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Global recession risk rises as IMF lowers growth forecast

This podcast was originally published at https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/play/w172ydq1zf6tjvb

The IMF says the risk of a global recession has increased as it lowers its growth forecast for the coming year. Its managing director, Kristalina Georgieva, said the gloomy outlook was fuelled by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the continuing impact of the Covid pandemic.

Hong Kong has relaxed several of its coronavirus restrictions in recent weeks. Now it’s giving away 500,000 airline tickets worth $250 million in a bid to boost visitor numbers. Will it succeed?

The Rooney Rule was adopted by NFL teams in the US in 2003, with the aim of creating equal opportunities for Black coaches. But there’s criticism that it hasn’t achieved what it set out to do. Gus Garcia Roberts from the Washington Post has been investigating and shares his findings with us.

Sam Fenwick is joined by Tony Nash, chief economist at Complete Intelligence in Houston, Texas and Zyma Islam from the Daily Star in Dhaka, Bangladesh to discuss these stories and the other big money and work issues of the day.

Transcript

Sam

Hello. You’re listening to the BBC World Service. I’m Sam Fenick, and this is Business Matters. Welcome to the program. Today we’re going to be talking about the risk of a global recession. It’s apparently creeping close. It’s the stark warning from the International Monetary Fund. We’ll be talking about what it might mean for businesses and consumers around the world. Why the price of oil affects more products than just the petrol in your car.

Tony

So natural rubber has gone up, oil prices have gone up, and therefore the tire industry margins, margins have come down.

Sam

And have you ever quit your job? Is it liberating? We’re going to be talking about that. We’ll be joined throughout the program with two from my two guests on opposite sides of the world. And pleased to say that Tony Nash joins us. He’s in Houston, Texas in the USA. He is the CEO at Complete Intelligence. Hi, Tony.

Tony

Hi, thanks for having me.

Sam

And Zyma Islam is a journalist at the Daily Star newspaper in Dakar in Bangladesh. Hi, Zyma.

Zyma

Good morning, Sam.

Sam

Hi. Good morning. It’s Friday morning with you. It’s Friday morning with us, but it’s still Thursday with Tony.

Tony

Yes, it is.

Sam

And have either of you ever quit a job?

Tony

Yes.

Sam

Have you?

Tony

Yes.

Sam

Was it liberating? Worrying?

Tony

Well, I had a better opportunity in both cases, so I guess it was liberating.

Sam

Zyma, have you?

Zyma

Oh, I’m terrified by the very thought, even when I’ve had better opportunities.

Sam

Yeah, I’m with you. Maybe it’s a female thing. Well, we’ll be talking about that a bit later in the program. But first, shall we look at the global economic outlook? Because the International Monetary Fund warned on Thursday that the risk of a global recession is rising because of Russia’s attack on Ukraine and shocks caused by the COVID pandemic.

Sam

Tony, I think we should start with you on this because you are an economist. Some of the quotes that I was reading in the speech, which she gave greater uncertainty, higher economic volatility, geopolitical confrontations, more frequent and devastating natural disasters. It doesn’t sound great, does it? It makes for quite grim reading.

Tony

Yes. And if it’s going to be more volatile than the last two years, look out. I think part of this is obviously post pandemic. Part of this is the backside of a lot of the stimulus that we saw over the last two years. Part of it, of course, is because of the war. Part of it is because of the other side of supply chains. There’s so much that’s happened over the past couple of years and there’s always the other side of it. Right. And I think that’s what we’re seeing right now is the other side of all of this drama that we’ve all lived through over the past two years.

Sam

The IMF is going to downgrade the economic forecast for next year, 2023. Explain what that means.

Tony

Well, in civil terms, it just means things will grow slower or they’ll do the opposite of growing and they’ll contract. So that’s really what they mean by contracting economic growth.

Sam

And energy prices are a big problem here, aren’t they? You mentioned them. The war in Ukraine is really causing a problem with gas into Europe, but also oil prices.

Tony

Sure it is. Yeah. I mean, Russia has been selling that to Asia primarily, but it has disrupted, obviously, the flow of oil to Europe, and that’s just dislocated global prices. Of course. In the US, the president opened up the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, which put millions and millions of barrels on the market and alleviate prices somewhat. That will end in November. And so we should see some at least in the crude market, we should see energy prices rise toward the end of the year once that slack is cleared from the market.

Sam

We’ve discussed some of those inflationary pressures come from the rising cost of crude oil. Crude oil derivatives make up nearly half of the cost of producing vehicle tires. About seven gallons of the black stuff is used to produce a single tire. Apollo Tires is India’s largest manufacturer of tires. Their annual revenue is $2.6 million. But over the past couple of years, their prices have gone up by about 30 or 40%. The vice chairman and managing director of Apollo is Near Edge Canoe, and he told me that he’s had to put his prices of his tires up.

Sam

Tony, I just wanted to come briefly to you just off the back of that. Mr. Kamwa there was talking about how they try and reduce costs. But it takes a lot of infrastructure to get those costs down, isn’t it? A lot of capital expenditure. And then it’ll be a while before these businesses start to see the reduction in cost because of the investment that they’ve made.

Tony

Well, it could. I mean, some of it could just be changing processes. I think when things like the input costs like crude oil or natural rubber are cheap, there’s very little incentive to refine your processes. Right? And so I think those first steps, him talking about going to the factories and getting, say, the same output with less input in the factories, that sort of thing, those are obviously the first steps. And I think every business, if they’re honest, can probably ease out productivity gains. I don’t know. I wouldn’t estimate what percentage they could, but those are obviously first. But part of it could potentially be, as you say, investing in equipment, investing in automation, other things which could produce a lot more. But I think what I found really interesting about what he was talking about was you’re seeing the primary impacts of inflation, which is crude oil and rubber. The secondary impacts of inflation is the tire price, and that the tertiary what we call the tertiary impacts of inflation are the freight costs that he talked about. So in that interview, we saw three different phases of inflation impacting the economy. It was really interesting.

Sam

Great. Well, thank you very much. Well, we are going to now move to another update on Twitter. Billionaire Elon Musk, he says he aims to complete his purchase of Twitter by the end of the month, but the company will not take yes for an answer.

Sam

And Tony, I mean, so many countries have no travel restrictions for COVID at all now. That you tend not to go to places where there are restrictions, because why would you?

Tony

I’ll be honest, I really miss Hong Kong. I used to go there once a month when I was at The Economist. Our original headquarters was there and I was there a lot. But even with small restrictions, it’s just an inconvenience. And so there would have to be a serious incentive to go and put up with really any restrictions.

Sam

I was looking at the various different restrictions that have been kind of removed over the past few weeks. So, Japan, so from next Tuesday, the 11 October, there will be no border controls in Japan similar to the US. But the thing with Japan is that China was the largest source of tourism revenue before the Pandemic, and of course, people can’t leave the other parts of China.

Sam

Welcome back to Business Matters on the BBC World Service. We are live in Salford in the UK. I’m Sam Fenix. Thank you for your company. We’ve got Tony Nash with us. He’s in Austin, Texas. He’s an economist. And Zyma Islam is a journalist from Dakar and she joins us from Bangladesh. We’re going to start the second half of the program by talking about whether it’s a good idea to quit your job. It’s often seen as a negative thing to do, but it doesn’t have to be. One in five of us are expected to quit our jobs this year, according to PwC’s Global Workforce Survey.

Sam

So, Tony, you said earlier in the program that you have quit a job. Tell us about what happened.

Tony

So I got a job at one point with a company that I thought was fantastic. After a couple years there, I realized that kind of everyone who had worked there for more than five years had really just kind of settled and they stopped being excellent and the best at what they could do. So I told myself at the time that I would stay there for five years and then I would find another job. And I did. And I moved on to a job with quite a lot more money and less work to do, which was really nice.

Sam

Did you listen to your body like we heard in that clip?

Tony

I guess so. In a kind of a silly way, I guess so. I just knew that I wasn’t comfortable being mediocre, but I didn’t want to leave the job right away, so I had to stay there for a period of time, do my time, and then find something where I could do great work? 

Sam

It doesn’t always look good on a CV, does it? To have lots of different jobs in very short space of time.

Tony

I don’t necessarily think that’s the case anymore. Look, my company is a tech company and in tech you stay at least in the US, you stay for a year and you move on. That’s pretty common with, say, developers in tech. So I think it depends on the industry. But I don’t think moving around jobs, say, every few years is necessarily seen as negative as it once was.

Sam

But you felt in that job you did have to stay there for a certain amount of time.

Tony

I did, and I wanted to stay there for a period of time because I wanted to make sure that my initial feeling wasn’t wrong. And I also wanted to make sure that I could get the most out of the job. You know, good experiences, great people, all that sort of thing. And I did. I enjoyed the next few years, but I also realized that it was time to go. And that’s something kind of early career, mid career, I think people need to do is when they come into a job, understand why they’re at that job, and then understand when it’s time to move on. And it’s not necessarily emotional, it’s just part of a growing process.

Sam

That’s the truth, isn’t it? Tony perhaps in the US, people are more likely to move around because there’s more job security, there are more jobs.

Tony

Possibly. I think especially in the US. Through the pandemic, there is so much work from home and so many people would switch jobs because it was just arbitrage. They could do the same work for more money and stay in their home. So I think that was a big factor in a lot of the job leaving in the US over the last couple of years. As things slow down, it’ll be really interesting as we enter recession or as things continue to slow down, it will be really interesting to see what happens with job leavers and job switching in the US to see if that slows down and what the expectations around jobs really are.

Sam

Well, I’m going to speak Tony.

Tony

It’ll happen. My company automates finance jobs, so highly educated professional workers in developed countries. So automation is going to happen to a lot of jobs where they’re not innovated. That’s just a fact. And so the entrepreneurs and the planning officials in Bangladesh should better get busy because automation of garment jobs is coming pretty quickly. And so.

Zyma

Absolutely, but there’s going to be a gender component to that, Tony. So when you start training garment workers for these more highly technical jobs, what happens is that women, they get cut out of the picture because they’re not as skilled graduating.

Tony

I spent most of my professional life in Asia. My son is South Asian. I understand the cultural issues around many of the workforce debates that happen in Asia. Deeply. I understand them deeply. And so that is a cultural issue that can only be solved by Bangladeshis in Bangladesh. It can only be solved by Bangladeshis in Baghdadesh. And so that’s not something that anybody else can solve. And I hope that there are people in Bangladesh who have the courage, your President is a woman. So I hope that people have the courage to solve that in Bangladesh.

Zyma

We’ll actually need to get our woman to start going to university. Because what happens here is that after high school, they drop out, they get married. When it comes to high school, we do have like an equal there’s, like a 50 50 balance when it comes to graduates. But the minute you go off to the treasury sector, you see fewer female graduates. So with fewer female graduates, they’ll be less eligible for the automated jobs. It’s easier for them to get these brick and mortar jobs involving, say, sitting in a supply chain line of some sort.

Tony

I’ll tell you what will happen with the automation around the garment sector. That won’t happen in Bangladesh. Because of supply chain issues, those automated garment factories will be put in Europe, or they’ll be put in the US or somewhere else closer to where they’ll be consumed. So, to be very honest, those jobs will disappear in Bangladesh if those higher level skills aren’t taught, and now is the time for that innovation to happen.

Sam

Do you see that happening? Any of that innovation, that education that Tony mentions?

Zyma

No, not at all. Absolutely not at all. I simply see women getting replaced in the menial workforce.

Sam

Well, Tony, we are actually on the eve of a big jobs data day, aren’t we? It’s a big day tomorrow in the US on Friday. Indications show that the jobs market might be slowing.

Tony

Yes, and we’re in a position in the US where kind of bad news is good news, I think, because the Fed is hoping that the rate of job growth slows so that they can ease up on interest rate rises. So Americans are kind of hoping that it’s a down number so that there’s less expectation or lowered expectations that the Fed will raise rates. So bad news is good news with that particular print.

Sam

Well, that’s a good thing for our listeners to look out for. Bad news is good news. When did you ever hear that? Thank you both very, very much for joining us. Tony Nash, economist with Complete Intelligence in Austin, Texas, USA. And Zyma Islam, a journalist with the Daily Star in Bangladesh. My name is Sam Fennick. You’ve been listening to Business Matters on the BBC World Service. Thank you to the producer, Hannah Mullane, and the team in the studio here in Salford. Join me again tomorrow at the same time, midnight GMT.

Categories
Podcasts

Business and Market Discussion

This podcast was originally published in https://www.rthk.hk/radio/radio3/programme/money_talk/episode/810164.

Surging energy and food prices in the United States have sent inflation to a 40-year high. Consumer prices rose 8.5% in March, the fastest annual gain since December 1981. The monthly rise was 1.2%, the fastest jump since September 2005 and a sharp acceleration from February’s 0.8% increase. 

Russian President Vladimir Putin says peace talks with Ukraine have reached a “dead-end” and he accused Ukraine of deviating from agreements reached in Turkey. He said Russia’s “military operation” will continue, blaming Ukraine for “inconsistency in key issues” from talks and “fake claims” about war crimes.

The World Trade Organisation said that global trade could be cut almost in half and is expected to grow by 2.4% – 3% in 2022, lower than its previous estimate of 4.7% in October due to the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The WTO said the war could lower global GDP growth by 0.7-1.3 percentage points to somewhere between 3.1% and 3.7%. 

Sri Lanka said yesterday it will temporarily default on its foreign debts amid its worst economic crisis in over 70 years. The country was due to pay a US$1bn international sovereign bond in July, part of a total of US$7bn of debt payments due this year. Sri Lanka’s foreign reserves stood at US$1.93bn at the end of March. 

Shanghai saw a drop in new Covid cases on Tuesday after ten straight days of record highs. The financial hub reported 23,342 new local cases for the day, compared with just over 26,000 the day before. However, it was being reported on Tuesday that authorities were backing away from lifting restrictions in several thousand low-risk areas. Residents can move around within their compounds but are still barred from venturing out onto the streets if their surroundings belong to higher-risk areas. Officials ordered another round of mass testing, at least the seventh in 10 days, in the highest lockdown zones. 

On today’s Money Talk we’re joined by Dickie Wong from Kingston Securities, Carlos Casanova of UBP and Tony Nash, Founder & CEO & Chief Economist at Complete Intelligence.

Show Notes

PL: This is Radio Three Money Talk. Good morning. It’s eight in Hong Kong. Welcome to Money Talk on Radio Three. From me, Peter Lewis. Here are the top business and finance headlines for Wednesday, 13 April. Surging energy and food prices in the United States have sent inflation to a 40 year high. Consumer prices rose 8.5% in March, the fastest annual gain since December 1981. The monthly rise was 1.2%, the fastest jump since September 2005 and a sharp acceleration from February’s zero 8% increase. Russian President Vladimir Putin says peace talks with Ukraine have reached a dead end, and he accused Ukraine of deviating from agreements reached in talks in Turkey. He said Russia’s military operation will continue, blaming Ukraine for inconsistency in key issues and fake claims about war crimes. The World Trade Organization said that global trade could be cut almost in half and is expected to grow by 2.4% to 3% in 2022, lower than its previous estimate of 4.7% in October due to the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Wto said the war could lower global GDP growth by zero 7% to 1.3 percentage points. Sri Lanka said yesterday will temporarily default on its foreign debts amid its worst economic crisis in over 70 years.

The country was due to pay a $1 billion international sovereign bond in July, part of a total of $7 billion of debt payments due this year. Sri Lanka’s foreign reserves stood at just under 2 billion at the end of March, and Shanghai saw a drop in new covert cases on Thursday after ten straight days of record highs. The financial Hub reported 23,342 new local cases for the day, compared with just over 26,000 the day before. However, it was being reported yesterday that authorities are backing away from lifting restrictions in several thousand low risk areas. On today’s Money Talk, we’re joined by Dicky Wong from Kingston Securities, Carlos Casanova of UBP, and Tony Nash, founder and CEO at Complete Intelligence. The moderation in core CPI initially prompted a rally in stocks on Wall Street and sent US Treasuries higher. But stocks then gave up their gains as the session wore on, with the S Amp P 500 and Nasdaq falling for a third day. The S Amp P 500, which was up 1.3% at the high of the day, closed a third of a percent lower at 4397. The Dow relinquished a gain of over 360 points to close 88 points lower at 34,220, and as the composite index, which was up 2%, declined zero 3%, ending at 13,372.

In Europe, the regional Stock 600 index fell a third of a percent. Deutsche bank and Commerce Bank led losses for the index, with both falling more than 8% after an undisclosed shareholder unloaded roughly 5% stakes in both German banks. London’s footsy 100 dropped null. .6% and it was a volatile day for mainland China and Hong Kong stocks, which opened higher before plunging late morning and then staging a drastic rebound in the afternoon session with reports that the China National team was actively supporting the market. The rebound came amid calls from China’s market regulator that firms buy back shares and ask major shareholders to support stock prices amid a sluggish stock market. The Hangsting index had slipped half a percent by lunchtime to a four week low before rebounding to close 111 points, or half a percent higher at 21,319. Tech index was up two and a half percent in the morning session before dropping zero 8% at lunchtime and then rebounding to close 1.4% higher. The Shanghai Composite recovered from losses of 0.8% to close one and a half percent higher at 3213. $0.10 advanced 3.6% added 4.2% after China approved new online gaming titles for the first time since July.

In the commodities markets, brewing crude oil rose almost 6% to $104.87 a bowel. Gold is up close to 1% at $1,966 an ounce. The yield on the benchmark ten year treasury notes fell five basis points to two point 73% after hitting two point 83% early in the session. And in the currency markets, the US dollar is stronger this morning. The Euro is trading at $1.08 and a quarter cents. The Bucks at 125.5 Japanese yen Sterling is worth one point $0.30 and Hk$10.19, and the Chinese yuan is at six point 38, versus the dollar in offshore markets. Bitcoin this morning is about 1% firmer at $40,100. Around Asian stock markets this morning. In Australia, the SX 200 up about zero. 1%. Stocks in Japan have now opened the nicate 225, about three quarters of a percent higher. The Cosby in South Korea is half a percent higher, but futures markets pointing to a loss of about 70 points for the Hang Sein at the open this morning. Fine. Let’s welcome our guests. We have with us Dicky Wong, head of research at Kingston Security this morning, Dickie

DW: Good morning, Peter. How are you?

PL: I’m well, thank you. And also with us, Carlos Cassanova, senior Asia economist at UBP. Morning to you, Carlos.

CC: Good morning, Peter.

PL: And over in Texas, in the USA, we have Tony Nash, founder and CEO and chief economist at Complete Intelligence. Thanks for joining us again, Tony.

TN: Thank you, Peter.

PL: Let’s start in the US with those inflation numbers. Surging energy and food prices in the United States have sent inflation to 40 year high. Consumer prices rose eight and a half percent last month. That’s the fastest annual gain since December 1 981. The monthly rise was 1.2%, the fastest gain since September 2005. Excluding food and energy, core CPI increased 6.5% on an annualized basis in line with expectations, core inflation rose zero. 3% for the month energy prices, they were up 32% year on year food prices, they jumped 8.8%. And shelter costs, which make up about a third of the CPI, rose by 5%. Tony, you’re over there in the US, so let’s start with you. It’s hard to find very much good news in this data. But who do workers blame for this?

TN: I think a lot of Americans really do see inflation rising as Joe Biden has been in office. It’s accelerated during his tenure. So whether it’s his fault or not, he’s sitting in the seat while it’s happening. There is a lot of resource from the White House going into saying that this is Putin’s inflation responsibility, claiming that inflation didn’t really accelerate until the war started. But again, if we look back to the rapid acceleration of inflation, it really started, I guess you could say maybe October. But we’ve been at this for a year or so. I think Americans working level, Americans, whether they’re working class, blue collarly workers, they’re obviously the hardest hit by this. And for workers at those levels, it’s really looking at the political issues, not something that’s happening on the other side of the world.

PL: So what can Joe Biden do to try and bring inflation under control? What are people expecting to do?

TN: Well, I think one of the really easy things that he could do, which I’m in Texas. So this is a very biased view, but since Joe Biden has come to office, he’s put a lot of restriction on the drilling and transport of oil and gas. And so there could be a lot of alleviation of energy prices if the White House would remove the regulations that they put in place on the drilling and transport of oil and gas. The White House also killed a pipeline of Canadian crew or a pipeline from Canada that would transport heavy crude to American refineries, which is what’s needed for petrol or gasoline here. And Americans actually don’t necessarily use the light sweet crude that’s refined or drilled, say in Texas. They use the heavy sour crew that say from Canada and from Venezuela. So the pipeline from Canada would have been very helpful to keep prices stable in the US, energy prices stable in the US, but that was killed literally on the first day of the Biden administration.

PL: Vicki, what is the impact for markets and particularly out here, US markets? They rallied initially because they took some optimism for the fact that the core CPI had declined slightly from last month, but they lost those gains. How do you think markets are going to respond to this?

DW: Well, in terms of inflation, I guess it’s an overall problem not only in US but basically everywhere else, also in China. And you may say, like Russia invasion of Ukraine intensified the situation of inflation in US, but inflation is already there. It’s already a problem in US. So in terms of the market expectation, I would expect first of all will probably have another rate cut for even 50 basis points in May and continue to high interest rate until the year end. At the year end, maybe the sets and target rates will be like two point 75 even at this really high level compared to one year ago. So in terms of the year car still going on, keep going up there’s no question ask but already probably the market already digest this kind of situation like you asked me have to continue to high interest rate. But in terms of in mainland China is another thing. Even though China official CPI rose by 1.5% in March, still below US CPI or everywhere else in Europe. So expecting that PVoC may have some kind of room to have an outer round of rate card or triple archives.

But in terms of the situation now in mainland China it’s pretty dilemma because if they really want to have another round of fresh cut of interest rate or even triple R may intensify the situation now because the ten year value of the US Treasury is slightly higher than the same period treasury in mainland China. Now it may be some kind of money outflow from mainland.

PL: Is the window of opportunity for the PPO to go and cut rates? Is it closing the worst this inflation data gets? It doesn’t leave them much opportunity, does it?

DW: Exactly. So I don’t really expect a rate cut in the near term but maybe I expect Arrr cut instead of a rate cut because rate cut create a high pressure of capital outflow. We have already seen in March no matter in the bond market, also in the Asia market from the stock connect. So people actually getting money out from mainland China. So this is also another reason why recently the Asian market underperformed even the US market because the capital outflow. So it’s not a good timing for China but then you still have to think about it, what they can do because capital outflow and intensified the situation in Russia and Ukraine. So also create another round serious pressure. The CPI future growth is mainland June.

PL: Let me bring Carlos in. Carlos, this is not an easy situation for central banks to deal with, is it’s? Because this is not demand led, this is a supply shock, correct?

CC: I think what we saw in the market this week was some investors pricing in the probability that inflation was peaking within the next few months. We think it’s a little bit early to say we are expecting around eight to 9% inflation in the US in the coming months and of course then a gradual descent, but it will nonetheless remain significantly higher than expected in 2022. And as Tony was mentioning, this will be front and center with Biden facing elections in the fall. So I do think that central banks around the world are going to be very focused in trying to address the demand side factors or drivers of inflation even as they have very little control over the supply side factors. And on that note, just keep in mind that we have this conflict in Ukraine that’s leading to supply chain disruptions. But we are already seeing disruptions to global shipments through the Port of Shanghai following from the lockdown there. So it is likely that these supply factors will continue to exert pressures in the coming months. So in my opinion, I think central banks will unfortunately remain in this very hawkish trajectory even though they don’t have 100% control.

PL: And what does the PPOC do? That’s probably the one major central bank in the world that would like to ease monetary policy to cope with the slowdown there on the mainland. It’s in a difficult position as well, isn’t it?

CC: Ppoc is in a very difficult position because we’ve seen authorities voice their concerns about the lack of easing quite a few times since the middle of March, and yet PPOC has an east the risk of outflows is real. We saw that China’s premium over the US in terms of its ten year yield is completely gone. So any form of eating will exacerbate potential capital risks. But you have inflation creeping up potentially above the 3% target set by the beginning of the year. So the conditions could turn less accommodative very quickly. So PPO has a narrow window of opportunity in my opinion to deliver stimulus and a triple our card won’t be enough given what is happening in Shanghai, given that we have -40% sales in the housing sector and that accounts for a third of the economy is not going to be enough to get us from where we are now to 5.5% growth by the end of the year. So unfortunately, they should be doing a rate cut even if that exacerbates capital outflows and even if the impact of a rate cut might be more muted as most people remain in some form of lockdown.

So it’s less easy to go out and spend money. I think that is something that PVC has been discussing, but it doesn’t matter. They need all hands on deck in order to reach the fact growth target by the end of the year and really running out of time given that inflation is rising.

PL: Tony, you mentioned energy prices, but of course, food prices are also jumping as well. They were up 8.8% over the period. We’re seeing global trade slow quite dramatically now. And the UN saying that the war in Ukraine is causing a huge leap in food prices. The UN food prices index is at a record high. It was up 13% in March are on consumers feeling that as well. Over in the United States, this rise in food prices?

TN: Yeah, for sure. Americans are feeling the rise in food prices. I think, however, the most acute food price rises will be in places like Lebanon and Egypt and other places that are more directly affected by the Ukraine and Russia war. Here in the US, we do have pressure on wheat and corn prices, corn prices or maize prices. There’s upward pressure on those prices partly because the White House just said they want to add corn to fuel here to in their minds, reduce fuel prices. So there’s pressure on corn both to feed people and for fuel now and of course, with proteins, those prices are up as well double digits. So Americans are feeling it really all around, but not as acutely as some of the people in Europe and the Middle East will as the pressures from, say, Ukrainian and Russian exports hit those markets.

PL: We’ve already had an energy shock in many parts of the world. Do you think we’re heading for a food crisis that we’re going to see shortages, we’re going to see prices soaring, and maybe, as unfortunately always happens in this case, it affects the poorest parts of the world the most?

TN: Yes, it does. And sadly, I think that is the case because places like Ukraine and Russia do provide so much mostly Ukraine provide so much weed and maize and cooking oil to some of these markets. So, yes, I definitely think that that is.

PL: Our Americans questioning President Biden’s support for Ukraine. When you start to see the costs of this mounting. They’ve banned American. They banned Russian oil and gas imports. That’s helping fuel price rises. They’re seeing the price rises in food. Are they starting to question whether or not the US is on the right track supporting Ukraine?

TN: I don’t know. I know that a number of Americans have questioned it from the start, not that they don’t support Ukraine, but Americans are worried about being directly involved, meaning sending troops to Ukraine. I think Americans generally are comfortable sending weapons and supporting with that aid, but not necessarily with the troops.

PL: Okay, Dickie, let’s talk about the lockdowns up on the mainland. There was a slight decrease in COVID cases yesterday, but we’ve had ten days now of record cases in Shanghai. Guangdong, Guangzhou has gone into a partial lockdown as well. Now, what sort of impact is this having on the economy?

DW: Well, that’s so obvious. The big lockdown in Shanghai may give some kind of pressure to not only the first quarter GDP, but indeed the 5.5% annual gain of the GDP. It’s probably not that easy to achieve. So I do see some kind of civil linings because China’s government recently added some of the approval of the online and cellphone gaming. And also when we talk about the first quarter lending also hits record to 1.3 trillion before PVC take any action in the first quarter because last year PPOC cut LPR rate triple R, but not this quarter. So I would expect definitely I do agree that PPOC has to take some kind of action like seriously to treat the problem, especially the lockdown in Shanghai. And 5.5% is not something easy. So they have to no matter fiscal policy, monetary policy, and et cetera regulations has to be used, especially some of the tech companies.

PL: Let me ask you also because I want to ask you about the markets as well. We’re seeing a lot of calls now from Premier Leakage, the State Council to take steps to support the economy and also from the regulators now to support the market the China Securities Regulatory Commission wants shareholders to buy back stock. It wants Social Security funds, pension funds, trusts, insurance companies to increase their investment in the markets. What are your thoughts on this? Isn’t this the regulator going way over their skis here? It’s not the job of the regulator, is it to tell companies to buy back more shares and to put public money into the stock market? Surely this is way, way beyond what the regulator should be doing.

DW: Well but in terms of the mainland market, the HR market, this is probably the regulator will regularly do I know they do it but it’s wrong isn’t it wrong that the regulator should do that?

PL: It’s sort of almost an outrageous abuse, isn’t it? The regulator should be there to make sure the market operates fairly and efficiently to crack down on abuses but not do this?

DW: You may say so but the regulator to mainland because you can see intensifying the tension between China and US never gone and also like recently no recently just yesterday the holding foreign companies accountable action called Hscaa a fresh round of addiction of a lot of Chinese companies like more than twelve companies this is the fourth round already it gives some kind of pressure to the ADR market yesterday in US and definitely some of the ADR may open slightly lower today although the pressure may not be as high as the previous one or the first round of the addiction of the Hscaa but because of the tension of these two countries China may have to do their own thing so in terms of like Green Valley always comment about the stock market and try to interfere with the stock market I will not say good or bad but at least it would be some kind of support to the local Hong Kong stock market so I believe we find support at 21,000 because investors may expect or they will expect like PPOC will take action very soon so it may help to stabilize the overall sentiment in Hong Kong as well as in Asia Carlos.

PL: We’Ve heard Premier Leakage now has issued his third warning about economic growth in under a week what can they do?

CC: Well, we do expect to see weaker growth in March, April and May so those will be the three weakest months I think that in addition to doing more monetary policy and fiscal policy support the big question Mark is will they announce some easing of restrictions or at least provide some degree of regulatory clarity for global investors? On the housing and also tech front there’s a whole debate around this. Recent regulations surrounding dual circulation in China points to some additional regulatory headwinds for some of these companies but I think that the issue is not so much regulation it’s more the lack of visibility so they are likely going to at least provide that in the coming weeks. And of course, if this contraction is bigger than expected in the first half, and I did use the word contraction because I do think that GDP has a chance of actually declining in Q two, then the measure of last resort in order to achieve that growth target would be to effectively inflate the housing sector again in Q four. But we should be back to square one. So I think they will try as much as possible to use more Australian and other channels to try to prop up the economy so that growth doesn’t follow the cliff.

But they are running out of time and we do hope that they will announce something big in April.

PL: Okay, Tony, final word to you. I know all sorts of things go on on the mainland that perhaps wouldn’t go on elsewhere, but when you see the regulator trying to arm twist companies into buying back their own stock and get public funds to get the market back up, what do you make of that, Peter?

TN: It reminds me of June of 2015, if you remember, when markets on the mainland really fell pretty hard. There is pressure domestically in China for people to buy shares for a patriotic reason. Even within the Chinese bureaucracy. There was pressure for Chinese bureaucrats to buy shares. So I think they’re just doing it out loud now and they’re doing it for the companies themselves. But to me, when I first saw this news, it really was an Echo of June of 2015 when markets fell and there was real pressure on Chinese retail investors to buy the dips and to support the market. And a lot of them lost. I knew people there who lost 2030, 40% of their wealth because they were buying patriotically.

PL: Yeah. Okay. Well, that’s a fair warning. Thanks very much. That’s Tony Nash, founder and CEO and chief economist at Complete Intelligence. Dickie Wong, head of research at Kingston Securities, Carlos Casanova, senior Asia economist at UBP. You’re listening to Money Talk on RTHK Radio Three. Let’s take a final look at the markets for today. In Australia, the SX 200 up zero 2%, the Nico two five in Japan rallying as well, up zero 8%. The Cosby is up. A third of the cent in South Korea does look like, though the hangsting is going to fall slightly, about 50 points or so at the Open later on this morning. Thank you very much for listening this morning. Please join me again for the final time this week in a holiday shortened week at 08:00 tomorrow. Stay tuned for covered updates after the news with Jim Gold and Anna Fenton. The weather forecast, mainly cloudy, few showers going to be hot with sunny intervals during the day. Maximum temperature of 29 degrees, mainly fine and hot during the day tomorrow. And on Friday, the temperature right now 25 degrees, 82%. Relative humidity 32 here’s Andy Shawski with the half hour news.

AS: Thank you, Peter. The head of the Government’s policy innovation and coordination office says the authorities have expanded it’s $10,000 subsidy for people who have recently lost their jobs Due to covet. Officials say they have received 470,000 applications for the subsidy. In February. They expected only 300,000 Would apply. Doris Hoe said that’s because more people have lost their jobs.

DH: This is partly because more people were out of employment in March When the unemployment situation was in February and partly because we expanded our scheme subsequently to cover employees working in closed app premises such as affinity centers and beauty salons and who were forced out of work about their employers.

AS: Medical Association President Choi keen says the government initiative giving private doctors access to oralcobid drugs will definitely be effective in preventing severe cobalt infections. Authorities on Monday said that private doctors could request antivirals through a dedicated electronic platform. Doctor choice said this is a sensible arrangement.

DH: The patients usually see the GP first before they go to the emergency Department before they get very ill, so it’s the first stage that the antivirus are infected. So if they are seen at the first stage and given the medication, they will not proceed to a very ill stage so it is effective and useful.

AS: Police in New York are searching for a man who shot ten people at a Brooklyn subway station during the morning rush hour. Six others were also hurt, Mostly through smoke inhalation. None of the injuries are life threatening. The New York city police Commissioner, Ketchen Sewell, gave details of the incident just before 824 this morning.

KS: As a Manhattan bound and train waited to enter the 36th street station, an individual on that train donned what appeared to be a gas mask. He then took a canister out of his bag and opened it. The train at that time began to fill with smoke. He then opened fire, Striking multiple people on the subway and in the platform. He is being reported as a male black, approximately 5ft five inches tall with a heavy build.

AS: The city of Guangzhou has reported 13 new COVID cases. Health officials in the city say the new infections were linked to previous cases, but they warned that transmissions might have been taking place for some time before the new cases were found. And the next few days will be critical. To contain the outbreak, local authorities have been conducting mass testing to screen out patients primary and secondary schools of suspended face to face class.

Categories
Week Ahead

Week Ahead 17 Jan 2022

This is the second episode of The Week Ahead in collaboration of Complete Intelligence with Intelligence Quarterly, where experts talk about the week that just happened and what will most likely happen in the coming week. Among the topics: industrial metals, energy markets, natural gas, China’s flood of liquidity and property market, CNY, and bond market.

You can also listen to this episode on Spotify:

https://open.spotify.com/episode/1JGX3v5tpmQ5sS2wtOr0mK?si=3692162380a84ab0

Follow The Week Ahead experts on Twitter:

Tony: https://twitter.com/TonyNashNerd

Tracy: https://twitter.com/chigrl

Nick: https://twitter.com/nglinsman/

Albert: https://twitter.com/amlivemon

Show Notes

TN: Hi, everyone, and thanks for joining us for The Week Ahead. My name is Tony Nash. We’re with Tracy Shuchart, Nick Glinsman, and Albert Marko. To talk about the markets over this past week and what we’ve expect to see next week. Before we get started, please subscribe to our YouTube channel so you don’t miss any of the upcoming episodes.

So, guys, this week we saw kind of a whipsaw in equity and commodity markets with a slow start, but a lot of action mid week. And commodities seem to kind of extend gains until the end of the week. We saw bonds really wait until Friday to start taking off, but they took off quite a bit today. And part of that may have been on the back of the retail sales print that we saw. That was pretty disappointing. So, Tracy, do you want to kick us off a little bit with talking about commodity markets and energy?

TS: Sure. I mean, obviously, we’ve seen a big push in the oil market. Right, in WTI and Brent this week. We’re definitely a bit overbought. But that said, what I think is happening here is we’re seeing a shift from sort of growth to value. I think the markets are pricing in the fact that OMA crime is over. Right. And the Fed may raise rates. That’s putting pressure on growth and giving kind of a boost to the value market. And we’re kind of seeing a chase here a little bit in the oil markets.

As far as if we look at the natural gas markets, it’s been very volatile this week, not only in the US, but global markets. I think that will continue. And we saw a big push up on Wednesday, and then we saw a big pullback, but that was due to weather. But now we’re looking at this weekend, we’re having another cold front. And part of that reason was also because we discovered that Germany had less natural gas in storage than initially thought. So that market, I definitely think it’s going to continue to be very volatile. So try lightly in that market there’s.

TN: You mentioned the Germany supply side of the market, but what does supplies look like, say in the US and other parts of Europe? Are supplies normal? Are they low? What is that dynamic?

TS: Yeah, we’re pretty much normal in the US, and we’re set to in this year. We’re set to pretty much overtake the market as far as the export market is concerned. That would mean taking over Australia and Qatar because of the amount that we’re building out in the delivery system in Texas. But the supplies here are okay. The problem is within the United States is that the distribution is uneven.

So you’re talking about the Northeast, where you’re seeing local natural gas prices a lot higher there. Then you’re seeing, say, in Henry Hub, which is the natural gas product that trade that you’re trading.

TN: So I saw some just to get a little bit specific on this. I saw some news today about some potential brownouts in, say, New York or something because of this winter storm. How prevalent will that be? Maybe not just say, this weekend going next week, but for the rest of the winter. Are the supply problems that extreme?

TS: Yeah, I think you’re going to have a lot of problems in the Northeast. And I’ve been alluding to this over the last few months saying that they have decided not to go ahead with pipelines. They’ve shut pipelines. They kind of cut off their supply because they don’t really want to pursue that Avenue anymore.

However, it’s turning out to be a particularly cold winter, and that’s a lot of pressure on that market. And that’s why we’re seeing $11 natural gas prices up in that area as opposed to $4 in Henry Hub.

TN: Right. Meantime, Albert’s warm down in Florida, right.

AM: Yeah. Well, I wanted to ask Tracy what happens if we have an extended winter where the winter temperatures go into late March or early April.

TS: Then that’s extremely bullish. That’ll be extremely bullish for domestic supplies because domestic supplies will be in higher demand than they are normally seasonally, especially at a time where we’re a giant exporter right now.

We just came to save the day in Europe with 52 now cargo. So we’re exporting a lot if we have an expanded winter here. Supplies are unevenly distributed. We’re going to see I think we’ll see higher prices in out months that we normally see a pullback in those markets.

TN: Great. Texas, thanks you for those cargo, by the way. We really appreciate it. Okay. What about the broader commodity complex? What are we seeing on, say, industrial metals and precious metals?

TS: So obviously, those have been very bullish are going to continue to be bullish because they’re in deficit. As far as if we’re talking about battery metals and such, I think we’ll continue to see that we’re seeing a little bit in the platinum markets. We’re seeing some demand. I think there’s going to be bigger demand this year.

TN: So we’ll show some platinum on screen here so our viewers can see kind of where the platinum price is and where it’s expected to go.

TS: Yeah. So platinum demands expected to grow because of the automobile markets and because of Palladium is so high they can substitute platinum for that. But that may be capped for the rest of the year, and then we may continue to see higher prices going into 2023.

TN: Okay. So when you say that’s growing because of automotive, is this growth in ice ice vehicles. Okay. And is that happening because and I don’t mean these leading questions, but is that happening because the chip shortage is alleviating and we’re having more manufacturing in ice vehicles?

TS: I mean, that’s part of it. But platinum is used for catalytic inverters Palladium. And because of the fact that there’s platinum happens to be a lot less expensive. Right now. And also there’s more of it right now. So we’re seeing kind of demand pulled to the platinum industry. And I’ve kind of been worrying about this for the last couple of years that this was going to happen.

And now we’re kind of seen that comes to fruition because it takes a couple of years to retool and everything to sort of switch that metal. So I think demand looks good right now for that. We may see it capped a little bit. That may go up again. But if we look at this chart, technically speaking, I would say anywhere between 1005 a 1010. If we kind of Zoom above that, then that market could go a lot higher.

TN: Right. So short term opportunities in platinum, medium term, not so much, but longer term back in.

TS: Yes.

TN: Okay, great. Now when you talk about industrial metals like copper and you say a lot is needed for batteries, these sorts of things, that’s a more medium, longer term term opportunity. Is that right?

TS: Absolutely. When you’re talking about things, I mean, we’re already seeing the nickel market, cobalt market, lithium market, aluminum markets all hitting new highs. Copper’s kind of waffling about. But that’s kind of more a marathon trade rather than a sprint trade, in my opinion. So I think we’re going to see more and more demand for that further out in the market. So it’s kind of a longer term investment.

TN: Okay, great. And then what about industrial metals demand in China? As we switch to talk about a China topic, are we seeing industrial metals demand rise in China, or is it still kind of stumbling along and it’s recovery.

TS: That is still kind of stumbling along. And so what I have said before try to emphasize is that I think a lot of these battery metals in particular demand is going to go going to be outside of China.

China won’t be the main driver of this demand anymore as the west policies want to change to EVs and greener technology. So I think you’re going to start seeing very much increased demand for the west. So China demand might not be as significant anymore in that particular area.

TN: Okay. So that’s interesting. You mentioned China demand, Dink and Albert, I’m interested in your view on that. We had the Fed come out last week and talk about tightening and reinforced some of that this week. What dynamic is necessary in China, if anything, for the Fed to start tightening?

AM: Well, I think first of all, Tony, China is going to have to stimulate. They’re starting to prioritize growth for the first time in a long time. They see the US in a bit in a little bit of trouble here with the Fed making policy errors. I don’t want to say heirs. We’re more about like throwing together against the wall and see what works. Right.

So China is trying to be the seesaw for the world’s finance sector. Money comes into the United States it goes out. Where is it going to go? It’s either Europe or China. Europe right now is a complete mess. So obviously you see that money going into China you will keep on leaning on businesses and look to control more than you should but they’re breaking up a lot of the old power structures and that’s actually bullish long term for China. We can debate many of these episodes that we’re doing now, Tony, about whether it’s a good or bad thing for the China power structure. But that’s for another day.

TN: Right. What kind of stimulus if we look at things like loan demand so we’ll put up that chart on loan demand. Can you talk us through can you talk us through the chart of what it means and what the PPO will likely do as a result of low demand or consumer credit? Sorry.

NG: Yeah, the credit impulse so that’s private sector lending as a percentage of GDP and that chart shows it may have based and that looks like what we’ve been hearing is that the PBOC has been encouraging the private sector to start extending credit into the system, particularly to find off the real estate market which is not a surprise.

My personal view and some of the people that I talked to on China is that’s just filling a hole. This is plugging holes or putting plasters on various holes. So what will be interesting is to see how that progresses further down the line along this year. I don’t think nothing’s going to happen before February 1, lunar new year and then you’re running into that plenum. Do they encourage that you’ve got the Olympics and then you’ve got the plenum? Do they encourage some sort of boost?

I don’t think there’s going to be much fiscal. I think there’s a reason for that. I think there’s a connection with the real estate sector. Real estate sector. As a source of great funding for the local governments.

TN: They spend fiscal on bailing out real estate already. Why would…

NG: You have to provide fiscal to the local governments just for the services?

TN: Right. So the central party meetings are in November, so there’s plenty of time between Lunar New Year and November to really tick off some monetary stimulus and get some feel good factor in, say, Q three or something. Is that what you’re thinking?

NG: There is a desire, as Albert rightly said, they are talking about the economy now, but it just feels like it’s one plug the bad, the big holes that have been appearing and they just keep appearing and now we’ve got Shamal. It just seems like it’s step by step plug every hole and then give a little bit of access to try and get the private credit rolling again.

AM: Tony, everybody is looking for a flood. When is the flood of liquidity going to come into China? Right. But that’s not going to happen until May or June until they see what the US Fed is going to do because nobody right now knows what the Fed is going to do.

Inflation is obviously a problem within China, specifically oil and other commodities, as Tracy was talking about. Their eyes are completely on the Fed. China will have to pop services sector as a real economy. It’s kind of a shambles there due to commodity prices and inflation.

The willingness is there to lend. There’s no question about that. But who wants property right now in China? They can force feed the economy via credit. But that’s inflationary also. So there’s another do move here within China. How do they boost their economy but still keep inflation down? Same thing the United States is going through. Okay.

TN: So let me give you a really simple trick here.

NG: Let’s not forget you’re seeing some majors. Shanghai now has Omikaron. Remember, China, supposedly, according to the World Health Organization, didn’t suffer the first route, but you got Dahlin is closed, Nimboa’s got problems now Shanghai, Shenzhen, and they’re worried it’s going to head up towards Beijing.

All these international flights to Hong Kong completely canceled. So that’s another problem if you extrapolate and equate it to what’s happened in the west whenever these outbreaks have occurred.

TN: Yeah, but I think the solution. Yeah, that’s a problem. I think everybody’s facing that and I think China is just very, very sensitive about that. We can come up with whatever kind of conspiracy theories we want about China, but I just really think that they’re very embarrassed by COVID and they’re trying to cover things up, not cover up, but they’re trying to offset the negative preconceptions globally by taking dramatic action at home. That’s my view.

TS: And they have Chinese New Year and the Olympics coming up, right?

TN: Yeah. And they’re being very careful about that now. My view for quite some time has been that they would keep the CNY strong until after Lunar New Year and after Lunar New Year, they could get some easy economic gains by weakening CNY just a bit. Is that fair?

AM: I think it’s fair. They don’t want the bottom to fall out of the economy. And the extent of their damage the extent of damage to the economy was pretty significant. So they’re going to have to pull off a few tricks. Like you said.

TN: It’s percentage wise, it’s a lot. But in reality, at 65667 CNY historically, it’s nothing compared to where that currency has been historically. And I think it’s pretty easy to devalue to that level. And I think they would get some real economic gain from that.

AM: Yeah. But again, it matters what the Feds are going to do with rate hikes. That’s the wild card.

NG: The devaluation not just look at the dollar, look at the CFA, because I think it pays them to value against the Euro more than the dollar.

TN: Yeah. Okay. We can have a long talk about the CFO’s basket at some point.

NG: My point is you got to look at the Euro CNY as well as the US, because I think that’s where they’ll go.

TN: Yeah. Okay. So does this present an opportunity for Chinese equities in the near term, or is it pushed off until Q two?

AM: I mean, from my perspective, I’ve been on Twitter saying that I’ve gotten into Chinese equities. They are de facto put on the US market, in my opinion. They don’t have the strength of the actual but does. But money has got to flow somewhere, and if it’s not going to the United States. It’s going to go to China.

TN: Okay. All right. Let’s move on to bonds. Okay. Nick, can you cover bonds and tell us are we on track? Are things happening as you expected? Do markets do bonds like what the Fed has been saying? What’s happening there?

NG: Well, the initial reaction after the testimony from Powell was you had a steadying and a slight rally in bond prices, slightly slower yields. But I thought today was fascinating because today we’ve across the York Cove. We’ve made new highs for the move, so we’re at the highest yield for the last year.

What was interesting is we had that disappointing retail sales. Okay. That would typically suggest if this Fed is sensitive on the economy, perhaps they won’t do much. Well, the bond market didn’t like that. So now you have what is typically good news for the bond market, creating a sell off. And that tells me that the bond market is beginning, especially with the yield curve. Stevening, the bond market is beginning to express more anything that suggests that the Fed doesn’t do what they’re talking about. The market wants to see action. Not words.

TN: We’re getting punished for now.

NG: And what’s interesting is if you think a little bit further forward, if the Fed does hold back and isn’t as aggressive as some of the governors have been suggesting, three to four hikes I didn’t think Ms. Bond Mark is going to like that.

TN: Or Jamie Diamond saying eleven heights.

AM: Jamie diamond is nothing that comes out of his mouth should be taken at face value. Him knocking the 30 year bonds down today, he’s just setting himself up to buy. I mean, the guys he talks his book always has.

TN: Hey, before we move on, before we move on to talking about next week, we did get a question from Twitter from @garyhaubold “Does the FOMC raise rates at the March meeting? And how much does the S&P500 have to decline before they employ the Powell put and walk back their lofty tapering and tightening goals” in 20 seconds or less going, Albert? Oh, 20 seconds or less.

AM: Well, the market needs to get down to at least the 4400, if not the 43 hundreds. That’s got to be done in a violent manner. And it has to put pressure on Congress to do it. And they can’t raise rates unless they get at least $2 trillion in stimulus.

NG: And also don’t forget the Cr expires on February 18. So we could be in the midst of a fiscal cliff.

TN: February 18. Okay. We’ll all be sitting at the edge of our seat waiting for that. Okay. So week ahead, what do you guys think? Albert, what are you seeing next week?

AM: Opec pump for Tuesday and then Biden dump for Wednesday as they set up a build back better push in Congress, along with probably a hybrid stimulus bill to try to get to that $2 trillion Mark. Otherwise, they got no fiscal and this market is going to be in some serious trouble.

TN: Okay. Can they do it? Can they do some sort of BBB hybrid?

AM: Yeah, they can do it. They can get ten Republicans on board as long as there’s a small business, small and medium sized business stimulus program. Okay. They’ll get that.

TN: And if they do market react and you say that’s $2 trillion. You say that’s…

AM: They need a minimum of 2 trillion to be able to even think about raising rates in March.

TN: Okay. And Nick, how does it matter?

AM: This is dependent on how bad inflation actually gets, because if we get an 8% print of inflation next month. Then everything is on the table.

TN: So can you say that you cut out just a little bit if we get what, an 8% print?

AM: If we get an 8% print on CPI the next time around and anything is on the table.

NG: Okay. I think what was happening with the bond market basically is it’s beginning to look a little bit longer term. And I’ve had this conversation, the big traders, the big fund managers are sitting there thinking, okay, look at crude oil now, 85 on Brent. Energy price is crazy in Europe.

That’s going to feed through from the wholesale level all the way through to the consumer via manufacturing goods, via the housing market, via service industries. Starbucks has to charge some more because they’ve got a much bigger overhead.

TN: Netflix just raised their prices by a buck 50 or $2 a month or something.

TS: Filters down to everything. Energy runs the world, right? So that’s going to higher energy prices are going to factor into literally everything you do.

NG: And my personal view, I think that sort of works is in sync with Tracy. I think crude goes a lot higher. I think this year we could see north of 100, perhaps as high as 120. This all feeds through, right? So the point is the bond market there’s a lot of conversations on a longer term plane right now. And the bond market is an expression if it’s higher yields, yield curves deepening.

Anything that says that the fed is hesitant, I think you get sent off. I think that’s why we sold off. We should have been running on week retail sales.

TN: Okay, Nick. Sorry. If we do get a $2 trillion bill, what’s going to happen with bonds?

NG: They’ll be sold.

TN: They’ll be sold. Okay. So they’re going to punish the fed if we get fiscal?

NG: They’ll punish the fiscal fed to start acting and acting in short order. And I remain unconvinced. We’ve only heard words. We got to see the action. They’re still doing. Qe. Right? It’s absurd.

TN: Yes. We’re going to keep the flow going over here, but we’re going to raise interest rates over here. I’m not sure I get it. There’s been that disconnect ever since they announced this in December.

Okay, guys. Thank you very much. We’ve hit our time. Have a great week ahead and we’ll see you next week. Thank you very much.

AM, TS, NG: Thank you. Bye.

Categories
QuickHit

QuickHit: What happens to markets if China invades Taiwan? (Part 2)

Get 94.7% accuracy on your markets forecasts with CI Futures. Subscribe for only $50/mo for a limited-time only: http://completeintel.com/2022Promo

In this second part, Mike Green explains what will happen to Europe if China invades Taiwan. Will the region be a mere audience? Will it be affected or not, and if so, how? How about the Euro — will it rise or fall with the invasion? Also, what will happen to China’s labor in that case, and will Chinese companies continue to go public in the West?

You can watch Part 1 of the discussion here.


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This QuickHit episode was recorded on December 2, 2021.

The views and opinions expressed in this What happens to markets if China invades Taiwan? Part 2 Quickhit episode are those of the guest and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any contents provided by our guest are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

 

Show Notes

TN: So we have a lot of risk in, say, Northeast Asian markets. We have a lot of risk to the electronics supply chain. I know that this may seem like a secondary consideration. Maybe it’s not.

What about Europe? Does Europe just kind of stand by and watch this happen, or are they any less, say, risky than any place else? Are they insulated? Somehow?

I want to thank everyone for joining us. And please, when you have a minute, please follow us on YouTube. We need those follows so that we can get to the right number to reach more people.

MG: No, Europe exists, I would argue, as basically two separate components. You have a massive export engine in the form of Germany, whose core business is dealing with China and to a lesser extent, the rest of the world. And then you have the rest of Europe, which effectively runs a massive trade deficit with Germany. I’m sorry. Germany is uniquely vulnerable in the same way that the corporate sector is vulnerable in the United States. That supply chain disruption basically means things go away.

They are also very vulnerable because of the Russian dynamic, as we discussed. In many ways, if I look at what’s happened to Germany over the past decade, their actions on climate change and moving away from nuclear, away from coal into solar, et cetera, has left them extraordinarily dependent upon Russian natural gas supplies. It’s shocking to me that they’ve allowed themselves to get into that place. Right.

So my guess is that their reaction is largely going to be determined by what happens with Russia rather than what happens with China. Right. In the same way that Jamie Diamond can’t say bad things about China. Germany very much understands that they can’t say bad things about China.

Europe, to me, is exceptionally vulnerable, potentially as vulnerable as it has ever been in its history. I agree. It has extraordinary… Terrible way to say it. I don’t know any other way to say it, but Europe basically has unresolved civil wars from 1810, the Napoleonic dynamics all the way through to today, right. And everybody keeps intervening, and it keeps getting shoved back down into a false equilibrium in which everyone pretends to get along, even as you don’t have the migratory patterns across language and physical geographic barriers that would actually lead to the type of integration that you have with the United States, right.

Now ironically, the United States are starting to see those dynamics dramatically reduce geographic mobility, particularly within the center of the country. People are becoming more and more set in their physical geographies, et cetera. Similar to the dynamics that you see in Europe, which has literally 100,000 more years worth of Western settlement and physical location, than does the United States. But they’ve never resolved these wars. Right.

And so the integration of Europe has happened at a political level, but not at a cultural level in any way, shape or form. That leaves them very vulnerable. Their demographics leaves them extraordinarily vulnerable, the rapid aging of the populations, the extraordinarily high cost of having children, even though they don’t bear the same characteristics of the United States, but effectively the lack of land space, et cetera, that has raised housing costs on an ownership basis, et cetera. Makes it very difficult for the Europeans, and they have nowhere else to go now. Right. So the great thing that Europe had was effectively an escape valve to the United States, to a lesser extent, Canada, Australia, et cetera, for give or take 200 or 300 years, and that’s largely going away. Right.

We are becoming so culturally distinct and so culturally unacceptable to many Europeans that with the exception of the cosmopolitan environments of New York City and potentially Los Angeles, nobody wants to move here anymore. Certainly not from a place like Europe. I think they’re extraordinarily vulnerable.

I also think, though, that they’ve lost sight of that because they’re so deeply enjoying the schadenfreude of seeing the unquestioned hegemony of the United States being challenged. Right. It’s fun to watch your overbearing neighbor be brought down a notch. Right. You tend not to focus on how that’s actually adversely affecting your property values in the process.

TN: Sure. Absolutely. So just staying on Europe, what does that do to the importance of the Euro as an international currency? Does the status of the Euro because of Germany’s trade status stay relatively consistent, or do we see the CNY chip away at the Euros, say, second place status?

MG: Well, I would broadly argue that the irony is that the Euro has already peaked and fallen. Right. So if I go back to 2005 2006, you could make a coherent argument that there was a legitimate challenge to the dollar right.

Over the past 15 years, you’ve seen continual degradation of the Euro’s role in international commerce, if I were to correctly calculate it, treating Europe as effectively these United States in the same manner that we have with the US, there’s really no international demand for the Euro. It’s all settlement between Germany, France, Italy, et cetera.

If I go a step further and say the same thing about the Chinese Yuan or the Hong Kong dollar, right. They really don’t exist in international transactions. To any meaningful degree. The dollar has resumed its historical gains on that front. Now that actually does open up a Contra trade.

And I would suggest that in just the past couple of days, we’ve seen an example of this where weirdly, if the status quo is maintained, the dollar is showing elements of becoming a risk on currency as the rest of the world basically says some aspect of we’re much less concerned about the liquidity components of the dollar, and we’re much more interested in the opportunity to invest in a place that at least pretends to have growth left. Right. Because Europe does not have it. Japan does not have it. China, I would argue, does not have it. And the rest of the world, as Erdogan and others are beginning to show us, is becoming increasingly dysfunctional as a destination for capital. Right.

Brazil, perennially the story for the next 20 years and always will be right. Africa, almost no question anymore that it is not going to become a bastion for economic development going forward. And we’re broadly seeing emerging markets around the world begin to deteriorate sharply because the conflict between the United States and China creates conditions under which bad actors can be rewarded. Right.

If I sell out my people, we just saw this in the Congo, for example, if I sell out my people for political influence, I can suddenly put tons of money into a bank account somewhere. Right. China writing a check for $20 million. It’s an awful lot of money if I’m using it in Africa.

TN: For that specific example, and for many other things, the interesting part is China is writing a check for $20 million. Yeah, they’re writing a check for €20 million. They’re not writing a check for 20 million CNY. It’s $20 million. All the Belt and Road Initiative activities are nominated in dollars.

So I think there’s a very strange situation with China’s attempt to rise, although they have economic influence, they don’t have a currency that can match that influence. And I’m not aware, and you’re such a great historian. I’m not aware of an economic power that’s come up that hasn’t really had its own currency on an international basis. I’m sure there are. I just can’t think of many.

MG: Well, no. I mean, the quick answer is no. You cannot project power internationally unless effectively the tax receipts of your local population are accepted around the world. Right? Broadly speaking, I would just highlight that the way I think of currency is effectively the equity in a country right now. It’s not a perfect analog, but it’s a reasonable analog. And so, what you’re actually saying is the US remains a safe haven. It remains a place where people want to invest. It remains a place where people believe that the rule of law is largely in place. And as a result, anyone who trades with the United States is willing in one form or another to say, okay, you know what? I can actually exchange this with somebody who really needs it at some point in the future.

I think one of the reasons that we tend to think about the dollar as having fallen relative to the Euro or the CNY is we have a very false impression of what the dollar used to be. Right. So we tend to think about the dollar was the world’s reserve currency following World War Two and everything happened in dollars. Right.

People forget that half the world, certainly by population, never had access to dollars, never saw dollars. There was a dollar block. And then because of their refusal to participate in Bretton Woods, there was a Soviet ruble block and then ultimately far less impactful things like a Chinese Yuan, et cetera. But the Soviets, for a period of time, had that type of influence. They could actually offer raw materials. They could actually offer technology. They could offer things that had the equivalent of monetary value to places like Cuba, to places like Africa, to places like South America, et cetera. China right.\

That characterized the world from 1945 until 1990. Right. I mean, the real change that occurred and really in 1980 was that Russia basically ran out of things to sell to the rest of the world, particularly in the relative commodity abundance that emerged in the 1980s after the 70s, their influence around the globe collapsed.

And I think the interesting question for me is China setting up for something very similar. Right. It feels like we’re looking at a last gasp like Brisbanev going into Afghanistan, right. And oh, my gosh, they’re moving out and they’re taking over. Well, that was the end. They make a move on Taiwan. And I think a lot of people correctly point to this. It’s probably the end of China, not the beginning of China.

I just don’t know that China knows that it has an alternative because it’s probably the end of China, regardless.

TN: Sitting in Beijing, if you bring up any analogues to the Soviet Union to China in current history, they’ll do everything to avoid that conversation. They don’t want to be compared. Is Xi Jinping, Brezhnev or Andropov or. That’s a very interesting conversation to have outside of Beijing. But I think what you bring up is really interesting. And what does China bring to the world? Well, they bring labor, right. They’re a labor arbitrage vehicle. And so where the Soviet Union brought natural resources, China’s brought labor.

So with things like automation and other, say, technologies and resources that are coming to market, can that main resource that China supplied the world with for the last 30 years continue to be the base of their economic power? I don’t know. I don’t know how quickly that stuff will come to market. I have some ideas, but I think what you’re saying is if they do make a play for Taiwan, it will force people to question what China brings to the world. And with an abundance of or, let’s say, a growing influence of things like automation technologies, robotics, that sort of thing, it may force the growth of those things. Potentially. Is that fair to say?

MG: I think it’s totally fair. And I would use the tired adage from commodities. Right. The cure for high prices is high prices. If China withdraws its labor or is forced to withdraw its labor from the rest of the world, there’s two separate impacts to it.

One is that China’s role as the largest consumer of many goods and services in things like raw materials, et cetera. That has largely passed. Right. And so as we look at things like electrification, sure, you can create a bid for copper. But at the same time, you’re not seeing any building of the Three Gorges again. Right. You’re not seeing a reelectrification of China. You may see components of it in India. And I would look to areas like India as potential beneficiaries of this type of dynamic. But we’re a long way away from a world that looks like the 20th century. And you’ve heard me draw this analogy. Right. So people think about inflation.

The 20th century was somewhat uniquely inflationary in world history. The reason I think that happened is because of a massive explosion of global population. Right. So we started the 20th century with give or take a billion people in the global population. We finished the 20th century with give or take 7 billion people. So roughly seven X in terms of the total population. The labor force rose by about five and a half X.

If I look at the next 100 years, we’re actually approaching peak population very quickly. And if I use revised demographic numbers following the COVID dynamics, we could hit peak global population in the 2030s 2040s. Right. That’s an astonishing event that we haven’t seen basically since the 14th century, a decline in global population. And it tends to be hugely deflationary for things like raw materials. Right. People who aren’t there don’t need copper, people who aren’t there don’t need houses, people who aren’t there don’t need air conditioners, et cetera.

I think the scale of what’s transpiring in China continues to elude people. I would just highlight that we’ve all seen examples of this. Right. So go to any Nebraska town where the local farming community has been eviscerated with corporatization of farms, and the population has fallen from 3000 people to 1000 people. What’s happened to local home prices? What’s happened to the local schooling system? What’s happened to deaths of despair, et cetera. Right. They’ve exploded. China’s facing the exact same thing, except on a scale that people generally can’t imagine. The graduating high school classes are now down 50% versus where they were 25 years ago. That’s so mind blowing in terms of the impact of it.

TN: That’s pretty incredible. Hey, Mike, one of the things that I want to cover is from kind of the Chinese perspective. Okay. So we’ve had for the last 20-25 years, we’ve had Chinese companies going public on, say, Western exchanges and US exchanges. Okay. So if something happens with Taiwan, if China invades Taiwan, do you believe Chinese companies will still have access to, say, going public in the US? And if they don’t, how do they get the money to expand as companies?

Meaning, if they can’t go public in the west, they can’t raise a huge tranche of dollar resources to invest globally. So first of all, do you think it’s feasible that Chinese companies can continue to go public in the west?

MG: Yeah. Broadly speaking, I think that’s already over. Right. So the number of IPOs has collapsed, the number of shell company takeovers has collapsed. So the direct listing dynamics. I just had an exchange on Twitter with a mutual friend of ours, Brent Johnson, on this. Ironically, that would actually probably help us equities for the very simple reason that the domestic indices like the S&P 500 and the Russell 2000 do not include those companies. Right.

So if those companies fail to attract additional capital or those companies are delisted, it effectively reduces competition for the dollars to invest in US companies and US indices. Where those companies are listed and are natively traded, at least are in places like Hong Kong, China, et cetera, those are incorporated in emerging market indices. And I would anticipate, although it certainly has not happened yet. That on that type of action, you would see a very aggressive move from the US federal government to force divestiture and prohibit investment in countries like China.

I think that would very negatively affect their ability to raise dollars. Again, and I mean, no disrespect when I say this. I want to emphasize this, but we tend to think of Xi Jinping as this extraordinarily brilliant, super thoughtful, intelligent guy. The reality is he’s kind of Tony Soprano, right? I mean, it’s incredibly street smart, incredibly savvy, survived a system that would have taken you and I down in a heartbeat. Right. You and I would have been sitting there. Wow. Theoretically, someone would have shot. Congratulations. Welcome to the real world, right. He survived that system. But that leaves him in a position where I do not think that he’s actually playing third dimensional chess and projecting moves 17 moves off into the future. I think he very much is behaving in the “Ohh, that can only looks good.”

I think it’s really important for people to kind of take a step back and look at that in the same way that Japan wasn’t actually forecasting out the next 100 years. The Chinese are not doing that. It’s a wonderful psychological operation. One of the best things that people can do is go back and relisten to the descriptions of IBM’s Big Blue computer or Deep Blue. I’m sorry beating Gary Kasparov. Right. So one of the things that they programmed into that computer was random pauses. So the computer processed things and computed things at the exact same speed. But by giving Kasparov the illusion that he forced the machine to think, he started to second guess himself.

Well, what did I do there that made it think, right. He didn’t do anything. It was doing its own thing and designed to elicit a reaction from you. I think China’s done probably a pretty good job of getting a lot of people in the west and elsewhere. And I think Putin is even better at this, of second guessing our capabilities and genuinely believing that we’re second rate now.

It’s fascinating. There was just a piece that came out from the US Space Force where they’re talking about the rising capabilities of China. And if you read the public Press’s interpretation of this, China is moving ahead in leaps and bounds. And what actually he’s saying is, no, we’re way ahead. But they are catching up at an alarming rate.

TN: That’s what happens. Right.

MG: Of course, it is always easier to imitate than it is to innovate.

TN: Right. When I hear you say that it’s easier to imitate than innovate. I know you don’t mean it this way, but I think people hear it this way that the Chinese say IP creators are incapable of creating intellectual property. I don’t think that’s the case. I don’t think you mean that to be the case. They are very innovative. It’s just a matter of baselining yourself against existing technology. So it does take time to catch up. Right. And that takes years. Your TFP and all the other factors within your economy have to catch up. And it takes time. It takes time for anybody to do that.

MG: Well… And I think also it’s important to recognize that things like TFP, total factor productivity, tends to be overstated because we don’t do a great job of actually correctly defining it.

TN: It’s residual. I can tell you.

MG: Exactly right. And just to emphasize what that means, it means it’s the part that we can’t explain with the variables we’ve currently declared. Right.

TN: Right.

MG: And so when I look at TFP in the United States, I actually think TFP is quite a bit lower than the data sets would suggest, because I think that we are failing to consider the fact that we’ve introduced women into the labor force. We’ve introduced minorities into the labor force. Right. So the job matching characteristics or the average skill level of people has risen.

People live longer, so they get to work in different industries and careers for a longer period of time. The center of the distribution is now starting to shift too old, and that’s showing up as a negative impact. But we failed to consider that on the other side. And the last part is just again, remember going back to the start of the 20th century, the average American had three years worth of education at that point. Third grade education, where a year was defined as three months, basically during the non harvest season. Right.

TN: It’s the stock of productivity. Correct. We’re adding to that stock of productivity, and the incremental add is large compared.

MG: But small compared to the stock. Absolutely correct. Right.

TN: Okay. Just to sum up, since we wanted to talk about the impact on markets, I want to sum up a couple of things that you’ve said just to make sure that I have a correct understanding.

If China is to invade Taiwan, we would have in Northeast Asia a period of volatility and uncertainty. That would go across equity markets, across currencies, across cross border investments and so on and so forth. Okay. So we would have that in Northeast Asia.

MG: And I would just emphasize very quickly. So we’ve seen this rolling pattern of spikes in volatility. Right. So we saw it in 2018 in the equity markets. We saw it in late 2018 in the credit markets and commodity markets. We’ve now seen it in interest rate markets. What’s referred to as the Move index. The implied volatility around interest rates has reached relatively high levels of uncertainty.

The one kind of residual area where we just have seen no impact whatsoever has been in FX. That has been remarkably stable, remarkably managed. That’s kind of my pick for the breakout space.

TN: Okay. Great. Europe also appeared of volatility because of their exposure to both China and Russia. Since both China and Russia have a degree of kind of wiliness, especially Russia, I think almost a second derivative. Europe is volatile because of both of those factors. Is that fair to say? And that has to do with the Euro that has to do with their supply chains? That has to do with a number of factors.

MG: I would broadly argue that’s a reasonable way to think about it. I mean, almost think about it. Flip the image and imagine that the continents are ponds and the oceans are land. Right. What we’re describing is a scenario where a rock gets dropped into Asia or a rock gets dropped into Europe. You will see the waves spread across. There’s potential for sloshing over, and it’ll absolutely impact the United States. But in that scenario, we literally have two giant barriers in the form of the Pacific and the Atlantic Ocean that separate us.

And while our supply chains are integrated currently, in a weird way, COVID has been a bit of a blessing in starting to fracture those supply chains. We’ve diversified them significantly in the last couple of years.

TN: Okay. And then from what I understand from what you said about the US is supply chains will definitely be a major factor. Corporates will likely keep their investments in China until they can’t. They won’t necessarily come up with, say, dual supply chains or redundant supply chains.

US equity markets could actually be helped by the delisting of Chinese companies. Or we’ll say, US listed equities, meaning US companies listed could be helped by the delisting of Chinese equities, potentially.

MG: Certainly on a relative basis. I might not go so far as to say in an absolute simply again, because you do have people and strategies that run levered exposures. And so anytime asset values in one area of the world falls, you run the risk that the collateral has become impaired, and therefore there’s a deleveraging impact.

TN: Yes. Understood. And then the dollar continues to be kind of the preeminent currency just on a relative basis because there really isn’t in that volatile environment, there aren’t many other options. Is that fair to say?

MG: Well, again, I think there’s an element of complication. I would prefer to argue volatility. I think it is hard to argue that the dollar wouldn’t appreciate, but I also think it’s important, and this is why I go back and say we can’t actually stop Russia from taking Ukraine. We can’t stop China from taking Taiwan.

If they were to actually do that, then there is kind of the secondary loss of phase dynamic associated with it that may you could see and you’ve already seen Myanmar. You could see Thailand. You could see Vietnam. Say, you know what? We got to switch. I’m skeptical, but I’m open to that possibility.

TN: Interesting. Okay. Very good. Mike, thank you so much for your time. I really appreciate how generous you’ve been with what you’ve shared. I’d love to spend another couple of hours going into this deeper, but you’ve been really generous with us.

I want to thank everyone for joining us. And please, when you have a minute, please follow us on YouTube. We need those follow so that we’ve we can get to the right number to reach more people.

So thanks again for watching. And Mike Green, thanks so much for your thoughts on China’s invasion of Taiwan.

MG: Tony, thank you for having me.

Categories
QuickHit

What happens to markets if China invades Taiwan? (Part 1)

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In this QuickHit episode, we’re joined by Mike Green to talk about what will happen if China invades Taiwan? We’re not saying that China is going to invade Taiwan, but what if it is to happen? What will be the impact to markets?

Mike Green is the chief strategist and portfolio manager for an ETF firm called Simplify Asset Management. They specialize in derivative overlays and derivative structures that modify the traditional market exposures. Their flagship products are things like US equities with downside protection.

His background prior to Simplify, has been in hedge funds for about 15 years and have built an expertise or a degree of renowned for the work that he does in primarily the derivatives and volatility space and have managed traditionally in what’s referred to as a discretionary global macro style. The assets that he purchases or that he monitors exist around the world, including places like China, Taiwan, et cetera.

A lot of the discussions Tony and Mike have had around Taiwan are tied to some geopolitical observations and some dynamics that exist in which Mike played a role less under the Biden administration. But in the prior administration had an advisory capacity to some components of the Department of State and Department of Defense.

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This QuickHit episode was recorded on December 2, 2021.

The views and opinions expressed in this What happens to markets if China invades Taiwan? Quickhit episode are those of the guest and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any contents provided by our guest are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

 

Show Notes

TN: So today we hear or any day, pick a day. We hear that China is invading Taiwan. What are the first things that come to your mind as the news crosses the wires?

MG: Well, I think there’s a couple of things that are really important about the question of is China invading Taiwan, right. And so what we have seen very clearly, and this is fact, not speculation, is a dramatic escalation of China’s incursion on what would traditionally be thought of as Taiwan sovereignty or independence. Right.

We’ve seen a dramatic increase in boats transitioning across the international marine borders. We have seen a dramatic increase in incursion of both fighter jets and bombers into Taiwanese airspace. And in general, the strategy that you see China engaged in is what is typically thought of as a precursor to an invasion. They’re effectively forcing Taiwan to maintain alertness and readiness, which slowly degrades the quality of defenses.

If you have to constantly scramble jets, there’s only so many hours that you can actually have them in the air. There’s only so many hours you can have pilots operating before their capability deteriorates. That is very clearly what is in play here.

Now, it’s an unknown question whether they go to the next step, whether they take what is currently a largely psychological and relative resource advantage to degrade Taiwan’s capabilities, whether they turn that kinetic as compared to hoping for a psychological collapse where Taiwan effectively decides to sue for the best possible deal they can get is unclear.

And I think that’s really what we’re all debating. I mean, China has come out very clearly. Others have made this observation, and it’s not dissimilar to my former employer, Peter Thiel’s observation about Donald Trump, right. That everyone takes him literally, but not seriously. I would flip that on its head. And everyone say everyone takes Xi seriously, but not literally when he says we will reunify with Taiwan in one form or another within the next five years.

And that’s the core of the question. Are they going to do this in a peaceful fashion? Are they going to do it in a kinetic military fashion? What are the ramifications of each of those two strategies and what’s the state of gameplay that is in place right now, as each side including the allies of Taiwan in the form of Japan, the United States, et cetera, evaluates how they want to respond to it.

TN: Right. What is that? What are those initial responses that you think happen, setting aside battle plans, of course. Honestly, I don’t believe that Min Def or DoD know 100% of whether this will happen or not. I think everything is a potential.

What do you think those reactions are initially in terms of, say, markets, investments, even things like trade? Those are like, what do you think happens right away?

MG: Well, I think there’s a couple of things that are worth hitting on. Right. So the first is why does China want Taiwan or why does it matter? Right. So one component is just the psychological final victory over the Republic, the Taiwanese Republic, what is known as the Republic of China outside of the area.

When you think about that dynamic, this is a final victory that would allow Xi to place himself permanently on par with the founders of the Chinese Communist state. Right. The Mao’s, et cetera, of the world. So this is a huge accomplishment.

I think there’s a huge misunderstanding that the objective is to obtain the semiconductor resources, right. To me that feels, one, extremely unlikely to expect that they could do that successfully, and two, I’m not sure it’s actually entirely relevant. Right. But that does then speak to the indications that the game is being taken much more seriously.

And so one of the things that I would point to people is the dramatic expansion of capabilities and investment that Taiwan is making in Arizona, where they’ve effectively doubled on a nameplate capacity and potentially up to 5x the capacity of TSMC in Taiwan. Now, that’s a huge implication.

If we were to put ourselves back into the 17th century, it would be the akin of a European sovereign entity, a small Principality, taking the Crown jewels and shipping them for safekeeping somewhere further away when they were faced with a threat, taking the error apparent and shipping them abroad so that there’s a base of operations. If you think about TSMC’s investment in Arizona, that can be very easily thought of as a base of operations and a source of income for a government in exile. Right. So I don’t think Taiwan is planning on going away.

It also opens up kind of the interesting angle of how effective is China’s strategy, because I think that China broadly looks at it and says, we can wear them down and I would point to it and say, yeah, your best opportunity was actually probably a year ago to use the element of surprise. Now you’ve pretty well telegraphed it. Taiwan has made significant advances. The US Department of Defense, in particular, I would argue, would have been caught very much off guard a year to a year and a half ago. Today they’re pretty much on top of this, right.

The Pacific Theater has been opened pretty widely. You’re actively hearing expressions of support from South Korea, Japan, et cetera. So to me, it feels like the element of surprise has been lost, and now it just becomes a question of, is this ultimately going to happen? It seems extremely unlikely to me that it will be a long term successful component.

Then you have to ask yourself the last question, which is, why does China care beyond simply the moral victory or the desire for that? And that’s where you and I have been through these maps. And I don’t know if we’re doing this in a visual format, but I could share it if you wanted to.

The way the world looks at China is not the way China looks at itself. Right. So the traditional map that we think of with China when we look at it, we see this large access into the Philippines and in the Pacific Ocean. It looks like China has a coastline that is similar to the rest of the similar to the other great powers like the United States. The reality is that their entire access to the Pacific Ocean is framed and blocked by barrier Islands, Taiwan being the most prominent of those. Japan to the north, being another equally important one. The Philippines come into play. Okinawa comes into play there, et cetera. Right. What they’re really trying to do in terms of expressing a desire to take over Taiwan is to break into the Pacific Ocean and pick up that Deepwater Navy capability that is absolutely mandatory for an “Empire to express power.”

Map of China and countries surrounding it. Image from Google Maps.

So I think we’re at kind of a point of maximum uncertainty where it feels like they may have missed the best opportunity to do so. But as you and I have talked about, I’m not sure that China is actually as good at this game as everybody thinks.

TN: I’m with you on that. Yeah, I don’t think they are, either. And one of the things that I’m seeing more and more of two years ago, a year and a half ago, as you mentioned, China was winning diplomatically, not everything. But there was more of a positive bias toward China.

Today, they’re just annoying people. And so if they take an action like that, it seems like they start from a negative position, and it’s hard for them to get to a positive position out of that when Xi Jinping was going to the left to talk and all this other stuff, he had a lot of positive momentum behind him, and he actually could have done a lot of really terrible things, which, if you look at what’s happening in Xinjiang and other things, he did a lot of terrible things. He could have done more, actually. And I think the world would have turned the other way. But now I think it’s really hard for them to turn the other way. Does that make sense to you?

MG: No. I actually think that’s true. I think that they may have gained a degree of false confidence off of the failure to react to Hong Kong. But absolutely, with the exception of… Australia has clearly turned. The UK has recognized that it has to turn. Europe continues to enjoy the schadenfreude of the US’s relative standing having deteriorated. I think Europe is slowly waking up to the risks of their reliance on Russia, particularly for energy supplies.

And an interesting angle, and again, you and I have talked about this offline, would be the dynamic of a simultaneous move in both directions by Russia to expand into Ukraine and China, to expand into Taiwan and the immediate aftermath of the Chinese Olympics in Beijing this winter, which is February. From a purely mechanical standpoint, it’s almost impossible to mount any form of attack on Taiwan until May due to weather conditions, and an amphibious assault would make no sense, you could certainly see an airborne one.

I think there’s a very real chance that we see at least an increase in the drumbeats associated with that to test it out. But Europe will eventually turn, right. They have to understand at their core that they are an exposed peninsula on the Eurasian continent, and they really can’t allow China and Russia to become as dominant as they are expressing at least their interest of becoming.

TN: That’s right. Okay. So you bring up an interesting analog when you mentioned Hong Kong. Okay. So Hong Kong and Taiwan used to be this kind of holdouts from the mainland, and people looked at them as these democracies-ish, although Hong Kong, whether it was a democracy or not as questionable. But the takeover of Hong Kong is one that happened.

I was telling people in 2014 that it was already done. That this was going to happen. And for five years that I talked about it, people said, no, you’re crazy. It’s not going to happen. There’s too much money that goes through Hong Kong and so on and so forth. But it happened. And now in the wake of it, people just kind of shrug their shoulders like, okay, whatever it happened. Do you think that a takeover of Taiwan would be similar? Do you think people would just kind of shrug shoulders and say, “they invaded Taiwan. It was going to happen anyway, let’s just move on.?”

MG: No, I think it’s much harder for people to look at it in that context. Now, I would frame it, if we’re going to use a World War 2 analogy. And you always got to be careful with Godwin’s law about this, but it would be the analog to Nazi invasion or the German invasion, more accurate of the Sudettan land, which ostensibly was done in a manner very similar to Russia’s invasion of Crimea and the Dunbas region, were there to protect the Russian speakers.

We’re not actually there to have any form of substantive gain, and the world has broadly moved on from it. Right. Same thing I would argue with Hong Kong. Well, of course it was ours, right? You didn’t actually expect us to sit around 2047 and wait for this. There had to be a gradual progression in that direction.

Now, if this is the definition of gradual, I’d hate to see the definition of sudden. But again, the world has largely ignored it and moved on because for the most part, those outside the region have not experienced a significant shift. And again, if you were to look at foreigners in Berlin around the invasion of Sudetenland, they wouldn’t have seen anything different either. Right. Maybe they would have seen the riding on the wall and gotten out. But as we know, many didn’t.

There’s the risk that this is similar because the reality is if China were to decide to invade Taiwan, and now we can kind of get into the market impact, I don’t think the west can do anything about it. Right. Remember, this is 100 miles, give or take off the 100 km. I’m sorry. Off the coast of China. The US cannot Mount a credible defense and certainly not the ability to take back that region once China has taken it.

And I think that’s kind of the interesting feature associated with this is that like the actions of Germany and Sudetenland or the Blitzkrieg into Paris or any of these components, it’s going to be very hard to undo this. And so the minute it happens, it becomes a much longer protracted extended dynamic. And that’s the reason we care. It’s not so much that are we going to win or lose? Right. Almost any credible analysis of it says that China can indeed take Taiwan.

Taiwan is unique and in terms of its mountainous dynamics, et cetera. It’s uniquely suited in a lot of ways for guerrilla warfare. So my guess is they will be playing an Afghanistan type dynamic for decades if they take it. And the US would certainly be working in ways to resupply that and create harassment and everything else. But it is unrealistic to think that it can be stopped if they truly decide that they’re going to do that.

And that’s kind of the thing that, to me is more interesting is that how do the pieces start to fall together in a puzzle if they were to do that and what is properly priced under those scenarios? And I think, Ironically, people will point to US equity markets and say, oh, they’re going to fall or the dollar would be affected, et cetera.

I think there’s some truth to that certainly on a short term basis. But as you know, I don’t really think that the fundamentals matter all that much in the US equity markets right now. Are Americans going to lose their jobs and stop contributing to their 401k plans? And is the Federal Reserve suddenly going to step away from markets and stop engaging in supportive activity? To me, that seems very low probability. And so while there could very well be a correction, I’d be surprised if it moved in that direction. But I do think there’s other trades that are particularly interesting. Right.

So we mentioned Hong Kong. The Hong Kong dollar has been completely unaffected, both in terms of the absolute level of the dollar and its relationship with the US dollar. In other words, they continue to trade, basically a parody with very minor exception. But also the volatility associated with that. So taking bets against that relationship have retreated to near the lowest levels in years.

TN: Sure.

MG: If China were to make a play for Taiwan, it would be almost impossible for me to imagine a scenario in which that relationship didn’t fray violently. Same thing becomes true for Japan, right. Because Japan has two separate issues. One is they are a client state of the United States, and now they are directly in the face of a kinetic war that requires them to rapidly increase their government spending and to do so under somewhat existential risk. And at the same time, they have to write off, basically the minute they do that, they have to write off all of the collateral that most of their corporates have invested in China, which has become the single largest source of their external investment. Right.

So those to me, the area across Asia feels mispriced for this risk. Even if we’re just talking about a volatility spike, it feels that that area is much more mispriced than the US equity markets, for example.

TN: Interesting. So what you say about Japanese companies riding off their investments in China with the same go you think for, say, Korean companies as well?

MG: Oh, absolutely. You’re effectively placing them in a very difficult situation for sovereign reasons and for very obvious political reasons. Those are regions: South Korea, Philippines, Japan that really can’t get on board the China train. Right. Because it creates too powerful of an entity, and one that you point out is increasingly unliked. It places too powerful of an entity in their backyard.

TN: Okay. So something like 37, we all kind of know this 37% or something of global manufactured goods are made in northeast Asia. Right.

MG: Right.

TN: And if you look at electronics, it’s a lot more than that. I don’t know the number a lot more than that. So you have a manufacturing base, and especially in electronics, you have a manufacturing location where risk all of a sudden is amped up. Okay. What does that do? I know this is kind of an obvious question, but I want to get a little bit into details. What does that do to supply chains, especially around electronics?

MG: Yeah. Well, the quick answer is obviously it throws them into chaos. Right. And the most important point on the electronics that I would make is that while China holds a fraction of the world’s IP on electronics, again, the commentary around semiconductors, they are massive in the assembly process. Right. They’re basically the assembly line or the finishing stop. And so you have a ton of semiconductors that get shipped into China and then shipped out in the form of flat panel TVs, computers, iphones, et cetera.

That would unquestionably be disrupted. Right. And it creates an interesting, there’s an interesting game theory associated with it, which is you’re effectively talking about splitting the world in two at that point in a manner that is very similar to the breakdown of the alliance between the Soviet Union and the United States following World War II. Right.

TN: Right. This is what I’m not sure a lot of people, especially in the corporate world, understand, is how acute and how distinct that break could be if this happens.

MG: Yeah. I agree with you broadly. Now, the irony, of course, is part of the reason that they can’t embrace that is that redundancy costs money.

If I’m going to build a diversified supply chain, it places me at a disadvantage to competitors that do not do so in the interim. It potentially positions me for a knockout punch for a true winning of the game. But even there, you start to have to ask yourself questions. Would it be politically feasible given the likely response in terms of price controls and everything else that would kick in? Right.

I mean, I find it highly likely that a Biden administration or a Republican administration. Remember, the price controls were instituted by Nixon, not by Johnson. When you start talking about those types of dynamics, the game theory doesn’t really support the desire to fully diversify your resources. It places you at a disadvantage to your peers in the immediate future, and the potential rewards associated with it are somewhat in doubt as well because it becomes politically unacceptable to raise prices in response to that type of event.

TN: Right. Everyone else is going to be knocked out. I’ll be knocked out, too. So there’s no advantage or disadvantage to me to have a redundant supply chain.

MG: Correct. There’s a disadvantage if it doesn’t happen, right? You’re maintaining something more expensive.

So it’s hard to look at those who would be most impacted and say that they’re behaving in an irrational way. Right. Like the game theory is actually very much. Don’t do anything. Don’t do anything. Don’t do anything. Panic.

TN: Right. Okay. So we have a lot of risk in, say, Northeast Asian markets. We have a lot of risk to the electronic supply chain. I know this may seem like a secondary consideration, but maybe it’s not. What about Europe? Does Europe just kind of stand by and watch this happen, or are they any less, say risky than any place else? Are they insulated somehow?

Categories
QuickHit

EM Meltdown: China, Turkey & Russia (Part 1)

The emerging markets expert Michael Nicoletos shares his insights into the Chinese economy and why it’s in a very big trouble?

 

This is the first part of the discussion. Subscribe to our channel to get notified when Part 2 is out.

 

In this first part, Michael talked about China’s household debt and how much is that? Can they ever recover from the Evergrande disaster? And how they got into it in the first place? Is CNY still valuable? How do the Chinese get dollars now with their very limited FX reserve? Should you use the digital Yuan? How much is China spending right now to up its GDP?

 

Michael Nicoletos have spent most of his life around markets, and I used to run a hedge fund for more than 10 years on emerging markets. He shut it down in 2019 to take a sabbatical and Covid 19 hit the world. Now, he is doing a lot of research on emerging markets and trying to see what the next steps will be in terms of the investment world. But in the meantime, he is also advising a few firms on their investment.

 

Tony Nash met Michael at a Real Vision event in 2019, when he was giving a presentation on China, and he had a chart in there that was actually Michael’s chart. They had a conversation after that and have stayed in touch occasionally since then.

 

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This QuickHit episode was recorded on October 20, 2021.

 

The views and opinions expressed in this EM Meltdown: China, Turkey and Russia (Part 1) Quickhit episode are those of the guest and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any contents provided by our guest are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

Show Notes

 

TN: So on China. Michael, I wanted to ask you, you sent out a tweet. I think it was last week talking about China’s household debt and it’s on the screen now. So it’s talking about how China’s household debt is at $10 trillion and looking at the ratio of China’s household debt to say, Hong Kong and the US. So can you talk to us a little bit about China’s household debt loads and what that really means for the Chinese economy?

 

Banking bubble in China and Hong Kong

 

MN: Well, as we all know, it’s been in the news lately. The Evergrande imminent. I don’t know if it’s going to be a default because there are some discussions right now to find a solution. But either way, it’s very hard for it to be repaid at its face value.

 

Now, the problem here is twofold. One problem is that China is highly levered as a whole, approximately more than 270% of GDP. The other thing is that real estate is approximately 62 trillion, I’d say the property market, which includes also home prices and everything. It’s about 62 trillion, of which around 10 trillion around sold properties. So it’s a very big backlog. The real estate crisis has started with Evergrande, and we’ve seen actually bond yield spiking in China real estate bond prices. And the big issue here is that banks are the ones who lend obviously to the real estates. So right now, banking assets in China are around 400% of GDP. And in Hong Kong, which is a proxy to China is around 900% of GDP. Just to put it in perspective.

 

In 2007, the relevant numbers for the US was 230%. And Ireland where the crisis started was like 700%. So we’re past both those levels. So we see that there’s a very big debt problem within China. Now, because China has capital controls in place, money cannot leave the country. So the bubble grows, grows, grows. But the money stays in the system.

 

So people now are starting to be afraid. And it’s the first month after six years that retail prices started falling in China. So this is creating a vicious loop. That fear that the contractor will not deliver your house. It means that you’re not going to purchase a new house. So you’re afraid. People in China have stopped buying, which creates a negative, vicious look.

 

So China has tried to avert this at least three or four times in the past ten years. Every time China is trying to stem back from giving you debt, we see such a small crisis, and then China is forced to reverse immediately because it cannot afford. It’s too big of an economy. Real estate is approximately 29% of China’s GDP. So you understand that something like that is very hard to control.

 

Now, China has been a rock in a hard place because I’ve been trying to shift from an investment, let’s say, investment intensive economy to a more consumption driven economy.

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TN: This has been a 20-year transition, right? It’s not something they started two years ago. They’ve been trying to do this for, like, 20 years, right?

 

MN: They’ve been trying to do this, say ten years. But let’s see, consumption as a percentage of GDP is around 38%. When in the US, it’s around 70%. It’s very hard to get that number higher. And given that all the wealth or most of the wealth by Chinese people, is linked directly or indirectly to real estate, you understand that this is a chicken and egg problem. If you try to stop one problem, you’ll create the other problem.

 

TN: Sure.

 

MN: So there are these problems right now in China. I think China will be forced to reverse course again. I don’t think you can afford to create a real estate crisis. I don’t think there would be a world contagion, by the way. But I think it could create a spillover effect with other real estate entities. Evergrande, the size was around 300 billion. It’s actually the biggest one. So we’ve seen the biggest one. And the thing is this could spill over to the whole industry.

 

Now, what’s the problem here, besides that? The problem is that China has been trying to convince banks and actually all the regions to stop giving loans, which are unproductive. Now, because GDP in China is an input number and not an output number like it’s in the Western countries, whatever the number the government sets, that’s what everyone tries to achieve and they can achieve it by giving more money.

 

TN: I just want to stop you there because I don’t think that point is well understood. When you say GDP is an input number in China and it’s an output number everywhere else. I’ve been trying to make this point for years to people, and you say… Help me understand, when you say it’s an input number. What do you mean in simple terms?

 

MN: In simple terms is the government wants 7% growth, so everyone will do the best they can to achieve that 7% growth, no matter what. So it means if I’m a bank or if I’m a region in China and I need to do more, I need to produce more growth. I’ll give out loans, which could be unproductive.

 

What do I mean? If I build a bridge, this is the most common example. If I build a bridge, when I build a bridge, this is counted in the GDP growth. Now, if I destroy the bridge, that is not deducted by the GDP. Right? If I rebuild the bridge, it’s added again. So in theory, you could make one bridge, build it, destroy it, build it, destroy it. And you would only have growth. So when China wants an input number, it will create bridges. The bridges could be, as we say, the usual “bridges to nowhere.” The famous quote. Or it could be bridges, which are useful. So all these unproductive debt went mostly to properties. And that’s why we see all these vacancies and all these ghost towns around China which actually were built and this was added in the GDP growth numbers. But then no one went to live there and the towns are there, and now they have to bring them down.

 

TN: Right. Now, you’re famous for kind of calculating for every say CNY spent by the Chinese government, it results in X amount of GDP, right? There used to be a multiplier effect to CNY spent and GDP. But you started seeing as that was diluted. So when you last calculated that, what was that number? For every say Chinese Yuan spent how much GDP was created?

China credit to GDP ratio

 

MN: So your viewers can understand because it’s a bit technical. So let’s assume you’re an economy and you create debt. You want that debt to create more GDP than the debt you’re giving. So if you’re giving one unit of debt, you want that one unit of debt to create one point, something of GDP.

 

So in theory, you would want it to be two, three, four. Okay, that’s not very easy. But if it’s a plus, it means that your debt was accredited. So it helped the economy. The problem here is, since 2008, China from using approximately let’s say, two units of debt to create one unit of GDP. So we’re already negative, because when you have two units of debt to create one unit of GDP, it means that that one unit will end up as a bad debt at some point. It’s not imminent, but at some point it will add up. So we went from 1 to 2.2 units of debt to create one unit of GDP. And right now we’re approximately between eight and nine units of debt to create that same one unit of GDP. So China needs more and more debt to sustain the same rate of growth.

 

TN: Right. So instead of a multiplier effect, which is what kind of economic impacts people usually talk about, there’s almost a divisor effect in China.

 

MN: You could say that. But because it’s a closed economy, that money can’t leave the system. So in theory, if you had a free account or if you had an open capital account, the Chinese will say, oh, my God, my currency is overvalued. Or let me take some money out of China and make a dollar. Now, this is not possible because Chinese have, I think, a quota of $50,000 a year they can take out? Something like that. Now, obviously, there are ways to take money out, but it’s not the easiest thing, and it’s not for everyone.

 

TN: I guess. It’s jewelry and watches the latest.

 

MN: Right. Okay. It was also Bitcoin. They try to be creative. Well, there’s a good ratio here, which is pretty interesting, and people forget. Now, if you devise the M2, the FX reserves to M2, why do I do that? Because let’s assume money is the money supply within the system. The ratio goes to 9%. Now, the Tiger countries in the Asia crisis in ’97 had the same ratio of approximately 25% to 30%. When it dropped below the 25%, you had the big devaluation.

 

Now, China doesn’t have a big external debt. So since it doesn’t have a big external debt, there is no trigger from that side of the equation for China to be forced to liquidate that fixed reserves to cover for it. But even though they have approximately $3.2 trillion of FX reserves and maybe another trillion from the banks and everything. I’d say 4 trillion. The M2 is approximately around $36 trillion right now. So these numbers… Imagine a hot balloon that you put air. At some point it’s going to blow. We don’t know what that level is. Okay. It could be like ten years before that happened. Or we could see, in my view, the Japan-like model where for ten years, you have an anemic growth. But you don’t see anything really, not a substantial bust. Because one thing.

 

TN: You also just destroyed the idea of China becoming a global currency, of the CNY becoming a global currency. Right. Because if they do have to trade on an open basis, then it’s way overvalued. Right. It’s like monopoly money.

 

MN: Well, China tried or is trying, at least. And it appears through Alipay and WeChat to create a digital Yuan. Why does he want to create a digital Yuan. It’s pretty simple. If the world is using a digital Yuan outside China, it means that the CNY or Yuan or Renminbi or whatever you want to call it, will be used abroad. So this means that it’s usage outside China will increase.

 

We’ve seen, however, that during the last two years, and I’m sure you have the guests, which are better to talk about this, know this subject a bit better than me. The dollar usage has gone up. The dollar is around 87% of global transactions. It actually went up. So there’s a discussion where everyone says the dollar is dying. The dollar is dying, the dollar is dying. Okay. And I understand where it’s coming from because of the policies. But monetary policies are relative. They’re not absolute. Maybe US is doing something bad, but the rest of the world is not doing something better.

 

So right now, the US dollar dominance increases. Now. I’m pretty sure I understand that this cannot stay at current levels. But going from 87% to being to 5%, it’s not something that’s going to happen in the next 2 years.

 

TN: I think the dollar had been down to like 82% six to seven years ago. And seeing it go up to 87%, that’s not a small amount. But the Fed does not want to be the World Central Bank. The US Treasury does not want to be the world’s treasury. So there’s this belief that the US wants to be the dominant global currency. I don’t necessarily believe that’s true. I think there are advantages to having a large portion of global currency usage, but I think 87% is just way too much. It’s way too much concentration of risk, actually, for the Fed and for US monetary officials. Go ahead. Sorry.

 

MN: No, you’re absolutely right. I think you’re right. However, the US, I think would like to remain the number one. Now, I don’t know what the percentage, the optimal percentage would be. But I’m pretty sure they prefer being the dominant than not being the dominant.

 

TN: Oh, yeah, absolutely. They want to say number one, but 87% is just too much.

 

MN: Since we’re talking about the dollar. The important thing about the dollar is that if the dollar strengthens, okay. And I don’t have a strong view here, I think it’s going to strengthen, but I understand if it doesn’t. If the dollar strengthened, this puts the pressure on emerging markets as a whole, because usually emerging markets tend to borrow in foreign currency because the foreign currency interest rate is much lower than the local currency.

 

For example, in Turkey, it’s 20%. The dollar is 0%. So if there’s a Turkish corporate wants to launch a bond, it will borrow on dollars at five 6% instead of borrowing at 20%. So they try to do that.

 

Now, as the dollar strengthens, especially for emerging markets, this puts pressure to repay the debt and it becomes harder and harder. So if the dollar were to strengthen, that would create a very, very big problem. I think the Goldman Sachs issued a report where it showed that the growth divergence between emerging markets and developed markets is at its lowest point. If you look at the cycles and it leaves that it could expand and right now, I think it discounts like a 4% growth for EM as a total.

 

So if the dollar strengthens, I don’t think we’ll see these numbers. I think you’ll see pressure on EM. Huge.

 

TN: Talking about EMs, and we talked about reserves and you mention Turkey. Let’s talk about Turkey Turkey for a minute because you’ve made some really interesting statements about Turkey. And I’d like to really understand your perspective.

Categories
QuickHit

QuickHit: The Anglosphere and the Multi-Speed Recovery

Macro specialist, geopolitics and history commentator Nick Glinsman joined us for the first time on QuickHit to discuss how the Anglosphere compares to the world in this multi-speed recovery in the wake of Covid.

 

Nick is based in Brazil and he brings decades of experience to macro, markets, and politics. His background is basically London and New York with a bit of Europe and, Australia and Hong Kong. He worked with the Salomon Brothers and Merrill Lynch. He’s doing a lot of advisory work and the ability to express views on the markets, geopolitics and macroeconomics in the market.

 

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This QuickHit episode was recorded on April 8, 2021.

 

The views and opinions expressed in this The Anglosphere and the Multi Speed Recovery? QuickHit episode are those of the guests and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any content provided by our guests are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

 

Show Notes

 

TN: Nick, for a while you’ve talked about this concept called the anglosphere. Can you help us understand what you mean by the anglosphere?

 

NG: I’ll dig into it. I like the fact that you’re talking about the link between geopolitics and economics because with Trump and Brexit, that’s where what was a very boring macro environment suddenly started to become differently exciting. The politics would start to drive some of the macro markets and actually what’s interesting is  Brexit and Trump, part of the anglosphere. Not the formative part of the anglosphere.

 

So what we mean by the anglosphere is looking at countries that are historically tied via culture but critically also via common law, legal system, because that defines how the economy and how commerce can run. If you go back in history, there is a big difference between common law countries and roman law countries. Common law countries think of European Union countries and that construct. So what we mean by the anglosphere is being, better start with the UK because it is the mother country, it’s still the mother country for where you are currently still. If the US were now part of the commonwealth. You’re looking at an anglosphere. Now typically when I refer to it, I’m talking about UK, US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand. Five Eyes.

 

You could loosely add two countries. One of which has an anglo-saxon common law — India. The other one works much closer as a defeated entity country in World War II — Japan. So you’re getting the quad, which I would maintain is part of an angular influence, at least, if not anglosphere entity.

 

Let’s stick with that grouping. You’re looking at countries that have a similar legal system, similar financial structure, they have banks, central banks that are lenders of last resort and traditional backups, concept. Remember the European Union doesn’t have banks.

 

Back to common law. Common law also in this environment. This is where it’s getting critical. So Five Eyes is I would posit it’s the ultimate defense alliance.

 

TN: Even New Zealand, still? Ah, you know. Long discussion. That’s so much sarcastically.

 

NG: I know what you’re saying. Although she has the relation in the State of Victoria in Australia, who is actually not known as Kim Yong Dan. But if you look at what they’ve just done with the central bank, there is still a similarity there. And of course the travel corridor that’s about to open on the 16th I think it is, is between Australian and New Zealand. So as much as she kowtows to the panda in Beijing, they are still part of that structure.

 

So back to the common law and the financial. So you’ve got countries with central banks that act as lenders of last resort with independent monetary policy, you have independent fiscal policy and I would include of course in both these, Bank of Japan, RBI in India and so on so you’ve got independent fiscal policy, independent monetary central bank, which you don’t have in Europe.

 

There’s been no Hamiltonian moment there. So you have that flexibility and you can see that flexibility. You also have much more, common law enables Schumpeter’s creative destruction and thus reconfiguration. Much easier chapter 11 in the US or bankruptcy and start again. Right. Not so easy to either stop or start on the roman law. So that when you think of where we are now, you’ve gone through a pandemic where inexplicably a lot of countries have remained closed, the reopening is going to need that reconfiguration.

 

You’ve also been the countries that are advancing with the vaccine quickest of those that took a very commercial view as governments in terms of getting them… so you had operation walk speed in the US and you had a vc person take over the procurement policy and the vaccine policy in the UK. Private Sector innovation. And in fact, in the UK, you have that triangle, Oxford, Cambridge, London, that’s without biotech and so on and so forth, very flexible. You even have a situation where the famous Astrazeneca factory in Holland was financed by the British. Not by the Dutch.

 

We can get into that on another episode of the great vaccine debacle. But I think that’s part of the precautionary Roman Law System that the EU runs versus the go get innovative system that comes with the anglo-ceric countries, the common law system and the structure of finance business so and so forth.

 

TN: Okay. So it sounds to me like when you talk about the anglosphere and you look at it kind of post pandemic or at least post first wave of disaster in the pandemic as we enter a recovery, it sounds like you see a widening divergence between those with say common law and relatively independent central banks versus the other law formed be it roman and in independent fiscal policy as well.

 

So help me understand the… so we just had this IMF report come out earlier this week about 5.1% growth or whatever this year and everything’s amazing and which we know, given, it’s all base effects and if you do a three-year average, it doesn’t look good at all. In Europe, the only one, over that three years, the only one with positive growth is The Netherlands. Not even the UK. But I would argue there, they lean toward you know more of a British style than other styles.

 

So if we’re having a two-speed or multi-speed recovery, would it be fair for me to say that you believe the anglosphere will recover faster than the other spheres?

 

NG: Absolutely. Absolutely. You’re better expert on sinosphere than I would be. But I think the growth is going to disappoint because they’ve pushed so hard on the string of debt. Okay.

 

In terms of the Euro, Europe, I think there’s a very simple way of looking at things. It’s extent of vaccination and compare those and what does that mean? It’s now being said out of UCL, University College of London. UK’s herd immunity on Monday, 73%.

 

You can see there’s data coming out of the UK that is explosive as there is in the US. People are looking at the European and thinking, okay let’s close until August or beyond because this vaccine debacle is even worse. Everybody’s going to take Astrazeneca in Europe even though for the young women of age below 30, the chance of getting a blood clot is 1 in 600,000. Where the child’s getting Covid is substantially greater.

 

Because Europe and the Roman legal system has this precautionary black bent. It’s clear that this whole debacle in Europe has delayed that coming out of meltdown. The European summer season as the Germans would say is kaput.

 

TN: If we have this kind of two-speed recovery or multi-speed recovery, and let’s say Japan is part of the anglosphere, would you say Japan would be leading Asia out instead of China? Now I’m talking about real data. I’m not talking about Chinese 8.1% growth numbers like fictional. I’m talking about actual real performance with actual real usable output and you know all this other stuff.

 

NG: I’ve got so that’s going to be the case actually. I really do have that sense and I also, given the belligerence of the Chinese regime right now. You’ve got vocal and slightly belligerent actions against Taiwan, of course, which I’m with Albert on that. They’d have already invaded if they were going to do it. And you’ve got what’s going on in the Philippine islands with all these ships tied together.

 

I remember a very famous situation where chief ancient China economist from HSBC came into the office and talking about China and then we asked coming into that particular office, name unmentioned, always an aggressive to and fro Q&A, and then we have one of us asked about China, how’s the recovery going after Fukushima. Blood was coming out of this chad’s mouth having to talk a bit about China.

 

And we know that there is a much more passionate… we have passion against Germany or France as a Brit or as an Englishman come soccer. But, we love each other.

 

TN: Maybe that’s a bit strong. But we’ll use that.

 

NG: Maybe strong for Germans but with the French, there is a deep passion there and somebody keeps reminding the agent. But in the Far East, there has been that, you see that tension with the South Koreans and Japanese. However, the Chinese are forcing people out away from some of this stuff.

 

Japan with Australia and India will enable a lot of these countries to look elsewhere. Isn’t it ironic going back to the anglo-sphere link and that publicly is United Arab Emirates who are being given credit for getting India, Pakistan talking together. I have no doubt behind the show, the English are very active there because you’ve got a cricketer in charge. She made this game… So there’s stuff going on that gives you signals as to what could be happening.

 

It was rather like a mutual friend of ours, we were discussing India in terms of trade and I was saying, the UK and India are going to have a free trade deal as soon as it’s possible once they’ve overcome some of the agricultural stuff. And that person said India will do a trade with the EU well before they do it with the UK. And I’m saying hold your horses. No way!

 

TN: It’s familiar.

 

NG: One, it’s familiar. Two, one of the problems that the EU’s have with trade deals with anglospheres countries is legal interpretation thereof. And you know, I think they’ve been discussing it for 8, 10 years, EU and India, they’ve got a sub agreement already in the UK after several months.

 

TN: Just coming back to this kind of overall topic of the anglosphere and the multi-speed recoveries, so it does sound like you almost have this triangulated recovery from your perspective from India, Japan and Australia that’s leading the way in Asia. You have the UK, which is leading the way for Europe and then you have the US that’s kind of leading the way for the Americas. Is that kind of how you see things?

 

NG: I tend to think that’s the case. But I wonder whether one can justify the idea of UK leading the way for Europe given the tensions between the UK and the EU.

 

TN: I think the EU will play through… The EU will feel pain until they get tired of it and then they’ll relent, I think.

 

NG: There’s one big problem and this came up yesterday there was a meeting of the EU commission about article 122 vaccine export ban. Belgium, Holland, Sweden and Ireland said no way. All the others were saying we’re okay with it. With Germany covering itself with a few conditions. The damage to Europe’s role in the global supply chain is irreparable. They will not be able to go back to this.

 

And there’s another little fact of it which makes me wonder what will happen with Ireland because there’s tension building up in Northern Ireland again. Article 122, that export ban is specifically aimed at UK, US, Canada, Australia. They’ve stopped shipping to Australia already. US, UK, they’re saying well you’re not exporting anything. Paid for everything but not exporting everything. Canada just gets lumped in with the US and the UK.  So I think that’s really shattered the role of Europe in the global supply chain.

 

You’ll have people producing goods for Europe from European input but how can you possibly? Now going to Ireland where the UK has already said we’ll give the Republic of Ireland 3.7 million vaccines because it’s secures Northern Ireland in the coming out of lockdown. That’s an interesting overthought process.

 

Because you have a situation where Ireland is under attack like the Netherlands and Switzerland from Joe Biden’s global tax. If they come out, I would not be funny.

 

TN: It seems to me that what you’re also saying is there’s likely some kind of regionalization or re-regionalization that may emerge from this. Am I putting words in your mouth or is that?

 

NG: I would go and say US and commonwealth EU for as long as it stays stable, which may be problematic and then as you say Asia.

 

TN: Okay. Yeah, I mean I think that we’re coming to a place and I’ve been talking about this since about 2015, where you have global supply chains for goods that are long-term commoditized goods and then you have regional supply chains for the higher value goods.

 

NG: And that’s consistent with the decoupling that’s got to take place against China. And then you have that floater which you and I touched on before we got online, which is Russia and I have a slightly different view of where I can go, which will be, you know.

 

Categories
QuickHit

QuickHit: Can Western companies solve the China dilemma?

This week’s QuickHit, we have Isaac Stone Fish of Strategy Risks to talk about how western companies and other companies around the world should deal with China and compromises that you need to do for that. He also shares the status of Hong Kong as a gateway to China. How about the environmental and human rights violations of China and how the US companies can make sure they are running an ethical business? And what is the status of non-profit organizations in China, especially those that are environment and human rights focuses?

 

Strategy Risks quantifies corporate exposure to Beijing. This was started because Isaac got frustrated at the way that ESG environmental, social and corporate governance providers were ranking Chinese companies and US companies that had exposures to China. Isaac thought it would be fun and interesting and hopefully very useful to have a different way of measuring and quantifying this exposure.

 

Isaac grew up in Syracuse, a nice little place but basically about as far away from the center of anything as possible. He started going to China when he was 16 for something different. He started in Western China and ended up living in Beijing for about six years. He also worked in journalism mostly, it was the Asia foreign policy. Spent a few years doing a mix of public affairs, commentating, bloviating, writing, and then started Strategy Risks roughly six months ago.

 

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This QuickHit episode was recorded on February 3, 2021.

 

The views and opinions expressed in this Normalization of China QuickHit episode are those of the guests and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Complete Intelligence. Any content provided by our guests are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any political party, religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything.

 

Show Notes

 

TN: It’s really interesting looking at ESG and public markets and I think we’ve seen over the past few years a lot of tensions between China and the U.S. They’ve been there for 10 years but they really took shape over the last few years. If you’re a publicly traded company today in the U.S. or traded on a U.S. exchange, what are the things that you need to really think about with regard to China? What are the biggest risks and biggest considerations that you’re talking to your clients about?

 

ISF: One thing that people overlook is the risks of their China strategy. Not in China itself but globally and especially in the United States. The rules for engagement in China are so different for these corporations in China than they are in the United States. And the U.S. is drawing some pretty thick regulatory lines especially around Xinjiang, the region of northwest China where there are roughly a million Muslims in concentration camps. That a lot of times, these major corporations, their China offices will ignore or overlook or not put nearly enough attention on.

 

The messages that we’re communicating and the things that luckily are starting to bubble up into these board rooms is the understanding that to have a China strategy, you need to have a global strategy that is very aware both of what Beijing wants but also what the Biden administration and many American people want.

 

TN: For the last 15, 20 years it almost seems like companies have had a global strategy and then they’ve had this China strategy off to the side because it was such a big market, growing so fast. It seems to me like you’re talking almost about the normalization of China in terms of performance expectations, social expectations, those sorts of things. Is that right? Is that kind of what you’re implying?

 

ISF: One of the smartest ways of the Chinese communist party, which has ruled China since 1949, were the smartest things they have done is made it seem like their country was a normal country. And there’s nothing aberrant about China or the Chinese people. But there’s something quite apparent about the Chinese Communist Party.

 

And the rules for playing in China are quite different than they are in basically everywhere else. What we’re starting to see is the realization that companies need to do something to limit the influence of Beijing on their corporate headquarters, on their products and on their decision making.

 

TN: But can you do that actually? Because if you’re saying an automotive company and most of your revenues come from China, and the Chinese government says something, it seems really hard. And companies have been awkward about doing that for the past say 10, 15 years. Really changing how you help companies treat them like any other country? I think what you raised about what the CCP has done since 1949 is amazing. It’s great perspective. But can the CCP understand that they’re being normalized as well?

 

ISF: The CCP are doing this as an active strategy in as much as such a complex institution has a single strategy. They’re certainly trying to make people think that they are normal in our sort of western liberalism definition of that. Most of the companies that we talk about in this space, the U.S. is a far more important market for them than China. NBA is a great example.

 

China is its growth market. The USA is its most important market and what companies are starting to realize is that what happens to them in China and what touches China doesn’t just touch on their business in China but affects their business in the United States as well.

 

What we do at Strategy Risks is less working with the companies like the NBA that are having these problems, but work with other people in the financial chains, institutional investors, pension funds, endowments and explain to them the different risks and exposures that they’ll have with the companies in their portfolio and some of the problems they might have with being overweight in certain companies about Chinese or American that are complicit in Chinese human rights abuses.

 

TN: From a portfolio investor’a perspective, until very recently, you could park a whole lot of money in Hong Kong and then dip into China as needed. But it seems that that’s becoming less of an easy strategy since the crackdown in Hong Kong last year. Is that the case or is Hong Kong still in a pretty good place to take advantage of mainland stuff?

 

ISF: From a pure markets perspective, Hong Kong is still an excellent place for that. What’s really changed is the safety and the rule of law and the feeling of security for people doing deals in Hong Kong. Hong Kong is still an excellent window into China and we’re seeing Shenzhen and Shanghai supplanting a lot of what Hong Kong is doing in Seoul to agree. But the issue with Hong Kong is much more for the people there as opposed to the people who are using it as a conduit.

 

TN: That’s really interesting what you say about Shenzhen, Shanghai, and Seoul because I’ve been seeing that take shape over the last five or six years and it’s interesting that it’s getting a lot of traction.

 

With Xinjiang and with other things happening socially in China, what about things like non-profits? Issues that they have to raise in China? How can you operate a non-profit in China and stay true to your mission if it’s kind of awkward with Beijing or with the CCP, which are one and the same?

 

ISF: Most times, you can’t. What’s been happening is that a huge amount of western nonprofits have, sometimes it’s this evangelical view and sometimes it’s just well this is a very important country filled with a lot of lovely people and we want to come here and do good. But they find that knowingly or unknowingly, their message and their mission gets corrupted because they need to work with their government partners. And sometimes, their mission is totally at odds with the mission of the party. And so, they have to make sacrifices that I would say perverts what they’re doing.

 

We see this perhaps most intently in both the very human rights focused nonprofits and in the environmental focused non-profits. A lot of whom have found themselves being very praiseworthy of what Beijing is doing even though China’s far and away the worst polluter and the worst carbon emitter. They take signs coming from top leaders that Beijing is committed to making these changes even though the changes often don’t get made. But they are finding themselves in a position where in order to be there, they have to sacrifice some of their credibility. A very heartening sign I’m seeing is people saying, maybe I don’t actually need to be in China in order to do something that’s positive for the world.

 

TN: Do you see a path to China having that type of environment in 5, 10, 20 years time? Or do you think we’re kind of on this this really is it slower than that?

 

ISF: It’s such an important question and I wish I had some good way to answer it. In China, as Chinese officials love to say, has 5,000 years of history. The Communist Party has been in power for what, one and a half percent of that time. At some point, in the near future, the party will no longer rule China. Will that be next year? Will that be 30 years? Will that be 200 years? It’s so hard to say, but it’s certainly not inevitable.

Categories
Podcasts

Markets Pause As Wells, BOFA Miss And Stimulus Remain Distant

In this discussion with BFM 89.9, Tony Nash shares views on the recent bank earnings, update on Brexit and why it’s stalled, the future of Hong Kong and how vaccine news play for markets.

 

This podcast first appeared and originally published at https://www.bfm.my/podcast/morning-run/market-watch/markets-pause-as-wells-bofa-miss-and-stimulus-remain-distant on October 15, 2020.

 


BFM Description

 

The diminishing likelihood of stimulus and poor bank earnings have paused stock markets for now, as electioneering ramps up ahead of November polls, according to Tony Nash, CEO of Complete Intelligence, who discusses bank earnings, market expectations as well as Brexit.

 

Produced by: Mike Gong

 

Presented by: Khoo Hsu Chuang, Wong Shou Ning

 

Show Notes

 

KHC: On the line with us now is Tony of Complete Intelligence for some clarity on markets. Tony, thanks for talking to us. Now, obviously, the Wells Fargo, Bank of America, Goldman Sachs have all reported results so far. What is your take on the financial sector earnings thus far?

 

TN: Goldman obviously reported really well, Bank of America is down five percent. There was a huge disappointment there. Could get worse. A lot of that had to do with these penalties that were levied several weeks ago. But it looks like the investment banks are doing much better than the consumer banks. And until we get a next round of stimulus and we start to see money moving into the accounts of those guys who are unemployed, which is not a small number in the US, I think consumer banks will continue to suffer.

 

KHC: On that particular issue of the impasse in terms of a stimulus being introduced before elections, what is the biggest deterrent to consensus being reached on that front?

 

TN: One of the biggest issues is that you have a lot of states, all of them that are Democrat states that are heavily indebted. So what the House majority leader is pushing is a bailout program for those Democrat states like California, New York, Illinois, that have have billions of dollars in debt that have been racked up over the last 10 or 20 years. What are typically Republican states typically have balanced budgets. It would effectively be the Republican states bailing out the Democrat states. It’s a problem here in the US.

 

The other item is the House majority leader, Nancy Pelosi, wants to give stimulus checks to illegal immigrants in the US. She wants to give a few thousand dollars to people who are in the US illegally. And the Republicans are saying, no, why would we do that? So those are two of the things that are really holding things up in terms of the stimulus plan. And it’s electioneering. Democrats want to give money to the party faithful in their heavily indebted blue states. And they also want to try to get some votes from the illegal aliens who aren’t legally allowed to vote. But they want to get some loyalty from those illegal immigrants who are in the US.

 

WSN: Another thing that seems to be having an impact on markets is vaccine news. So every time we hear of a vaccine trial feeding, markets correct. Is it possible at all to quantify how much of this is in the markets really in terms of optimism?

 

TN: Remember, in 2019, every day, whenever we needed a bump in markets, Trump would tweet, a trade deal is near. And then we finally had the phase one deal in December. It seems like whenever there’s a tweet or some news about a vaccine, it’s because a bump in markets is needed. There’s a lot of cynicism among traders about vaccine. Until we see something actually proven and actually in a market, you’re not going to see a real firm belief in the difference it can make. So it’s going to be at least Q1 or so before we see things deployed.

 

We don’t necessarily expect the benefits to happen until 2021. But the problem, at least here in the US, is that nobody wants to be the guinea pig. At least half of Americans surveyed don’t want to be the first one. They’re going to have to see some high-level politicians go in, roll up their sleeves, get the job and and really face the consequences, if there are any negative consequences, because a lot of Americans just aren’t believers and they’re really worried about the effects of it.

 

KHC: OK, switching to the UK, if the UK fails to negotiate a Brexit deadline deal today, how should investors position themselves? And would you recommend shorting sterling assets?

 

TN: I think it’s a possibility. I don’t know if I’d necessarily recommend it, because I think the status quo is baked in to expectations. We haven’t necessarily had a positive outlook to negotiations for two or three years now. I think the expectation is that things will continue to muddle through and markets will fold that end. So I don’t know. Outside of a very positive agreement for the UK, I don’t necessarily think there’s huge upside anywhere.

 

And outside of a very negative concession given by the UK, I don’t think there’s huge downside anywhere because the EU is just intransigent there. They’ve been embarrassed by this whole process. They don’t want to negotiate and they’re not moving at all. So I think we’re in the range of where things will be outside of a major announcement somewhere.

 

WSN: Looking at China yesterday or a few days ago, his speech has outlined a comprehensive vision of for Shenzhen. What does this mean for Hong Kong’s economic future? Do you see a bright, a bleak one for the city street?

 

TN: Hong Kong’s fate was sealed in 2014 with the demonstrations. And I’ve been saying this since twenty fifteen. At that time, the MDC and the folks in the central government were planning on other options for the activities that were happening in Hong Kong. What we saw with the announcement in Shenzhen yesterday was simply cementing Shenzhen’s place, the central city at the end of the PRD, right at the end of the Pearl River Delta.

 

And so Hong Kong is no longer the central location. It is a place to get hard currency. But it’s no longer an industrial location. I believe we’ll start to see financial services move to other places over the next ten years. Not an overnight activity, but it’s something that certainly the central government wants to happen.

 

KHC: OK, Tony, thanks so much for your time. That was Tony Nash of Complete Intelligence.

 

His comments in terms of of China also resonate because we’ve got certain diplomats, a top ranking government officials coming to the Asian region for a charm offensive, but also his comments on banks, a tale of two halves, really, consumer banks that well said Bank of America really failed to meet expectations. They did beat expectations, but they felt some way of sort of you and your performance numbers. But then the investment banks like Goldman Sachs have done really well because of the trading desks and the stimulus checks that were written in the third quarter.

 

WSN: Yeah, actually, 2020 is the reverse of 2008 during the great financial crisis. If you remember then American banks itself, all the investment banks. Right, because of the derivative losses in the books exposed to the shuffle in equity markets. But this time around, actually, the volatility has really helped them. So for a change, they’ve seen incredible jumps in trading investment income. But it’s the main street banks which are feeling the pinch. So, yes, there’s an increase in deposits for these banks.

 

But for the consumer banks, for the main street banks, nobody or less people are taking out loans, is less credit cut usage as a result. So, you know, no such not such good times for the consumer banks. Better for the. And bad guys out there.

 

KHC: Now, of course, and Morgan Stanley reports tomorrow we saw net interest margin set wells and Bank of America really being crushed as well. And not many, not many companies reporting earnings are giving outlook statements.

Categories
News Articles

Time To Rotate

Tony Nash joins BFM 89.9 The Business Station for another look at the global markets particularly discussing the “Japanese equity market”. Is it the time to rotate into value or maybe it is a sign that the broader economy is recovering?

 

This podcast first appeared and originally published at https://www.bfm.my/podcast/morning-run/market-watch/time-to-rotate on August 26, 2020.


BFM Description

 

With technology stocks hitting all time highs, there has been some inflow into the finance and utilities sectors. We ask Tony Nash, CEO of Complete Intelligence if it is time to rotate into these names. We also ask his views on the Japanese equity market and if there is still money to be made with the change in leadership.

 

Produced by: Mike Gong

 

Presented by: Khoo Hsu Chuang, Wong Shou Ning

 

Show Notes

 

WSN: So far, deeper dive in global markets today. Joining us is Tony Nash, CEO of Complete Intelligence. Good morning, Tony. Now, last night, U.S. tech stocks will slump relatively while laggards like finance and utilities saw some inflows. So do you think this is the time to rotate into value and maybe a sign that the broader economy is recovering?

 

TN: I think it’s certainly a time to to that that that rotation is starting. I don’t necessarily think it’s in full swing yet, but but we’ve received signals for the past week or so that that rotation would start sort of seeing some of the techs off.

 

Today is not really all that surprising, given especially some of the Fed and Treasury statements over the past couple of weeks.

 

KHC: Yeah. So in terms of cyclical stocks, Tony, what is your point of view in terms of which sectors might benefit?

 

TN: Well, I think, you know, we’ve seen tech with companies like Nvidia, Tesla, and these guys have just had amazing gains over the past, say, four months. I think, you know, the rotation into some of the finance stocks, into some other more mainstream, broader market equities is likely. I think the indices are assuming that tech stays at elevated values. That rotation will only help the indices if tech comes off. Given the concentration of waiting within those stocks, it could really hurt some of the overall indices.

 

WSN: And, Tony, let’s focus on one of these, you know, super winners in the last few months. And it’s Tesla, right? They have a decision to sell five billion worth of shares. Is that smart or overly ambitious? Move now. And what more what kind of growth can we expect from this company?

 

TN: Well, the I think the the growth in the stock price is very different from the growth of the company, so Tesla’s trading at a PE ratio of almost 1200.

 

OK, the stock’s more than doubled since March. So, you know, the company itself isn’t doubling. You know, I think it has. I think what the management is doing is making a very smart decision to sell equity while they know the price is very high. So from a management perspective, I think that was a very smart decision. In terms of a buyers perspective, I’m not so sure it’s possible that Tesla stays at these elevated level. People have been trying to short Tesla for years and it just hasn’t worked.

 

So it’s possible there’s growth there and it’s possible they stay at these elevated levels.

 

WSN: So, Tony, are you a big fan of Tesla? This level…

 

TN: It’s hard not to be whether I’m a buyer, personally or not, I would hesitate here. But, gosh, you know, I think there are other places to look that are better value.

 

But it really, you know, part of it really all depends where the stimulus is going. So since the Treasury and Fed are intervening in markets, if they’re targeting specific equities or specific sectors, then you kind of have to follow that money.

 

And so it’s it all depends on how much further these things are going to run and where that stimulus is targeted.

 

KHC: OK, based on PMI data, most of Asia remains contractionary. But for China, of course. You know, Tony, in your opinion, why is recovery not yet forthcoming? And is there a main catalyst needed for manufacturing to take off?

 

TN: Yeah, I mean, look, in terms of manufacturing PMI, as you have Indonesia, Thailand, South Korea, Taiwan, you know, they’re all growing, which is great. Myanmar is actually growing faster than China.

 

But what we don’t have really is the demand pull. And that’s been a real problem. And, you know, we’ve been talking about that since February and we’ve been really worried about deflation. And, you know, what we see even in Southeast Asia is government intervention in markets is really what, propping up a lot of the activity. And I think, you know, the big question I have is, will we see steam come out of recovery in Asia in the same way we’ve started to see steam come out of recovery in the U.S.?

 

I think the answer is unfortunately, probably yes. And I think until the demand from both consumers and companies comes back and the fear of covid wanes, I think we’ve got some some volatility ahead.

 

We’re expecting some real trouble in September. I think it’s great that markets are doing well today, but we’re starting to see the the momentum really slow this month.

And without additional help from the Fed or PEOC or other folks, it really slows down. The problem is the efficacy of that support really deteriorates the more you add to the system.

 

WSN: And Tony, look at Japan, right?

 

I mean, are trading the equities. They are trading at a steep discount to their historical premiums. Do you see any value in yen based assets? After all, Warren Buffett himself just dipped his toes into it by six billion dollars worth of trading companies did. What do you think?

 

TN: Well, that’s the answer. I mean, it’s hard to it’s hard to bet against Buffett. He’s obviously seeing real value there. And I think the Japanese trading companies are really, really interesting because they’re you know, they’re a very good play right now. So is there a value? Sure. I think there’s value there. I think with Japan, a lot of the story is around productivity and automation. If if Japan can continue to raise its productivity through automation, I think it will be a very good play.

 

If that productivity and if the level of automation slows down, then it becomes questionable because everyone knows about the demographic story in Japan, but the economy continues to grow, which is really amazing.

 

WSN: So it seems like you’re quite a believer in that this can overcome some of the structural issues. But what about the fact that Abe has resigned for health reasons? Does it change at all the economic and monetary policies in Japan that might change your decision?

 

TN: Yeah, I think when someone like Abe steps down,  there’s always momentum. So it last for several months. The real question is, how long should the next leadership last? And is there enough structural stability to continue the momentum in Japan, meaning it’s not growing leaps and bounds, but it’s stable growth and it’s healthy growth. So I like Japan a lot. We have had reform under Abe. We have had structural reform under Abe. I think it’s much more healthy today than it was in 2011 or 2010. A lot’s been done.

 

Japan has the capability to continue to improve, but it all really depends. There are regional dynamics and there are domestic dynamics. But again, I think if demand regionally and globally doesn’t return, which is likely COVID induced, then I think Japan, like everywhere else, will have issues.

 

WSN: All right. Thank you for your time. That was Tony Nash of Complete Intelligence, speaking to us from Houston, Texas.