credit and demand for things like commodities. This is why you’ve seen such demand for things like coal and steel, which were quite high. We’ve seen that soften as firms built their inventory and really ramped up during the summer building season as the demand for credit has softened and some of the building has actually been undertaken. You’ve seen a softening of that which has caused you’ve already seen talk of maybe there’s going to be unleashing or the economy is a little bit softer than the planners would like. So there’s talk of unleashing some additional credit growth trying to stimulate different parts of the economy. We’ll have to wait and see if that happens.

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Generally speaking, the rule is, if there’s a debate about whether or not they’re going to unleash credit growth, I would definitely take the over.

 

TN: By about three times. Right. So one of the interesting things you mentioned is that you said that they expended credit in the early part of this year. But what I read from investment banks and what I’ve read from other people who look at China is that China just underwent this big deleveraging process. Is that real? I’m just not sure, because I see on one side that there’s this talk about deleveraging, but my gut tells me it may not necessarily be happening. Is it happening, or is it something that’s just happening on paper or what’s your view?

 

CB: It’s tough to understand the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics and PBOC’s math as to how they arrived at that, because if you’re just running more generalized numbers, it’s very clear that debt at all levels has continued to outpace GDP. So it’s very difficult to understand how they’re estimating a leveraging. And it’s important to note that we did not see, let’s say, the rapid, rapid expansion of economic growth that you saw, for instance, in the United States.

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And what I mean by that is, whereas any United States, maybe growth went from two or three to 5% relative, almost doubling, you know. You probably saw Chinese growth go for maybe like 5% last year to seven or 8% with the Corona boost where you have that base effect. And so you didn’t see it go to, like, 10, 12, 15% that you might have seen if it had really in relative terms, they doubled from the previous year.

 

And so it’s very difficult to understand how they arrive at those deleveraging numbers. And as we all know, China is famous for fudging their numbers. So it’s very difficult to understand how they’re arriving at those numbers.

 

TN: Right. No, I agree. I haven’t believed it when I’ve heard it, but I kind of nod along as if it’s real. But I think, you know, the Chinese economic data a lot more intimately than I do, but I just don’t see where it’s happening, where it’s actually materializing instead of just being debt transfers.

 

Okay. So earlier you said that Chinese economy is slowing. Now, from my perspective, that’s worrisome partly because you’re going into a big export season, and we’ve got some ports that are stopped up. We’ve also got an election next year with Xi Jinping being reelected, whether that’s in square quotes or not, but Xi Jinping being reelected next year.

 

In terms of the resources put towards stimulus this time around, do you expect that to be more intensive than normal?

 

CB: Typically, what you see. And you saw this the first time Xi was elected, you saw this second time Xi was elected. What you typically see is a pretty significant boost to fiscal outlays. And so I think if history is any guide, I think you’re probably going to see going in the fall and the first of year, it’s very, very likely you’re going to see some type of significant boost to fiscal outlays. And this pattern goes back many, many years well before Xi that when there are these elections. And I’m not sure if it’s a scare quotes or air quotes, but both seem to…

 

TN: Yeah.

 

CB: So I think it is very, very likely that you’re likely to see that. And one of the things I think that a lot of people have missed out on is yes, there were absolutely corporate, let’s say, bailouts or corporate funds for Corona. But one of the things is that in the United States, there were the large amounts of transfers directly to households. China has not enjoyed those transfers directly to households.

 

And so actually, consumer spending in China is actually pretty soft. And those are buying inflated data standards. And so I think that is something that is very important to note when we’re talking about the health of the Chinese consumer.

 

TN: Yep. That’s great. Okay. So I also want to talk about the supply chain issues. And I was just reading a story today about how Pudong Airport has been shut down. Cargo on Pudong Airport is going to be much slower for a period of time because of anothe Covid outbreak. This sort of thing. Do you see ongoing port capacity issues related to COVID? Is that something that you’re kind of concerned about?

 

CB: I think that is something that you’re going to be seeing for definitely the foreseeable future. And I should say it’s not just China. You’re seeing a lot of this in other parts of the world that I know, specifically Vietnam, the Middle East. I’ve heard of similar things in Europe where they are just straining at capacity. Sometimes it’s due to COVID shut down. Sometimes it’s due to other issues. But absolutely, these are issues that I think are not going away anytime soon.

 

And it is, I mean one of the debates in the United States right now is transitory or structural inflation. And I think, not to be capping out on the issue, but I do think it is kind of a mix of both. And I think the supply chain issues don’t be surprised if we’re looking at very likely two years before all these issues are really worked through, because when people went to, let’s say, just in time or contract manufacturing, what that did is that gave you less wiggle room. So you did not just have a massive warehouse of supply that you inventory, and then you could draw down as necessary where it would give you three months to make a mistake. Now people were essentially saying, I got one week of inventory, and if that one week gets shot, I’m in deep trouble.

 

So the chips are, there’s chips, there’s car, there’s Corona shutdowns, there’s capacity issues at some ports. And so it’s going to take a couple of years, probably to work through all these issues to return to what we think of as some degree of normalcy.

 

TN: Right. What’s interesting to me about that is the previous administration of the US tried to bring manufacturing businesses back to the US.

 

Now, with COVID because of the global supply chain issues and the intermittent supply issues, there’s more of a move to bring things back, at least to North America. I know lots going into Mexico right now. Some’s going into the US to minimize the disruption of things, especially in electronic supply chain.

 

So it seems like regardless of the kind of official policy, whether it’s trade policy or just say public health policy, it looks like more of this regionalization is happening. Does that make sense to you?

 

CB: Yeah, absolutely. I mean, look, nobody is going to announce that they’re leaving China for many reasons. But nobody’s going to announce that they’re leaving China. But you do absolutely see a spread of manufacturing capabilities.

 

Whether that is because they want to have multiple manufacturing bases, they want to be more diversified, whether it’s because of IT issues, whether it’s because of Corona risks, tariffs, all of these issues, there is absolutely increasing diversification of manufacturing capabilities, whether it’s Mexico, India, Malaysia, all of these different places. You’ve even seen Africa doing relatively well in certain areas. So it has absolutely happened.

 

TN: Okay. One last question on the economy then we’ll move to kind of politics and China’s place in the world. What’s the thought behind the elevated CNY? We’re trading much higher than we have for a long time, and it stayed there, right? It’s pegged right around 6.4 something, and it’s been there since Q1, I think. Why the persistent strength in CNY?

 

CB: Well, I mean, I think first of all, they have been running during Corona pretty significant surpluses. The United States has exports to China and other parts of the world have declined, not insignificantly or remained flat as we’re importing a lot more. That’s number one.

 

I think also the dollar has gone into a specific range. And the way that I think of the CNY is it’s basically just a reverse USB tracker, which I think explains most of what we’re seeing. I think what they’re trying to do and the reason that China has been buying some dollars, not in major amounts, but I think they kind of have, like, ICBC and CCB, those types of banks acting as dollar cushions for lack of a better term, is that they don’t want it to appreciate too much for a number of reasons, because they know they’ve become more expensive and that would just make it that much more expensive. So in a way, I think they’re trying to manage that, manage that flow. But I think it’s still generally within a range where it’s like you can say they’re within spitting distance of what their index say they should be. Okay, that’s fair.

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TN: Okay. Now let’s move on to politics. Let’s move on to kind of China’s big, long term, multi hundred year plan to rule the world, which I think is not real.

 

So let’s talk about Afghanistan. This just happened over the last couple of weeks, and there’s a few that China is going to be the master winner of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. I think there are multiple perspectives on that, but the consensus view seems to be that the US really did had to job on the withdrawal. And the ultimate winner of this is China. Can you kind of walk me through some of your views on that? What are some of the possibilities there with China and Afghanistan?

 

CB: Sure. So I think it is very fair to say that the United States has pretty badly bungled the withdrawal. You know, why, you know, we should have waited until we’d already evacuated all the army to say we’re going to start evacuating US citizens and Afghani translators and people like that.

 

One of the things I do think is absolutely happening. And this is not just China. And you’ve heard this from country after country. Taiwan, Germany, UK on down is they are saying we need to go back to the drawing board and re evaluate everything we think we know.

 

Okay. And somebody that I was talking to, I think, expressed it very well is the United States still has credibility because we can move large amounts of assets, whether it’s military, governmental, other private sector, we can bring significant assets and influence to the table. What, this has really changed in a lot of people’s minds is confidence.

 

TN: Yes. That’s fair.

 

CB: That has changed a lot of people’s mind. So you have a lot of people going back to the drawing board. One of the things I’m going to be a little bit hesitant to do is start pronouncing winners, losers, and this is what XYZ country is going to do in ABC country is going to do. And the reason I say that is it’s very, very plausible to construct a scenario where the Taliban and the CCP become BFFs. Okay?

 

TN: Sure.

 

CB: I mean, if China is shipping large amounts of fentanyl out of northeast China, it’s not a crazy scenario to say they partner with the Taliban to start shipping large amounts of opium into the United States at the same time.

 

TN: Sure.

 

CB: Not a crazy scenario. It’s also not a crazy scenario for the Taliban to start bombing China within a year or two. Okay. You could very easily construct those types of scenarios that lead to that. Okay. So it’s very, very difficult to construct those types of scenarios with any what I would consider a degree of certainty. Okay?

 

TN: Sure. So what about the, the China-Pakistan relationship? $46 billion of investment, supposedly, supposedly a tight relationship there. That’s arguable. Do you think that pays dividends in Afghanistan, or is that kind of something that’s a little bit, I wouldn’t say irrelevant, but a little bit less directly connected.

 

CB: So I think Pakistan is actually very pretty directly involved in all of this. But again, it’s very difficult to say with a high degree of certainty what’s happening there because Pakistan has very direct connections into both the Taliban, Al Qaeda. Some would even say that they were a Pakistani security service creation. At the same time, it’s well known that there are blood feuds between groups within each of those organizations.

 

So it’s very difficult to get to say exactly who the winner, loser there. With regards to China and Pakistan, one of the things that you’ve seen very clearly is that pretty much the Pakistani government and the Pakistani elites are effectively compromised by China. They will say nothing about wingers and other issues.

 

At the same time, everything, I think indicative on the ground and of the mass population is that there is maybe not extreme, but I would say broad discontent with the Pakistani relationship with China for many reasons.

 

TN: From who and Pakistan? Is it from the armed forces? Is it from other parts of the government, from regular folks who isn’t happy with that relationship?

 

CB: I think a lot of folks broadly. The business community. I think there’s a growing sense that they are effectively a Chinese colony. One Pakistani I know who described it as such. So I think there is very broad discontent. And as we all know, Pakistan has quite the lengthy history of governmental instability.

 

So similar to what you’ve seen in other countries in the region, it’s very easy to paint a picture, a scenario where the current government remains compromised and under the thumb of the CCP for years to come. I think it’s also plausible that a new government or some type of political instability happens in Pakistan. And all of a sudden, there’s an about face on how to manage relationships with China.

 

Generally speaking, though, I think there is going to be very tight coordination between Beijing, Islamabad and Kabul because those… Pakistan, I mean, almost anything that happens in Afghanistan is going to be maybe not controlled by Pakistan. I think that overstate it. But there’s going to be large amounts of information flows and influence back and forth happens over what happens in Afghanistan.

 

TN: Yeah. Okay. That’s all really interesting. I think we could spend a long time talking about China, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Russia, kind of where all those countries come together, Central Asia. But I want to end on this.

 

We’ve seen, a lot really changed with US standing in the world over the past couple of weeks over Afghanistan. We’ve seen a lot change in the US China relationship over the past year with the new administration. And so let’s talk for a minute about the overall US China relationship. What’s your thought there? Are they getting along? Is there a constructive dialogue? How do issues like Taiwan fit within that discussion? Can you just help me think about some of your thoughts there?

 

CB: So I was talking to someone, and I think they put succinctly the way that I would characterize the Biden administration’s record on China. You can’t criticize them for what they’ve done on China because they really haven’t done anything at all. Okay. Other than adding a couple of names to the Sanctiosn books, there really has not anything taken place.

 

They promised that they were going to get out their China strategy plan in June. Then there were rumblings that might happen in July, where now at almost rapidly approaching September 1. And now there’s not even talk of when it might be released. So really, nothing has been happened except for the Alaska meeting, which apparently went over like a lead balloon.

 

Everything right now just seems to be a stalemate. And the Biden administration is worrying, and that China is still moving forward, and the Biden administration is basically doing nothing.

 

The most telling point to me about the by administration approach, and I think this is something I think you should fault in. In fairness, Trump for is look, we can talk about values and do the right thing and all this kind of good stuff. But the United States, at some point has to actually put resources into this effort.

 

And the Trump administration, other than political capital with allies or other countries, never put any real hard resources or assets into these issues. And the point I would make is the Biden administration has made a point of spending literally trillions of dollars. And to the best of my knowledge, there has been almost zero spending passed that has really anything to do with China. Okay.

 

We cannot continue to talk to countries like Vietnam, Malaysia, South Korea, Japan. You cannot talk about the threat China poses and never spend any money on the issue.

 

TN: Sure.

 

CB: Okay. And look, this doesn’t have to mean we go out and increase military spending by 20%. This could simply mean we’re going to go into Vietnam and say, we want to have a development program and, you know, help solve issues. This can mean capitalizing the Development Finance Corporation to help countries like India and Malaysia and say, look, there is a real opportunity that does not involve the Belt and Road, where there’s going to be green standards or these non-corrupt standards and things like this to make sure that this money is really helping your country. You know, and it was probably something that was negotiated could be all the way back to the Obama administration.

 

There was some type of military center opened in, I believe, Jakarta with the Indonesian government that was supposed to have other governments. It’s a small center. Even those types of things. There’s simply not the resources being dedicated. And I think that’s indicative of where this ranks within the Biden administration priorities.

 

TN: I’ll be honest, Chris, it sounds like a mess. It sounds pretty bleak to me.

 

So great. I really appreciate this. I think if anybody knows has an idea of what China is thinking, I think you’re the guy. And I really, really appreciate your time.

 

Everyone watching. Please please subscribe to our YouTube channel. The more we have, the more we can bring to you as a part of our videos. And, Chris, thank you so much. And thanks to everyone. We’ll see you on the next interview. Thanks.

Categories
QuickHit

The Death of Growth: Old & rich vs young & poor in 2030 & beyond (Part 2)

The world’s birth rate is changing. Clint Laurent from Global Demographics shares surprising discoveries that he believes will happen in the next 10 years and how this will shape the world?

 

This is the second part of this discussion. Go here for part one.

 

Clint started Global Demographics in 1996 and cover 117 countries throughout the world and China. They do that right down to county level of 2,248 counties. Clint believes that demographics are better than financial data from the point of view of forecasting  because they tend to be stable trends.

 

Global Demographics is able to come up with reliable forecasts at least 15 years out. After 15 years, reliability goes down and they are typically never more plus or minus 5% error in our long-term forecast. Their clients are mainly consumer goods companies, infrastructure backbones and things like that.

 

 

 

 

 

 

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This QuickHit episode was recorded on June 17, 2021.

 

The views and opinions expressed in this QuickHit Clint Demographics Part 2 QuickHit episode are those of the guest and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any contents provided by our guest are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

 

Show Notes

 

TN: So Indonesia, India, Brazil and so on, so capital formation, capital investment is the real weakness there and it seems to me that’s a function of largely education. Is that fair to say?

 

CL: That’s exactly what it is. I mean, they you know, as they get the education right and, you know, they’re working on it, most of these countries that have been quite responsible in that area. And as they get that right, so the investment comes in, so the consumer gets more affluent and becomes a virtuous circle.

 

TN: OK, well, what timescale are we talking about for that consumption to come in a really notable way, for example, to take the place of, say, the under 40 Chinese consumption or the under 40, say, Western Europe or American consumption?

 

CL: Well, that’s the bad news. I mean, when you take India at least 15 years to get there. Because the education is only just coming right. And again to pick on India. India’s urbanization, 10 years ago, it was 30% of the population. Today, it’s 33% of the population.

 

TN: OK. So it’s not happening nearly fast enough.

 

CL: No. When you’re an uneducated girl in a village, why would you go to a slum somewhere of a big city? Your lifestyle would be actually worse, not better. And so they hadn’t been able to get that China effect of moving people from the low productivity agriculture into high productivity urban type of work.

 

TN: Yeah, but I think a lot of the, particularly the Westerners who are watching this would say, yeah, but I’ve been to Gurgaon and I’ve, you know, I’ve been to that kind of tech hubs in India. And I see, you know, a lot of women coming up in those hubs or have come up in those hubs over the last 10 or 20 years. But is not just such a small percentage that it matters, but it’s not making a huge difference?

 

CL: Exactly. It’s a small percentage. I mean, remember India is just behind China in terms of total population now. And by 2045, there’s 1.5 billion people. Because they’ve got the birthrate right under control as well. It’s dropping. But again, they’ve got an inertia of more women of childbearing age coming through. So total births keep going up. So they’ve got this problem of just too many people looking for jobs, which keeps the wage rates down. And that. And that’s what’s frustrating the education system, too, is they have to keep growing the number of school places to stand still, let alone expand. But they’re getting that right. So I don’t want to sound negative about that. All these countries are doing quite nicely on that, some positive.

 

And so but one important point to make is the demographic dividend hasn’t been collected. There’s was a lot of talk about India having a demographic dividend because there are always young people entering working age. But the trouble is they weren’t well enough educated, so they didn’t find jobs. In 2010, the propensity of a working age person to be in work was 58%. It’s now 50%. In other words, they couldn’t find the jobs for these people, so the dividend never paid off.

 

TN: OK, so jobs lead to consumption, of course.

 

CL: That’s right.

 

TN: But I guess. So it’s going to take these countries 10 to 15 years or more to get the quality of jobs that are needed.

 

CL: Yeah.

 

TN: So, you know, that growth that we’ve lazily relied on, say, China for the last 10 or 20 or 20 to 30 years, is there a gap between now and 10 to 15 years from now in terms of the rate of growth for, say, consumer goods and say, economic kind of new market entry, that sort of thing?

 

CL: Yeah, well, this is the crisis that’s coming. Because if we take, again, the kind of what I call the family stage countries, India, Brazil, etc, they actually need around about 250 million extra jobs in the next 25 years to get, to maintain their existing level of employment. Not lift it. Just maintain it. And that gives them a reasonable level of income. Not great, but hopefully with education situation, the earnings go up.

 

But let me put another layer on the cake, so to speak. This is fourth group of countries, which I call young and poor. I call them young because the median age of all of the countries in this group is 20 and some of them have a median age of 14. Mali and Niger, they both have a median age of 14.

 

That means half the population in those countries is under the age of 14 today. Yeah, and their birth rates are high. The average birth rate, an unweighted across these countries is 130 per thousand women. Most countries are at 40 elsewhere in the world. And the number of women of childbearing age, of course, are going up dramatically because of that as well. So even though the birthrate is starting to come down, it goes up dramatically. And it has a seismic effect.

 

First of all, is roughly a billion people in this part of the world at the moment. In 25 years time, there’s two billion of these people. In other words, in twenty five years, they add a billion people to their populations. And if I can just go on and to take Nigeria, for example, at the moment, has 45 million school age children, irrespective whether they are going to school, most of them are not. 45 million. It’s 90 million in 25 years time. Just to stand still on education, they have to double their education budget. And so, little own issues need improving.

 

TN: OK, so governments take, need tax revenue to grow their budgets. So will there will there be the incomes to allow them to grow those budgets just to keep up with where they are? And further, will they be able to accelerate the job growth to make sure they have those incomes, to keep their education, to improve their education like, say, India or Indonesia is doing well?

 

CL: Well, this is the crisis that’s coming because the answer simply is no. And it’s no for the simple reason that up until now, this is really what I was saying we were at a cusp. Up until now, the growth in consumption by the older affluent or the older countries generally, which includes China, has been such that it’s kept relatively full employment throughout the world.

 

There’s been enough jobs for those who are looking for jobs. And that doesn’t sound a bit. But even the young, poor countries have been trotting along at about 55% of working age people employed, which seems to work out quite well. But suddenly that whole relationship changes. As I said, the countries that account for, well, the old affluent account for 63% of global consumption. The other old add another 14% say up to 77% or 80%, chuck in a bit of India, 80%, which is also flattening out. So the countries account for 80% of the money that’s spent by households now flatten out in growth in their demand.

 

Layer on top of that, there’s a continuous increase in productivity per worker. The amount of number of workers needed to meet the new additional demand over the next 25 years is 300 million. And as I told you earlier, this 740 million people that are going to be looking for an extra job.

 

It’s going to be roughly 400 million people, mainly in the poor countries, are in a little bit in need, family stage countries, who are at working age, would like to have a job, but can’t get a job. That’s 400 million.

 

TN: That’s astounding. OK, so that’s as big as, say, the EU, right?

 

CL: Yeah, well, bigger.

 

TN: So if everyone in the EU didn’t have a job but they wanted a job. Man, woman and child couldn’t get a job.

 

CL: That’s right.

 

TN: So that’s terrible. So what do you think those people will do? What do you think some of the effects will be of this? First of all, where is this, kind of generally, geographically? Is this the kind of Bangladesh, Nigeria, kind of those types of countries?

 

CL: It’s based of the African continent and what we call South India, but not including India or Sri Lanka, which will be in Tibet, out there.

 

TN: So Bangladesh, Pakistan, Central Asia generally.

 

CL: And there’s a few small countries, obviously, in South America or Central America that are falling into this category as well. So it’s reasonably concentrated geographically. And it’s a real worry. And I think of myself. If I was turning, well, let’s say 20 and I cannot get a job. I’m scrambling for food. I’m scrambling for water, in some places in the world. What do I do? I’ve got nothing to lose. And that’s what something dramatic, I would rot and just die miserable, which is terrible.

 

So I think the world has a fairly major migration problem coming. These people are going to walk north. I would. So I don’t blame them. But it’s a desperate situation. So much so that in my own mind, it’s all very well to donate money to buy mosquito nets and things like that. I actually think would be better to donate money for a TV and an Internet connection so we could educate the kids. Because we could deliver education quite cheaply using modern technology. And if you could educate them, then they could do more productive things and then and so on and so on. You get the part of that. But there’s no easy solution to this one.

 

These people are largely alive today, will be alive in the next 10 years. And the consumption trends, well, they’re there too. The people with the money are getting older and saving. So the drawbridges are coming up. So this is.

 

TN: So migration. The migration issues we’ve seen over the last, say, 5 to 10 years sounds to me that they only intensify over the next, say, 15 to 20 years.

 

CL: Oh, incredibly so.

 

TN: And Europe is really the focal point. Yes. The US has some issues and maybe India, China have some issues. But it really seems to me that Europe is the major focal point there.

 

CL: But it’s the easy one to get to.

 

TN: Sure. Yeah.

 

CL: But there’s some other dimensions of migration, too, which is starting to come under stress. And I mean, for example, let’s take the U.K. It has one nurse for every 440 people in the population. So if you get sick, your access to a nurse is pretty good. But the UK hires nurses who have been trained and educated in the Philippines where there’s one nurse for every 4000 people in the population. Is that morally correct? Should affluent countries take skilled workers, from developing countries?

 

TN: But can you blame that worker for wanting to go to UK?

 

CL: Not at all. If I was the nurse, I’d be on the plane. I mean, basically, you’ve got the individual motivation and you’ve got the moral issue, and you’ve got the need. And then even if you take a country like Greece, which everyone says, oh, that’s nice and comfortable.

 

Greece’s population has dropped by one million people in the last 10 years. And that one million that are gone are skilled workers who got on a train and went north to Germany because under the EU, they can move.

 

TN: What percentage of the population is that? One?

 

CL: About 10%.

 

TN: 10% of the population?

 

CL: Well, you know, it’s a big drop. And again, you don’t blame the skilled plumber or electrician or whatever because he or she can earn 2 to 3 times as much going to Germany or getting across to Britain, which they could do perfectly legally. And then in 5 years time, the wife is with them, the kids are going to school, that kids speak German now, they never go back.

 

TN: So does this change, does this, you know, let’s say the education deficit issues and the jobs deficit issues in Africa, does it change immigration policy in Europe, for example, in the way Australia has the checklist of skills and those sorts of things to to migrate?

 

Does Europe come more to that type of migration policy to where they incentivize people, let’s say, in parts of Africa before coming, meaning get educated, you know, these sorts of things. And you can definitely come in. I mean, it certainly sounds like something that would be really helpful for places like Greece.

 

CL: Yeah, but not too helpful for places like Nigeria.

 

TN: Right.

 

CL: They’re losing the skilled worker. And the ability to lift the Nigerian economy is going to be a function of having skilled people. And if Greece takes them, that’s actually not that great. Right. So, yeah, you sort of resolve the great problem, but you don’t resolve the core problem, which is the change so to speak. Yeah. So it’s interesting because Greece, with its drop in population, its household values are dropping because the number of households is going down. And that’s the core asset of many households. So it’s trying to create some economic problems as well because the asset they could borrow against is going down in value, not going up in value. But that’s not just Greece. It’s Italy, Spain. It’s Romania, it’s Poland. And that being, you know, some of the talents are being sucked out. And that’s not good.

 

TN: So in sum, let me try to sum this up, because this has been a great conversation and it’s really opened up a lot of things I haven’t really thought about before. So so global consumption generally for, let’s say, the next 10 years or so is relatively stable.

 

We won’t see the rapid expansion that we saw in places like China over the last 10 or 20 years. So let’s say the pull on commodities right now, the inflation we’re seeing, the, you know, this sort of thing, that stuff really tamps down pretty quickly and really stabilizes for maybe a decade or so.

 

CL: Exactly.

 

TN: Once that stabilizes, then we see real disparities as these kind of young, poor countries explode in population. But the wealthy countries are pretty stable and continue to be pretty rich. Right. So we kind of have a status quo for the next decade or so. But then after that, there’s a real danger that emerges from global disparity.

 

CL: That’s right. You start to have a major, what I’d call a population crisis.

 

TN: Wow. OK. It’s a little bit dire. But this is great. Before we go, can you talk about, I know you have a couple of books coming out. Can you tell us what they’re about? I know they’re a little bit from coming to press, but I think it would be really helpful for people to understand what you’re writing about.

 

CL: Right. Well, one of the two books is basically called 2045: The Growing Demographic Crisis. And it’s pretty much along the lines that I’ve just discussed, the difference is, all the data is there. And you’ve got the data, if you like, at the segment level, which also go to by country level. And you can see how the numbers play out. It’s not something that we’re making these numbers up. They’re actually there. They’re pretty solid. And the core source, of course, is the World Bank and the United Nations that you can’t really argue with that. And it’s all old numbers behind what I’ve just discussed.

 

And the second book coming out is called China: 2040. Similar sort of theme. And what I have done that is China is going through a lot of changes that I’ve explained and China will continue to be important economically and politically for the next 10 years at least, if not longer. We know that.

 

So it’s actually quite important that people have a better understanding of what China is like demographically. And it’s not one country, it’s at least thirty one countries. The differences in consumption within that, it’s quite diversified.

 

This book is, if you like, the primer for someone that’s either doing business, thinking of doing business, investing in, whatever, into China. If you haven’t read it and you don’t know China, then you’d be dealing somewhat riskilly. If you read this, it’ll help you focus where the opportunities potentially are. Thanks for the opportunity to mention.

 

TN: Of course. Thank you so much for your time. You’ve been very generous and I think we’ve taken it a lot. I think of it to watch this two or three times before I kind of fully take it in. So I really appreciate it.

 

Further watching, please. We’d really appreciate if you’d like the video. We’d love it if you’d subscribe to our YouTube channel. And we’ll see you next time. Thank. Thanks very much.

 

CL: Thank you.

Categories
QuickHit

The Death of Growth: Old & rich vs young & poor in 2030 & beyond (Part 1)

Our guest is Clint Laurent from Global Demographics, an amazing demographer, businessman and observer of global trends long before they really take hold. He shares surprising observations that he believes will happen in the next 5 to 10 years.

 

This is the first of a two-part discussion. Watch the second part here.

 

Clint started Global Demographics in 1996 and cover 117 countries throughout the world and China. They do that right down to county level of 2,248 counties. Clint believes that demographics are better than financial data from the point of view of forecasting  because they tend to be stable trends.

 

Global Demographics is able to come up with reliable forecasts at least 15 years out. After 15 years, reliability goes down and they are typically never more plus or minus 5% error in our long-term forecast. Their clients are mainly consumer goods companies, infrastructure backbones and things like that.

 

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This QuickHit episode was recorded on June 17, 2021.

 

The views and opinions expressed in this QuickHit Clint Demographics QuickHit episode are those of the guest and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any contents provided by our guest are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

 

Show Notes

 

TN: Over the last year or so, we’ve seen the pandemic. We’re now having this bullwhip effect with inflation and other things. But I guess this capping off in the last 20 years where we’ve seen China as the global growth market and the marginal consumer for almost everything. And it’s really forced me to think what’s next. You and I published a piece about a year and a half ago around China’s population topping out around 2023, 2024. And so I’m really curious, what do you see happening in the next 5 to 10 years that will really come as a surprise to people? What are some of your observations over the next decade?

 

CL: The world is actually as bizarrely almost on a bit of a cusp at the moment. The pandemic is almost irrelevant to what was going to happen. I mean, I know the pandemic caused a lot of economic disturbance, obviously affected some people’s lives quite significantly. But really, there was a lot of change that was about to start to happen anyhow, irrespective of whether or not the pandemic came along.

 

From a demographic point of view, the pandemic is not really very relevant. I’m currently based in the UK and the people who have unfortunately died from it, most of them would have died in the next two years anyhow because they had severe underlying health situations. And so, its effect on death rates has actually been very, very marginal.

 

Secondly, most deaths being over the age of 60, that means it doesn’t affect the labor force, it doesn’t affect the propensity to have children. So really, it will be a horrible little blip in the history of mankind. And hopefully we move on from it and the vaccines keep working. And so a little bit of hope there. But that aside, it was going to be a big change.

 

And if I can explain the change in the following ways.

 

Up to now, the world has perhaps been a little bit lucky in the sense to be, first of all, had what I call the Older-Affluent countries, and that’s Western Europe, North America and what I call affluent Asia — Japan, Taiwan, Australia. All of those countries, which are actually only 14% of the world’s population, account for a very significant proportion of the global consumption. As you know, it grew quite rapidly, which was really quite good. And that is really the first big change is going to  come into effect.

 

What’s already started to happen is people. The only growth in these countries is people over the age of 40. Every age group below that is in absolute decline. So even if they’re going up in affluence, the young affluent market is no longer a growth market. It’s more or less stable. Even if you add in increased incomes, which still occur, but at a slower rate. So you’re now looking at a 40+ age group, and in some countries, obviously, Japan is one, it’s 60+ that are the age group that’s growing.

 

So all of those societies, to some extent, are in a lot of trouble. They’re flattening out. They’ve moved from a pyramid population to a square, and that’s actually very good.

 

A lot of people say you should have a pyramid population with young people coming through and looking after the old. That’s actually the poverty trap. Because if young people come through, the dependance, first of all, will keep driving the society down. With a square, then the same number of people need education each year, the same number of people need health care each year. The capacity is there and it’s an improvement of quality rather than an increase of quantity.

 

TN: So you’re saying with these wealthy developed nations, Japan is an extreme example, consumption isn’t really the worry. It’s the growth that’s falling off. So the consumption is stable. It’s just not growing.

 

CL: Exactly. There’s one other big change to appreciate is what people say because they’re getting old, they’re going to run out of labor force. And here’s a statistic for you: In Japan, 25% of males, 70 to 74 are still in full-time employment. And you’re saying, “yeah, well, that’s Japan. It’s different everywhere else in the world.” You know, it’s exactly the same statistic in the United States.

 

The aged worker is a new phenomenon. In fact, the age worker is the fastest growing demographic. So these countries actually are not running out of workers. And the assumption that we all go decrepit and work after age 64 is just wrong. I am over 65, as you can probably guess. I don’t have a single friend who’s not in full-time employment at this point in time, enjoying it. It raises lots of issues.

 

So the labor force keeps going in these countries as well. So they don’t even need migrant workers to sustain these countries. So they are nice, comfortable niche. Growing steadily, not phenomenally. You’re talking about 1%, less than 1% growth in total consumer spending. Households are getting a little more affluent. Number of households is flattened out, which would have implications for the housing market. But it’s not going down, so it’s actually not too bad.

 

TN: So you say GDP is pretty stable, but what’s happening to GDP per capita in those countries? Does it continue to grow?

 

CL: It does, but just at a much slower rate. You’re talking 1% or even less than 1%, but it’s positive. And do remember, 1% of a hundred thousand US dollars is more money than the total income of households at the other end of the spectrum. Much of their spending power is quite significant. But a really important point to keep in your mind right now is that consumption expenditure will start to level out. It won’t hit that high growth rate anymore. It drops back to about 1% or even slightly lower.

 

Then the other big change you’ve got is what I call the next group of countries, which is older but not so affluent. And that obviously includes China. Now, let’s just put China to one side for the moment and look at the other countries in that group. You’re talking about Russia and the Eastern European countries. All of which have huge potential because like the previous group that I just talked about, they score really well on education.

 

And countries that score well on education, with the right capital investment, can lift the productivity. The countries that have weak education, it doesn’t matter how much capital you throw into them, they don’t lift their productivity. And there’s plenty of statistics to prove that. So these countries actually have a resource. I mean, Latvia, Romania. It doesn’t really matter. And that actually got the one thing that’s really hard to do. Good education.

 

Why is it hard to do? India has been really bad on education up to now. It finally has universal education. Every kid, 5 to 12 is now supposed to be in school. But it takes another 10 years before some of those kids come out of school and get into work. And it takes another 10 years before the workforce has become sufficiently skilled that the capital investment comes and lifts the productivity.

 

So these Eastern European countries and Russia are actually interesting from the QuickHit point of view. They start getting the fixed capital investment right, got the education right. They could actually be the next growth area. Only warning to you is they also are relatively old. So it’s a growth area of 40 pluses and 60 pluses. That is going to happen because they’re under earning at the moment. They can lift their incomes, obviously, buy bit of car, bit of clothing, all of those sort of things. But it’s a growth area of an older population, not a young population.

 

TN: And it’s something that nobody’s watching, Clint. Like, I don’t think anybody is really looking for that even as a possibility. A lot of people have written Russia off, see it as a petro state or whatever, and central and Eastern Europe is kind of just kind of a no man’s land in many cases. So some manufacturing there. There’s some services there in terms of globalization. But I don’t think there’s a lot of expectation to see rapid growth there and high productivity there. So I think that’s a really interesting question mark that most people aren’t even thinking about.

 

CL: That’s right. And if you go into these countries physically, you start to see some of the big brands starting to look at them. And you come across someone from XYZ Corporation there. We just have a little look. So some people are starting to see that it’s there. It’s just as you say, it’s not visible yet.

 

Let’s switch to China briefly. China slightly different and also very similar. First of all, remember 1989, China introduced the one child policy. That came under a huge amount of criticism. But ignoring how you feel about that, is one very simple thing it achieved. It levelled off the number of young kids needed to be educated. And subsequently started, it was 1979, they introduced. Such that by 1984, when they introduced compulsory education for all six to 12 year olds, they were talking of a relatively stable number of kids. So they could focus on the quality of education. And so every kid’s been going to school in such when you go to the year 2000, you’ve got this population still living in the rural areas. But who could read, write and do sums and all of those sort of things. Could get on their bike, go into town and get a job in a factory or an office or whatever.

And the differential between an urban worker and rural worker in China is 3.6. And that’s actually how China drove its growth and its productivity per worker and its influence. What it did is, it said, take all these people who are nice people, but not well-educated, not earning very much money, educate them, put them into job, let them earn lots of money, and have a good lifestyle. And that drove up the productivity and the whole success story of China.

 

 

TN: So urbanization and wage arbitrage, productivity gain for China. But is that running out in the next ten years or does that continue over that period?

 

CL: We’ve got it going through actually. It’s 20 million a year at the moment, which is a phenomenal number. That’s Australia, every year. It’s 20 million at the moment. We have it dropping down to about 11 million by 2040 because it’s still a lot of people moving there.

 

Now, this is the other big trick. Because some people have been saying, China’s population’s leveling out. And, you know, we thought it was 2023, where even the Chinese government agrees with us. Now, it’s 2023, and it’s leveling out. The working age population is starting to shrink. Oh, dear. That can have a decline in the workforce. No. They’re having a decline in the rural workforce. The rural workforce have in the next 20 years.

 

The urban workforce keeps growing for the next 10 years to 2030. The number of people working in urban jobs, which are highly productive, keeps going up. So for the next 10 years, China’s GDP growth still chugs along reasonably well. After 2030, the growth rate drops away and we have it down to about 1.3% by 2045, because it just isn’t the extra workers to keep growing the total GDP. So that’s the story there.

 

But again, coming back to the consumption side, China in the last 10 years in the urban area had this huge group of people, 220 million of them urban, aged 40 to 64 years of age, educated, earning quite good money by turning a stand and spending money on holidays and trips and things like that. And between 2010 and 2020, that went up to 100 million people. Think about it, a 100 million extra people with disposable income. It was no surprise that the retail side of China took off and tourism and all of that. It was those people. They’ve got a house. They’ve got a fridge, they’ve got a refrigerator. Let’s have some fun. That’s really what’s happening right now.

 

Now, the bad news is that now it flattens out. Every age group under 40 in China is already declining and will continue to decline in size. So don’t go after the kid market in China except on the wealthy and those sort of areas for education. The 40 to 64 age, what I call the working age optimist, it grows for a little bit, and then it flattens out. And it’s named the 65 plus, which in China is not like the other countries. The 65 plus at the moment doesn’t have great health, doesn’t have a great life expectancy. You get some extension of the workforce, but not a lot.

 

So China’s consumption is healthy as well. It’ll chugging along quite nicely. And to digress slightly, but I think we need to recover quickly here. The one child policy, it’s moved to three now. That’s totally and absolutely irrelevant.

 

TN: Yeah, it doesn’t seem like it’s going to do much. They’re too rich to want to have more kids, right?

 

CL: Exactly. And actually, it’s the birth rate that’s not the important point. It’s the number of women of childbearing age. And that goes down by a third. It drops 330 million now to about 220 million in 20 years time. And the birth rate can’t give up fast enough to compensate there. So births in 2019 are 14 million. It dropped to 10 million last year because of the pandemic, waiting to come back up a bit about to 14. It’ll be down to 11 million by 2030. And they can’t change that even with the three child policy. That won’t change.

 

TN: It’s not the three child policy, it’s the fact that there are not enough women to have babies. And those women are wealthy enough that they don’t want to have three kids.

 

CL: That’s really basically it. Just look at Singapore. They tried everything to get the birth rate up.

 

TN: I was there. They were paying people to have babies and it still didn’t work.

 

CL: Even send them on cruises. I mean, I volunteered.

 

And then you have, so that’s the second group. And the key point by the first group is nice and stable now, chugging along nicely, but no longer super growth in consumption. Nice growth in consumption is how I call it.

 

The third group, what we call the family stage. And that’s obviously dominated by India, Brazil, Indonesia all there. The bulk of populations is in that 25 through to 39, having children, at work, that sort of stage. So the working age population is still growing a bit, but not a lot. Education’s improving. It varies quite a lot across this group. India is at the weaker end. Indonesia is probably one of the better ends.

 

So, you’ve got a bit of a dichotomy there. But they’re generally in a position to be able to attract capital and generally in a position to be lifting their total consumption, but not dramatically. We’re still talking of relatively low incomes under 10 thousand USD for the average family per annum. So the growth is there.

 

TN: So Indonesia, India, Brazil and so on, the capital formation, capital investment is the real weakness there. And it seems to me that’s a function of, largely, education. Is that fair to say?

 

CL: That’s exactly what it is. As they get the education right and they’re working on it, most of these countries have been quite responsible in that area. And as they get that right, so the investment comes in, so the consumer gets more affluent and becomes a virtuous circle.

 

TN: And what time scale are we talking about for that consumption to come in a really notable way to take the place of the under 40 Chinese consumption or the under 40 Western Europe or American consumption?

 

CL: Well, that’s the bad news.

Categories
QuickHit

QuickHit: The Anglosphere and the Multi-Speed Recovery

Macro specialist, geopolitics and history commentator Nick Glinsman joined us for the first time on QuickHit to discuss how the Anglosphere compares to the world in this multi-speed recovery in the wake of Covid.

 

Nick is based in Brazil and he brings decades of experience to macro, markets, and politics. His background is basically London and New York with a bit of Europe and, Australia and Hong Kong. He worked with the Salomon Brothers and Merrill Lynch. He’s doing a lot of advisory work and the ability to express views on the markets, geopolitics and macroeconomics in the market.

 

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This QuickHit episode was recorded on April 8, 2021.

 

The views and opinions expressed in this The Anglosphere and the Multi Speed Recovery? QuickHit episode are those of the guests and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any content provided by our guests are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

 

Show Notes

 

TN: Nick, for a while you’ve talked about this concept called the anglosphere. Can you help us understand what you mean by the anglosphere?

 

NG: I’ll dig into it. I like the fact that you’re talking about the link between geopolitics and economics because with Trump and Brexit, that’s where what was a very boring macro environment suddenly started to become differently exciting. The politics would start to drive some of the macro markets and actually what’s interesting is  Brexit and Trump, part of the anglosphere. Not the formative part of the anglosphere.

 

So what we mean by the anglosphere is looking at countries that are historically tied via culture but critically also via common law, legal system, because that defines how the economy and how commerce can run. If you go back in history, there is a big difference between common law countries and roman law countries. Common law countries think of European Union countries and that construct. So what we mean by the anglosphere is being, better start with the UK because it is the mother country, it’s still the mother country for where you are currently still. If the US were now part of the commonwealth. You’re looking at an anglosphere. Now typically when I refer to it, I’m talking about UK, US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand. Five Eyes.

 

You could loosely add two countries. One of which has an anglo-saxon common law — India. The other one works much closer as a defeated entity country in World War II — Japan. So you’re getting the quad, which I would maintain is part of an angular influence, at least, if not anglosphere entity.

 

Let’s stick with that grouping. You’re looking at countries that have a similar legal system, similar financial structure, they have banks, central banks that are lenders of last resort and traditional backups, concept. Remember the European Union doesn’t have banks.

 

Back to common law. Common law also in this environment. This is where it’s getting critical. So Five Eyes is I would posit it’s the ultimate defense alliance.

 

TN: Even New Zealand, still? Ah, you know. Long discussion. That’s so much sarcastically.

 

NG: I know what you’re saying. Although she has the relation in the State of Victoria in Australia, who is actually not known as Kim Yong Dan. But if you look at what they’ve just done with the central bank, there is still a similarity there. And of course the travel corridor that’s about to open on the 16th I think it is, is between Australian and New Zealand. So as much as she kowtows to the panda in Beijing, they are still part of that structure.

 

So back to the common law and the financial. So you’ve got countries with central banks that act as lenders of last resort with independent monetary policy, you have independent fiscal policy and I would include of course in both these, Bank of Japan, RBI in India and so on so you’ve got independent fiscal policy, independent monetary central bank, which you don’t have in Europe.

 

There’s been no Hamiltonian moment there. So you have that flexibility and you can see that flexibility. You also have much more, common law enables Schumpeter’s creative destruction and thus reconfiguration. Much easier chapter 11 in the US or bankruptcy and start again. Right. Not so easy to either stop or start on the roman law. So that when you think of where we are now, you’ve gone through a pandemic where inexplicably a lot of countries have remained closed, the reopening is going to need that reconfiguration.

 

You’ve also been the countries that are advancing with the vaccine quickest of those that took a very commercial view as governments in terms of getting them… so you had operation walk speed in the US and you had a vc person take over the procurement policy and the vaccine policy in the UK. Private Sector innovation. And in fact, in the UK, you have that triangle, Oxford, Cambridge, London, that’s without biotech and so on and so forth, very flexible. You even have a situation where the famous Astrazeneca factory in Holland was financed by the British. Not by the Dutch.

 

We can get into that on another episode of the great vaccine debacle. But I think that’s part of the precautionary Roman Law System that the EU runs versus the go get innovative system that comes with the anglo-ceric countries, the common law system and the structure of finance business so and so forth.

 

TN: Okay. So it sounds to me like when you talk about the anglosphere and you look at it kind of post pandemic or at least post first wave of disaster in the pandemic as we enter a recovery, it sounds like you see a widening divergence between those with say common law and relatively independent central banks versus the other law formed be it roman and in independent fiscal policy as well.

 

So help me understand the… so we just had this IMF report come out earlier this week about 5.1% growth or whatever this year and everything’s amazing and which we know, given, it’s all base effects and if you do a three-year average, it doesn’t look good at all. In Europe, the only one, over that three years, the only one with positive growth is The Netherlands. Not even the UK. But I would argue there, they lean toward you know more of a British style than other styles.

 

So if we’re having a two-speed or multi-speed recovery, would it be fair for me to say that you believe the anglosphere will recover faster than the other spheres?

 

NG: Absolutely. Absolutely. You’re better expert on sinosphere than I would be. But I think the growth is going to disappoint because they’ve pushed so hard on the string of debt. Okay.

 

In terms of the Euro, Europe, I think there’s a very simple way of looking at things. It’s extent of vaccination and compare those and what does that mean? It’s now being said out of UCL, University College of London. UK’s herd immunity on Monday, 73%.

 

You can see there’s data coming out of the UK that is explosive as there is in the US. People are looking at the European and thinking, okay let’s close until August or beyond because this vaccine debacle is even worse. Everybody’s going to take Astrazeneca in Europe even though for the young women of age below 30, the chance of getting a blood clot is 1 in 600,000. Where the child’s getting Covid is substantially greater.

 

Because Europe and the Roman legal system has this precautionary black bent. It’s clear that this whole debacle in Europe has delayed that coming out of meltdown. The European summer season as the Germans would say is kaput.

 

TN: If we have this kind of two-speed recovery or multi-speed recovery, and let’s say Japan is part of the anglosphere, would you say Japan would be leading Asia out instead of China? Now I’m talking about real data. I’m not talking about Chinese 8.1% growth numbers like fictional. I’m talking about actual real performance with actual real usable output and you know all this other stuff.

 

NG: I’ve got so that’s going to be the case actually. I really do have that sense and I also, given the belligerence of the Chinese regime right now. You’ve got vocal and slightly belligerent actions against Taiwan, of course, which I’m with Albert on that. They’d have already invaded if they were going to do it. And you’ve got what’s going on in the Philippine islands with all these ships tied together.

 

I remember a very famous situation where chief ancient China economist from HSBC came into the office and talking about China and then we asked coming into that particular office, name unmentioned, always an aggressive to and fro Q&A, and then we have one of us asked about China, how’s the recovery going after Fukushima. Blood was coming out of this chad’s mouth having to talk a bit about China.

 

And we know that there is a much more passionate… we have passion against Germany or France as a Brit or as an Englishman come soccer. But, we love each other.

 

TN: Maybe that’s a bit strong. But we’ll use that.

 

NG: Maybe strong for Germans but with the French, there is a deep passion there and somebody keeps reminding the agent. But in the Far East, there has been that, you see that tension with the South Koreans and Japanese. However, the Chinese are forcing people out away from some of this stuff.

 

Japan with Australia and India will enable a lot of these countries to look elsewhere. Isn’t it ironic going back to the anglo-sphere link and that publicly is United Arab Emirates who are being given credit for getting India, Pakistan talking together. I have no doubt behind the show, the English are very active there because you’ve got a cricketer in charge. She made this game… So there’s stuff going on that gives you signals as to what could be happening.

 

It was rather like a mutual friend of ours, we were discussing India in terms of trade and I was saying, the UK and India are going to have a free trade deal as soon as it’s possible once they’ve overcome some of the agricultural stuff. And that person said India will do a trade with the EU well before they do it with the UK. And I’m saying hold your horses. No way!

 

TN: It’s familiar.

 

NG: One, it’s familiar. Two, one of the problems that the EU’s have with trade deals with anglospheres countries is legal interpretation thereof. And you know, I think they’ve been discussing it for 8, 10 years, EU and India, they’ve got a sub agreement already in the UK after several months.

 

TN: Just coming back to this kind of overall topic of the anglosphere and the multi-speed recoveries, so it does sound like you almost have this triangulated recovery from your perspective from India, Japan and Australia that’s leading the way in Asia. You have the UK, which is leading the way for Europe and then you have the US that’s kind of leading the way for the Americas. Is that kind of how you see things?

 

NG: I tend to think that’s the case. But I wonder whether one can justify the idea of UK leading the way for Europe given the tensions between the UK and the EU.

 

TN: I think the EU will play through… The EU will feel pain until they get tired of it and then they’ll relent, I think.

 

NG: There’s one big problem and this came up yesterday there was a meeting of the EU commission about article 122 vaccine export ban. Belgium, Holland, Sweden and Ireland said no way. All the others were saying we’re okay with it. With Germany covering itself with a few conditions. The damage to Europe’s role in the global supply chain is irreparable. They will not be able to go back to this.

 

And there’s another little fact of it which makes me wonder what will happen with Ireland because there’s tension building up in Northern Ireland again. Article 122, that export ban is specifically aimed at UK, US, Canada, Australia. They’ve stopped shipping to Australia already. US, UK, they’re saying well you’re not exporting anything. Paid for everything but not exporting everything. Canada just gets lumped in with the US and the UK.  So I think that’s really shattered the role of Europe in the global supply chain.

 

You’ll have people producing goods for Europe from European input but how can you possibly? Now going to Ireland where the UK has already said we’ll give the Republic of Ireland 3.7 million vaccines because it’s secures Northern Ireland in the coming out of lockdown. That’s an interesting overthought process.

 

Because you have a situation where Ireland is under attack like the Netherlands and Switzerland from Joe Biden’s global tax. If they come out, I would not be funny.

 

TN: It seems to me that what you’re also saying is there’s likely some kind of regionalization or re-regionalization that may emerge from this. Am I putting words in your mouth or is that?

 

NG: I would go and say US and commonwealth EU for as long as it stays stable, which may be problematic and then as you say Asia.

 

TN: Okay. Yeah, I mean I think that we’re coming to a place and I’ve been talking about this since about 2015, where you have global supply chains for goods that are long-term commoditized goods and then you have regional supply chains for the higher value goods.

 

NG: And that’s consistent with the decoupling that’s got to take place against China. And then you have that floater which you and I touched on before we got online, which is Russia and I have a slightly different view of where I can go, which will be, you know.

 

Categories
Podcasts

Microsoft Executive Backs Australian Government In Tech War

Tech war in Australia, Trump’s impeachment hearing, companies moving to cheaper areas, volatility in the market, and online dating — these are some of the topics in the recent guesting of Tony Nash at BBC’s Business Matters. From Texas, he joins Rahul Tandon in UK and Michelle Jamrisko in Singapore.

 

What will happen to Australian businesses if Google left? Will Biden be involved in China deals? How will Trump’s impeachment hearings will bring about? How will this move to rural places evolve overtime, for example Californian companies moving to Texas? How will the stocks market play out with too much volatility with increasing number of retail investors? And will online scrabble be the new way of dating?

 

This podcast was published on February 12, 2021 and the original source can be found at https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/play/w172x197h9pkh53

 

BBC Business Matters Description:

 

The President of Microsoft, Brad Smith, says Australia’s proposals that tech giants pay for news appearing on their services, strengthen democracy by supporting a free press. We hear more from Rebecca Klar, a tech journalist from The Hill. As the second cricket test match in this series between India and England starts this weekend, the BBC’s Rahul Tandon reports that more Indian players are now coming from smaller towns than bigger cities, and how that reflects a broader economic change taking place in the country. It’s an interesting time for dating services with the pandemic throwing the world of romance into disarray; our reporter Deborah Weitzmann has been to meet some people looking for love in the time of Covid. And we’re joined throughout the programme by Michelle Jamrisko, Blomberg’s senior Asia economy reporter who is based in Singapore and economist, Tony Nash from Complete Intelligence; he’s based in Houston.

 

 

Show Notes

 

RT: Will there be some sort of compromise? Because Australia, and many of the businesses in Australia, particularly small and medium sized ones, would struggle if Google suddenly left?

 

TN: They would. How much of a compromise there would be? I’m not sure, and I think about like GDP in Europe, that wasn’t a real huge compromise. We start to see these nation states starting to act like nation states again. We’ve seen India push back on Twitter over the past. Right? And we’re starting to see countries push back on tech giants because they’re sovereign nations.

 

RT: What will we see countries getting together in a unified way to push back on the tech giants because there are two very powerful sides there?

 

TN: I hope they do, because they rule their own countries. And it’s up to a company to learn how to operate within a geography rather than the other way around.

 

RT: Do you think President Biden will want to get involved in this particular issue?

 

TN: I don’t think so. It’s interesting when you look at, like China has their way with tech companies all day long. They cultivate their own giants and they do whatever they want with Western companies. I don’t really think Biden will get involved or want to get involved, to be honest. I think it has a lot to do with whoever is closer to the campaign and whoever is closest to the Oval Office. But I think he would want to stay out of it.

 

RT: Do you think minds will be changed amongst those Republicans, 17 of them are going to have to vote to impeach President Trump? That looks unlikely, doesn’t it?

 

TN: Well, like Joe Biden, I really don’t know of anybody who’s watched it.

 

RT: I read something that said this had more viewers than the first impeachment trial. But from what you’re saying, it’s not exactly something that’s bringing in the ratings figures.

 

TN: I’m a political nerd. I talk to people all the time. I honestly don’t know of anybody who’s watching it. So what you say is possible, but it’s just not what I see. Do I think they change minds? Look, Trump is out of office like somebody pining over like losing a football game or something. This guy is out of office. They need to just let him go. That’s the way most of the people who I speak to feel. Every politician is competitive. Every politician uses rhetoric to win. And what Trump said was no different from what many, many Republicans and Democrats have said over the last four, eight, 12, 16 years. So I think this is just a clown show and it’s not going to result in anything.

 

RT: Michelle raised an interesting question, that is this about preventing what happened, making sure it doesn’t happen again or is a little bit about this preventing from Donald Trump running again?

 

TN: It’s more the latter than the former. If we look at the Supreme Court justice discussions over the last two years, especially during the cabinet hearings, there were protests in government buildings in the capital all over the place, people being violent.

 

RT: But this was different and they’re very different.

 

TN: But I don’t understand how it was different because though this was different because there was so much ruckus made about it and people wanted to make an issue of it. But if you look at the protests and the violence around the Kavanaugh hearings and you set them side by side with what happened on January 6th, there is very, very little difference aside from the Capitol Police letting people into the Capitol building, which they did.

 

And it’s on footage. People also let protesters into various government buildings during the Capitol hearings. So, again, this is completely about Donald Trump. Democrats are obsessed with Donald Trump and they just need to let it go. The guy’s not even in office anymore, so they just need to let it go.

 

RT: It’s not going to be let go for a while. And it’s going to be a conversation that we will be continuing here on business matters over the next few days as that impeachment trial continues. And Tony, China says to the U.S. confrontation will be disastrous. President Biden says he will work with China when it benefits the American people and he will have to work with China on some issues when he particularly his ideas on climate change.

 

TN: We will live in an integrated world. I actually think Xi Jinping would talk a a tougher game on climate change than Biden would. He certainly has at the World Economic Forum for several years. The question is what they actually do about it.

 

I actually worked for the Chinese government for a couple of years and the Central Economic Planning Agency. So I understand in a very detailed matter how the Chinese government actually works. And this discussion is just preliminary. It doesn’t mean anything. OK, we’ll know in six or nine or 18 months what the real policies are.

 

My concerns are with, we really have to look at the people on the National Security Council in the US and their relationships with China.How many paid speeches have they had in China that those are the biggest issues that we need to look at with regard to China policy today from the U.S. perspective.

 

RT: That trend in India where we’re seeing the growth of what’s called Taiwan tier two, often, these much smaller towns. Is that something that you’re seeing in Texas at all or is it still very much focused around Houston, Dallas, Austin, economic growth?

 

TN: First on India. The tier two and three cities is something I would forecast when I was with The Economist back in those days. We did work on this 10, 15 years ago. And it’s amazing to see it happen. You go outside of cities like Chandigarh and you see what used to be fields. That is all some suburban cities. It’s really incredible to see that is in Texas.

 

What we’ve seen since COVID is more people are moving to semi-rural areas or buying bigger plots of land further out. And it’s some people from Texas, but it’s a lot of people from outside of Texas. Some of us, including myself, get a little bit defensive about Texas, if you can imagine.

 

RT: One interesting thing I think that we are seeing as well is maybe COVID will accelerate this. But this was always going to happen, that we will see businesses moving to cheaper areas. We see that in the States, don’t we? With some movement from California towards Texas?

 

TN: Yes, but you also see this in places like I was hearing about a technology company that in Taiwan, so the companies are based in Taipei, for example, and the workers wanted to move outside of the city since they couldn’t come into town, into the office. So they moved to small towns around Taiwan where their family was. The company actually indexed their pay based upon the cost of living to those country towns. Right. So and I think what you’ll start seeing as you see the diffusion of employment, companies will start looking at their costs and say, “look, these people aren’t paying for an apartment in Manhattan, they’re living in Iowa.” So we need to really understand where people are living. That company in Taiwan was using mobile phone records to understand where those individuals were so they can index their pay. I think you’ll see more and more of that. It’s not that people won’t be able to live. It’s just that they won’t make the salary from Manhattan while living in, say, rural Texas.

 

RT: I think we’re seeing that in many parts of the world with that sort of story you described. The taking place in and companies looking at and what’s happening with employees if they move to what you could describe as cheaper areas.

 

We had Carrie Lee here, there being a little bit cautious about what’s happening with many of these companies are going public. There is a lot of cash around from stimulus in the U.S. Interest rates are very low. Do you see this continuing?

 

TN: We’re very late in the investment cycle and we’ve moved from a company being valued on its earnings or future potential to a speculator’s market. And a lot of what we’re seeing in markets today are stocks that pop for one day by 50 percent and then they lose that 50 percent the next day. We just saw that with a big pot stock, a big marijuana stock over the past 24 hours here in the U.S. And people are trying to to squeeze out as much gain as they can in markets. So this this market is very long in the tooth. I just don’t see this lasting much longer because we are in such a speculative market right now.

 

RT: Do you not think that when stimulus begins to to slow down in many parts of the world, some of that frothiness in the markets may disappear?

 

TN: There’s a concept of stock, meaning how much money is in the market. And then there’s a concept of flow, meaning how much money is moving into the market. And because a lot of the investment climate right now is focused on flow. So how much money is coming in stimulus? How much money is coming in support from other mechanisms? Not necessarily a reallocation of the money that’s already in the market.

 

One of the big triggers potentially could be a possible disappointment with the the package coming out of the U.S. Congress. If it’s not what people have been promised, then there’s a possibility that those marginal investors who’ve been pumping stocks up by 50 percent per day could be squeezed out of the market. And then we see that flow start or grind to a trickle. And then the action really slows down and then we start to see a correction. No one wants to call a top. I don’t necessarily think this is it. I have no idea. But it is that stock and flow discussion that really worries me.

 

RT: The thought of dating is always absolutely petrified me. I was always happy my mom would have arranged my marriage and to Indian way somehow there were not many takers. Unfortunately, if you had to go back in the dating scene, would playing Scrabble online be your idea of romance?

 

TN: No. No, not at all, sorry, it just doesn’t cut it.

 

RT: No?

 

TN: We would find way. Look, I have two 19 year old kids. They get out, they’ve been social. Their friends are dating. I know it’s impacted some parts of the world in a very difficult way, but it hasn’t necessarily impacted my kids and their friends. I certainly wouldn’t settle for online scrabble. Who is the researcher at the university in London who snuck out for a hookup? I think we would sneak out outside a curfew to get things done if needed.

 

RT: OK. All right. Thank you, Tony. We’re getting a very different image of you now. Tony, stop sneaking out, please. No breaking curfew for you. That’s it for business matters.

Categories
Visual (Videos)

Deflation (and falling demand) is Still The Main Problem Globally Now?

This video is originally uploaded on Youtube at https://youtu.be/0D0IxTnufoo.

 

Jason Burack of Wall St for Main St interviewed returning guest, founder and CEO of Complete Intelligence, Tony Nash.

 

Tony’s company helps many companies solve their global supply chain problems and he has also lived and worked in Asia for 15 years in the past and advised the Chinese government on their economy and trade in the past. Tony’s company also uses AI predictive analytics software to predict stock market and commodity price movements.

 

During this 40+ minute interview, Jason asks Tony about China’s economy, the global chain, the threat of much worse stagflation and volatility in markets like stocks. Tony thinks that the main problem is still deflation and a lack of demand now regardless of the amount of currency, stimulus and bailouts governments do.

 

Show Notes

 

JB: Hi everyone. This is Jason Burack of Wall St for Main St. Welcome back to another Wall Street from Main Street podcast interview today’s special guest is a returning guest he is founder and CEO of Complete Intelligence, Tony Nash thank you for joining me.


TN:
 Thanks Jason.

 

JB: now Tony, I know you’ve lived in Asia for 15 years you’ve done a lot of work with the Chinese government consulting them on their economy. You’ve worked with a lot of companies all over Asia — Singapore, China, Hong Kong — helping them with their supply chains. So let’s talk about the Chinese economy and if you think it’s recovered post coronavirus.

 

You put out a survey about a month or so ago talking about unemployment rates in China with factory order…

 

TN: 50 million because at the time I think China had said that there were five million unemployed as a result of coronavirus and I put out survey saying “is it 0-5 million, 5-25 or something and then over 50.” And the vast majority of people responded over 50 million people. Not vast majority, but majority of people responded over 50 million.

 

I’ve since seen data that estimates unemployment in China alone as a result of coronavirus at 120 million or more. I think it’s safe to say nobody actually knows the real number. But it’s probably big. And it’s probably tens of millions rather than single millions. I think it’s a safe bet to say it’s probably north of 50 million. A number of economists watching China are still assuming that the government number holds.

 

 

JB: I’ve been reading articles quoting some factory owners and some factory owners in China. I don’t know if this is all the factory owners. But at least a few of them that have been quoting articles have been saying that their orders are down 70 percent. So exports are down a lot so there are not purchase orders for a lot of different companies right now is that what you’re also hearing?

 

TN: Sure there was just a piece out today saying that a survey in China has exports for May down 7 to 8 percent year-on-year. Imports are down almost 10 percent year-on-year. That survey data Is possibly under under waiting what the fall is. I don’t doubt that exports are down double digits and there has been some lag. As you remember from the kind of early mid Corona period, there were these supply chain issues of just getting stuff out. So initially, there was this wave of pent up export requirements just to get stuff out of China. But now things are starting to settle in because you have those demand in May, especially with the US and Europe closed, you have real demand depression. I think the main numbers may be overstated a bit and I think the exports may be down even more. Of course, it’s highly unlikely we’ll see that in the official data but it’s terrible.

 

I think things may be recovering a bit. I don’t think that China is in for a V-shaped recovery like we’ve seen, but I do think that they’ll come back maybe not to as much as they had thought they would but I don’t think it’s going to be a long-term depression.

 

My concern with China is in industrial production declines and the employment declines that come as a result of that and then the wage pressure that comes as a result of that.

 

JB: what is the percentage of GDP for exports right now because there’s a lot of people that are I would call them China trolls that tell me that it’s a lot lower amount but the numbers I’ve seen for exports as a percentage of GDP are still very high for the Chinese economy.

 

TN: It’s not as high as I once as I once knew. It’s definitely, I believe as a percent of GDP it’s it’s smaller than it was like five years ago. You do have that growing services economy component you do have growing domestic demand so but I don’t think it’s it’s definitely not as high as it was. Sorry I don’t have the number to hand but it’s really not what it once was>

 

JB: It seems that China has like astagflation problem right now in food prices and rent they’ve had to import an enormous amount of pork last year. All of 2018, they were having the African swine flu problem so the report shortages in China food prices were rising long before the coronavirus, and there’s a lot of videos online of shop owners protesting either rent not being reduced or rent prices going up by their building owner. So would you say that that’s why the Chinese government and the People’s Bank of China has been very hesitant about how much stimulus and QE to inject into their economy right now because they are worried that if they put too much in it will accelerate like a stagflation problem in their rural economy?

 

TN: I think that’s a concern. I think there’s also just concerns about the fiscal resources if the Chinese government has. Of course, they can print as many fun tickets as they want as long as it’s in CNY. But I think that is a concern.

I’m quite frankly more concerned about about deflationary pressures in China and just just on the face of it naked deflationary pressures through obviously the rest of Q2 and into Q3 and then how they potentially get out of it. I think China really hasn’t had an issue or had a problem with contriving inflation when needed. But if we do have the industrial production issues and the wage issues that I’ve been concerned about, I do think that deflation is more the overall and more serious concern there.

 

JB: That’s interesting because you’ve been predicting that the Chinese yuan against their exchange rate against the dollar it gets devalue down 7.2, right?

 

TN: That’s right.

 

JB: How would that jive then with deflation if they’re trying to devalue their currency?

 

TN: I think you’ve got both of those trends moving in the same direction. Unfortunately with energy prices down into the 30s, of course you have into the 40s. Yesterday or today, you have Brent move into the 40s. Sorry WTI. With the resources depressed, again, this is on a year-on-year basis.

 

But I think there’s serious downward pressure and will be continuing a series downward pressure on resources and commodities so the secondary impacts will also show a bit of producer price deflation. And then you have just the function of overproduction in China and having to sell those inventories. You don’t necessarily have the take off from the US. Partly I mean, this is a two or so year-old trade war, but because of our discussion, but because of the trade war, and then you have the issues in Europe with demand as a result of COVID, so I think you’re looking at more supply in China of manufactured goods.

 

They’re looking at commodity prices that I don’t believe we’ll come back dramatically. It’s it’s an ongoing issue. At the same time, you have the what I believe ongoing concerns for industrial production as a result of this and then there are the jobs and wages issues. If you have wages declining, then people just can’t pay for those goods so that’s disinflationary. Again I’m worrying about this where I think a lot of other people aren’t worrying about this. But it is something that I’m actually quite concerned about in China.

 

JB: It looks like the government can create even more distortions with what they try to do with intervention and central planning with the currency. We’re recording this interview right now in June 5th, the currency is that the Chinese Yuan is at 7.081 to the Dollar.

 

I’ve been reading articles that a lot of Chinese manufacturers are producing but there’s not really demand. So they’re stockpiling a lot of stuff. I’ve been reading a lot of articles lately too about a lot of oil companies in China importing more oil. I think they built another or the atleast announced another Strategic Petroleum Reserve. How many is that what five or six now? They are buying more oil. I don’t know if they’re using the oil because my friend tracks Chinese auto traffic data and he says it’s nowhere near the pre-coronavirus 2019 levels and there’s almost no traffic whatsoever on the weekends in the major cities. Only at rush hour is there actually like anywhere close to normal traffic levels and the other data throughout the day and night and on the weekends is nowhere is way way off.

 

TN: It’s not surprising at all. What it reminds me of is the kind of quotas for stockpiling for Soviet production and the kind of deflationary impact that had in many ways on certain goods in the former Soviet Union. In China, over production and stockpiling, I mean we’ve known about this and things like steel for years. But as it comes to finished goods, that’s hugely problematic given the volume that I suspect overproduction is happening and given the disappearance of demand in overseas markets and obviously domestic markets. Areas like automotive auto parts electronic goods these sorts of things that just people are not going to be renewing. Of course that’s not an absolute statement. It’s an incremental statement, but these things really hurt the manufacturing complex in China. We’ve all taken a pause generally from consumption in Q2 globally. In China it’s been a bit more stark.

 

JB: I think the factory orders are not coming in like you said in the stockpiling is just increasing the amount of credit that I think the Chinese government is injecting I’ve seen from China beige but they put an article out on their Twitter it was like 400 billion in a month pace. But I think a lot of that’s just going to keeping the factories running right now so they don’t go bankrupt.

 

TN: Yeah and that’s not surprising. I mean they don’t want people to be unemployed because they don’t want to see civil unrest. We’ll see more and more social controls in China so that there isn’t civil unrest because people are just bored out of their minds.

 

JB: Speaking of social unrest you know all the rules changes and stuff going on with Hong Kong. We’ll talk about U.S. and China trade relations in a couple minutes, but do you think that China one of the main reasons they’re going into Hong Kong is economically? Do you think that the Chinese government is eyeing that $400 billion that the Hong Kong Monetary Authority has to protect their dollar pay?

 

TN: Of course they are. I think the US was really smart to take away Hong Kong status very, very quickly because the incentive was that Hong Kong would continue to be this buffer zone and that China would continue to be able to benefit from that buffer zone and it’s fine if it’s a buffer zone and it really is a free market because in its heyday, and this is not that long ago like months ago, Hong Kong was the freest market in the world. But as you have the mainland authorities take over things like the judiciary, then Hong Kong no longer become the freest market in the world. So I think that was the reason or there are a lot of reasons but that was one of the reasons for them to grow assertive. China is looking for reasons to distract from the economy, which i think is extremely dangerous, but I think Hong Kong is one way for them to distract from their domestic economic issues.

 

JB: I completely agree. I think there was multiple reasons for what they did with Hong Kong and then what Trump does they gonna blame it on Trump.

 

TN: Right of course and that’s fine and that’s easy. Anything to distract, whether it’s incursions in India or whether its South China Sea or its Hong Kong or whatever it is. The Chinese ambassador to the UK making stupid statements about the Tiananmen, well kind of circumventing that. They’re doing anything they can to distract from their own domestic economy.

 

JB: I think yesterday was the anniversary of Tiananmen.

TN: that’s right

 

JB: For our listeners are not familiar, I think one of the tricks that what not the a lot of Chinese companies were getting around to not pay the tariffs last year was they were exporting their goods from mainland China to Hong Kong and then they were taking advantage of that. So they were re-exporting out of Hong Kong to avoid the tariffs that the US had put on. I think that was quite common practice, right?

 

TN: Sure yeah. Any sort of third country trans-shipment, but Hong Kong was as viable as any other, and because it had this relationship with the US, it was a very easy solution. But I think that’s becoming more and more difficult. Regardless of the goods, I think it’s becoming more and more difficult. Even things like exporting components or knocked down goods for assembly and their locations even that stuff is becoming more and more difficult.

 

JB: So now I want to transition to the US and China trade relations. We still occasionally get a tweet out from Trump or one of his representatives in the Trump administration or White House about how the US-China trade deal is progressing. But really, there’s been very little positive actions on China’s end about the trade deal. I think they made one purchase of soybeans. The trade announcement was in October 2019. So we have October, November, December, January, February, March, April and May. Finally, the Chinese government buys some soybeans in May. It was a fairly decently large order. But look at all the months that they didn’t really buy anything, it didn’t comply with phase one. So do you think the phase one trade agreement is dead?

 

TN: I don’t think it’s necessarily dead, but I think China is very good at negotiating agreements and very bad at going through on them. This is why the Americans were very focused on the enforcement mechanism within the phase one agreement. So I think the real question is, will the US follow through with enforcement? If the US doesn’t follow through with enforcement, then it’s just a piece of paper. It doesn’t really matter that much. But if the enforcement mechanisms come through, then I think it’s possible. Again, I’m skeptical. I was pleasantly shocked and surprised when the agreement was made in Q4. At the time, I was like most people skeptical about the ability to have that enforced because what are you gonna do? You can’t force people to buy stuff from you. That’s the real problem. Now with Hong Kong coming into the picture and with the US has action on Hong Kong coming into the picture, I think it’s going to be harder and harder for those for those the agreement terms to be exercised.

 

JB: My contracts in China, when the phase 1 deal was announced, they were really happy for the Chinese government. They were celebrating because no more tariff hikes. That was the main goal for the Chinese government for phase 1 announcement the trade deal was to make sure there was no more tariff hikes.

 

TN: Right. Evidently some of the state-owned buyers have started to look at soybeans and other products more recently. I’m just not sure that that’s real. I mean, this is some stuff that we’ve been hearing some transactions in the market. But stopping the tariff hikes is the first thing but actually getting them to buy is the more interesting part on the US side of course.

 

JB: But did Beijing just almost now for the last month or so there’s been press release announcements back and forth, back and forth between the US and China like Trump is now blocking the retirement savings I think of a lot of military and government employees from being invested in China, China then threatened to remove Chinese companies listing from US exchanges. Those are just a couple examples but back and forth back and forth back and forth. This is going. It doesn’t seem like this is Trump’s crazy way of negotiating from the art of the deal but this just doesn’t seem like it’s productive towards a trade agreement.

 

TN: I think it’s more of a recognition that these things haven’t been happening anyway. We may very well see more purchasing later in the year but I think this stuff is that there has to be well, there is tension between the US and China. China has become more aggressive in South China Sea in Hong Kong and other places, India. I think part of this is maybe not necessarily a direct hit on what may seem to be a problem it may be related to actions that China has been taking toward relationships that the US is becoming closer to. I don’t necessarily see trade as a single issue. I see trade as a multi-layered issue.

 

JB: Interesting. How important do you think what’s happening with Huawei and how the Huawei CFO, her extradition process in Canada is continuing, how important do you think that is?

 

TN: It’s very, because Huawei is kind of a crown jewel in China and I think as the UK starts looking to other technology as Huawei technology becomes an issue for Germany and they start looking at other sources, I think that removes China’s centrality to the deployment of these types of networks. Of course, that’s obvious. But the services, the information and other things that you can sell off of owning that network equipment is huge. So it’s not just a one-time sale. It is a long relationship. Now that doesn’t just have impacts on Huawei. It has impacts on places like China export-import bank or CDB. It’s not just the equipment, it’s the financing of the equipment. These centrally planned economies or heavily centrally influenced economies, it’s a game of musical chairs. Once you stop the music, it has knock-on effects for many, many other players. I think the Huawei issue with Canada and the US  is that on its own is an embarrassing issue. But stopping the purchase of Huawei equipment in Europe and the US and other places has long-term commercial effects with Huawei, but also the whole value chain including places like Export Import Bank and other places that are supporting those purchases or supporting the financing of those activities, whether it’s Exim Bank or another bank doesn’t matter, but it’s the overseas financial services impacts in China is also stopped or slowing dramatically.

 

JB: Do you think then if the Huawei CFO, if the charges aren’t dropped, if this doesn’t stop with what’s going on with Huawei, that that’s a deal-breaker for the US and China trade relations? Are they going to be able to figure out a workaround?

 

TN: There are a number of layers here. First of all, it shows that the law is not the law in China, that you can be of a certain class and rank and the law doesn’t really apply to you, if in fact she broke the law, right? If she broke the law and China is still upset then, it’s a very clear indicator to Chinese citizens that the law doesn’t apply to people of Ming stature. That’s a problem for China. While they fight for her return, I think a very bad development for them would be that she has found guilty yet China still wants her let free and they let her go. That’s a real perception problem in China for Chinese citizens. But do I think it will impact the US-China trade war? I think every issue is connected when you’re talking to China. So now from the US side, the way Trump thinks is he bundles issues, and so the way American administration’s typically think is they think in an unbundled way. So the State Department typically cannot walk and chew gum at the same time. We’ve seen that for decades State Department will be happy about finishing one agreement when another agreement that should be linked isn’t and they can never get it done or something like that. What Trump and what his administration actually does very well from my perspective is they bundle things extremely well and so I don’t think the Trump administration itself sees that trade agreement as discrete and different from the main issue or from Taiwan or South China Sea or Hong Kong or any of these issues. I thing the administration sees everything is bundled which is not dissimilar from the way the Chinese diplomats and central government see things. They see everything is bundled.

 

JB: I see Huawei is one of the most important things for China because they have such long-term plans for it like you said like it’s their main cornerstone company, it’s their main technology company and then once Huawei has control over the 5g networks and all the other infrastructure there for communications, then the other Chinese companies the financing companies and all the others start to follow suit after that.

 

TN: Yeah. I think that’s fair.

 

JB: Let’s talk then about the global supply chain. It seems in January and February, the global supply chain started to break. Do you think that it’s being fixed now?

 

TN: Do I think it’s fixed? I don’t. Our US supply chains fixed. I don’t think they’re fixed. Is the Chinese supply chain infrastructure moving again? Yes. I think what’s happening is a number of important US importers and US manufacturers and even global manufacturers are trying to find places to reduce their risk and exposure to China. And not because they want to abandon China. I don’t believe that’s the case at all. I think we see people who are say super nationalist or whatever who want to act like these guys are interested in leaving China completely. I don’t believe that’s the case at all. I think global manufacturers are looking for incremental manufacturing capacity to reduce their risk if there is a second wave of Corona, if there is political unrest in China, if there is some sort of retribution or something. I think they want incremental manufacturing for that. And for that, they’ll look to places like Mexico, parts of the US parts, or Europe or somewhere else, other place in Latin America. I don’t necessarily see a wholesale substitutional effect for supply chains out of China at least for the first two to three years. I think over time, there may be more substitutionality. But right now, I think it’s more of an incremental discussion.

 

JB: Do you think India is gonna benefit from this because we’ve seen headlines where India is talking about subsidizing, trying to get more Apple supply chain out of China? I think they’ve gotten one company to move from China to India but they’re going after a lot more than that. They see this as an opportunity and the sentiment online, Tony, I don’t know if I’ve ever seen this before where lots of people here in the West in the US and Europe are talking about boycotting Chinese products. Now that’s easier said than done because a lot of stuff that’s partially made in China is finished assembling here in the US and then it’s stamped made in the US but it’s all the components that go into it are not fully made in the US.

 

TN: Do I might think India will benefit from this? I love India. I really wish India would benefit from this. But I think there’s so much corruption in India. I think it’s very, very difficult. I think it’d be a very difficult thing for any manufacturer to make a significant commitment to India. While I would love for India to benefit from this, and while I would love for manufacturers to move to India, I think the reality is from a bureaucratic, from a corruption, from a just sheer logistically difficult position, again, you know I spent a lot of time in India in the same way I spent a lot of time in China. I just don’t see that happening. I wish it would, but I just don’t see it happening.

 

JB: That’s sad.

 

TN: Yup.

 

JB: it’s sad, they have an opportunity to do it too.

 

TN: They do, but I think the institutional issues are so great that it’s gonna take them years and years to root that out. Look, having services functions moved to India? No problem at all. This is why the BPO sector started booming in India 20 years ago. But actually having physical Manufacturing, and physical logistics, I think it’s probably still a very difficult proposition.

 

JB: In some of your answers, you said that the large corporations don’t want to leave China said they don’t really care if some of their intellectual property or research and development or forced technology transfer or a forced Chinese silent partner they were okay with that?

 

TN: No, I’m not saying they don’t want to leave China. But they already have a large amount of investment there and so moving wholesale from China over the next two to three years presents a big risk for them. So I think, what they’ll do is initially move incremental production away from China. Let’s say it’s a new model or a new product line or a regionalised product line. Let’s say they do something just for North America or something, I think they’ll move that stuff first because those are new supply chains that they would be building out. New manufacturers or expanded with existing manufacturers and then they look at either new physical transport or expanded physical transport. All these things are things that they have to be careful of not just the risk in China, but the risk within the new supply chains that they’re developing in other places.

 

So I don’t think any major US manufacturer will rush out of China unless they’re absolutely forced to. I think they’ll develop parallel supply chains and incremental supply chains first. Test them out for a couple years and then gradually, some of that may be rapid some of that may be slow, but gradually move stuff out.

Before the financial crisis in 2008-09, many manufacturers, particularly Japanese manufacturers, but many manufacturers were looking at something that they called their “China plus one” or “China plus 2“ or “China plus 3 strategy”, where they were looking at manufacturing goods in China but having other locations as backups. Now when the financial crisis came about, all these manufacturing firms wanted to just get rid of risk and they saw these other supply chains as risk so they doubled down on China and they continue to build out in China for all the new equipment and hiring and everything else in China as well. So they saw it as de-risking or at least not growing risk, but actually by concentrating their activities it actually became riskier. Now with a place like Japan, we saw with the 2012 riots and protests and other things that the Chinese did against Japan, this was over the Senkaku Islands, we saw a lot of Japanese manufacturers move their manufacturing out of China. Initially it was slow, and then it became much faster. I think people looking to exit China will look at that as a template. It wasn’t that long ago. It was 2012, 13, 14 when this stuff started and then it moved. So I think they look at that as a template rather than China try to invent something wholesale.

 

JB: I think it could take years for more factories to leave China. Could take a significant amounts of the supply chain to move. There’s billions of dollars of investment. Some of these factories now are not cheap to build. It’s a lot of technology involved, a lot of investment. And given the global economy right now, and how the consumer has not come back, some of these investments may be delayed.

 

TN: Yeah, I don’t think I’ll take as long as a decade. But I do think it’ll take years. But having said that, I don’t think many of these manufacturers will completely want to remove their operations from China either. It’s a big market and the Chinese spend money just like anyone else. So they’ll have their China operations for China and maybe they’ll build for other parts of Asia or they’ll build especially parts or something like that. But I don’t think many of them will have global manufacturing based in China. I think we’re going to see re-regionalization of supply chains and we may have talked about this before, but the move away from say the NAFTA and Euro area around 2000, it was a zero sum where most of the stuff went to China over the next 10 years, 15 years, particularly in the first five years. But then it kind of bled over the next five to eight years and then it became completely concentrated in China and then with the centrality of China, kind of the regionalization complete now we’re starting to see the re-regionalization even if it is a higher manufacturing price because the risk associated with closing again with an event like COVID is so high that people just need to have supply chains closure at home.

 

JB: Yeah. You told me to call it localization and not de-globalization like Peters Ayhan has been calling it regionalization.

 

TN: Regionalization, yeah. I think the globalization is a bit of a, it’s charged first of all but I also think it’s not really accurate. I think we’re still globalized. We still have globalization. But I think we’re Re-regionalizing. Things were pretty regionalized in the 90s and then they de-regionalized, they globalized with China as the epicenter but I think we’re going through a phase of re-regionalization and I think we’ll dip into globalization as needed, we’ll dip into regionalization as needed because people can run pretty sophisticated supply chains now and so whereas 20 years ago it was harder to do that.

 

JB: Yeah, I totally agree. I’ve been reading articles and also my last interview with you where you talked about it, our listeners can go back I think in December 2019, where you’re talking about your company Complete Intelligence and the supply chain management software, the improvements it’s had just in the last couple decades. So in the past, when there wasn’t good supply chain management software, it might take a purchasing manager or manager, even a senior manager at the company, might take them days or weeks with phone calls and tracing to trace orders and exact amounts of the supply chain. Now they can do it on their on their iPad.

 

TN: Sure, yeah. Just the track and trace stuff, the location of stuff, that’s old technology and it’s very easy. I think what’s harder for people is to understand the true cost and cost scenarios for manufacturing a good. What is the cost at the element level or the component level of that phone that you’re building or that electronic equipment or that food item or whatever. What we’re able to do and I think things are moving is much more precision around taking those costs, breaking them out, understanding where they’re going over the next one to say 24 months so that you can really plan where the best location is, what the right price is, all this stuff. The geopolitics and the trade policy around trade, I don’t think that stuff will ever leave us. The precision with which you can plan around cost and price and other things, I think those things are allowing manufacturers to adjust really, really quickly and really have a bottom line impact within say 90 days something like that.

 

JB: I think a lot of these governments are talking about trade so much because they all are seeing that they want to bring back manufacturing for jobs.

 

TN: That’s right. Whether it’s Europe or the US or South East Asia. You look at a place like Malaysia. A lot of Malaysian manufacturing was transitioned to China between say 2000 and 2012, 2015. And now global manufacturing companies or for the past couple years they’ve been looking at places like Malaysia and Thailand again because it’s simply not China and so it’s not just localizing manufacturing in North America it’s looking at other regions and arbitrage in the regulations and the tariffs instead of arbitrage say the electricity price, which is one of the reasons people after Mexico, or regulatory in taxes, which is part of the reason people of the US. So, this isn’t just say a Western or European US issue. It’s regionalization in the truest sense.

 

JB: So these governments and central banks, it’s not just the US and the Federal Reserve. The European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, the People’s Bank of China is doing some but nowhere near the amounts because I think they are really worried about the stagflation component, but they are flooding in general the global economy and asset markets with currency. Some people are getting what twelve hundred dollar checks. There’s SBA loans. Is this going to put a lot higher costs in the global supply chain? Are you seeing higher cost yet?

 

TN: I don’t necessarily foresee that, but I do think we’ll see incremental costs. So what you’re talking about is so much money is out there that chasing those goods will become more expensive. I think you’ll see that maybe in futures markets or in financial trading markets. But I think in terms of demand-led consumption, actually people buying tangible things, I think we’re in an environment where prices are hard for us to rise. Granted you see oil trading like I said earlier WTI broke I think $40 today, which is great. It’s healthy. But when that actually transitions into physical demand and how that transitions into other areas, I’m not really sure. Meaning, that $40 or how much price pressure is that going to have on downstream goods? Because $40 is much less than it has traded even though we had negative 37 and 20 and 28 and 32 for a long time, those prices are still pretty far depressed from where they have been historically. So I don’t see that. Typically when we have this type of stimulus that cash makes its way into things like real estate and equities and that sort of stuff. Will there be inflation there? Probably. But will we see it in supply chains? Probably not as much as one would think initially.

 

JB: So you don’t see a stagflation scenario where people in the US are going to be given more $1,200 or more checks per month and then because the global supply chain is not functioning at pre coronavirus levels, that there’s going to be less goods and services to purchase, so there’s going to be more currency creating less goods and services which would be stagflation airing that in my opinion?

 

TN: Certainly that’s possible. Not necessarily my central view. I think once you see these, the benefits and this $600 a week extra for unemployment, I think once you see that end at the end of June, I think we’ll see people really try to get back to work as quickly as possible. I think we will see some wage deflation among kind of white-collar workers especially in places and things like oil and gas. I’m based in Houston, Texas so I think you’ll see that stuff as those jobs become more competitive. But I don’t necessarily see a fully stagflation airy environment in the US.

 

JB: I think one of the main points though is the distortions that all these government interventions and the central bank intervention is creating because look at the stock market now that the stock market the Dow is over 27-thousand and I we haven’t seen any examples really of a recovery in the US economy yet.

 

TN: Again, markets are trying to find their levels and what I’ve been explaining to our clients is we will likely see quite a lot of volatility between now and say August, where we’ll see markets rise and we’ll see markets fall.

 

In hindsight, if we look let’s say on a monthly average basis, they may look like pretty boring markets. But in reality, we’ll see things rise and fall quite a bit until those markets, whether it’s say a copper price or whether it’s sp500 ETF. They’ll bounce around quite a lot. So again nobody really knows this is this is the problem it’s price discovery. When we talked with say procurement people, our supply chain people, even revenue planning people within companies, they’re all kind of making their best guesses. But they don’t really know and I think whether it’s somebody allocating a portfolio or whether somebody buying for a product, the planning, the precision of planning, the tools that people you are using really are not that precise and they really don’t incorporate a number of scenarios. We do have a lot of planning teams and let’s say portfolio strategy teams who are really kind of guessing and that’s why we see and we believe we will see the volatility in markets because it’s easy to look at the Dow or the S&P and say, “wow that’s too high” and then next week it swings 5% lower and then the week after it swings up 3% and so we see these things go up and down until we find that price where market participants agree that it should be in general region. I think we’re gonna be having that debate in markets for the next two to three months.

 

JB: I expect a lot more volatility even though the VIX is down below 25 that was below its support levels at 28. It was in a new trading range a higher trading range now it’s below that. But the Fed has talked about Powell and the Fed have talked about wanting to reduce volatility. Temporarily, they have reduced stock market volatility. But I’m looking for data out of the real world economy especially in the US economy where there’s improvement and I haven’t really seen improvement yet, now they are gonna we’re hopefully gonna restart the economy, but who knows if we’re gonna get a second wave of the coronavirus soon.

 

TN: Well if you look at driving right now, it’s at like 80 percent of pre corona. And this is part of what’s giving strength to crude oil markets. People are getting back on the roads. Not really getting back into planes that much yet. But they are getting back on the roads and I’m optimistic about that. When we start to see some of these basic signs of life at say 80% level, I think that’s positive. I do understand why markets were up today given the unemployment data and things like the road data that sort of stuff. Are they at the right level? I don’t know that anybody really knows but I think there is growing optimism that things may be coming back. The rate at which they’ll come back? Again, I think markets are going to debate that for at least a couple more months and then we’ll see real tangible, sustainable activities say late July August and people get an idea of where things will land for the rest of the year.

 

JB: Do you think the US economy is gonna have to make some really radical changes as in a lot of the bricks and mortar retailers, a lot of a lot of these casuals sit down in restaurants, they’re going to go away and the transition to e-commerce and online sales is gonna, it was already happening before the coronavirus, but now it’s gonna be a rapid acceleration than in the coming years?

TN: I think in general, I would say no. But I do think that a lot of your marginal businesses in strip malls or your marginal franchises or whatever that we’re just barely making it, I think it’s like this is a good time to cut those losses. I think things like real estate obviously you’ll see some changes there. But you know I think most people just want to go back to normal whatever that is. If we look at say pre 9/11,  everyone said the world was going to change. It ended up being kind of a TSA check and so I think yes it’s easy. It’s been pretty easy over the past couple months to kind of extrapolate today into the future and today is forever. Normal is not normal anymore. But I think most people just want to get back to normal. Of course there’s going to be changes, but we’ve seen from some from some of the say protest activity over the past week, people will get out and they’ll go in public for whatever their right reasons are. Do I think the dining experience is going to change dramatically? I don’t. Do I think the shopping experience is going to change dramatically? I think it’ll change a little bit, but I don’t think it’s going to be some new normal of every single thing being done online and everything being delivered to house. Of course, people want that especially that’ll take off or continue likely in urban areas in a big way. But I think at the end of the day most people just want to get out of the house right now. They’ve been there for so long that they’re just trying to trying to get out and do something else aside from eat another meal in their house.

 

JB: The food delivery companies, they’re way overcharging on fees. I’m paying for a couple of my deliveries I think I ordered like a pizza and a couple other things and it was fifty bucks. It’s way more than than the normal cost.

 

TN: It’s very inflexible demand, very inelastic so if they can charge it, they will and I don’t blame them. I wish I was in that position.

 

JB: They still can’t make money if you look at their earnings report. Jim Chanos like put out a he posted an interesting article on his Twitter about like there’s an the Pizza arbitrage. Did you see that article?

 

TN: no

 

JB: Yeah. So him and his buddy who’s a restauranteur, they figured out that GrubHub was under-pricing pizzas so they bought ten pizzas at the GrubHub subsidized price and then they were able to basically make $100 per order risk-free, 80 to 100 dollars cash for is free. There’s an article that I could send you. It’s pretty funny.

 

TN: They could sell it to other people.

 

JB: They could resell it, but it was basically, they were there was an arbitrage trade because of like doordash and GrubHub were intentionally under-pricing the menu items and so people would order from them and their call centers so they could sell to Wall Street that there was growth that there was revenue growth for deliveries so the stock would still go up.

TN: Wow fantastic, what a game, huh?

 

JB: well I’m not the CEO of a publicly traded company like that but yeah it’s a bad and said there’s a lot of added incentives right now in society.

 

TN: Yeah.

 

JB: Well, Tony, I really enjoyed our discussion today. We live in very interesting time. One last question here about the dollar. So you think the dollar shortage is real and that the dollar is gonna start rolling soon?

 

TN: “Soon” is relative. So do I think the dollar shortage is real? Yes. Do I think the dollar is going to rally soon? I think it’s inevitable, but I think it really all depends on several things. But I do believe that emerging markets will continue to try to devalue their currencies because their exports especially China, I think that the dollar is in demand because there is so much debt globally, and they have to have dollars to pay down their their US dollar denominated debt. I do believe that Brent Johnson, his view his milkshake theory, I think is very solid and I think there’s a level of patience behind that theory and I don’t see the fundamentals changing that much. I think it’s a pretty elegant in the way he’s put that together.

 

JB: It’s a sound theory, but I think the US government the US Treasury President Trump who’s tweeted a lot about the dollar in the last two years, there’s a lot of ways that Congress and Trump and the Treasury can spend, can hand out checks, can do a plaza court agreement, if things get bad enough, they can do what FDR did in 1934. And if the dollar does get to those levels that Brent Johnson is predicting at 120 and the dollar index I mean that would collapse everything.

 

TN: Maybe. I don’t know that it would collapse everything. But I think it would certainly put strains on emerging markets. I don’t know that it would collapse everything, but I think it would certainly harm and I think emerging markets would have to live within limits that they haven’t had to for probably 30 years. So, and this is the basis of the end of the Asian century is they borrowed against the next 30 years to pay for the last 15, right. It’s just not sustainable since they don’t have a global currency and I think if you get a dollar north of say 105 close to 110, I think Asia just starts having serious serious problems.

 

JB: Yeah, I agree. And emerging markets have an interesting business model since China joined the WTO. So they set up to export to China either luxury goods or commodities and then they started borrowing in dollars especially around what after 2009, when the dollar index in what 2011 to some of the all-time lows there with Ben Bernanke just doing the QE programs. They basically started shorting the dollar at the worst possible time when the dollar was already relatively low and they were doing a lot of exports to China but then borrowing in dollar so it was a dangerous game that the emerging markets had set up.

 

TN: Very dangerous. I think being in those markets, betting against the dollar is a really hard proposition especially right now because the relative strength of the US, the US is in pretty good position compared to a number of these markets. It’s in a good position compared to say Europe. I’m not just talking like this month, I mean we’re all hurting this month. I think over the medium and long term from demographics to resources to other things, the US is in a is in a pretty good position it’s not in an excellent position I don’t think anybody globally is but I think it’s in a pretty good position.

 

JB: I want to thank you so much for your time today, Tony. If my listeners want to follow you more on Twitter or take a look at your company Complete Intelligence and the work you do, how did they do so?

 

TN: Sure, our company website is at completeintel.com on Twitter the company URL is or the company tag is @complete_intel. My personal twitter is @TonyNashNerd.

 

JB: Putting out a lot of good surveys and a lot of good stories, too, about the global trade in China as well.

 

TN: Thanks Jason. Thanks so much for your time.